A historical study of the role of cost accounting on performance in the UK confectionery market: the experience of Cadbury and Rowntree 1919-1938 by White, Vaughn
A Historical Study of the Role of Cost 
Accounting on Performance in the UK 
Confectionery Market:  
The Experience of Cadbury and 
Rowntree 1919-38 
 
Vaughn White 
 
 
PhD 
 
University of York 
Management 
 
June 2014 
 
 
 
  
 
1 
 
Abstract 
Rowntree’s and Cadbury’s emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century as two 
of the UK’s major confectionery firms. By 1918 they had achieved national 
prominence through the manufacture and marketing of distinct products. Their 
growth during the interwar period reflected the broader development of non-durable 
consumer goods within the British economy. 
The increasing size and complexity of these companies -- a direct consequence of 
their commercial success -- meant that effective management became critical to their 
continued ability to compete in the UK confectionery market. In addition to 
competencies in production management, planning, sales, marketing, distribution and 
labour management, which became increasingly necessary for the successful control 
of growing firms, this thesis argues that cost accounting was also a key determinant 
of this  success. Rowntree’s and Cadbury’s pursued different paths to the introduction 
and development of their respective cost accounting capabilities. This was reflected in 
the level of technical sophistication they had achieved by the outbreak of World War 
II. These important differences are identified and explained.  
The end of the Great War created a changed landscape for the UK confectionery 
industry and the response of the two companies to this new environment is assessed 
and explained by a wide range of comparable financial performance measures which 
were known to contemporaries. Using a wide range of accounting metrics this thesis 
argues that the prevailing view in the historiography -- that Cadbury’s achieved  
superior performance -- needs substantial re-assessment. The extent to which the role 
of cost accounting contributed to this performance is considered, including examples 
where failings played a part in inferior performance. This is an important addition to 
business history by the exploration of the role of cost accounting in an industry not 
previously studied, and its impact on performance that is considered in a wide 
context. 
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Introduction 
Background 
Every dissertation leading to a PhD must have had a genesis as to why the topic area 
was originally chosen for scrutiny. For this thesis that genesis moment is lost 
somewhere during the time that the author worked at Rowntree’s from 1979 until 
2004 as a practicing cost and management accountant.
1
 Commencing work at 
Rowntree’s in 1979 involved the understanding and acceptance of the existing 
corporate culture of the company that was firmly rooted in the fundamentals of social 
responsibility surrounding the Quaker faith of the founding family. In addition to this 
cultural base, most long-standing organisations of over 100 years would also have 
had a history of traditions that were to become the basis for the way in which the 
company operates. These loose traditions have been identified by Johnson as a 
“Cultural Web”, whose main elements include stories, rituals, symbols, routines, 
control systems and organisational power structures.
2
 Johnson suggested that the 
loose affiliation of elements that surround a company are collectively a way of 
preserving its identity and could be described as  “the way we do things around here”, 
which is then passed on to new employees.
3
 With these principles in mind, one of the 
“stories” which was constantly being referred to within the finance department at 
Rowntree’s, and particularly by the older members, was the acceptance that the cost 
accounting techniques which were currently being used had first been suggested and 
implemented prior to World War II. In addition to this perceived fact was the belief 
that superior competence in these techniques was the foundation of the company’s 
success that was then being enjoyed. Whilst at the time this perception within the 
finance department could have been interpreted as being one of ‘blowing your own 
trumpet’. An alternative suggestion is that it was a response to the accepted belief that  
Rowntree’s success was based on primacy in product development and marketing. 
But, like all stories and myths that are passed down, the constant nagging at the back 
of my mind was how much truth is there in this perception – and could it be 
established? Furthermore, did this perceived superiority in cost accounting provide a 
significant and measurable contribution to overall company performance? 
                                                          
1
 1979-1988 as Rowntree plc, then from 1988-2004 as the Rowntree Division of Nestle(UK) Ltd. 
following the takeover of the business. 
2
 Johnson, “Managing strategic change”. 
3
 Ibid. 
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The eventual suggestion that perhaps there was a structured avenue whereby this 
thesis could be tested came from an original discussion with Professor David Otley at 
Lancaster University, when he and the author were both members of the Business 
Process Research Group (BPRG)
4
, and a subsequent collaboration in support of 
Professor Otley’s research at the time into the problems associated with the 
introduction of new management accounting techniques into large organisations.  
Professor Otley is an enthusiastic champion of the case-based approach to accounting 
research and following detailed discussions it appeared feasible that a comparative 
study into the introduction of cost accounting principles at Rowntree was possible. 
Professor Otley has published extensively on the case method of inquiry.
5
 The notion 
of a comparative study was important, and led to the natural identification of Cadbury 
as Rowntree’s closest competitor.6 Over a period of time this original concept was 
developed further and eventually formulated into a formal research proposal. Given 
that the original idea for the project emanated from stories at Rowntree’s that pre-
eminence in cost accounting was achieved prior to World War II, it seemed 
appropriate to carry out the study over the 20 year time period of 1919-38. Within 
this nominated period, the scope of the project is to provide answers to the following 
research questions: 
1. What was the extent of the development and implementation of cost 
accounting techniques by Cadbury and Rowntree, and how did this enable 
them to compete in the UK confectionery market between 1919 and 1938? 
2. How did cost accounting capability contribute to their corporate performance 
in the period between 1919 and 1938, and how did any deficiencies in cost 
accounting sophistication impact upon this performance? 
It is important to point out that in both companies the emphasis was predominantly on 
the UK home market prior to World War II, the export market was relatively 
insignificant and any overseas activity was carried out mainly through manufacturing 
                                                          
4
 The BPRG was a distant descendant of the Management Research Groups (MRG’s) that had been 
established by Seebohm Rowntree in the 1920’s as a forum to share and discuss contemporary topics 
relating to management issues. 
5
 See for example Otley and Berry Case-Based Research in Accounting in Humphrey and Lee, (eds.)  
Real Life Guide to Accounting Research.  
6
 Cadbury emerged as the natural comparator given that company had a similar background to 
Rowntree, being a Quaker company and had also been in existence since the mid-nineteenth century. 
17 
 
subsidiaries in the British Empire.
7
 The primary reasons for the lack of emphasis on 
export markets were the perishable nature of the products combined with the 
devastating effects of the Great War on overseas markets. Even trading with countries 
of the British Empire such as Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, the effects of 
local taxation meant that profits were meagre.
8
 Consequently the focus of this study is 
on the performance of the two companies within the UK confectionery market during 
the interwar period. 
A preliminary examination of the literature, revealed previous organisational studies 
on the development of cost accounting in the traditional industries of coal mining, 
iron and steel, chemicals, textiles and shipbuilding. The research in these “old” 
industries has thus far has been principally conducted by the ‘Cardiff School’9.  The 
case study in this thesis reflects the “old” versus the “new” debate in the interwar 
period and therefore provides new insights as to the different ways in which 
techniques such as cost accounting could be applied.
10
 The confectionery market 
provides an important example of this trend of “new” industries and this thesis makes 
a substantial and original contribution to knowledge by providing an in-depth analysis 
of the introduction of cost accounting and how this affected performance. In addition, 
this thesis provides a major revision of accepted scholarship on “performance” by 
focussing on the application of heterogeneous measures that were known and 
understood at the time, derived from the contemporary literature. 
This thesis will argue that the differing approaches and development of cost 
accounting at Rowntree’s and Cadbury’s had consequences on the way that each 
company competed in the UK confectionery market during the interwar period. For 
Rowntree, the evidence in this thesis demonstrates that they developed a superior 
competence in cost accounting that enabled the company to survive at a time when 
their branded product portfolio was not as strong as Cadbury’s. For Cadbury, 
however, the possession of superior brands was not maximised in terms of superior 
                                                          
7
 See Fitzgerald, Rowntree and the Marketing, p. 511 and Cadbury Brothers, Industrial Record, pp. 76-
81. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Wilson and Thomson, The Making of Modern Management,  pp. 236-237. The ‘Cardiff School’ 
comprises Boyns, T., Edwards, J.R., Anderson, M.. and Matthews, M. 
10
 An example of the debate surrounding “old versus new” industries has been provided by Weir, R. 
(1989) Rationalization and Diversification in the Scotch Industry, 1900-1939: Another Look at ‘Old’ 
and ‘New’ Industries. The Economic History Review, 42: 375-395 
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performance. This was a consequence of the failure to develop their cost accounting 
capability in support of the execution of a cost reduction/price cutting strategy.  
This thesis will also demonstrate that for both companies, but especially so for 
Cadbury, the inability to understand and incorporate the principles of price elasticity 
had a significant effect on the effectiveness of their sales and brand policies. This had 
consequences in terms of performance because profit maximisation selling prices 
could not therefore be determined. 
The findings in this thesis challenge the accepted view of interwar performance of the 
two companies under scrutiny that can be found in the business history literature, and 
provides an alternative perspective of what is described as “superior” or “inferior” 
performance. 
Methodology 
Although the topic area of this thesis is concerned with the technical arrangements in 
cost accounting that Cadbury and Rowntree attempted to establish prior to World 
War II, and its effect on performance, it is important to recognise at the outset that 
this thesis falls within the boundaries of “Accounting and Business History”. 
Therefore if deemed to be an applied historical study of the two nominated 
companies, the argument should be supported and informed by the accepted cost 
accounting conventions during this period.  
As a broad starting point as to how the study should be approached from an historical 
perspective, it is useful to consider the suggestion by Boyns and Edwards
11
  that any 
study of accounting, in whatever guise, should be viewed in an organisational context 
and critiqued not according to the contemporary best-practice, but rather as to 
whether it satisfied the needs of the business. They concluded that the best method to 
approach this should be based on organisational studies supported by company 
archival research. This knowledge, they argued, is obtained by studying the practices 
used and then discovering when, how and why they changed, combined with an 
identification of any consequential effect. In addition, a broader business history 
perspective outlined by De Jong, Higgins and Van Driel is also appropriate to this 
study: 
                                                          
11
 Boyns and Edwards, A History of Management Accounting, p. 8 
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 “All businesses are different because they have unique characteristics and, over time, 
each will follow a different path of growth or decline. In our view a scientific analysis 
should aim to understand why managers, entrepreneurs and employees involved in  
companies have made certain strategic decisions, why companies change over time,  
why businesses perform better or worse in terms of, for example, revenues, profits or 
survival.”12 
This study will engage with these observations, albeit from a particular cost 
accounting perspective, but it does recognise that competence in any functional 
process has a direct influence on managerial decisions of a more general strategic 
nature. With this in mind, the perspective to be approached in this study has been 
described and identified as “Mainstream Managerialist” by Rowlinson, Toms and 
Wilson, who characterise this as the time in which managers rationally craft strategies 
and then organise their structures and processes to support this, which from 
subsequent conclusions can then be supported by carrying out appropriate company 
archival research.
13
 
In addition to the identification of the internal processes at work, a wider social and 
economic viewpoint is also deemed relevant, in which the suggestions by Hopwood  
in his seminal work are considered here to be appropriate.
14
 Hopwood put forward the 
argument that research into accounting should not merely focus on an analysis of the 
technicalities involved, but should also include a consideration of the managerial 
processes underpinning development and how these can be related to broader 
environmental factors, thereby placing accounting into a societal context.
15
 This 
concept is also supported by Fleischman, Mills and Tyson  who also maintained that 
only with an understanding of context through recognition of the broader society, will 
the task of a historical study of accounting be complete. In addition they also made 
the point that in order to understand context, accounting historians should also be 
prepared to consider knowledge from other disciplines such as economics, 
philosophy, sociology and political economy.
16
 Scapens also concurred with the 
importance of economic and social trends, but also suggested that there are also 
                                                          
12
 De Jong, Higgins, and Van Driel, “New Business History”, p. 5.  
13
 Rowlinson, Toms and Wilson, “Competing perspectives”, p. 247. The other three alternative 
perspectives suggested by Rowlinson, Toms and Wilson are ‘Mainstream Anti-Managerialist’; 
‘Radical Managerialist’; Radical Anti-Managerialist’.  
14
 Hopwood, “The archaeology of accounting systems”. 
15
 Ibid, pp. 207-208. 
16
 Fleischman, Mills and Tyson, “A theoretical primer”, p. 62. 
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factors which are unique to particular organisations which may have influenced the 
way in which cost accounting was introduced and developed.
17
 He concluded that a 
clear understanding of the forces at work within the organisation are required in order 
to make sense of what occurred when interpreting company archives.
18
 However, as 
Boyns and Edwards pointed out, care needs to be exercised in how terms were used 
then and how they may differ from current practice. They provide the example of the 
use of the term “budgetary control” as an illustration of the many ways this technique 
was perceived and understood by different people working in disparate companies 
prior to World War II.
19
 
In the light of the approaches discussed above, the method adopted in this thesis is 
firstly to carry out literature reviews to establish the broad external environmental 
forces at play during the period under scrutiny, the issues relating to the UK 
Confectionery Market during this period in order to establish the currently accepted 
version of events and finally to establish the contemporary and business history 
explanation of the development of cost accounting and the methods surrounding 
financial performance appraisal. Once the extant evidence surrounding the 
development of cost accounting and its wider environmental context has been 
established, the existing company archives for both Cadbury and Rowntree are 
interrogated, and to report on these findings. In addition to the internal company 
documents studied, any other appropriate written material will also be sourced, both 
published and unpublished. Following the examination of archival and other material, 
a consideration of the published financial statements will be carried out to apply 
contemporary performance measurement techniques to both companies to identify 
any perceived superiority. Finally, conclusions are drawn from the evidence derived 
from the process of this thesis and the context as to how the original research 
questions have been answered. 
Structure 
Having outlined the methodology the thesis is divided into four logical sections: 
literature review, fieldwork and data collection, data analysis and conclusions. 
                                                          
17
 Scapens, “Understanding management”,  p. 10. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid., p. 8. 
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Chapters within each section provide the evidence to support the thesis and the 
research questions identified above. 
Section 1 – Literature Review 
Chapter 1. This chapter considers and describes the wide-ranging contemporary 
external environmental forces that impacted on the UK Confectionery Market and the 
individual manufacturers who supplied and competed in this market. The 
environmental factors that are identified include: a)Economic Factors (Economic 
Growth & Industrial Development, Living Standards, Unemployment, Transport, 
Retail Trade); b)Socio-Cultural Factors (Population & Demographics, Consumerism, 
Diet, Advertising & Branding); c)Technological Factors (Technological 
Development, Confectionery Manufacturing Processes, Packaging Technology). 
Chapter 2. This chapter focuses on the extant published reports surrounding the 
establishment and evolution of the UK Confectionery Market and how it was affected 
by the complex external forces described in chapter 1. Although the scope of this 
dissertation is primarily the interwar years, this chapter discusses events prior to this 
period in order to provide appropriate background. To provide some context to this 
chapter, a discussion on raw materials prices, is followed by comments on the 
structure of the market, including the identification and explanation of terminology. 
Having established a framework to the industry, a detailed analysis of the key 
timeframes establishes the evolution of the UK confectionery market. The analysis 
covers the origins and early developments up to 1870, the period of growth and 
expansion from 1870 to 1914, the impact of the Great War from 1914 to 1918 before 
concentrating on the years concerning this project, from 1919 to 1938 which was an 
era of maturity and mass market. 
Chapter 3. The circumstances surrounding the development of cost accounting, 
financial performance measurement and the level of sophistication are examined. 
This is achieved by examining the contemporary literature and the perspective of 
business and accounting historians. The chapter commences by placing cost 
accounting into context by examining its relationship with systematic and scientific 
management, as well as the interface with traditional financial accounting. From this 
platform the contemporary literature on cost accounting is examined divided into the 
three important elements of costing, distribution costing and budgeting will then 
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discussed in the business and accounting history literature along with a review of 
some alternative interpretations on the development of cost accounting by some 
commentators. In the same vein, the review of the literature on financial performance 
measurement is also divided into the contribution from the contemporary as well as 
the business and accounting history works. 
Section 2 – Fieldwork and Data Collection 
Chapter 4. Archival and other data collection work on cost accounting at Rowntree’s 
is presented in this chapter. This was obtained principally from the official Rowntree 
corporate archive stored at the Borthwick Institute, University of York. The records 
that were scrutinised date from 1869 and coincide with the arrival of Joseph 
Rowntree at the business. Prior to this date, no record of cost accounting activity was 
found. The chapter therefore commences by examining the beginnings of cost 
accounting activity at the company between 1869 and 1918. Having established the 
impact of Joseph Rowntree on the development of cost accounting, the progress made 
after the Great War is examined by placing the subject in an organisational context 
which emphasised efficiency that was a paramount objective of the business. The 
circumstances regarding the establishment of a functional cost office in 1918 are 
reviewed, which permits a detailed assessment of the company’s achievements in 
costing procedures and budgeting for the time period under scrutiny and coincides 
with the establishment of Seebhom Rowntree as chairman elect. The cost office is 
placed in context of the wider organisational changes that took place as a response to 
the acceptance of the concept of functionalisation following the end of the Great War. 
The achievements in the progress made in cost accounting during the interwar period 
are identified. 
Chapter 5. This chapter summarises the archival record for Cadbury, held at Cadbury 
HQ in Bournville, Birmingham. Similar to the approach taken at the Rowntree 
archive, the natural starting point for the research was 1861 to coincide with the 
arrival of George and Richard Cadbury at the business. Prior to this date no record of 
cost accounting activity was found. The chapter commences by examining the 
foundations of cost accounting activity at the company from 1861 to 1902 and the 
establishment of a functional cost office in 1903. Following this, the period from 
1903 to 1918 is considered in which the overall organisational context is considered 
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that led to the formalising of costing procedures based on the early quest for 
efficiency at the company. The years of progress following the Great War, 1919 to 
1938, are then scrutinised specifically in the role that cost accounting had on the 
relentless quest for efficiency by the company. The extent of the achievements in 
costing procedures, distribution costing and budgeting during the interwar years are 
presented. 
Section 3 – Data Analysis 
Chapter 6. Based upon the published financial statements of Cadbury and Rowntree, 
an examination of their respective financial performance in the years 1919-38 is 
conducted, based on reconfigured  income statements and balance sheets to ensure 
compatibility of measurement. The measurement of performance is divided firstly 
into what might be described as ‘absolute performance’ in terms of a comparison of 
actual reported sales revenues, gross profit, operating profit and market share. 
Secondly, performance is also considered in terms of relationship or financial ratios 
which were known and mentioned by the majority of the contemporary 
commentators. These are current ratio, gross profit ratio, operating profit ratio, 
operating profit to net worth ratio, sales to net worth ratio, sales to inventory ratio, 
sales to receivables ratio, debt to net worth ratio, sales to fixed assets ratio and the net 
worth to fixed assets ratio. Combining the absolute and relationship ratio measures, 
the comparative performance of Cadbury and Rowntree is evaluated for the entire 
period from 1919 to 1938 before making a more detailed interpretation in five-yearly 
time frames to provide a more comprehensive study. The analysis provides an insight 
into the consequences of the strategies that were being followed by both companies. 
The principal strategy for Cadbury, that of  sales revenue growth driven by a policy 
of market price reductions, that were enabled by cost savings due to mechanisation 
efficiencies, failed to achieve the expected growth in profits, return on investment or 
market share. In addition, this failure was combined with serious deficiencies in 
working capital management. The performance for Rowntrees is also characterised by 
disappointing profitability, return on investment and market share But unlike 
Cadbury, there was much less volatility throughout the period, and additionally the 
company also achieved superior working capital management, ensuring a less risky 
proposition for investors. 
24 
 
Chapter 7. Having established and reported the overall and detailed financial 
performance of both Cadbury and Rowntree, the extent to which cost accounting 
techniques contributed to this performance is examined. Following the interrogation 
of the company archives at both Cadbury and Rowntree, the capabilities that cost 
accounting influenced were pricing decisions, the application and measurement of 
efficiency, the recognition and control of overheads and finally with regard to 
budgeting and forecasting. The extent to which these factors were supported by cost 
accounting competence at both companies is scrutinised together with suggestions as 
to where a lack of sophistication may have adversely affected performance. For 
Rowntree’s, their adoption of marginal costing techniques meant that they could vie 
for business that they would otherwise have rejected under total cost configurations, 
thereby embracing niche markets. Cadbury’s lack of sophistication in the 
interpretation of cost accounting information saw their low price high volume 
strategy stutter in the face of an ignorance regarding the level of sales volume that 
would be required to compensate for revenues lost through the reductions in price. It 
is also suggested that failure to apply price elasticity of demand principles contributed 
to Cadbury’s deficiency in achieving superior returns.  In addition, for both 
companies, an assessment of the consequence of their inability to implement 
company-wide budgetary control systems is made to determine the  effect this had on 
overall company performance. 
Section 4 – Conclusions 
Chapter 8. The conclusions are divided into the way that both companies established 
a relationship with the environment, the extent of their organisational capabilities, the 
success in the formulation and implementation of strategy, the pathways to cost 
accounting, the level of sophistication that was achieved and finally a discussion on 
the overall implications for both Cadbury and Rowntree. Cost Accounting capability 
clearly had a profound effect on both company’s ability to compete in the UK 
confectionery market during the inter-war years. The measurement and perception of 
performance is considered important in the final evaluation, as is the challenging of 
long-held beliefs in the literature regarding superiority of one company over the 
other.  
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Section 1 – Literature Review 
Chapter 1 
The External Environment 
1.1 Introduction 
As previously explained in the Introductory chapter, any historical study into the cost 
accounting developments of two major British companies such as Rowntree’s and 
Cadbury’s has to be viewed in relationship to the external factors at the time and how 
these  influenced the development of their businesses. These factors applied to all 
companies at this time. The two companies under consideration were founded in the 
middle of the 19
th
 century at a time of great economic, social, cultural, technological 
and legal change. These external factors all had some effect on why they grew from 
relatively small enterprises into major multinationals by the outbreak of World War 
II. Although the specific era of the study is the interwar years (1919-38), it is 
important to understand the factors that enabled the two companies to emerge and 
develop in a wider time frame. Therefore, the external environment from the middle 
of the nineteenth century to the outbreak of World War II will be examined. 
1.2 Economic Factors  
Economic Growth and Industrial Development 
The growth in consumer dependant companies like confectionery manufacturers was 
linked inextricably to the overall performance and development of the economy as a 
whole. The UK economy from the middle of the nineteenth century up to the 
beginning of World War II underwent major structural changes. In terms of economic 
growth, GDP provides one accepted measure which has been regarded as an indicator 
of the relative performance of different countries. Crafts has analysed previously 
published data provided an analysis of UK GDP average percentage growth figures 
for this period in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 GDP Annual Growth Rates 1800-1937 
Year GDP Growth Rates 
1856-73 2.2% 
1873-82 1.7% 
1882-89 1.6% 
1889-99 2.2% 
1899-07 1.4% 
1907-13 1.7% 
1924-29 2.4% 
1929-37 2.0% 
Source: Crafts (2004, p. 13).  
Previously commenting on the trends in the GDP growth rates during this period, 
Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee, claimed that whilst the growth rates appear to 
follow a U-shape, they were consistently lower than most other industrialised nations, 
particularly from the 1870’s onwards by an average margin of 1% per annum. They 
concluded that as there was a persistent shortfall in the UK growth rate, the level of 
income also declined relative to other countries. They also pointed out that it is quite 
difficult to identify long-run phases of growth in the UK economy, due to World War 
I and the high levels of unemployment during the inter-war period. However, roughly 
speaking between 1856 and 1913, there was a peak in 1870 and a trough in the 
1880’s, with another peak around 1900 and a trough in 1913, which provides some 
supporting evidence for “long-swings” of approximately 20-year periods in the UK 
economy. These “swings” in the economy had consequences for companies relying 
on growth in consumption, and would have been a critical factor influencing 
corporate strategy for many firms.
20
 
In the intervening years there has been a vigorous debate on the real performance of 
the UK economy, with differing explanations of why the economy did not perform as 
well as some of the UK’s main industrial competitor’s like Germany and the USA. 
Whilst these explanations seem plausible, Crafts has commented that the situation is 
not as straightforward as first appears. He put forward the proposition that an 
alternative way of approaching the situation would be to take account of the TFP 
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(Total Factor Productivity) which is the weighted average of the growth of 
productivity of the individual factor inputs such as capital stock, elasticity of output 
and the contribution of the labour force.
21
  Whilst the TFP allows a different 
perspective on the measurement of growth in the economy, Crafts demonstrated in 
Table 1.2 that the annual averages show a not too dissimilar pattern in comparison to 
that of the GDP figures. 
Table 1.2 GDP and TFP Growth Rates 1856-1937 
Year GDP Growth TFP Growth 
1856-73 2.2% 0.8% 
1873-82 1.7% 0.4% 
1882-89 1.6% 0.2% 
1889-99 2.2% 0.8% 
1899-07 1.4% -0.1% 
1907-13 1.7% 0.5% 
1924-29 2.4% 1.0% 
1929-37 2.0% 0.6% 
Source: Crafts (2004,  p. 13). 
Crafts argued that growth in TFP is the consequence of a combination of external 
forces and the internal dynamics of a country and reflects both the difference in 
technology and the efficiency of labour and capital.
22
 McCloskey claimed that the 
growth in the UK economy was constrained to some extent by the resources and  
technology available. He went on to cite the inability of UK businesses to embrace 
technological changes during the nineteenth century, and to adopt modern 
management techniques, particularly from the USA as being crucial deficiencies. The 
belief that external factors drive TFP is reinforced by the notion that productivity per 
capita in the UK was no worse than other industrialised countries.
23
 Nelson and 
Wright have pointed to the fact that there was more innovative technological activity 
in the USA and elsewhere, and this could have been the driver of relatively poor 
performance in the UK, particularly as it is suggested that at the time, the transfer of 
technology between nations was not particularly easy.
24
 Crafts explained that the 
different circumstances in the USA for example meant that economic growth was an 
                                                          
21
 Crafts, Long Run Growth, p. 13. 
22
 Ibid,  pp. 3-4. 
23
 McCloskey, Did Victorian Britain. 
24
 Nelson and Wright, “The rise and fall”. 
28 
 
easier proposition than in the UK due to factors such as a larger domestic market, 
which allowed R&D costs to be spread much further, and crucially the superior 
education system which provided more skilled scientists, engineers and technicians. 
He concluded that the USA would perform better overall than the UK was therefore 
unavoidable, thereby supporting the McCloskey view.
25
 
The overall trends in the UK economy are therefore linked inextricably to the growth 
and performance of businesses and the rise of industrialisation which gave rise to 
larger companies
26
. As has already been suggested the genesis of the modern large 
corporation was founded in the USA and migrated to other industrial nations like 
Germany, Britain and Japan during the nineteenth century. According to Boyce and 
Ville, prior to 1850 most firms were small in scale and constrained by access to 
capital as well as the limitations of markets at the time. However, after 1850 larger 
scale enterprises became more prominent across many industries which meant more 
concentration of producers into oligopolistic structures. They claim that factors such 
as higher scales of efficiency were driving forces which meant that could sustain and 
develop the demand at an earlier stage.
27
 This view is also supported by Hannah 
(1983), who discusses how efficiencies were achieved through economies of scale via 
the integration of manufacturing with distribution and retailing.
28
 Hannah pointed out 
that the achievement of these efficiencies coincided with the rapid increase in the 
number of firms in domestic manufacturing with quotations on the London Stock 
Exchange, claiming that between 1885 and 1907 these had grown from only 60 to 
over 600 during this period.
29
 It is worth noting, however, that more than 80% of 
these firms were private rather than public companies, highlighting the common 
practice of founding families retaining a major interest in the newly floated company. 
Hannah also concluded that conditions of competition during the last half of the 
nineteenth century created the impetus for firms to amalgamate together, forming a 
greater concentration of output, which he claimed gave rise to more division of labour 
to accommodate the mass market. This combined with a more standardised approach 
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to the development of common products led to the increasing propensity for larger 
scaled production using capital-intensive processes. 
The large proportion of family-owned and controlled firms observed to by Hannah, 
are thought by some commentators to be a reason for the decline in UK 
competitiveness.  Early commentators such as Aldcroft put forward the hypothesis 
that it is was a failure of entrepreneurs in the UK to adapt to the challenges of the 
changing conditions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century’s.30 This idea 
has also been supported by Chandler who criticised the prevalence of the family firm 
as being an anachronism by the end of the nineteenth century, claiming they were 
more concerned with current returns in the form of high dividends thereby starving 
the firm of investment.
31
 Chandler contrasts this with a more ‘Managerial’ approach 
to business in the United States, which he claimed was the reason why American 
economic growth was superior to that in the UK.
32
 Payne has also contrasted the 
emergence of large scale enterprises between the UK and the USA but he found no 
evidence that organisational structures and managerial ability were superior in the 
USA. He argued that it was more of a benefit from monopoly power in some 
industries in the USA which gave some companies the time to develop their 
organisational capabilities.
33
 Lazonick also stated that many UK family firms were 
too conservative and inward-looking in which they failed to invest in new technology 
and marketing techniques.
34
 However, the validity of this criticism of the UK family 
firm has been called into question by some later commentators, notably Church who 
suggested that whilst some family firms could have been limited in their development 
by a more conservative approach, there is no convincing evidence that companies 
who were controlled in a more managerial style, as quoted by Chandler, did perform 
any better, or were immune from the dysfunctions which affected family firms.
35
 
Church then pointed out the fact that different industrialised countries at the time, 
notably Germany and Japan as well as the UK, all had a high proportion of family 
controlled firms. From this he asserted that it is the cultural environment in which the 
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family firm operates as being the key factor, rather than the structural forms of the 
business.
36
 
Living Standards  
The impetus for the emergence of consumer-led companies during the nineteenth 
century was the consequence  of rising overall living standards. However, the 
measurement of living standards in the UK during this time period and the debate on 
the validity of data has been the paradox of the accepted growth in living standards 
and high rates of urban poverty and depravation.
37
 Rather than simply taking a single 
measure, Boyer suggested that there are two broad areas where any changes in living 
standards can be measured : Economic (Real Wages, Cost of Living) and Biological 
(Life Expectancy, Infant Mortality, Weight, Height, BMI).
38
 
Given the suggestion that these measures are important to the understanding of trends 
in living standards, Boyer has provided data surrounding the growth in real wages 
during this time (as measured in annual growth rates): 
Table 1.3 Growth in Real Wages 1856-1938 
Year Growth in Real Wages 
1856-73 1.81% 
1873-82 1.02% 
1882-99 1.58% 
1899-13 0.29% 
1913-24 1.28% 
1924-38 1.17% 
Source: Boyer (2004, p. 284). 
A later study comparing the growth in real wages in the UK to that of Germany has 
shown that during the period 1871 to 1938 the average UK worker was better off than 
their German counterpart. The study showed that during the period of their analysis, 
the closest that the German wages came to the UK level was 83% in 1913 and the 
same in 1937.
39
 Also from the suggestion that Biological factors are equally 
important in the measurement of living standards, Woods has analysed the expected 
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life expectancy during this period (as measured in years),
40
 and Mitchell (1988) has 
identified the infant mortality rate, as measured by infant deaths per 1,000 live 
births:
41
  
Table 1.4 Life Expectancy and Infant Mortality Rates 1856-1939 
Year Life Expectancy Infant Mortality 
1856-73 41.1 years 153.1 
1861-70 41.2 years 154.1 
1871-80 43.0 years 148.8 
1881-90 45.3 years 141.8 
1891-00 46.1 years 153.5 
1901-10 50.9 years 127.3 
1920-22 53.5 years 111.0 
1922-30 57.6 years 71.8 
1933-39 60.8 years 58.9 
Source: Woods(2000, p. 297); Mitchell(1988, pp. 57-8). 
The data in Table 1.4 demonstrates the dramatic rise in expected life expectancy of 
the average individual during this period, combined with the steep decline in infant 
mortality during the same period up to World War II.  
In addition to the suggestions of Economic and Biological measures of living 
standards, there have also been attempts to include what is known as the “Human 
Development Index” (HDI) as developed in the Human Development Report(1990).42 
The aim of the HDI is to extend the measures used to include income, longevity and 
knowledge, and has been extended further by Dasgupta and Weale to incorporate 
measures of political and civil rights.
43
 However, Crafts has disputed that a 
comprehensive all-inclusive measure can be relied upon due to the complexity of the 
relative weightings which could be given to each component.
44
 
The importance of approach using different criteria to measure living standards is 
highlighted by the fact that during the course of the nineteenth century there was a 
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large migration of the population from rural to urban areas .
45
 This population move 
to the industrialised sector in some ways helps to explain the significant increases in 
real wages alluded to above. However, this also meant a deterioration in some other 
aspects of living standards such as housing. Woods commented that a closer 
inspection of the life expectancy statistics in terms of the mean average demonstrates 
that the figure for urban dwellers is much lower than for the rural population, 
concluding that the move to an industrialised environment in search of wage 
improvements were at a cost of health and mortality.
46
 For the manufacturers of 
consumer goods like confectionery, however, it was the urbanisation factor which 
would contribute more to their growth, rather than a benefit from an overall 
lengthening of life expectancy. 
Unemployment 
The spectre of unemployment has been a constant consequence of capitalism from the 
beginnings of the industrial revolution up to the present day. Despite political 
posturing, the prospect of full employment, however this can be measured, probably 
remains hypothetical. According to Hatton the way that unemployment has been 
perceived by contemporary social commentators has changed over time. In the 
middle of the nineteenth century unemployment was seen as a conscious choice made 
by the lazy and work-shy in society. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, 
unemployment was being viewed as a consequence of an inefficient labour market, 
where the skills-to-jobs fit was out of balance, and was therefore temporary. The 
steep rise in unemployment during the inter-war period then called into question the 
functioning of the whole capitalist economic system.
47
 The notion that unemployment 
was for the most part beyond the control of the average worker was first recognised 
by Beveridge, and that the causes and cyclical patterns of unemployment were 
national and international phenomena. The recognition of this fact by government 
was reflected in the 1909 Labour Exchanges Act, which attempted to align skills to 
jobs more effectively.
48
 Additionally in 1911 the National Insurance Act was passed 
which provided some protection to the unemployed in the form of financial benefits. 
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The rise in the proportion of the unemployed during the inter-war years led to further 
questions of cause and responsibility, with Keynes laying the blame firmly at the door 
of government, from whom the remedial action should therefore come.
49
 
The absolute number who are unemployed at any given point in time, and how these 
are reflected in the statistics have been the subject of discussion and controversy over 
the years. For example, the official Board of Trade unemployment figures for the 
period 1870 to 1913 vary between just under 1% and 10.7%, with the annual average 
being 4.5%. However, these figures have been revised by Boyer & Hatton, who have 
attempted to include more variables into the statistics, which consequently provide a 
higher average annual figure than originally calculated of 5.8%.
50
 However, despite 
the different methods of calculation, what the consensus provides is a distinct cyclical 
trend up to 1913 with periods of high unemployment and also periods of relatively 
full employment. What became clear is that the mass unemployment experienced 
after World War I had no parallel in terms of scale, pattern or volatility that had 
previously been experienced historically. 
Whilst unemployment and its average statistics can be studied in general terms, this 
can blur the reality in terms of how unemployment is spread between geographical 
regions, industries and time. This is especially true when the exceptionally high 
unemployment rates of the inter-war period are considered, and the conclusion could 
be drawn that this was a period of depression where there was universal poverty and 
depravation on a national scale.  
Hatton provided a more analytical view of unemployment during the crucial inter-war 
period, claiming that it was the structural decline of the old Victorian industries such 
as shipbuilding, mining and heavy engineering, and their traditional geographical 
locations of concentration such as Northern England (particularly the North-East), 
Wales and Scotland.
51
 An example of these regional differences in unemployment 
statistics is demonstrated if we compare the South-East with Wales, the North-East 
and Scotland in Table 1.5: 
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Table 1.5 UK Regional Unemployment Rates 1929-1936 
Region 1929 1932 1936 
South-East 3.3% 12.0% 5.0% 
Wales 18.1% 37.3% 29.0% 
North-East 12.6% 29.8% 17.5% 
Scotland 10.9% 25.9% 15.8% 
Source: Hatton T.J. (1986) ‘Structural aspects of unemployment in Britain between the world wars. 
Research in Economic History 10: 55-92. 
 Hatton claimed that response by the population during this period to shifts of 
distribution in industries and geography was slower than had been previously 
experienced during the urban growth of the nineteenth century, although as we can 
see in Table 1.5, by 1938 the industrial and regional differences of unemployment 
began to gradually dissipate. There had been, however, a major shift in prosperity of 
the UK regions towards London and the South-East during the inter-war period; a 
major factor being the legacy of munitions factories established during the Great War 
which were converted to modern facilities for the expanding consumer goods 
industries utilising the available skilled and semi-skilled workforce and good road 
communications
52
. These regional variations in prosperity would have a significant 
effect on the potential sales for those companies relying on consumers having 
sufficient disposable income to purchase non-essentials, which in turn would 
influence their strategies. 
A further insight into the unemployment statistics is provided by Thomas who 
demonstrated that whichever time period is studied, it was always the unskilled 
workers who suffer the most during periods of economic downturn, irrespective of 
the industry or region to which they belong.
53
 Unfortunately, during the high levels of 
employment during the inter-war years, this fact was amplified. Thomas cited the 
example of three categories of skill for the year 1931and their respective 
unemployment figures to highlight this fact: Clerical & Supervisors (5.4%), Skilled 
Workers (12.0%), Unskilled Workers (21.5%).
54
 
A further facet of the nature of unemployment was observed by the Pilgrim Trust  
which found that not only were the unemployed likely to be more unskilled, but that 
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age was a major factor: with those over 50 years old are far less able to maintain 
employment due to obvious failing health and physical capabilities.
55
 
Despite the overall increases in total average unemployment, especially during the 
1919-39 period, the living standards for those in work rose during this period, as has 
been demonstrated previously which had the effect of polarising the population into 
those who reaped the benefits of the expanding consumer society, and those who 
struggled to merely survive. How this was interpreted by companies in terms of their 
strategies will be discussed in due course. 
Transport 
The role transport in the economic development of the UK has long been recognised 
in the literature. Early writers in the field such as Smith saw transport as the 
mainspring of economic development through its ability to provide a market-
widening effect, thus providing the scope for growth.
56
 Youngson also claimed that 
the link between transport and economic development is one of the few economic 
truths that is universally accepted.
57
 Indeed, Fitzgerald also claimed that this overall 
expansion of the transport infrastructure was a key driver in the expansion of the 
consumer society as it provided companies with the distribution capabilities to reach 
customers quickly and economically.
58
 The original city centre locations of 
Rowntree, Cadbury and Fry during the nineteenth century provided access to inland 
waterways for the transporting of raw materials and finished goods, but the decision 
to move to green field sites was to incorporate rail and road links into the factory 
designs. 
Although internal transport systems of road and waterways had been developed 
throughout the period of the industrial revolution, Freeman has dated the application 
of steam to transport in the mid-nineteenth century as the most significant driver of 
growth and expansion of the economy.
59
 Similarly, it can be argued that the 
application of oil and its by-products give a further stimulus to this economic growth 
and expansion in the early twentieth century. Cootner however, claimed that the 
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diffusion of transport systems was a gradual process, which was delayed and 
handicapped by conservatism and the unreliability of some of the new technologies.
60
 
Duckham  has concluded that the development of the UK’s inland waterway network 
system was as a direct consequence of the industrialisation process and the need to 
transport a range of industrial goods. He suggested that the growth period for 
improvement of the internal waterways system was between 1660 and 1880, and that 
no new canals were built after 1830, coinciding with the expansion of the railways. 
61
 
Duckham provided evidence that most waterway traffic consisted mostly of bulky 
low-value cargoes such as industrial raw materials and agricultural produce, and the 
output of waterway services continued to grow throughout the nineteenth century 
despite the competition from road and rail. He then argued that the main advantage 
that inland waterways had at this time was that it was more cost-effective, especially 
in long-haul services with access to and from ports.
62
 
At the same time as the development of inland waterways, the UK’s road system was 
also expanded, and Ville claimed that roads were important in the shaping of 
industrialisation in the forward-linking consequences, particularly in the linking of 
markets.
63
 He argued that more extensive road links encouraged the evolution of 
more standard tastes and fashions onto a national scale. Therefore it was in the receipt 
of information, and particularly commercial intelligence, that road systems provided 
the greatest effect on society and for economic development. However, Ville 
conceded that in the carriage of large quantities of bulky goods, road transport 
remained relatively inefficient.
64
 
It was, however, the development and expansion of the rail network during the 
nineteenth century which perhaps had the greatest effect on economic development, 
not only in the UK, but throughout the world. 
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Data provided by Mitchell has shown that there were three stages in the growth of 
railways,: a mid-Victorian boom (1850-70), followed by a gradual deceleration to 
1910, and stagnation between the wars.
65
 
This growth in the railways during the nineteenth century as demonstrated above was 
also matched by average annual gains in productivity of around 2% during this time 
due mainly to technological developments and better utilisation.
66
 Caron also 
measured the market growth of railways claiming that their share of volumes moved 
from around 11% in 1851 to over 73% by 1913, mainly at the expense of the inland 
waterways.
67
 
Overall, it has been suggested that by 1860, as a general consequence of the diffusion 
of railways, the GNP of the UK was 10% higher than what it would have been 
without the railway.
68
 
The Retail Trade 
An important element in the expansion of the consumer society during the latter half 
of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century was the 
transformation of the retailing landscape in the UK during this time. Indeed, Fraser  
called this transformation more of a “revolution”, as new forms of retailing began to 
appear as the old-established trades gave way to the new.
69
 Fraser argued that these 
developments began as a direct response to the major social, economic and cultural 
changes.
70
 He also pointed out that the general rise in the living standards, 
particularly amongst the working class, produced a demand for a wider range of 
goods and services, but relatively cheaply.
71
 He concluded that these changes in 
demand were then matched and satisfied by technological changes in manufacturing 
and transport systems. Fraser also argued the point that it was the power of the 
retailers who were instrumental in forcing the changes in production methods because 
when adequate supplies were not readily available, it was the retailers who went out 
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and found them, and in doing so created new production units.
72
 The conclusion was 
that the retailers ‘amplified’ the demand from consumers, thereby accelerating the 
consumer society. 
According to the literature, there are essentially four theories of retail institutional 
change, which have been summarised in Figure 1.1 by Shaw & Benson:
73
 
Figure 1.1 Theories of Retail Institutional Change 
Theory     Basic Characteristics 
General-specific-general cycle Retail institutions widen(general) and 
narrow(specific) their range of goods over time. 
First noted by Hower(1943) and 
Hollander(1966) 
Retail life-cycle Based on the product life-cycle, retail life-cycle 
maintains institutions evolve through stages of 
birth, growth, maturity and decline. First noted 
by Davidson (1970) 
Economic natural selection Environmental factors determine the 
introduction, acceptance and survival of retail 
institutions through a process of ‘natural 
selection’. First noted by Alchain (1950) and 
Gist(1968) 
Wheel of retailing Begins as a cut-price, low-cost operation which 
subsequently ‘trades-up’. First noted by McNair 
(1939) 
Source: Shaw & Benson (1992, p. 13). 
Whilst all these theories have provided evidence of an on-going change in the retail 
sector, the explanation for these changes has been given by Bucklin.
74
 His model of 
structural changes in the retailing system firmly links variations in retail operations 
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with changes in consumer demand, with strong emphasis being placed on the idea 
that retail change was most influenced by changes in the level of income and the rise 
in living standards.
75
 This original model has been further developed by Shaw & 
Wild who introduced the notion of a broader link between levels of industrialisation, 
urbanisation and the stages of retail development in the UK. This model suggested 
that the British retail system moved through a recognisable sequence of changes, with 
particular emphasis on development in terms of average retail operating costs.
76
 
The role of socio-economic forces had also been stressed previously by Simmons, 
who attempted to identify these forces and how this has impacted on retailing 
evolution.
77
 Simmons initially identified the stimulus for change: levels of 
income/expenditure, levels of transport/technology, levels of product technology, 
growth of population and urban systems.
78
 From these stimuli he then suggested the 
controlling forces of these: ecological, consumer preferences, consumer mobility, 
speed of transport, economics of scale, product mobility.
79
 Finally from these 
controlling forces he charted the retailing evolution: Distribution of different 
consumers, structure of retail type, grouping and location of retail types.
80
 
One of the major developments of the changes in the retailing landscape at this time 
was the growth in what we now refer to as ‘Multiple Retailers’. Mathias charted the 
rise of the early multiple retailers such as Liptons, Maypole, Meadow, Massey, 
Templetons and Broughs, and claimed that there are similarities in the way in which 
they all were established. In the first instance they were all born at the heart of the 
industrialised cities which created a new urban society spawned by the process of 
industrialisation.
81
 Mathias also claimed that they all shared the commercial vigour 
and elemental social standards always associated with the early stages of this 
economic transformation.
82
 Indeed the multiples established themselves in the more 
high-density central districts of the cities rather than in the suburbs, as the founders 
were themselves of working-class origin and therefore had much in common with 
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their customers and understood their situation. Perhaps it was this closeness and 
affinity with their customer-base that enabled the multiple retailers to interpret their 
desires and communicate this to the manufacturing producers of consumer goods. 
An important contributor to the rise of the multiple retailer was the role of the Co-
operative movement, which was important as it stressed the importance of the ‘moral 
economy’ of co-operation in a society and as a reaction which was rapidly being 
formed which seemed to only emphasise the notion of profit. However, Gurney  
pointed out that the ideologies of the founders of the movement were perhaps not 
fully aligned to their concern which was mainly to maximise dividend on their 
purchases.
83
 
Jeffreys  provided a detailed account of how the changing retailing dynamics during 
the latter part of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century 
influenced the confectionery market.
84
 According to Jeffreys, by the turn of the 
century there were four broad types of retail outlet: grocers, confectionery shops, 
bakers and what he describes as ‘other outlets’ such as newsagents and tobacconist’s, 
and by 1939 the combined number of such outlets was estimated to be around 
300,000.
85
 In terms of the economic type of retailer, Jeffreys provided further 
evidence in Table 1.6 of the importance of the multiple retailer in confectionery sales, 
as already indicated above: 
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Table 1.6 Growth in the number of multiple shop firms and branches in the 
confectionery trade 1905-1939 
10 or more branches 
           Totals 
25 or more branches 
           Totals 
Year No.Firms No.Branches No.Firms No.Branches 
1905 5 163 2 116 
1910 10 308 4 242 
1915 15 496 6 374 
1920 14 565 6 445 
1925 19 780 7 630 
1930 22 1,051 10 912 
1935 22 1,225 8 1,052 
1939 24 1,427 12 1,271 
Source: Jeffreys (1954, p. 257). 
This provided evidence of the rate of growth of multiple shop trading during this 
period and suggests that manufacturers had to modify their product, distribution and 
marketing strategies to accommodate these changes in the retailing environment. 
Jeffreys also made the point that the increasing demand for nationally advertised 
brands, especially during the inter-war period, meant that for the multiple retailers 
this meant the decline their ‘own label’ offerings, and by 1938 the proportion was 
about 50/50, whereas prior to 1914 some multiples were 100% own label.
86
 
Another major difference in the retailing landscape before and after the Great War 
was increased attractiveness of the retail outlets, from largely a ‘back-street’ 
operation to being  more ‘main street’. Jeffreys also identified the emergence of the 
shopping centre as a key factor in this change, which inspired a revolution in shop 
design, giving rise to a range of point-of-sale advertising opportunities for the major 
manufacturers of branded consumer goods (see later).
87
 
A direct consequence of the growth in the multiples was the way in which competing 
retailers adopted pricing policies, and how this was to develop into what was to 
become known as Resale Price Maintenance (RPM), which was an attempt to curb 
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the increasing power of the multiples in their attempts to cut prices. Yamey argued 
that the pressure for some kind of resale price maintenance came at the latter end of 
the nineteenth century from small retailers who felt threatened by competition from 
the expanding multiple retail trade.
88
 Resale price maintenance therefore provided 
small retailers with some protection against the multiples which had grown to 36% of 
total retail sales by 1939. Multiples had the power of economies of scale in which 
they could potentially use to reduce their prices, but resale price maintenance limited 
their ability to do so. This essentially meant that smaller retailers were shielded from 
competition, which could be argued on one level to be against the public interest. 
However, Mercer also claimed that in addition to the motivation for resale price 
maintenance being driven by retailers, this was also largely driven by the 
manufacturers themselves in many industries, particularly the confectionery industry 
because he suggests that this was a key component of their marketing strategies, 
where a large and diverse number of outlets was important.
89
 This being the case, 
then the application of resale price maintenance to retailers secures this policy, and 
could be enforced through mechanisms such as loyalty rebates or the withholding of 
supplies from price-reducing retailers through stop-lists. Mercer made the point that 
resale price maintenance grew alongside the evolution and development of the 
‘branded’ product and there was common force behind both the tendency to mass-
marketing, uniform production, concentration and centralisation of production and 
distribution, and hence the tendency to the large scale unit.
90
 Mercer therefore 
concluded that resale price maintenance represented an alliance of small retailers 
alongside the large manufacturers of branded goods.
91
 
The importance of small retailers must not be overlooked, despite the increasing 
relevance of the multiples. Jeffreys acknowledged the fact that the number of small 
retailers had between 1900-1950 decreased by an estimated 10,000 units, but he also 
pointed out that the number of outlets selling a variety of goods such as fancy goods, 
tobacco, newspapers and other consumables had increased, and these became an 
important outlet for sales of confectionery.
92
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1.3 Socio-Cultural Factors 
Population and Demographics  
The absolute growth and the migration of the UK population from rural to urban 
areas during the latter half of the 19
th
 century, has been alluded to above, but requires 
further analysis to provide a better understanding of the consequences to the economy 
of this shift.  
Anderson reported that between 1851 and 1911 the population of Great Britain nearly 
doubled from 20.8m. to 40.8m, and by 1939 had increased further to 50.0m.
93
 This 
increase can be further analysed as in Table 1.7 to provide a more detailed 
understanding of the changes by decade: 
Table 1.7 Growth in UK Population 1851-1941 
Year Population (m.) %change 
1851 20.8  
1861 23.1 11.1% 
1871 26.1 13.0% 
1881 29.7 13.8% 
1891 33.0 11.1% 
1901 37.0 12.1% 
1911 40.8 10.3% 
1921 42.0 2.9% 
1931 44.8 6.6% 
1941 50.0 11.6% 
Source: Mitchell  B.R.(1988, p. 7-10) British Historical Statistics. 
The double-digit percentage increases each decade were only arrested temporarily by 
the advent of the Great War and the subsequent flu epidemic. 
The overall increase in population provides evidence of a nation which was beginning 
to benefit from the rise in living standards already described, and which can be 
further supported by an analysis of the shifts in social class towards the end of the 
nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century. These changes in the 
distribution of social classes provided evidence of a better educated and more skilled 
workforce, and also the emergence of the middle classes in society: 
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Table 1. 8: Changes in social classes 1861-1911 
Social Class Prop.1861 Prop.1911 
I Professional 2% 3% 
II Managerial/Technical 15% 15% 
III Skilled (non-manual) 40% 43% 
IV Skilled (manual) 30% 29% 
V Unskilled 13% 10% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: Banks J.A. (1978, p. 197) The social structure of 19
th
 century England through the census, in 
Lawton R. (ed.) (1978) The Census and Social Structure. 
The data in Table 1.8 reinforces the notion that it was the middle classes which grew 
fastest in which they grew more wealthy and prosperous as a consequence of 
receiving higher and more secure incomes. This was especially true of the lower 
middle class.
94
 
Evidence for a movement in the social status of the population is also as a direct 
consequence, and reflection of, the physical migration of the population from rural to 
urban environments during this period. This movement can be demonstrated from the 
data in Table 1.9: 
Table 1.9 Changes in Rural/Urban Population 1856-1911 
Year Rural Pop. Urban Pop. 
1851 46% 54% 
1861 41% 59% 
1871 35% 65% 
1881 30% 70% 
1891 26% 74% 
1901 22% 78% 
1911 21% 79% 
Source: Law C.M. (1967, p. 130) Growth of urban populations in England & Wales, Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers 41: 125-143. 
The trend in the decline in agricultural employment as demonstrated above by Law 
(1967), further emphasises the fact that by 1911, Britain was an overwhelmingly 
urban country in which large commercial and industrial cities predominate.
95
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The consequence of these dramatic changes in the population and demographics of 
the UK population were to provide the foundations for the economic and social 
conditions that enabled the confectionery and other consumer markets to develop and 
thrive in the years prior to the Great War. 
 Consumerism 
The increase in the population of Great Britain and the shift in demographics to a 
more urban and better skilled workforce which ultimately improved overall living 
standards, increased demand for what has been called “consumer goods”. However, 
whilst it is natural to conclude that increased personal wealth and status would lead to 
increasing demand for goods and services, Benson suggested that it was the increased 
purchasing power of the individual which lies at the heart of the rise of consumerism, 
or putting it another way it was the increase in disposal income which was the key 
driver.
96
 Indeed Benson claimed that not only were the lifestyles of the middle classes 
enhanced during this time due to the increase in their purchasing power, but for the 
majority of the working class this was also true.
97
 This conclusion is also supported 
by other commentators such as Halsey (1988) who claimed that the increase in wage 
earnings of manual workers in the years 1900-1981 increased by over 400%.
98
  
Whist the rise in consumerism can be viewed in strictly economic terms, there is also 
a sociological viewpoint on how society reacted to a shift in economic conditions. 
With this in mind this concept of the growth in consumerism being a function of the 
changing status and wealth of different social groups has been taken up by Bourdieu 
(1984) who attempted to map the difference in the range of consumer goods to the 
differences between the social groups.
99
 He argued that differences in tastes of 
individuals are directly related to their position within each social group.
100
  
The notion of the way in which goods are perceived by individuals and the broad 
economic approaches to consumption are challenged by Miller, who claimed that 
nature of demand and the actual relationship between goods and people is merely a 
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function of the symbolic equation of price, however unsatisfactory this measure can 
be.
101
 
Another alternative view of consumerism is that of Cross who claimed that the rise of 
the consumer society was linked to the uses and meaning of time.
102
 He suggested 
that the triumph of consumerism meant that this was at the expense of increased 
leisure time, and gave rise to the “work-and-spend” culture that many of us recognise 
today.
103
 This means that there was a social decision to direct industrial and 
commercial innovation towards producing more and different quantities of goods 
rather than leisure. 
The date when consumerism first began is contentious, but the first evidence of 
demand for an increasing range of alternative goods is probably from around the 
middle of the eighteenth century, and grew slowly until the middle of the nineteenth 
century when the pace accelerated. Stearns has cited that a single product such as 
sugar could be a metaphor for consumerism, and claimed that it is in fact the first 
mass consumer good as it suggests a new taste for indulgence in a food that is not 
necessary from a health or dietary point of view.
104
 
Whilst there was a growing demand for increasing the quantity and quality of 
consumer goods available, this did not happen overnight and the progress of 
consumerism and the advent of a mass market was slow.
105
 One of the reasons for 
this was the way in which the supply side of the consumer equation was developed. 
Benson argued that the increasing demand for more consumer goods had to be 
matched with a major shift in the restructuring of the economy, the introduction of 
mechanisation and the adoption of changing organisational capabilities.
106
 Fitzgerald 
has taken this further by claiming that changes in distribution, marketing and other 
forms of communication were essential in meeting the needs of the consumer.
107
  
The emergence and development in earnest of the consumer society in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century marked a major 
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shift in the development of society in Britain. But following the Great War, Fitzgerald  
claimed that the mass market matured into a more sophisticated and developed phase 
as markets became bigger and consumers became more educated, fickle and 
conscious of choice, cachet and lifestyle.
108
 
During the crucial inter-war period there was a significant increase in expenditure on 
a wide range of consumer goods being offered by an increasing number of suppliers. 
Bowden and Higgins have provided evidence that it was the growth in both durable 
and non-durable goods during the inter-war period which accounted for the highest 
growth in any sector, especially on food, transport and other non-durable household 
goods. They went on to claim that the rise in consumer-related goods and their 
respective industries was matched by a similar decline in the old traditional Victorian 
industries such as shipbuilding, textiles, mining and engineering.
109
 
A key factor in the provision and supply of consumer goods is the formation and 
development of basic infrastructure. The development and expansion of transport 
systems as described above was a key factor in this provision as was the actual 
availability of goods through the rapid and diverse changes in the retailing landscape 
of Britain during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
In addition, although consumerism is sometimes seen as a reflection of the relative 
prosperity of a particular society, Hilton perceived it to be more of a mobilising force 
for social and economic change which lies at the heart of socialist thinking.
110
 Hilton  
argued that this is manifested in organisations such as the labour movement, the Co-
operative, the Women’s Cooperative Guild and others who campaigned strongly for 
the availability of reasonably priced and good quality everyday household necessities 
which would benefit those in society who needed it most.
111
 He went on to 
demonstrate the use of official governmental responses of the need to protect the 
interests of consumers in the introduction of the Consumer Council in 1918 which 
was established to encourage the working together of working-class movements, 
especially pertaining to food.
112
 However, Hilton also pointed out that this official 
response by government was seen by some as a cynical attempt by politicians to 
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contain the growing unrest among the working-class after the end of the Great War 
rather than a positive step to provide real benefit in a purely social sense.
113
 
Diet 
 Any study of the UK confectionery industry is linked inextricably to the overall diet 
of the population, and how this changed during this time. Specifically, the factors 
surrounding the way in which the diet of the new urban working-class was changing 
in relation to the overall family budgets. This is important in how spending shifted 
into the new consumables such as tea, biscuits, confectionery, etc. 
Oddy provided evidence that the diet of the majority of the UK population in the mid 
nineteenth century was based largely on starchy foods; bread and potatoes in 
particular.
114
 This diet was very unpalatable and as it changed little from day-to-day, 
proved quite boring, and consequently Oddy concluded that many were under-
nourished.
115
  
Drummond & Wilbraham also supported the notion of a narrow-based and 
unpalatable diet by claiming that in studies of the period, the majority of the 
population expressed prejudice against foods such as fruit, vegetables and milk until 
the beginning of the twentieth century.
116
 
 Given this lack of variety in the daily diet, Mintz argued that it was the increasing 
availability of sugar to the general working class population which proved to be the 
catalyst for a dietary revolution.
117
  Mintz pointed out that price of sugar fell by 55% 
between 1840 and 1870, making a previous luxury that once was the privilege of the 
wealthy now within the reach of a good proportion of the rest of the population.
118
 
This price reduction was the greatest margin of any food commodity at this time, and 
it was this single factor which enabled sugar to become an important part of the 
British diet. This meant that the average per capita consumption of sugar rose from 
29kg in 1880 to 43.5kg by 1930.
119
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Oddy also provided the explanation of why sugar, given an increasingly lower price, 
increased so dramatically in the latter half of the nineteenth century. He argued that 
sugar provided the main, and cheapest, relief from a stodgy, starchy diet, in addition 
to providing a stimulating addition of much-needed calories to an under-nourished 
working class population.
120
 
Mintz went on to argue that the consequence of the lower price, and a population 
which had begun to become ‘hooked’ on sugar, was the increasing prevalence of 
processed foods in which sugar was the main ingredient. These sugar-based products 
included jam, treacle, custard, biscuits, cakes and confectionery. The response by 
manufacturers in creating a market of new food consumables provided a revolution of 
eating and dietary habits where prepared foods could now be consumed outside the 
context of the home. This revolution is still being developed and refined by 
manufacturers to a slightly more sophisticated and demanding population even at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century.
121
 
This new consuming phenomena was as Mintz claimed, the catalyst for a shift in 
lifestyle, in that prepared sugar-based products provided instant energy for an 
increasingly mobile population, and it was therefore the epitome of the opening up of 
what we now regard as ‘mass consumption’.122 
Fine, Heasman & Wright examined the organic properties of sugar, and they suggest 
that it was these which enabled certain foods to be ‘invented’ around sugar as the 
main ingredient, including confectionery, cakes and biscuits. They therefore claimed 
that sugar was the ‘enabler’ which allowed mass-produced industrial food products to 
be developed, thereby allowing new and innovative kinds of products to be 
introduced to satisfy the new consumer demand.
123
 Fine et al, however, provided a 
link of this provision of sugar on an industrial scale to the vested interests of the sugar 
producers which dates back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the 
sugar trade was predominately from the Caribbean.
124
 The sugar trade was an 
important component of the world political system, which was unfortunately deeply 
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involved in the slave trade. How this was reconciled by religious entrepreneurs, such 
as the owners of confectionery company’s , will be discussed in due course. 
An important facet of the changes in the British diet was the growing consumption of 
beverages such as tea, coffee and cocoa, all of which were sourced as the direct 
consequence of the extent of British Empire during Victoria’s reign. Similar to sugar, 
it was the fall in the commodity prices of these beverages which led to their increased 
consumption, especially amongst the working class. Indeed some commentators such 
as Othick suggested that it was the increase in these non-alcoholic beverages which 
accounted for a corresponding decrease in the consumption of alcohol during the last 
half of the nineteenth century.
125
 Dingle however, claimed that the answer was 
actually more complex than this simplified explanation,
126
 and Mintz  also casted 
doubt on this ‘substitution effect’, suggesting that tea, coffee and cocoa never 
displaced alcoholic drinks, but only vied with them.
127
 
Advertising & Branding 
The rise of a more urban population, the establishment of a new middle-class and the 
advent of the mass market meant, that for the manufacturers of consumer goods the 
issue of how to inform your potential customers of your product became a new 
challenge. From the mid nineteenth century onwards the onset of a competitive 
market environment ensured that the managers of consumer goods companies would 
have to be more informed about how people behave as consumers and how to pursue 
them of the superior merits of your product over those of the competition.  
Although ‘Advertising’ as a generic notion for the means of communicating 
something to somebody had been in existence for centuries, it was the conditions that 
arose from about the mid nineteenth century which saw the ‘art’ of advertising being 
viewed more as a ‘science’, and how effective you were at its prosecution had a 
profound impact upon the success or failure of a company. 
The expansion of the retail trade and the number of outlets serving the new urban 
communities, as already discussed, provided the opportunities for new ways of 
communicating products and brands in ways which had previously been unheard of. 
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Indeed, Loeb (1994) suggested that the emergence of the new retail environment 
meant that this was a blank canvas for innovative companies who could take 
advantage that this provided.
128
 The consequence of this was that suddenly 
advertising became an increasingly visible feature of the Victorian consumer culture 
in that retail outlets were to become awash with displays, posters and other point-of-
sale materials enticing the consumer to purchase. 
The embracement of advertising as a ‘necessary evil’ was a difficult transition for 
Victorian society in the mid-nineteenth century. Loeb made the valid point that for 
the average Victorian at the time, the reason for having to stoop to having to advertise 
had connotations of quackery, promoting products of poor quality and the 
advancement of fraudulent claims. Turner described the accepted Victorian attitudes 
of doing business as to surrounding yourself with your key customers and then to 
establish personal relationships with them, supported by the excellence of your 
goods.
129
 This, it was thought, would then ensure that your reputation would be 
enhanced by satisfied customers passing on their fulfilment by word of mouth. With 
this mind it is no surprise that there was some reticence on the part of some 
manufacturers to advertise their products with any great vigour, and this would have 
direct consequences on sales, market share and profitability.  
Although the drive for advertising was being established in mid-nineteenth century 
Britain as a way of establishing a company’s competitiveness, Nevett pointed to the 
fact that it was a series of other factors at the time which actually enabled the rise of 
advertising to occur.
130
 He cites the rapid advancement and increasing 
professionalism of the artistic and technical expertise at the time which gave rise to 
the establishment of the new graphic arts as important. This coupled with the rise of 
the popular press and the obvious opportunities in terms of the amount of column 
inches available that this provided.
131
 The advertising revenues were obviously 
important revenues to fledgling periodicals for their survival, and thus were 
instrumental in the establishment of an important relationship that is still valid today. 
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Turner also suggested that another obstacle in the way of the growth of advertising in 
mid-nineteenth century Britain was the tax and stamp duties imposed upon it and also 
on the press itself by government, which was further interpreted as being evidence of 
advertising being frowned upon by the establishment.  However, public pressure saw 
the abolishing of the Advertising Tax in 1853, the abolishing of stamp duty on 
newspapers in 1853, and finally the lifting of tax on paper in 1861.
132
 
The development of advertising during the latter part of the nineteenth century 
coincided with dramatic advances in the quality of artwork and illustrations which 
were matched by the improvements in reprographic representation. Loeb described 
these developments as a dramatic visual representation of the myriad of products of 
the industrial age that were now available, thereby shifting society from one of 
requiring basic needs, to one of the desire of fantasies.
133
 This changing emphasis is 
further explored by Loeb who goes on to speculate that the target for the new 
advertising revolution was that of the woman, and indeed ‘Advertising World’, a 
leading trade journal in 1913 reported that 90% of the advertisers that they had 
sampled felt that the man was no longer considered in the design of their 
advertisements.
134
  
However, as Wilkins pointed out, Advertising per se is does not make sense unless 
there are differentiated products, that is goods that are branded or have trade names, 
although there are instances of generic product advertising such as the Milk 
Marketing Board and British Beef that occurred post-1945, for example.
135
 Therefore, 
if the consumer wished to buy the advertised product, the consumer has to be able to 
differentiate that product, and the brand name performed that service. Wilkins 
therefore concluded that advertising and branding went in tandem, and that for foods 
and beverages this was particularly important as it allowed consumers to make 
choices of predictable standard goods, especially as repeat purchase was important.
136
 
There are some exceptions to this notion, however, as Horst cited the example of the 
large American confectionery company Hershey who never advertised, preferring 
instead to use their brand name to forge strong relationships with distributors via a 
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large and dedicated sales team.
137
 In addition Casson has argued that branding can 
also be an important barrier to entry, particularly so for the food and drinks industry 
in which the perception of longevity by consumers provides more evidence of 
competence than in their newer rivals.
138
  
The rise in branding during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be viewed as 
beneficial both to the producer and the consumer. Wilkins argued that branding, 
particularly for food and drinks products, multiplies as incomes and living standards 
rise, because buyers purchase not only basics but extras in order to satisfy social and 
emotional needs. The brand is therefore crucial because it introduced efficiencies in 
production, distribution and provided the link between supply and demand. For this 
reason it therefore provided the consumer with savings in time in the preparation of 
meals, with greater choices and with more possibilities of satisfaction.
139
 
1.4 Technological Factors 
Technological Development 
One of the key drivers of an industrialised economy is the ability to create, develop 
and utilise technology in an optimum way, which would then lead to industrial 
competitiveness. The lag in economic progress throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries as described earlier, have been viewed by Mokyr as a failure in 
the UK of the adaptation to technological change.
140
 He pointed out that the failure 
was one of a lack of innovation and creativity in the first place, and also one of a slow 
reaction to embrace technologies developed elsewhere. 
141
 
Different suggestions have been made as to why the UK lagged behind other major 
industrial nations in the development and use of available technology. Crafts asserted 
that a lack of technical and scientific training was the reason,
142
 whereas Lazonick put 
forward the theory that the increase in unionisation of many industries in the UK 
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compared to other countries, acted as a barrier to new technologies because this could 
have affected their members working arrangements.
143
 
Magee suggested that the in the UK, old industries like iron and steel, textiles were 
based on traditional craft skills, and as industries relied less on R&D capabilities, but 
the newer industries were more in tune with the growth in the consumer society and 
were based on mass production techniques, and this became especially true of the 
confectionery industry.
144
 
Confectionery Manufacturing Process 
The development of the UK confectionery industry during the nineteenth century was 
formed and influenced by the improvements and progress of the manufacturing 
processes which enabled the industry to expand, especially during the final decade of 
the century. It is maybe significant to note that the majority of the breakthroughs of 
the manufacturing processes which occurred during the nineteenth century were 
outside the UK, predominantly in mainland Europe.  This particular industry example 
supports the earlier notion that a crucial factor in the slower rate of UK economic 
growth was the fact that most technological advances occurred overseas, and that the 
transfer of this knowledge was slow and difficult. 
It could be argued that the growth in the UK confectionery industry grew as a 
consequence and as an ‘off-shoot’ of the beverage industry, and particularly cocoa, 
which originally was consumed as a drink. The consumption of cocoa as a drink was 
originally perceived to be a ‘healthy’ option, as the consistency of cocoa was thick 
and almost akin to a gruel. Indeed, the sale of cocoa was originally made through 
apothecaries and other health-related outlets. However, Othick claimed that a 
technological breakthrough in 1828 by a cocoa producer, C.J. Van Houten of Weep in 
the Netherlands revolutionised the industry.
145
 This new process meant that the high 
cocoa butter content of the cocoa bean could be removed which minimised the need 
to add starch or some other ingredient to off-set the high fat content. This process 
enabled cocoa to be produced in the powder form we recognise today, which 
provided a more convenient form to which liquid could be added to form a drink. 
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This ‘new’ form of cocoa is described as ‘pure cocoa essence’ because it negates the 
need for ‘adulteration’ of the product by having to add other ingredients to make it 
palatable. Othick went on to make the point that the removal of the cocoa butter as a 
direct by-product of the Van Houten process, meant that this provided the main 
ingredient for the manufacture of block chocolate for eating, rather than as a beverage 
as originally intended for the cocoa bean.
146
 Thus the whole concept of ‘eating’ cocoa 
as chocolate was stumbled upon almost by accident, as a need to find an economic 
use for the residue of the Van Houten technological process for producing a superior 
form of drink. 
Whilst the Van Houten process was hailed as a technological success, Othick went on 
to point out that the diffusion of the process into the rest of the industry, particularly 
overseas, was painfully slow.
147
 Part of the reason was the fact that cocoa, which was 
seen by consumers as a medicinal drink, persisted for much of the nineteenth century 
and most manufacturers produced and marketed the traditional form until the early 
twentieth century. Other reasons for the slow spread of the new process was that Van 
Houten tried to maintain the new process for himself, and also the fact that the new 
cocoa was more expensive to produce, and was therefore more expensive to buy for 
the consumer. This lack of progress has to be viewed within the context of the 
Chandlerian view of the slow response to new technologies by inefficient family-
owned firms in the UK. 
Othick also described the second major technological innovation, which was again 
pioneered by Van Houten during the 1860’s. This was the process by which alkali 
was added to the cocoa powder. The original reason for the development of this 
refinement was to make the cocoa powder even more soluble, but had the indirect and 
unforeseen consequence of making the cocoa taste better, as it seemed to become 
more ‘chocolatey’ in flavour.148 Again, this technological improvement was slow to 
be adopted by many manufacturers, one of the major objections was the reluctance to 
return to a process where another ingredient was added to what was now regarded as 
a ‘pure’ product. The concept of product adulteration and the diminishing of quality 
were key aspects at the time. 
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The third key technological development in the industry concerned the improvement 
in the slowly expanding edible chocolate market. Wey described how in 1875 Peter in 
Switzerland succeeded in mixing cocoa paste with condensed milk to create the first 
example of milk chocolate, and this was originally dubbed Gala Peter.
149
 Clarence-
Smith claimed that this innovation was further refined in 1879 by Roderich Lindt, 
again in Switzerland, by the invention of ‘melting chocolate’, which is the basis of 
what we now recognise as chocolate today.
150
 This method was developed by 
enriching the chocolate with added cocoa butter and the texture improved by the 
mechanical ‘conching’ process of the cocoa mass. This innovation allowed 
manufacturers to pour chocolate into moulds rather than pressing, as had been 
necessary previously.
151
 
Confectionery Manufacturing Technology 
Technological development in manufacturing processes occurred throughout the 
nineteenth century, with Othick pointing out that the leaders in the design and 
manufacture of capital equipment for the confectionery industry were based mainly in 
mainland Europe, with Lehmann of Dresden being perhaps the most important.
152
 He 
also stated out that the key impetus for the development of new confectionery 
manufacturing machinery was not to reduce costs, as might first be thought, but for 
improving the quality of the finished product.
153
  Clarence-Smith made the point that 
it was the hugely impressive performance of the Lehmann machines at a trade fair in 
Chicago in 1893 which persuaded Milton Hershey to begin manufacturing chocolate 
in the USA. Hershey have continued to rely on German and Swiss machinery ever 
since.
154
 
Another key innovator in the development of confectionery equipment was Anton 
Reiche, founded in Dresden in 1870, and Clarence-Smith claimed he was by 1910 the 
largest supplier of moulds to the confectionery industry in the world.
155
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Knapp identified Buhler Brothers of Uzwil, Switzerland as leading innovators in the 
design of confectionery machinery, having developed the ‘conche’ equipment 
necessary for the Lindt process of the ‘melting chocolate’ technique.156 Fitzgerald 
however, emphasised the point that many British confectionery manufacturers were 
supplied principally by Joseph Baker & Sons, a UK manufacturer of food processing 
equipment.
157
 
Evidence therefore suggested that many companies were involved in the design, 
manufacture and marketing of capital equipment for the confectionery industry 
throughout the nineteenth century. The availability of the new technologies was 
obviously available for those firms who could evaluate the potential benefits of these 
advances and turn them into competitive advantage. 
Packaging Technology 
The rise in consumerism and the advent of products designed to appeal to the new 
found attitudes and demands of the burgeoning middle classes and the urban working 
classes, meant that goods had to be stored, transported and displayed as they had 
never done so before. As Paine and Paine have explained, this meant that consumer 
goods required a means of protection in the first instance, for which the development 
of packaging technologies was designed to provide this. The direct opportunity that 
packaging provided was via a new means of communicating the product through 
design and branding techniques, and also as a means of mechanising the process.
158
 
The packaging of consumer goods, particularly foods, developed during the 
nineteenth century in which various materials such as glass, tin, paper and cardboard 
materials were utilised. Sacharow & Griffin described the historical background to 
the evolution of the packaging of convenience foods, claiming for instance the 
introduction of the first cardboard box for this purpose in the UK in 1817.
159
 The use 
of wrappers was first used by French confectioners to wrap individual bonbons in 
1847, and with the development of lithography and other graphic arts meant that the 
branding of products on to wrappers and boxes became commonplace during the last 
half of the nineteenth century. The introduction of tinfoil towards the end of the 
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nineteenth century provided superior protection properties to convenience foods. 
Metal tins were also used by confectionery manufacturers amongst others, 
particularly for some assortment offerings, with the development of printing directly 
onto the metal being introduced by Lyons Cakes for an even better quality branding 
opportunity.
160
 
1.5 Conclusions 
The emergence of a confectionery market in the UK during the nineteenth century 
and its growth and development into the twentieth century was the result of many 
complex and inter-related factors and circumstances, each of which was important in 
its own right. 
The upward trend in the overall economic situation, albeit with cyclical fluctuations, 
provided the foundations for the emergence of large companies based on 
consumerism. The overall living standards of the population improved over time as 
measured by several key indicators, despite periods of high employment. Indeed for 
the majority of those in work, this period saw improvements in individual prosperity 
never experienced before in such a relatively short period of time providing an 
expanding market for companies providing consumer-led durable goods. 
Growth in the economy meant significant progress in the development of basic 
infrastructures such as the transport systems of waterways, rail and road construction. 
This provided the basis for rapid communication and the method by which raw 
materials and finished goods could be moved in large quantities very quickly. As a 
consequence, retailing could develop within this transport network providing an ever 
increasing range of material goods to serve a more prosperous population. 
Demographically, the period under consideration witnessed massive changes. What 
had been basically an agrarian population for centuries, suddenly within a short 
period of time the number of people living in the UK exploded and became an urban 
population with the majority living in towns and cities. This in turn gave rise to what 
is now called ‘consumerism’, in that the new urban and more well off individual 
required outlets for an increasing disposable income in the form of goods which serve 
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a more social requirement, and also for more convenience in terms of the 
improvement in their everyday lives. 
For the confectionery market, this was linked to the changes in the average diet of the 
working classes, which with the advent of cheap raw materials like sugar suddenly 
provided taste and variability to the traditional starchy and stodgy diets of the 
majority of people. The natural properties of sugar enabled several new convenience 
foods to be developed, which it turn could be packaged and advertised to appeal to a 
wider range of potential customers. The advent of a wide variety of opportunities and 
technical advancements for the advertising of the new consumer goods provided the 
requirement for differentiation in the form of branding for advertising to become 
effective. 
Finally it was the individual technological breakthroughs in both confectionery 
product development and manufacturing processes, which occurred principally in 
mainland Europe, linked with the developments of the ability to successfully package 
the product, which provided the finished product itself that was to provide the 
stimulus for the eventual demand that led to the growth and development of the 
market in the UK, and thereby the manufacturers within it. 
These factors are important in providing the environmental context from which 
Rowntree and Cadbury developed their internal competencies, including cost 
accounting capabilities, that allowed them to compete in the UK confectionery 
market during the interwar period and from which their respective performances can 
be measured. 
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Section 1 – Literature Review 
Chapter 2 
UK Confectionery Market 
2.1 Introduction 
The origins, development and maturation of the UK Confectionery Market were a 
direct consequence of the widely differing and complex external forces which have 
already been described in chapter 1. The inter-relationship between economic, social, 
cultural, and technological factors provided the environment in which the market for 
confectionery products evolved: where demand was driven by these prevailing 
conditions, and ultimately satisfied.  It is important to understand the forces under 
which the market was created and developed in order to explain the ultimate factors 
necessary for successfully competing in this market. Consideration of the detailed 
dynamics from the earliest period is necessary to fully appreciate market conditions 
between 1919 and 1938.  
This chapter therefore considers the fundamental factor underpinning the foundation 
of the market - the supply, price and availability of basic raw materials: sugar and 
cocoa beans. In addition, the way that the UK confectionery market was structured is 
analysed to provide the basic knowledge required for an understanding of its 
subsequent growth and development. A review is then undertaken of the published 
literature to provide an overview of the accepted understanding of the UK 
confectionery market, and how Cadbury’s and Rowntree’s competed in this 
environment. 
2.2 Raw Materials Foundation of the UK Confectionery Market 
Without a continuous and reliable supply of the two main raw materials of sugar and 
cocoa beans, there would be no UK Confectionery Market, or indeed a UK 
Confectionery Industry. The role of sugar in the UK diet during the nineteenth 
century has already been discussed in chapter 1, (particularly amongst the working 
class). However, the sugar industry was also an important facet of the UK economy 
61 
 
during this period and helps explain the origins and growth of the confectionery 
industry itself. 
Whereas sugar was the facilitator for the creation and development of so many new 
convenience foods for the mass market, the cocoa bean was a major incubator in 
which sugar could enhance its consumption, either as a beverage or later as an edible 
product. 
The cocoa bean which is the natural fruit of the Theobroma Cocao L tree was first 
cultivated as a crop by the various cultures of pre-Columbian Mesoamerica, and 
according to McNeill formed part of their religious rituals as well as being a 
component of the diet of the various tribes.
161
 He also suggested that the cocoa bean 
was a main ingredient in the medicines of these cultures. Following the subjugation 
of the societies in Mesoamerica by the Spanish conquistadores, the latter adopted the 
cocoa bean for their own consumption and cargoes of the raw material were shipped 
back to Spain.
162
 Indeed Norton suggested that cocoa’s traditional use in rituals by the 
Central and South Americans transferred to Spain during the seventeenth century, and 
claims that the word ‘Regalo’ or ‘Gift’ was first used in the consumption of cocoa 
with its connotations of sensual pleasure and social affinity.
163
  
The commercial cultivation of the cocoa bean was originally confined to parts of 
South and Central America, especially Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil and the Caribbean 
Islands, but as world demand grew during the nineteenth century, new sources of 
cultivation were established in other tropical areas of the world such as West Africa, 
notably the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Cameroon and also in South East 
Asia, especially Java. Consistent with other raw materials, there are differences in the 
quality (and taste) of cocoa beans depending upon where they are sourced. This 
difference in quality can also be measured in price. According to Wickizer the best 
quality beans are to be found in Venezuela and Ecuador, whilst the poorest quality is 
from West Africa.
164
 The expanding market for confectionery products and the 
consequence of competitive pressures for cheaper raw materials were some of the 
reasons for the migration of cocoa bean production from the New to the Old World. 
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Table 2.1 provides an analysis of the changing sources over time of world cocoa bean 
production: 
Table 2.1 Analysis of Changes in % Share of World Cocoa Bean Production 
1895-1939  
Production 
Source 
1895 
   % 
1909-13 
       % 
1926-30 
      % 
1935-39 
       % 
Americas   86       62       44       30 
Africa   10       35       64       69 
Asia     4         3         2         1 
   Source: Wickizer (1951, p. 264). 
Wickizer also reported that of the 69% accounted by Africa in 1939, by far the largest 
individual nation producer was Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast), which accounted 
for some 38% of world cocoa bean production.
165
 
Unlike some other comparable markets, such as coffee for example, the relationship 
between the production of the raw cocoa bean and its use in the confectionery 
industry has  been largely synchronised, which meant that there have been few 
instances of huge stockpiles of the raw material plaguing the industry. Wickizer  
attributed the steady decline in the price of cocoa beans to the growth of low-cost 
West African sources, and also from advancements in technology from an end-user 
perspective which permit use of lower quality beans.
166
 Figure 2.1 provides evidence 
of the trend in the price of the Accra (Gold Coast) grade, which is the bean usually 
quoted on the New York market, because it reflects world prices. 
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Figure 2.1 Accra (Gold Coast) Cocoa Bean Prices: New York Market. (US cents 
per pound) 1910-1939 
 
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics: Wholesale Prices. 
The high price level of cocoa beans in the artificial conditions surrounding the Great 
War was followed by irregular declines, culminating in record lows in 1932-33, when 
the price averaged only 4.4 US cents per pound. Indeed average wholesale prices for 
ordinary grades remained at around 5 US cents per pound at the outbreak of World 
War II. For comparison purposes, by late 1947 the same grades of beans were selling 
in New York above 50 cents per pound, some ten times higher than previously. Some 
of this was a direct consequence of a reduction in supply: some growers, particularly 
in West Africa, who were forced to discontinue their cocoa bean crops because of the 
consistently low prices in the 1930’s, in favour of more productive crops, which had 
the effect of reducing overall productive capacity in the post-war period thereby 
forcing up prices. Wickizer claimed that the sharp, if temporary price movements, 
illustrated in Fig. 2.1 were the result of wildly speculative activity in the markets 
based on unfound prospects for the industry.
167
 However, it is argued here that the 
low price of cocoa beans during the 1930’s in some ways “insulated” the 
confectionery industry from the world depression at that time and therefore failed to 
check the overall expansion of consumption.  
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2.3 Market Structure & Definitions 
The origins of the UK Confectionery Market need to be seen in the context of the 
structure of the market alongside a clear definition of what actually constitutes ‘the 
market’, particularly with the identification of ‘categories’ that form it. Confectionery 
can be very broadly divided into its two constituent segments: sugar confectionery 
and chocolate confectionery.  Within these two broad segments, sugar confectionery 
can be further divided into boiled sweets, liquorice, gums and pastilles, mints, toffees, 
rock and chewing gum. Chocolate confectionery can also be sub-divided into cocoa 
(as a drink) and chocolate (as an eating product). Within the chocolate segment, there 
are further categorises such as bars, assortments, biscuits and count-lines.  
2.4 Origins and Early Developments up to 1870 
The earliest date when confectionery was consumed within the UK is uncertain, and 
is inextricably related to the way in which sweetness (usually in the form of sucrose) 
has evolved historically, and then how the consumption of sweetness migrated around 
the world, to the British Isles. According to Richardson, the origins of confectionery 
consumption are in the Middle Eastern traditions of using the preserving properties of 
sugar to enable foods to be transported long distances.
168
 He also asserted that the 
medicinal uses of sugar in combination with plant extracts in the Middle East were an 
important factor in the broader acceptance of sugar. Richardson traced the gradual 
migration of the consumption of sugar from east to west (i.e. Europe), beginning with 
the first real interface of these cultures during the period of the Crusades.
169
 The 
diffusion of sweet consumption in different parts of Europe was relatively slow over 
the centuries that followed, and due to the high cost of sugar, was usually confined to 
the wealthy elements of society. As previously stated in chapter 1, it wasn’t until the 
mid-nineteenth century that the lowest cost of sugar enabled the working-classes to 
consume it and this has reflected changes to their diet.  
Richardson claimed that the first real evidence of a confectionery market in the UK 
was during the latter half of the eighteenth century, when the few specialist 
confectioners in London who supplied their wealthy clients, also began to appear in 
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provincial cities like Bristol, Norwich and York.
170
 The demand for cheap boiled 
sweets grew and as a result a ‘cottage industry’ emerged to supply the local needs of 
consumers. This small-scale operation became the norm for sugar confectionery and 
as a consequence data on the size and extent of the market during this time is virtually 
non-existent. Richardson pointed out that in Victorian Britain practically every 
village had women supplementing their income by boiling sweets to supply their 
local communities.
171
   
In tandem with the consumption of confectionery in Britain, there was the increasing 
popularity of non-alcoholic beverages: tea, coffee and cocoa, again initially consumed 
only by the wealthy members of society. The consumption of cocoa in the form of a 
beverage was the pre-cursor to its consumption as an edible product, but also an 
important category in its own right.  
According to Norton, the consumption of cocoa spread throughout the rest of Europe 
from Spain, initially by the clergy, aristocrats and army officers.
172
 It is also 
suggested that the perceived medicinal properties of cocoa helped increase its 
popularity important factor in its use and popularity.
173
 Clarence-Smith claimed that 
Jewish communities were also responsible for the spread of the use of cocoa, being 
constantly on the move due to religious persecution and setting up workshops in 
many cities such as Amsterdam, Bayonne, Bordeaux and London.
174
 
According to Clarence-Smith, the consumption of cocoa in the UK was slow, and 
Churchman’s Chocolates established in 1728 in Bristol and later in St Paul’s Church 
Yard in London by Walter Churchman, is the first real evidence of the establishment 
of a manufacturer of any scale.
175
 Wagner reported that this company actually 
patented the manufacture of its cocoa products in 1729, which was claimed to be the 
first example of the use of mechanisation in the industry.
176
 This invention enabled 
cocoa beans to be ground more finely than by hand, which improved the consistency 
of the finished product. However, the market for cocoa in the UK at this time was 
small and almost entirely dominated by the wealthy members of society.  
                                                          
170
 Ibid., p. 214. 
171
 Ibid. 
172
 Norton, Sacred Gifts, p. 261. 
173
 Ibid. 
174
 Clarence-Smith, Cocoa and Chocolate,  p. 66. 
175
 Ibid. 
176
 Wagner, The Chocolate Conscience, pp. 12-14. 
66 
 
Probably the first large scale confectionery manufacturer who had a significant 
impact on the UK market  was another Bristol businessman, Joseph Fry, who had 
trained as an apothecary and practiced in Bristol during the mid-eighteenth century 
and began to use cocoa in a medicinal context, which was popular throughout Europe 
at this time. As Daiper pointed out, Fry followed in the tradition of Quakers, or the 
Society of Friends, by entering business to make a living because their religious 
beliefs prevented them by law from entering University or practicing any of the 
‘learned professions’ due to the Test and Corporation Acts.177 Daiper  further argued 
that Quakers were ideally suited to business because of their frugality, industry and 
because they had the support of other Quakers. The importance of Quakers on the 
development of the UK confectionery industry cannot be overstated: the Fry example 
was to be repeated by the Cadbury and Rowntree families.
178
 
The tradition of Quakers entering business as a ‘profession’ was part of a general 
trend in which other religious ‘non-conformists’ in the UK sought ways of 
circumventing the restrictions placed upon them by society. Jeremy, however, 
commented that the actual extent to which the religious beliefs of the non-conformists 
contributed to the growth of business and the economic progress of the UK has been 
the subject of some debate.
179
 He cited Casson , who forwarded the suggestion that it 
was the “trust” factor that existed within groups like the Quakers which was their key 
success factor, because a lack of trust increases transaction costs both within and 
between firms.
180
 This therefore gave those firms dominated by religious groups an 
economic advantage driven by lower costs and faster transactions. This notion of trust 
is also supported by Fukuyama who pointed to the success of high-trust societies like 
Germany and Japan which has been translated into economic prosperity in these 
countries.
181
 
Network relationships within religious groups and their effect on entrepreneurial 
success has also been identified by Rubenstein who claimed that it was factors such 
as risk-sharing, the supply of capital, opportunities, sharing of market information, 
honest partners and also the provision of long-standing dynasties through inter-
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marriage which were important, rather than spurious pious attitudes and beliefs.
182
 
Credit worthiness and the effective supply of capital within the Quaker community is 
also deemed to be an important factor in industrial development by Prior & Kirby, 
who provided the important example of the building of Britain’s first commercial 
railway line between Stockton and Darlington in 1825, which was funded through 
Quaker connections.
183
 
The influence of Quaker beliefs, attitudes and community upon the UK confectionery 
market  and how this influenced the individual and collective behaviour of individual 
firms, their corporate objectives and how this has manifested itself into financial 
performance,  will be explored later. 
Regarding Quaker involvement in the UK confectionery market, Walvin mentioned 
that the establishment of Joseph Fry as a businessman in 1753 was made with “the 
assistance of other Friends”, as Bristol had a thriving Quaker community at this 
time.
184
 With this support, Fry had the confidence to consider the future expansion of 
his business by concentrating on cocoa and chocolate. Daiper traced Fry’s expansion 
to the purchase of the Churchman business in 1761, including the patent for the 
mechanical process of chocolate production, and then deciding to invest in larger 
premises as well as purchasing a Boulton & Watt water engine to further enhance his 
firm’s capabilities.185 It is interesting to note here that even after Fry had taken over 
the Churchman business, which provided the technical expertise, he continued to 
advertise ‘Churchman Chocolate’, which obviously meant that Fry recognised the 
importance of the acquired ‘brand’ name and the leverage this gave to his own 
products, which he continued to market alongside. Daiper also suggested that the 
geographical location of the infant Fry confectionery business was a key factor in 
terms of a relatively affluent customer base in Bristol, given that cocoa and chocolate 
were still an expensive luxury, and also that Bristol was also a major port for 
immediate access to key imported raw materials.
186
  
Data on the performance of Fry as one of the early manufacturers of confectionery 
during this period is almost non-existent, though Daiper pointed out, that by 1764 Fry 
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had built up a network of agents in 53 locations throughout the country and had 
opened a large warehouse in London, providing evidence of a national operation.
187
 
Also the company moved into larger premises in Bristol in 1777 to cope with the 
increased demand. Following Joseph Fry’s premature death in 1787, the company 
briefly passed to his wife until his son Joseph Storrs Fry was old enough to take full 
responsibility for the running of the business in 1795. Almost immediately, J. S. Fry 
began a programme of expansion and mechanisation in production, using these 
technical advances as a point of difference in his advertising claims.  
Fry’s expansion was halted in the general economic slump following the Napoleonic 
Wars, which lasted until around 1840, and as Clarence-Smith pointed out this was a 
stagnant market for confectionery in general with few real advances made during this 
period. He goes on to state that even the major technical breakthrough made by C. J. 
Van Houten in 1828 and the effective removal of the high fat content of cocoa was 
insufficient to provide an impetus to the market.
188
 Data contained in Figure 2.2 
regarding the sales performance of Fry is available from 1822, and clearly shows the 
effect of the economic depression of 1820-40, but expansion after this between 1840 
and 1865: 
Figure 2.2.  J.S. Fry & Sons: Sales 1822-1865. (In £’s) 
 
Source: Daiper (1988, p. 37). 
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Daiper attributed the success of the company during this time to the effect of J.S. 
Fry’s three sons who took control of the business after his death in 1835.189 The effect 
of Fry on the market was substantial in the mid-nineteenth century. The demand for 
cocoa products was increasing due to the external environment already discussed in 
chapter 1 and Fry’s provided additional stimulus by providing new products which 
would appeal to different  ranges of consumers, including a ‘healthy options’ range. 
Of course it was working class consumers who grew rapidly during this period and 
Fry deliberately targeted this section by providing a product designed to appeal to this 
market, and from which much of the sales expansion was to come. 
During the mid-nineteenth century the UK market demonstrated an increasing affinity 
for edible cocoa products, rather than just cocoa beverage. This demand was 
stimulated by imports of chocolate ‘assortments’ consisting of different flavours 
being produced by French manufacturers. Clarence-Smith offered the examples of 
Pelletier in Paris, Louit of Bordeaux and especially Menier of Noisiel.
190
 As was 
usual in the industry, Menier began in business, by manufacturing medicinal 
products, with chocolate as a side-line, but confectionery quickly became the 
mainstay of his business after he pioneered the process of the efficient packaging of 
chocolate and cocoa products. Menier had expanded greatly during this period and 
invested heavily in new production technologies at their purpose-built factory in 
Noisiel near Paris, which became known as the “cathedral”.191 Indeed, it was claimed 
that this factory was the largest confectionery manufacturing unit in the world at the 
time. Daiper pointed out that Fry’s along with other British manufacturers attempted 
to copy the ‘French’ style by offering individual sweets in an attractive boxed 
assortment.
192
 Clarence-Smith also claimed that individual bars of eating chocolate 
were introduced by the company as early as 1852, with the Royal Navy being one of 
the biggest customers.
193
 
Whilst the UK confectionery market did expand considerably during the mid-
nineteenth century, in contextual terms it was still a small and highly fragmented 
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industry with Fry’s becoming the largest player during this time, with only 193 
employees in 1867.  
The Cadbury family had been prominent Quakers in the Birmingham area for some 
years carrying out a number of business operations including draper, tea dealer and 
coffee roaster. In 1831, John Cadbury began his career as a chocolate manufacturer, 
and according to Walvin he divided his time between the development of his business 
and philanthropic duties in the city of Birmingham in his role as a leading Quaker.
194
 
The focus of John Cadbury was not entirely on the management of the business, and 
as a result financial problems began to occur, partly as a consequence of their 
products being inferior in quality to other cocoa manufacturers.
195
 It is estimated by 
Walvin that Cadbury had become one of the smallest of approximately thirty cocoa 
and chocolate manufacturers in the UK at this time. Consequently, the control of the 
business was assumed by two of John Cadury’s sons, Richard and George Snr. in 
1861, with product quality their first priority in re-establishing their reputation in the 
market. A key decision in 1866 was to incorporate the Van Houten process for 
removing the high fat content from the cocoa bean. Their new product Cocoa 
Essence, became key to the company’s future prosperity, although in the short term it 
probably saved the business from liquidation.
196
 Again, putting the role of Cadbury as 
a business into context, Clarence-Smith estimated that the company only employed 
30 people in 1860.
197
 
The other eventual prominent large player in the UK confectionery market was 
Rowntree of York, another Quaker family. The original cocoa and chocolate business 
had been established in York during the early eighteenth century by another Quaker 
family, the Tukes. Mennel stated that like many others, the Tuke business 
encompassed many Grocery activities.
198
 In 1861 Henry Isaac Rowntree purchased 
the cocoa and confectionery operation of the Tuke business and set up his own 
factory in York moving into new premises in 1862, and also placing product quality 
at the forefront of the new business. According to Fitzgerald the business employed 
about 12 people in 1862, demonstrating that the company was very small indeed in 
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comparison to other manufacturers.
199
 In a situation similar to the Cadbury 
experience, Henry Isaac Rowntree was more interested in the activities of the Quaker 
movement in York than in the business, and by 1869 the company was on the brink of 
bankruptcy. According to Fitzgerald, only the decision by Henry Isaac to bring his 
brother Joseph Rowntree into the business to provide much needed financial skills, 
which prevented the looming liquidation of the company. 
The confectionery market was, by 1870, gradually increasing due to demand created 
by the external factors examined in chapter 1. The industry which grew up to satisfy 
the market was very fragmented, innovation had been implemented at a very slow 
pace and the individual companies were dominated by Quaker influences.  
2.5 Growth & Expansion: 1870-1914 
If the foundations of the confectionery market were laid during the early and mid- 
nineteenth century, then the period from around 1870 to the start of the Great War is 
when the market grew and expanded to meet the demand created by the factors 
considered in chapter 1. Published data illustrating the growth and expansion of the 
confectionery market is only available from 1900, and this information provides 
invaluable insights into the dynamics of its development during this period (see 
Appendix 1). 
The influence of foreign manufacturers on the UK market during the early part of the 
nineteenth century has already been alluded to in the form of Van Houten of Holland 
in the drinking cocoa category and Menier of France in the chocolate assortments 
category. Indeed, Othick suggested that up to around 1890, Van Houten probably sold 
more drinking cocoa than any other manufacturer in the UK.
200
 This influence was 
further increased by the expansion of the confectionery industry in Switzerland, 
principally in the chocolate blocks category, which had a profound effect in the 
shaping of the UK market in the years up to 1914, to technological developments 
already described in chapter 1, and their exploitation. There were, however, other 
factors which enabled them to successfully assault foreign manufacturers in the UK 
market prior to the Great War, and these factors will be discussed in due course. 
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During the early part of the nineteenth century a number of small confectionery 
manufacturers emerged in Switzerland to serve their domestic market. Wey  
described the emergence of the Swiss confectionery industry and claimed that F.L. 
Cailler of Vevey was one of the early pioneers, having learnt the skills of the 
confectioner in Italy before opening up his own manufacturing facility in 1819
201
. 
Wey discussed Cailler’s contemporaries, including Phillipe Suchard of Neuchatel in 
1826, Amadee Kohler of Lausanne in 1830, Rudolf Sprungli of Zurich in 1845, 
Daniel Peter of Vevey in 1867, Jean Tobler of Berne in 1869, Rudolf Lindt of Berne 
in 1879 and Henri Nestle in 1905, and suggested that the years 1890-1920 were the 
heyday of the Swiss chocolate industry in terms of its influence throughout the world: 
by 1912 the Swiss had cornered 55% of the world’s chocolate export market.202 It 
was only the outbreak of the Great War and the subsequent difficult years that 
eventually ended Swiss dominance and allowed domestic manufacturers, particularly 
in the UK, to take advantage of the vacuum left by Swiss companies. 
Heer provided some explanation of the reasons why the Swiss were so successful 
during this period in penetrating export markets, especially in the UK. The root of the 
technological breakthrough in the creation of a ‘milk chocolate’ by Daniel Peter, as 
described in chapter 1, was in the availability of condensed milk, which had in turn 
been the source of another separate, but successful industry also based in 
Switzerland.
203
 Heer went on to describe the fierce competition between the two main 
manufacturers of condensed milk in Europe during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth century: The Anglo-Swiss Condensed 
Milk Company of Cham, and Nestle of Vevey.
204
 The Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk 
Company had been created in 1866 by two American brothers, Charles and George 
Page, supported by other American and Swiss businessmen. The term “Anglo” in the 
company was designed to ensure greater acceptance in the UK market, as the new 
company clearly identified where the potential for sales was going to come from. 
Their main rival, Nestle had been founded by Henri Nestle, a chemist and inventor 
who had dabbled in various activities before creating the world’s first infant milk 
formula as a substitute for breast milk in 1867. The company expanded rapidly as 
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worldwide demand multiplied, but the aging Henri Nestle was not really a 
businessman and in 1874 he sold the business to three experienced Swiss 
industrialists, and effectively ceased all contact with the company that still bears his 
name. Before his retirement, it is interesting to note points out that despite some 
suggestions for change, particularly in some export markets,  Henri Nestle insisted 
the prominence of the “nest” trade mark in all of his products, thereby creating the 
brand image still perceived as important today.
205
 
Heer described how the new owners of the Nestle company began to expand the 
business, moving into the condensed milk sector in 1878 to challenge the Anglo-
Swiss Condensed Milk Company. The intense rivalry which followed forced both 
companies to improve their respective production, distribution and marketing 
capabilities, especially for Nestle, who were to later utilise these capabilities when 
they further expanded their scope of operations into the manufacture of confectionery 
in 1905 which had a profound effect on both the Swiss and the UK market.
206
 
Prior to Nestle entering the confectionery market, the other Swiss manufacturers had 
been carefully nurturing their own capabilities, based on innovative product offerings 
founded on the technological advances already identified. One contemporary 
commentator, Farrer ascribed part of the success of  Swiss manufacturers to the 
quality of local milk  coupled with the availability of cheap electricity and investment 
in the newest machinery.
207
 In Table 2.2 Farrer also provided some evidence of rapid 
growth during this period: 
Table 2.2 Total Exports of Swiss Confectionery 1890-1906 
Year Export Sales £’s Index 
1890 £85,331 100 
1895 £150,509 176 
1900 £434,599 509 
1906 £1,453,195 1703 
 
Source: Farrer (1908, pp. 111-112).  
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The total export sales described by Farrer were destined for many countries, but Heer  
suggested that about half went to the UK, encouraged by free trade and increasing 
consumer demand.
208
 Such was the attractiveness of the UK market, that a spate of 
mergers occurred between the leading Swiss confectionery manufacturers to establish 
formidable businesses capable of further assaults on the UK market. Heer  claimed 
that these arrangements were part of an overall strategy by Swiss companies to 
provide the capabilities to exploit export markets, particularly  within the UK. 
209
 
As part of these merger arrangements, Kohler joined with Peter in 1904 to form the 
Swiss General Chocolate Company, to which Nestle also agreed to a partial merger in 
1905. The rationale was that Nestle already had substantial distribution networks in 
the UK, which would provide the necessary leverage for expansion. In 1911 this 
alliance was strengthened by the addition of Cailler to establish a large and very 
dangerous threat to other manufacturers in the UK market. 
In addition to the onslaught of the Swiss manufacturers, the UK market also became 
the target of the German confectioner Stollwercks of Cologne, which Chandler 
described an example of a company which invested greatly in their organisational 
capabilities of marketing, advertising, packaging and distribution which enabled them 
to expand into Europe and the USA. Chandler claimed that this success was achieved 
through the recruitment of professional managers at a much earlier stage than at 
Cadbury’s; it appeared that foreign companies were much quicker to identify and 
exploit opportunities than their UK counterparts. Such was the Stollwercks ambition 
regarding their expansion in the UK market was that they opened a factory in London 
in 1903.
210
 
Although the UK market was greatly influenced by these foreign companies, her 
domestic manufacturers were also experiencing growth. J.S. Fry, the leading UK 
manufacturer, undertook an extensive building programme at their Bristol factory to 
cope with the increase in demand in the years following 1870. Daiper  put this into 
perspective, by indicating that the number of employees increased from 193 in 1867 
to around 5,000 by 1914.
211
 Despite the investment in new factory premises, 
                                                          
208
 Ibid., p. 85. 
209
 Ibid., p. 84. 
210
 Chandler, Scale and Scope,  pp. 399-401. 
211
 Daiper, J.S. Fry & Sons, p. 40. 
75 
 
Clarence-Smith pointed out that the expansion took place over many different sites 
within the company eventually having to co-ordinate eight different locations in 
Bristol.
212
 This, combined with the conservative attitude of ageing owner Joseph 
Storrs Fry regarding product development and advertising, saw the company’s market 
share gradually falling year by year, being finally overtaken by Cadbury’s in 1910 
(see Appendix 1). Daiper provided another explanation for the demise of Fry’s, 
claiming that it was complacency and a lack of entrepreneurial skills which proved 
costly, with the main criticism being levelled at Joseph Storrs Fry II, who never 
relinquished power to more younger and innovative members of the family, right up 
to his death in 1913 at the age of 87.
213
 
Cadbury’s embraced technological advancements in the drinking cocoa category as 
evidenced by the introduction of their unadulterated Cocoa Essence, based on the 
Van Houten process which, according to Bradley was the principal reason for the 
gradual erosion of Fry’s market position; the latter had steadfastly persevered with 
their long-standing adulterated cocoa brands.
214
 
As briefly discussed in chapter 1, the topic of the adulteration of foods had been a 
long-standing issue in the UK and it was partly through lobbying by Cadbury’s that 
led to the Adulteration of Foods Acts in 1872 and 1875.
215
 Bradley emphasised the 
point that the fallout from this legislation was that manufacturers had to state on their 
labels what had been added to their product, which of course gave the Cadbury 
offering a unique point of difference, given that their cocoa was “pure” and free from 
additives.
216
 
The success of Cadbury’s unadulterated Cocoa Essence continued to the end of the 
nineteenth century and enabled the company to move to a purpose built factory at 
Bourneville just outside Birmingham in 1879, employing just 230 people, but this 
rose to 1,193 by 1889 and 2,685 by 1899. Smith, Child & Rowlinson viewed this 
move by Cadbury as being an important strategic change for the industry which 
                                                          
212
 Clarence-Smith, Cocoa and Chocolate,  p. 40. 
213
 Ibid., p. 49. 
214
 Bradley, Cadbury’s Purple Reign,  p. 12. 
215
 Many food manufacturers including Fry’s had opposed the legislation, maintaining that the practice 
of  adding other substances enhanced flavour in their products. See French and Phillips Cheated not 
Poisoned,  pp. 35-36. 
216
 Bradley, Cadbury’s Purple Reign.,  p.13. 
76 
 
others had to follow if they were to be able to remain in business.
217
 However, as 
Smith, et al pointed out, there had already been examples of other UK confectionery 
firms moving into new modern factories, notably Epps & Co in 1872. This change in 
the Cadbury ambition was matched by the decision to register as a private limited 
company in 1899.
218
 
However, despite their progress, Cadbury’s dominance of the drinking cocoa 
category was challenged by a new version of the product by Van Houten, who had 
developed improvements in the taste and texture of cocoa by introducing alkali into 
the process, as described in chapter 1. The new cocoa was marketed in the UK by 
Van Houten and immediately began to have adverse effects on other cocoas which 
were available, and particularly Cadbury’s Cocoa Essence. This caused controversy 
as the addition of alkali was perceived by some as a return to adulteration; indeed 
Bradley described how Cadbury launched a campaign to try and prove that the 
addition of alkali was harmful to consumers.
219
 This campaign proved to be counter-
productive for Cadbury:  the market positioning for ‘purity’ in the cocoa market had 
been overtaken by consumer desire for taste and solubility, which Van Houten had 
identified and was subsequently exploiting. Cadbury’s had mistakenly thought that 
their Cocoa Essence was the driver of their success, but perhaps they were simply 
expanding along with the market in general.
220
 Indeed, by the beginning of the 
twentieth century sales growth of Cocoa Essence halted, and then gradually began to 
decline in line with Cadbury’s market share (see Appendix 1).  
The response by Cadbury’s was to introduce two new products which were 
eventually to prepare the foundations for their future success. In the drinking cocoa 
category, they abandoned their initial opposition to the Van Houten alkalized cocoa 
and developed their own version, Bourneville Cocoa in 1906.
221
 This effectively 
meant the beginning of the end for their previously biggest selling line, Cocoa 
Essence. The other major product development was in the milk chocolate blocks 
category, a direct response to the growing threat from Swiss manufacturers. Bradley 
claimed that the significant insight that was made was that the increasing public 
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preference for Swiss milk chocolate did not depend on the ‘cocoa’ credentials, but 
was the ‘milk’ credentials.222 This realisation provided the foundation for the 
introduction of Cadbury Dairy Milk in 1905, claiming the ‘glass and a half’ of full 
cream milk as their major selling point. The approach to this product has been largely 
unchanged to the present day. The initial marketing of Cadbury Dairy Milk  
emphasised quality and value, as opposed to the Swiss approach of presentation and 
advertising, and this had the effect of slowly building a notable brand following up to 
the outbreak of the Great War.
223
 
The category of chocolate assortments (or ‘boxed chocolates’), which had been 
dominated by French manufacturers, notably Menier, who had expanded extensively 
and also had established a factory in London in 1870 was also challenged by 
Cadury’s.224 This category was more specialised in nature, but as with cocoa and milk 
chocolate, the company simply copied the market leaders, even to the extent of 
opening an office in Paris which gave the company certain ‘French’ credentials on 
their packaging and other promotional materials.
225
 The main product developed by 
Cadbury in this category was Milk Tray, introduced in 1915.
226
 Overall this meant 
that by 1914, Cadbury employed around 7,500 people at their Bournville 
headquarters.
227
 
The UK’s third major cocoa manufacturers, Rowntree were also trying to compete 
effectively in the confectionery market during this time. In the drinking chocolate 
category, they introduced their Elect Cocoa brand in 1887, a product version of the 
Van Houten process which meant it could compete against other premium cocoas like 
Cadbury’s Cocoa Essence.228 However, Fitzgerald pointed out that the drinking 
chocolate market included a large segment of cheap unbranded versions, which firms 
like Rowntree, Cadbury and Fry reluctantly felt they had to engage within order to 
defend their respective market shares.
229
 Although as Goodall explained, it was the 
innovative marketing techniques used by Rowntrees, including sampling and coupons 
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which allowed the company to compete effectively in a market segment which had 
been dominated by Van Houten and Cadbury.
230
 
Nonetheless, it was in the sugar confectionery category which was to be the 
foundation of Rowntree success following the introduction of Fruit Pastilles and 
Fruit Gums in 1881.
231
 These products were normally imported from French 
manufacturers, and the folklore suggested that a French confectioner Claude Gaget 
“called upon the Rowntree factory” offering his services to help develop their product 
range.
232
 After much product development Rowntree firmly established their market 
position in this category, and as Fitzgerald stated, it was the increase in sales of Fruit 
Pastilles and Fruit Gums that inspired the decision to move to purpose built premises 
on the outskirts of York in 1890, following the earlier decision by Cadbury to move 
to their Bournville site.
233
 In line with their expansion, Rowntree’s became a private 
limited company in 1897, chiefly to raise further capital for the company’s plans for 
further development at their new site.
234
 
The one category which was proving elusive for domestic manufacturers at the end of 
the nineteenth century, and the start of the twentieth century was in chocolate blocks, 
in which the Swiss were the dominant competitors. Rowntrees’ own development of 
milk chocolate was uninspiring, and their offerings at the time bore ‘Swiss’ sounding 
names like “Alpine” and “Mountain Milk” to try and emulate the market leaders, but 
the quality of their offerings was inferior to Swiss products.
235
 Consequently, in this 
period Rowntree were unable to mount a successful challenge in the chocolate blocks 
category. 
In addition to the three main UK manufacturers of Fry, Cadbury and Rowntree, and 
the plethora of foreign companies, the UK confectionery market was extremely 
fragmented, and other manufacturers vied for market share. Clarence-Smith, 
mentioned Terry’s of York, another Quaker company founded in 1767, Taylor 
Brothers of London, who had once claimed to be ‘the largest manufacturers of cocoa 
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in Europe’, and also Carsons of Scotland.236 However, the firm of Mackintosh’s of 
Halifax was probably the most important ‘other’ UK confectionery manufacturer. 
Fitzgerald described Mackintosh’s, founded in 1890 and incorporated in 1899 by a 
leading Methodist John Mackintosh, as a major influence on the UK market because 
they manufactured and marketed a range of distinctive products, concentrating 
initially on the sugar category.
237
 Their early competence was in the development a 
range of toffee products, building on the popular American caramels, but with a 
softer, more chewy texture which appealed to UK taste. Fitzgerald also suggested that 
the company was a leader in the marketing of their products evidenced by the 
quadrupling of their overall market share in the years from 1900 to 1914 (see 
Appendix 1).
238
 
In summary, the UK confectionery market experienced significant growth during the 
years leading up to the beginning of the Great War, fuelled by: technological 
developments, chiefly from the continent, which greatly enhanced the quality of the 
products being marketed; increasing use of advertising and marketing techniques; 
falling costs (both raw material and manufacturing costs), and an increasing level of 
affluence which allowed for the development of consumer goods. In value terms, the 
UK market almost doubled in the years 1900 (£16.25m.) to 1914 (£31.04m.) - see 
Appendix 1. In this period competition was not merely between the leading UK 
manufacturers, but also involved aggressive European firms who wanted to exploit 
the commercial opportunities. It is also worth pointing out that  the three major UK 
manufacturers, Fry, Cadbury and Rowntree were not particularly innovative 
companies, but imitated the technologies and ideas that had been invented elsewhere 
in Europe.
239
.  
2.6 Impact of the Great War: 1914-1918 
It is widely accepted that the Great War had a significant impact upon the UK 
confectionery market, both during the war itself and in the conditions that existed in 
the post-war period. 
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The data in Appendix 1 shows that there was no increase in the total market shares of 
the UK manufacturer’s in the years prior to the Great War, confirming the increasing 
encroachment of foreign competition. Heer acknowledged that the outbreak of war 
posed significant problems for Swiss confectionery companies who relied heavily on 
a thriving export trade, but who encountered raw material supply shortages and an 
ever increasing blockade for finished products to export destinations like the UK.
240
 
Bradley claimed that the war reduced the imports of Swiss chocolate to a trickle, 
thereby eliminating the biggest competition to Cadbury’s Dairy Milk brand in the 
block chocolate category.
241
 Bradley also suggested that the war decimated Van 
Houten’s sales in the drinking cocoa category, which never recovered once hostilities 
were over,
242
 whilst Chandler reported the fact that the London factory premises of 
the German company Stollwercks was appropriated by the UK government at the 
start of the hostilities, with the result that the company never recovered its UK market 
position.
243
 
A key effect of the war was the acute shortages of raw materials, in addition to 
labour, following mobilization. According to Fitzgerald, this was the catalyst for 
placing greater emphasis on greater efficiency, standardisation and longer production 
runs, combined with a new approach to marketing based on the sudden mismatch 
between supply and consumer demand.
244
 Bradley also echoed the point, claiming 
that  the war had forced Cadbury to significantly reconfigure their product range and 
methods of manufacture, making production efficiency the new priority.
245
 
Prior to the war there had been some collusion between the three major UK 
manufacturers of Fry’s , Cadbury’s and Rowntree’s, and as Clarence-Smith pointed 
out this was based on the fact that all were connected by their Quaker affiliations.
246
 
But this collusion was limited to giving discounts to retailers and fixing minimum 
prices, especially in the chocolate blocks category. Othick also claimed that collusion 
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in the UK confectionery industry included agreements on raw material supply, 
railway freight costs, trade-marks and advertising.
247
 
One direct consequence of the war was that these informal arrangements generated 
more serious discussions regarding a formal merger of the three main Quaker-
controlled companies, which would provide a stronger entity to defend against any 
possible renewed onslaught from foreign competitors.
248
 Fitzgerald described more 
formal arrangements between Fry and Cadbury were instigated in 1915, which were 
to become known as the “Cheltenham Conferences”, although Rowntree’s declined 
participation at that point.
249
 As the war progressed, Daiper claimed that Cadburys 
made a formal merger offer to Frys in 1918 in arguing that such a merger would 
reduce the wasteful elements of competition, better serve the community, as well as 
providing a more robust adversary for any foreign manufacturers.
250
 Daiper  
maintained that this suggestion from Cadbury came at a time of anxiety for the Frys 
because of its falling market share, its inability to compete effectively, and they 
therefore agreed to a formal merger.
251
 Unfortunately the advisors to the firms could 
not agree upon a basis for merger, so a holding company was formed - the British 
Cocoa & Chocolate Co (BCCC), in which Cadbury members dominated the board. 
The two companies traded separately following this arrangement, until official 
amalgamation in the form of a takeover took place in 1936. As Fitzgerald mentioned, 
although Rowntree’s agreed to participate in  the Cheltenham Conferences in 1918, 
the rationale for not wanting to join the merger with the BCCC was that it was at 
variance with company principles of fair trading and fair employment.
252
 This 
opinion was, however, to change within a short period of time following the cessation 
of hostilities. 
The Great War therefore changed the landscape of the UK confectionery industry. 
Some of the major competitive threats had been removed, giving opportunities for 
domestic manufacturers to consider how to compete in the new world environment. 
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2.7 Maturity & Mass Market: 1919-1938 
1919-1923 
Analysis of the total UK confectionery market provided in Appendix 1 shows that in 
sales value the market grew by 190% between 1900 and 1914, stimulated greatly by 
the availability (up until 1914) of a range of superior product offerings in various 
categories from European manufacturers. As we have seen, the Great War 
temporarily reduced these foreign products in the UK almost to zero, providing the 
opportunity for domestic manufacturers to fill the vacuum that this created. Indeed as 
Corley has indicated, the inter-war period saw a 30% rise in consumer’s real 
expenditure which created enormous opportunities for domestic producers of 
consumer goods in a range of “Buy British” initiatives during this time.253 
Within the confectionery market, it has already been demonstrated that Cadbury had 
successfully replicated the quality of the pre-1914 foreign offerings with the 
introduction of Dairy Milk block milk chocolate in 1905, Bournville Cocoa in 1906 
and Milk Tray in 1915. Bradley argued that these pre-war initiatives provided 
Cadbury with a competitive advantage in terms of product offerings, enabling them to 
control the direction of the market in the years immediately following the war.
254
 
However, as Bradley pointed out, Cadbury had no idea at the time that the substantial 
threat from the pre-war foreign manufacturers would not return in earnest once 
hostilities were ended.
255
 Therefore, as a possible defence against this eventuality, 
Cadbury passed on the reductions in raw material prices that occurred between 1920 
and 1924 to the consumer. This meant that for Cadbury, by 1924 the retail price of 
their biggest sellers Bournville Cocoa and Dairy Milk were back at their pre-war price 
levels.
256
 
Cadbury attempted to understand the nature of the UK confectionery market in the 
years following the Armistice. Fitzgerald has pointed out that the company 
introduced sales planning by collecting information on regional sales patterns, which 
provided data on the efficiency of its distribution systems.
257
 However, whilst this 
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new use of data provided information that the company was increasing its sales, 
Fitzgerald suggested that it was the success of Dairy Milk that was providing the 
expansion: the market for cocoa beverages had peaked, and would remain unchanged 
for the next fifty years.
258
 
Whilst Cadbury appeared to be in a more fortunate position following the end of the 
Great War, having already established their CDM brand in the block chocolates 
category, Rowntree’s suffered as a consequence. However, as Appendix 1 illustrates, 
the market share for both companies was in decline during this crucial period when 
significant opportunities presented themselves to UK domestic manufacturers.  The 
explanation why Rowntree’s suffered in terms of sales immediately after the war 
came from Joseph Rowntree who blamed the deterioration of the quality of their 
products on the inferior raw materials available during the conflict. Terry’s of York 
had become one of the leading manufacturers in the assortments category, and 
Rowntree’s saw their opportunity to introduce lines which could challenge this 
position.
259
  
One of the key categories in which Rowntree’s had a dominant position was in the 
sugar category, especially so with their Fruit Gums and Fruit Pastilles, but as 
Fitzgerald commented, it was the new sales in toffee products which were increasing 
within the sugar category, not the products that Rowntree’s were offering.260 In a later 
study Fitzgerald claimed that it was Mackintosh’s who were at the forefront of the 
development of toffee lines in the years after the war, even though the founder of the 
company John Mackintosh died in 1920, and the company passed to his sons who 
continued to manage the company as before.
261
 Fitzgerald stated that the overall 
company strategy was of promoting product quality and differentiation through 
advertising campaigns, rather than price, believing that price-cutting was detrimental 
to manufacturers, retailers and consumers.
262
 Fitzgerald went on to comment on the 
opinion of the company that confectionery should remain a “luxury” for which a 
demand had to be created.
263
 Despite this position, events made the board of 
Mackintosh’s re-consider its strategy in the light of the price-cutting atmosphere 
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created by its rivals. One of the options considered by the company was to develop 
products in the chocolate category following the establishment of their own 
laboratory in 1922. Because the company considered that its name was synonymous 
with toffee products, Mackintosh’s also considered some form of partnership in the 
development of chocolate lines with Terry’s of York and Whitfield’s of London, but 
without success.
264
 
During the early 1920’s Rowntree’s efforts to compete were thwarted by the 
efficiencies that the merger between Cadbury and Fry had provided, particularly in 
distribution, and consequently in 1921 they decided to extend its own distribution 
network.
265
 However, despite these efforts, it was the inability to challenge the 
success of Cadbury in the key category of milk chocolate blocks that prevented 
Rowntree from improving their position any further. Fitzgerald estimated that by 
1922, Cadbury’s sales of milk blocks were some twenty times greater than that of 
Rowntree.
266
 Rowntree’s decision to cut advertising expenditure at a time when 
Cadbury’s were increasing their own, exacerbated the problem. 
Depressed economic conditions during the early 1920’s meant that any attempt to 
enforce resale price maintenance on branded goods was doomed to failure, and as 
Fitzgerald pointed out this provided the first evidence that the larger multiple retailers 
were beginning to exert their power and influence on the market. 
267
Also smaller 
retailers saw some benefits during this period as wholesale prices fell, but their own 
margins stayed the same. 
Compelling evidence for falling prices is provided by Bradley who stated that 
between 1920 and 1924, the price of a half-pound block of Cadbury Dairy Milk fell 
from two shillings to one shilling (modern decimal equivalent = 10p down to 5p).
268
 
The company felt that the prevailing economic conditions provided no alternative but 
to continue with this strategy.
269
 
In 1923 the long-standing chairmanship of Joseph Rowntree passed to his son 
Seebohm, bringing with it radical changes to the company’s operations, particularly 
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in labour management, production and administration, although Fitzgerald claimed 
rather unflatteringly, that marketing was not one of his business talents.
270
 However, 
circumstances forced the company into reducing their prices in line with the market, 
these being forced through by Cadbury-Fry via the ‘Cheltenham Conferences’, which 
were a series of meetings of the large confectionery manufacturers designed to 
discuss matters of mutual interest, or to facilitate collusion . These decisions were 
seen by some members of the Rowntree management as a deliberate ploy by the new 
combine to restrict their ability to advertise to any great extent. Confident of its own 
position as the dominant force in the market, and under the direct influence of the 
Cadbury management, Fry’s re-located from cramped city centre premises to new 
purpose-built facilities on the outskirts of Bristol. 
In terms of the overall UK confectionery market during this period, Appendix 1 
reveals that sales value was £102.70 million in 1920, but had reduced to only £68.10 
million by 1924, reflecting severe price-cutting policies of the major manufacturers. 
Fitzgerald contrasted this decline in relative sales value with the absolute increase in 
volume between over the same period: 295,000 tons in 1920 and 322,000 tons in 
1924.
271
 This meant that the overall sales value per ton fell from £348 in 1920 to only 
£211 by 1924, a reduction of some 40%. 
1924-29 
Despite the price reduction strategies of the major manufacturers in the years 
following the war, overall sales of confectionery began to falter, and as Bradley 
noted, for Cadbury this meant a reduction of 9% in sales revenue between 1925 and 
1928, and halving of trading profits.  This was despite a 50% increase in advertising 
over the same period. Failure in the various advertising campaigns led the 
management of Cadbury to conclude that it was the perception of ‘value for money’ 
by the consumer which was the over-riding factor determining any future growth in 
sales; the selling price was key in any strategic considerations.
272
 Fitzgerald  
described how the company embarked on a substantial investment programme in 
plant and machinery beginning in 1924 at their Bournville factory with the sole 
purpose of increasing mechanisation to reduce unit product costs, the savings of 
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which would then be passed on to the consumer.
273
 The company predicated this 
decision on the belief that per capita consumption of confectionery in the UK was far 
lower than that of say Germany or the USA, so they believed that there was still more 
scope for the UK market to expand further, driven by the Cadbury concept of value. 
Bradley made the point that Cadbury decided to embark on this capital investment 
programme because management wanted to have more internal control of their ability 
to reduce unit costs, rather than depend on the uncertainty of further falls in the price 
of raw materials, particularly cocoa beans, which had risen temporarily during this 
period (see Figure 2.2).
274
 Wagner claimed that the capital investments made by 
Cadbury meant that they had the most modern confectionery manufacturing factory in 
the world, capable of producing enormous outputs.
275
 It is also worth noting here that 
Bradley pointed out that a closer inspection of the advertising campaigns conducted 
by Cadbury’s during this period was to focus principally on the fact that prices were 
indeed being reduced.
276
 The only exception to this was the introduction of the “Glass 
and a Half of Full Cream Milk” slogan in 1928.277 
By virtue of these strategies, Cadbury’s determined the dynamics of the whole UK 
confectionery market and other manufacturers had to find ways of competing, either 
by following the price reduction avenue, or by some alternative means. For 
Mackintosh, their plans for expansion into other categories were thwarted, as we have 
already noted above. As Fitzgerald commented, the company also began to invest in 
capital equipment designed to reduce their overall cost base, but also to improve and 
then maintain quality, with products also being heavily promoted through various 
advertising campaigns.
278
 Consequently during this difficult period the company 
seemed content to try and survive on much smaller profits, and to try and have at least 
some control over price-setting with the acquisition in 1927 of some confectionery 
retail outlets. In a further attempt to diversify its product range and to pre-empt the 
threat posed by chewing gum to its chewing toffee, Mackintosh acquired Anglo-
American Chewing Gum Ltd. in 1929.
279
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The overall market conditions during the second half of the 1920’s also impacted 
upon Rowntree’s, and the priority appeared to be that a stagnant market share 
position had to be arrested. Fitzgerald noted that the company decided upon the 
prioritization of categories, with support for the cocoa beverage category being 
withdrawn and increased effort devoted to block chocolate with the development and 
advertising support of new lines in this category.
280
 Nonetheless plans to launch an 
alternative to Cadburys Dairy Milk in 1927 were postponed because further price 
reductions by Cadbury prevented Rowntree’s from competing on price. Rowntree’s 
did have some success in its product range in the plain chocolate block category. 
However, as Fitzgerald conceded, the company’s decision in 1927 to launch its Fruit 
Gums and Fruit Pastilles products in the now familiar single tube format in the sugar 
category proved to be a resounding success, reinforcing Rowntree’s dominant 
position in this sector. Despite Rowntree’s long-standing stance on quality as a major 
part of its core competence, the company conceded that there was a large market for 
lower quality confectionery, and it decided that it would enter this market via the 
acquisition of subsidiary companies like Epps, Whitfield’s and Duncan’s, who 
operated in different parts of the country, because this market was very regional. 
Fitzgerald also pointed to the attempt by Rowntree’s to challenge the assortments 
category, with new initiatives developed during 1927 and 1928 to launch new 
offerings in this market.
281
 The sum effect of the actions by the management at 
Rowntree’s was to improve the company’s market share by 1929 from its 1924 (see 
Appendix 1). 
Overall, in a trend which repeated the early 1920’s pattern, the UK confectionery 
market during the second half of the 1920’s experienced declining sales value terms 
from £68.1 million in 1924 to £66.4 million by 1929. In terms of volume growth the 
market did grow by almost 19% from 322,000 tons in 1924 to 382,000 tons in 1929, 
supporting the Cadbury proposition that there was potential growth in the per capita 
consumption within the UK market. 
These figures once again reflect the overall situation of the market as being one of 
price cutting, resulting in declines in sales revenues for the individual manufacturers 
from £211 per ton in 1924 to £174 per ton by 1929. This obviously had the effect on 
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the squeezing of margins, unless manufacturers reduced their cost bases to 
compensate for the reduction in revenues. Cadbury’s were at the forefront of this 
policy and they continued to drive the direction of the overall UK market as they 
improved their production, distribution and marketing capabilities. It is perhaps worth 
noting here that despite strong organisational capabilities which enabled Cadbury to 
dictate the course of the market during the 1920’s, its main product offerings had 
been developed before the Great War;  failure to build upon these by further product 
development during the post-war period would affect the company in the future. Past 
evidence suggests that success in its products was derived from the imitation of 
technological innovations made by others, and then improved the processes via mass 
production techniques which made them better and more cost efficient.  
1930-34 
The global economic consequences of the 1929 financial crash were to be felt 
throughout the early 1930’s and had direct effects on all markets as unemployment 
reached record proportions, particularly in some regions of the UK, as has already 
been identified in Chapter 1. 
For the UK confectionery market, the dawn of the 1930’s continued to follow the 
direction already instigated by Cadbury throughout the whole of the 1920’s. The new 
order of austerity dovetailed with the policy of further reductions in prices in order to 
try and maintain or indeed increase demand during these difficult times.  
For Cadbury the strategy was simple: continue to make further price reductions on the 
company’s leading brands thereby making the product accessible to more consumers. 
Bradley confirmed that the price of a half-pound block of Dairy Milk was reduced in 
stages from one shilling in 1926 down to 8d by 1934 (decimal equivalent = 5p to 
3.3p), and had by 1933 achieved its ‘2d. for 2oz.’objective.282 This was used as a 
slogan   extensively in subsequent advertising campaigns by Cadbury. This caused a 
five-fold increase in sales of Dairy Milk, and by 1934 chocolate was being consumed 
by 90% of the population, thereby transforming what had been a luxury product 
consumed on infrequent occasions before the Great War, to a food for the masses - a 
candidate for basic expenditure - and arguably made possible by Cadbury strategy. 
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However, as Fitzgerald explained, despite the success of the company during this 
time, Cadbury were always conscious of possible threats from other competitors in 
what was still a very fragmented market with a multitude of UK manufacturers (see 
Appendix 2), vying for market share.
283
 Fitzgerald went on to make the point that 
Cadbury sought to consolidate its position as market leader by investing heavily in 
improvements to the company’s distribution systems, especially through its depot 
system and extensive use of lorry transport to complement its railway links.
284
 The 
net effect of this initiative was not only to provide the necessary infrastructure to 
make sure that its products were distributed as widely as possible to ensure optimum 
sales, but between 1922 and 1938 the company almost halved it’s per unit distribution 
costs, despite the 250,000 retailers that the company supplied.  
Attention to the production efficiency, administration and distribution capabilities 
enabled them to prosecute their price reduction strategy which influenced the way 
that Cadbury perceived the market and the consumer at this time. Bradley confirmed 
that the company’s sales representatives were instructed by senior management to 
direct their customers towards those products that the company could manufacture 
efficiently, rather than establishing what the customer actually wanted.
285
 This 
provides evidence that the company was a ‘production-orientated’ rather than 
‘market-orientated’. The company’s rationale for this stance was that the harsh 
economic climate of the inter-war period meant that affordability was the key driver 
of success. However, Bradley drew attention to the way that Cadbury also 
communicated to the UK public: a ‘bond’ was created to convince the way that the 
company was a good employer with high principles, using the Bournville factory and 
village as a clear example by arranging factory visits and tours.
286
 However, Smith, 
Child & Rowlinson pointed out that in reality most of the ordinary workers at 
Cadbury could not afford the rents in the Bournville village, and that the company 
simply wanted to promote themselves as ‘model employers’ using this as simply a 
marketing tool.
287
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Cadbury’s product development in the early 1930’s was limited to extensions in the  
milk chocolate blocks category which had proved so successful to the company, all 
using the ‘Cadbury’ house name to promote the brand, although a few other minor 
innovations in the stagnant cocoa beverage category were also introduced, principally 
to challenge the increasingly popular Ovaltine brand which had stolen market share. 
For Mackintosh’s the disappointments of the 1920’s were not alleviated during the 
early 1930’s as prices and sales continued to decline, and as Fitzgerald argued, the 
management of the company became fearful that this trend would associate the 
company’s products with the cheap goods end of the market, thereby reversing the 
message of quality and distinctiveness that the company had been trying to get across 
for years.
288
 During 1932, their toffee range was in the 3d. per quarter pound market, 
which was dangerously close to the 2d per quarter threshold which was the consumer 
perception of poor quality, which would obviously result in total loss of prestige for 
the company. This situation coincided with an approach from Rowntree’s for merger 
discussions to take place, but as Fitzgerald noted, the management of Mackintosh 
rejected the offer, and sought instead to purchase outright A.J. Caley & Son, an 
established confectionery business based in Bristol and Norwich, which had 
previously become part of the Unilever empire, but had ceased to become part of their 
future plans.
289
 Unilever therefore offered the company to Mackintosh at a bargain 
price, and suddenly they had access to an established chocolate producing operation 
which would provide them with the capability of entering the various expanding 
chocolate categories. This partnering of toffee and chocolate making expertise proved 
extremely beneficial to Mackintosh’s future. 
For Rowntree’s the dawn of a new decade also posed the same issues that the 
company had tried to overcome in the 1920’s, principally one of trying to compete in 
a market which was being driven by the price-cutting strategy of the leading 
manufacturer. As a possible solution to their dilemma, the senior management at 
Rowntree made the decision in 1930 to approach the Cadbury-Fry partnership with a 
view to a merger, but as Fitzgerald discovered, there was little incentive on the part of 
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Cadbury-Fry to the proposal given that they considered that Rowntree had little to 
offer the existing partnership, and the approach was formally rejected.
290
  
Following the rejection of the merger, the problem for Rowntree of trying to compete 
with Cadbury, especially in the milk chocolate blocks category was back on the 
agenda. Fitzgerald painted a gloomy picture of a company in crisis unable to find 
answers on how to compete effectively in the market, and was facing the fact it was 
facing the possibility of going out of business altogether, the rationale for this 
suggestion being that by 1934 the Rowntree share of the total market was still only 
5.0%, which was the same as it had been in 1920 (see Appendix 1).
291
 Bradley 
succinctly explained that it was a futile prospect for Rowntree even to attempt to 
compete with Cadbury in the categories in which it dominated, therefore the simple 
answer was to try and find out what alternative products would the consumer prefer 
in addition to what was already on offer on the market?
292
 There was to be an 
untapped mass market for other types of chocolate confectionery, and Rowntree’s, 
through a systematic and highly imaginative method of intelligence gathering and 
market research, put in place the mechanics of finding out this information. 
The clues to these new alternative ways of satisfying consumers came in the shape of 
innovation from a foreign manufacturer. Unlike the overseas competition from 
European manufacturers before the Great War, the new threat originated from the 
USA in the form of Mars. Brenner provided the background for the Mars company, 
established in Chicago by Frank Mars in 1923, producing simple to manufacture 
confectionery products which had become known as “count lines”, a practice that had 
become popular in the USA during the Great War because they were sold to service 
personnel by the number or “count”, rather by weight as was the tradition with 
chocolate blocks and assortments.
293
 According to Brenner Frank Mars had brought 
his son Forrest into the business, but they soon clashed over the direction that the 
business should go in, and in 1933 Forrest left the family business for Europe, where 
having spent short spells as an employee with Swiss confectionery manufacturers, set 
up his own version of the ‘Mars’ company in Slough, England with the intention of 
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challenging the UK market.
294
 The company introduced the Mars Bar and Milky Way 
brands to the UK, thereby introducing the new category of “count lines” onto the UK 
market which provided almost instant success. The key to the success of count lines 
was the ability to manufacture them in vast quantities principally using the same 
machinery, making them ideal for a market where value and the propensity to 
manufacture products cheaply and efficiently was paramount.  
Bradley claimed that Cadbury in the first instance did not perceive the new Mars 
challenge to be of significance,
295
 however Wagner pointed out that the newly 
appointed Marketing Director at Rowntree’s, George Harris,  was a personal friend of 
Forrest Mars, and wanted to bring some of his business philosophy to the company.
296
 
Wagner goes on to point out that the appointment of Harris by Rowntree in 1931 
coincided with the death of their long-standing advertising advisor Philip Benson. It 
was at this point that Rowntree opted to assign J. Walter Thompson (JWT) as their 
new advertising agents with the brief of making a challenge to the Cadbury 
domination.
297
 
Fitzgerald suggested that the early attempts by Rowntree’s in the early 1930’s were to 
have mixed results.
298
 A further attempt to challenge Cadbury Dairy Milk in the milk 
chocolate block category was in the development and eventual introduction of Extra 
Creamy Milk in 1933, but despite consumer preference for the new product, the 
Cadbury response was to simply reduce prices once again, and by 1934 the new 
initiative had to be withdrawn having made no impact on Cadbury sales. The other 
new product that had been developed by Rowntree in the assortments category, Black 
Magic, also launched in 1933 was more successful, with the development of the 
product being made using the new market research techniques that newly-appointed 
advertising agents JWT brought to the company.
299
 Ward  provided evidence that 
these new techniques were also being used by some of JWT’s other clients, including 
the Horlicks brand to great effect.
300
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The trend during the period 1930-34 was for the market to grow in terms of volume, 
from 382,000 tons in 1929 to 455,000 tons in 1935 (increase of 19.1%), but value 
once again declined from £66.4 million to £55.7 million during the same period, 
resulting in a £/ton reduction from £174 in 1929  to £122 in 1935. This reflected the 
continuing trends of the UK market, driven by the Cadbury strategy of continuous 
price reduction. However the changes that had begun during the early 1930’s began 
to have a more profound effect on the market in the later part of the decade up to the 
outbreak of the Second World War. 
1935-38 
More than any other, the years 1935-38 were to lay the foundations for the UK 
confectionery market which were to change very little for the next fifty years, finally 
transforming it into a truly mass market which had influence on the lives of the 
majority of the population.  
By 1935, the ‘loose’ partnership between Cadbury and Fry was re-examined, and as 
Bradley noted, Fry had continued to decline during the inter-war years, despite their 
modernisation plans, and therefore a formal takeover by Cadbury was accepted.
301
  
The original merger which had first taken place in 1918 had proved to be a mistake, 
given that the rationale to provide a stronger challenge to foreign competition proved 
to be unfounded in that the post-war surge from either the Swiss, or from the USA in 
the form of Hershey, never materialised, and Bradley claimed it had actually 
weakened the Cadbury business.
302
 
Cadbury was by no means ignorant of the emergence of the new count lines category, 
and had in fact wanted to launch its own version of an Australian product called 
Crunchie, but decided that it was so insignificant that they gave it to Fry to try out, 
with limited success. This seemed to be evidence to the company that the new 
category would be too small to worry about, and Cadbury therefore continued with 
their existing brands. 
For Rowntree, however, under their new marketing management team had by 1935 
several new product offerings in development, believing that unlike Cadbury, it was 
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the new count line category which offered scope for market development. As 
Fitzgerald, the first of these new products was Aero, an aerated milk chocolate, which 
offered some of the count line novelty appeal, but also challenged the milk chocolate 
block category at the same time, and was launched in late 1935, with spectacular 
success, being the most universally accepted new line that Rowntree had ever 
produced.
303
 The second of these new products was the introduction of Chocolate 
Crisp (later to be re-named Kit Kat), which created another new category, that of 
chocolate biscuit count lines (or CBCL’s as they were to be known later).304 Bradley  
however, claimed that it was Cadbury who first launched a product in this new 
category back in 1902, but failed to promote effectively and the line was withdrawn 
soon afterwards.
305
 
The introduction of Aero, and subsequent marketing that it was superior to other milk 
chocolates on the market caused unrest at Cadbury who obviously saw the new 
product as a threat to their market position. Wagner described how Cadbury took 
offence to the Rowntree marketing stance and made representations at the regular 
Cheltenham Conference in 1936, and veiled threats were made by Cadbury as to the 
consequences, including direct  response in the marketplace and also legal action.
306
 
The conflict rumbled on into 1938, when compromises were eventually made and 
settlements reached between the two companies. But as Wagner observed, it proved 
to be a watershed in that finally Cadbury’s market dominance was being challenged 
and that Rowntree were now a major force to be reckoned with.
307
 
Despite the fierce conflicts surrounding the introduction and marketing of Aero, it 
was Kit Kat which proved to be the most effective in the challenge for the UK 
market, becoming a large selling line despite receiving minimal advertising support, 
with brand names being prominent on the wrappers, and not the ‘house name’ as was 
the principal method used by Cadbury in its marketing. The new found winning 
formula as Fitzgerald described of coming up with product offerings to challenge the 
Cadbury brand and to convince consumers of a credible alternative.
308
 The increases 
in sales which the new products had provided, produced an immediate effect on 
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Rowntree’s market share position, increasing from 5.5% in 1935, to 7.6% in 1936. To 
further increase the pressure on Cadbury, Rowntree’s also launched a competitor 
product to Cadbury Milk Tray in the assortments category in 1937, which was in 
addition to the successful launch of their Black Magic brand in 1933. The new 
assortment Dairy Box proved another immediate success, prompting a problem for 
Rowntree in its ability to be able to hire enough workers to cope with the demand.
309
 
Another new product had also been under development at Rowntree and was 
introduced to the market in 1938, based on a French dragee-style product of small 
chocolate beans covered in a sugar shell. This new product was named Smarties, and 
again was well received by the trade and consumers, and straggled the 
chocolate/sugar category classifications. The last of the important Rowntree product 
launched before the outbreak of the Second World War, was Polo Mints in 1939, 
which was as Fitzgerald admitted was a direct copy of the Lifesavers product, popular 
in the USA, and which further expanded the Rowntree presence in the sugar category 
to complement its Fruit Gums and Fruit Pastilles ranges.
310
 
These product launches now meant that Rowntree had by 1938 significant brand 
offerings in all the key confectionery categories, and its market share had risen 
correspondingly to 8.5%. 
In addition to the Rowntree advancements made in the final years of the 1930’s, the 
Mars company also made significant inroads in the UK market during this time, 
predicated on their strategy of focusing on the new count line category, and  Brenner  
claimed that as a result of their success, Mars had become by 1939 the third largest 
player in the UK.
311
 
The new Mackintosh-Caley combine were also productive in their product 
development, and as Fitzgerald comments the company were keen to establish a 
presence in the lucrative chocolate market. The result was the introduction of a 
chocolate/toffee assortment in 1935, which they named Quality Street, sales of which 
were boosted by the Hollywood film of the same name in 1937, starring Katharine 
Hepburn. Mackintosh also noted the growth in the new count line category and as a 
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result developed and launched its Rolo line in 1937, again utilising its existing 
chocolate and toffee credentials.
312
 
In addition to the efforts by the various confectionery manufacturers in changing the 
dynamics of the market, it is also worth mentioning that whilst the pre-Great War 
activities of the Swiss manufacturers had been virtually curtailed by the conflict, as 
Heer suggested, with the amalgamation of Nestle, Cailler and Kohler in 1929, a slow 
but increasing presence from the new combine did make inroads into the UK market 
during the 1930’s.313 This provided an additional facet to a market, which although 
clearly still very fragmented was being formed and controlled by the main big 
players. 
The overall effect was that by 1938, the total UK confectionery market had again 
grown by nearly 6% in volume terms, from 455,000 tons in 1935 to 481,000 tons by 
1938, and also more significantly in value terms for the first time during the inter-war 
period, from £55.7 million to £60.9 million during the same period. This change 
reflected the shift in the market away from the price cutting regime of the previous 
twenty years as espoused by Cadbury. 
2.8 Conclusions 
Prior to the outbreak of World War II, the UK confectionery market had grown from 
a very small niche market, originally based on a beverage, and also low level crude 
sugar-based confections into a multi-million pound industry catering for a truly mass 
market, with practically every member of the population indulging in confectionery 
products. 
The market itself had been formed by the complex external influences described 
previously in chapter 1, but it is the way in which these factors were embraced and 
moulded by the various confectionery manufacturers, combined with the crafting of 
strategies which enabled them to compete effectively.  Indeed, Fitzgerald  commented 
that as an industry, many governance structures had become apparent and that the 
success of an individual company derived from a number of different approaches, 
revoking the Chandler hypothesis of British manufacturing being identified with 
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‘personal capitalism’.314 Fitzgerald went on to comment on the key capabilities which 
were crucial within the UK confectionery market, these being quoted as product 
development, branding, production and advertising:  whilst this is true, it is suggested 
that other capabilities, notably in cost accounting were also important in supporting 
the decisions taken by the management of these companies, and the subsequent effect 
that these decisions had on performance. 
315
 
Whilst the reporting of performance by Cadbury and Rowntree has been provided in 
the business history literature, with the consensus being that Cadbury enjoyed a 
superior performance over Rowntree during the interwar period.
316
 It is suggested that 
this perception is founded on superficial and unstructured data that has not been 
verified as comparable, and the measures that have been used are narrow in their 
scope. Consequently, subsequent comments of superiority of one company over 
another cannot be adequately supported or justified. This thesis addresses these 
shortcomings by presenting an empirical study of performance by using a wide range 
of measures based on information for the two companies that is of a comparable 
nature to ensure efficacy of the results. 
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Section 1 – Literature Review 
Chapter 3 
Development of Cost Accounting and Financial 
Performance Analysis        
3.1 Introduction – Cost Accounting 
 The realisation that manufacturing companies were evolving into large complex 
organisations during the latter half of the nineteenth century necessitated management 
restructuring. Indeed, Epstein
317
 suggested that Charles Babbage
318
, as early as 1832, 
had put forward some of the basic ideas and principles which were later to become 
known as “Scientific Management”. However, the credit for the articulation and 
diffusion of these principles is usually given to F.W.Taylor, an engineer by profession 
from Philadelphia.
319
 
Taylor had refined some earlier principles of what was known as “Systematic 
Management” that Litterer described as an attempt to replace traditional “rule of 
thumb” methods of management, with a more structured approach based on 
engineering principles which would identify and reduce waste and inefficiency by the 
introduction of management systems, thereby transferring power from front line 
supervision to the plant manager.
320
 In a separate article, Litterer
321
 cited Alexander 
Hamilton Church as a key advocate of the development of systematic management, a 
belief also supported by Jelinek
322
 whereby he identified two main areas that Church 
contributed: cost accounting and general management theory, which Church claimed 
are dependent on each other to facilitate planning, coordination and control
323
. In 
addition, Dale and Meloy also claimed the significance of the contribution to 
systematic management by the Du Pont company, and particularly of Hamilton 
MacFarland Barksdale during the period 1893-1914 when he held various executive 
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positions in the company, emphasising the human relations aspects of systematic 
management developed at the company.
324
 
Nelson suggested that the metamorphosing of systematic management into what 
became widely known as “scientific management” came about during the 1890’s 
through the practical work being carried out at the time by F.W. Taylor, especially in 
his role as a consultant to the Bethlehem Steel Company, and by 1901 Taylor had 
developed his ideas as published in the 1903 seminal work cited previously.
325
 Nelson  
made the point that a key aspect of Taylor’s work as a consultant, both at Bethlehem 
Steel and other companies during the 1890’s, was to introduce cost accounting 
procedures as an important component in the successful implementation of 
production control systems and piece work arrangements.
326
  
This revolution in management theory and practice emphasised the need for more 
information and although the practice of financial record-keeping had been utilised by 
organisations dating back into the Middle Ages, the use of financial data by managers  
for decision-making, planning and control in what is now collectively known as cost 
and management accounting is a more recent development, driven by the new 
approaches to management. Consequently from the end of the nineteenth century, the 
subject of accountancy had been primarily divided into the function of Financial 
Accounting
327
 and Cost Accounting
328
. The collection and reporting of internally 
generated cost data in a primitive format probably originated in the United States 
around the middle of the nineteenth century, thereby anticipating the rise of the 
scientific management movement. The subject of cost accounting was originally 
mentioned by Metcalfe who described his experiences in the US military ordnance 
corps, in which rudimentary costing techniques were employed in the manufacture of 
munitions.
329
 The inclusion of costing in addition to  general accounting techniques 
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began to appear in some general accountancy textbooks, for example in Dicksee, a 
standard work at the time for accountancy students.
330
  
 
3.2 Development of Cost Accounting: Contemporary Literature 
 Costing 
 The first practical theories surrounding the production and application of cost 
accounting data to appear in the contemporary literature is generally accepted as 
Garcke & Fells, who suggested that the newly produced cost data should be 
integrated into the established double-entry financial accounting systems.
331
 They 
also alluded that costs behave in different ways, the precursor to the concepts of fixed 
and variable costs. Within specific industries, Norton emphasised cost analysis in 
mechanised production, specifically within the textile industry.
332
 Church expanded 
the boundaries of cost accounting by advocating the use of product cost information 
to trace a company’s overall profitability to the profits earned on individual products, 
thereby introducing the use of cost accounting information as a decision-making 
device in the consideration of the firm’s product portfolio.333 Unlike the suggestions 
by Garcke & Fells, Church believed that methodologies for the systematic linking of 
overheads to individual products was essential in the consideration of individual line 
costs, and devised quite complex methodologies for doing so.
334
 Lane, as a practicing 
engineer, used this logic when first articulating the suggestion of “standards” in a 
business whereby at the end of a period managers can be presented with the 
comparisons of these standards against realised costs for the same period.
335
 
Longmuir, another American engineer, also suggested “standard” levels of output 
from which actual costs could then be compared to these standards. This would then 
identify any differences between standard and actual performance; this idea being the 
first reference to the technique of variance analysis.
336
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The use and objectives of the emerging science of cost accounting were discussed by 
Arnold, in which he illustrated his thoughts with examples of current practice from a 
range of American companies.
337
 The original ideas that had been put forward by 
Church, were considered by Whitemore, who attempted to simplify some of the 
complex ideas of Church, especially the treatment and allocation of indirect overhead 
costs to products.
338
 In a similar vein, Emerson developed the idea of having a 
“standard” level of efficiency from which the measurement of actual performance 
could be made and reported in the variances, as first suggested by Longmuir.
339
 
Harrison identified different degrees to which variances could be calculated, and 
sought to propose a framework whereby the terminology could be properly defined; 
indeed he is often credited with using the term “standard costs” for the first time in 
the literature.
340
 
After the end of the Great War, a range of commentators (including Elbourne
341
, 
Nicholson and Rohrbach
342
, Newman
343
, Hazell
344
, Scott-Maxwell
345
 and 
Ainsworth
346
 provided further foundations for cost accounting in terms of data 
gathering, recording and processing. However, one of the most significant 
contributions to the development of cost accounting was Clark, who examined in 
detail the issues surrounding overhead costs, and, more importantly, how these can 
influence management decision-making.
347
 Clark also described for the first time 
some of the concepts still in use by practitioners today including avoidable costs, 
sunk costs, opportunity costs and incremental costs. In addition, Clark discussed the 
categorization of costs into their variable and fixed elements, advocating that by 
utilising this knowledge, managers are able to practice “price discrimination”, 
whereby a company could exploit its product range by offering different versions to 
different consumers at differing prices according to the market being served.
348
 Clark 
concludes that by adopting a price discrimination policy, a company could solve the 
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issue regarding unused capacity and the consequential effect this has in under-
absorbed overheads.
349
 
Being an economist, Clark approached the concept of overheads from a wider 
perspective than a purely accounting viewpoint, later demonstrated by his theoretical 
work on the business cycle. The path which Clark took in trying to understand the 
nature of overheads in a business came from the basic economic premise that value 
had to be balanced against cost and therefore ‘economic efficiency’ is achieved when 
a product is worth more than its cost. Given this basic economic premise, it should be 
the duty of business to produce and sell everything it can without driving value below 
cost. Clark approached the question of how to arrive at an acceptable overall total 
cost of a product in three different ways: the accounting method, the statistical 
method and the operator method. In the accounting method, costs in the traditional 
accounting financial ledgers are charged against the various products used, the 
overheads being allocated on some predetermined basis.
350
 This method ensures that 
the sum of all product costs equals the total costs in the financial accounts. The 
statistical method provides information on how costs behave under different levels of 
output, and builds upon the generally accepted notion that costs can be divided into 
their variable and fixed elements. Finally, the operator method is where the 
production manager or engineer provides cost data based on their ‘hands-on’ 
experience of the actual job, providing the evidence of what actually drives cost as a 
method of allocation. Clark advised that best practice would be to combine all three 
methods to provide a holistic approach, where information is being gathered and 
processed from different sources of the organisation. This led him to conclude that 
cost accounting may not be accounting at all, and may evolve into “cost statistics” or 
“cost analysis”.351  
Commenting on the significance of the identification and growth of overheads 
through transcripts of lectures given on the University of Birmingham’s commerce 
degree course, Ashley concluded that the increasing importance of overhead expenses 
provided the direct impetus for executives to consider business policy in a more 
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structured way.
352
 In other words, the suggestion by Ashley that a key component of 
the development of business policy -- and hence strategy -- was driven by the 
dilemma facing senior managers of how to deal with those costs in the business not 
directly related to output. Ashley warned against the accepted belief that a policy of 
increasing sales volume will automatically reduce costs per unit (given that overheads 
are generally fixed costs in nature), because he argued that to obtain these cost 
benefits, the level of additional sales had to be substantial, otherwise the cost per unit 
could possibly increase in the short-term.
353
 Indeed, Sanders added a cautionary note 
to any policy whereby the additional volume that is stimulated by price-cutting 
measures requires “extreme care and foresight”.354 Moreover, Sanders also guarded 
against a policy of marketing a wider range of products simply to absorb overheads 
that would otherwise be unabsorbed by a reduction in sales of standard products. 
Such a policy, he argued, could only be successful if cost computations provided by 
the cost office were divided into their fixed and variable elements, thereby requiring 
any new lines to be costed on a marginal basis.
355
 
Babbage had originally suggested the significance of how different types of costs 
behaved in different ways, generating the concept of variable and fixed costs.
356
 This 
original concept was developed further in Garcke and Fells’ seminal work in 1887, 
which Chatfield observed, were probably the first to explore the significance of the 
distinction of costs being either variable or fixed.
357
 Not surprisingly, given the early 
contribution made by engineers in the genesis of cost accounting techniques, one of 
the original descriptions of how this knowledge could be useful to managers was 
published in the Engineering Magazine by Hess, who described how a company 
could calculate the sales volume required to “break-even”; that is when total revenues 
equals total cost.
358
 However, the first practical demonstration of cost-volume-profit 
analysis was provided by Williams via the medium of the Bulletin of the Taylor 
Society.
359
 This article was published in a series following the appointment of 
Williams as chairman of a special committee of the Taylor Society convened to 
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address the functions of the chief executive. The remit of this committee was to 
identify and develop techniques that could be available to assist in decision-making. 
In his article Williams stated that the difference between revenues and variable costs 
equates to the “contribution to fixed costs and profit”, thereby articulating the idea of 
“marginal contribution”.360 By establishing the marginal contribution per unit, in 
combination with the knowledge of total fixed costs, Williams concluded that by 
dividing total fixed costs by the marginal contribution per unit will provide managers 
with the number of sales unit required to break-even. By establishing these principles, 
Williams uncovered a Pandora’s Box of possibilities for providing important insights 
for managers:  evidence of how the profitability of similar companies can vary 
significantly should sales volume rise or fall, depending on the individual level of 
fixed costs in each business. In an assessment of the “best business”, Williams put 
forward the following proposition: 
“The best business is the business with the lowest Variable Cost consistent with 
the breaking point below the smallest volume of business which there is a 
reasonable probability of doing”.361 
This knowledge enabled managers to assess the impact of the variability of sales 
volumes, production capacity, individual product costs, product pricing decisions and 
total fixed cost in an infinite number of scenarios, all of which could be modelled to 
establish optimum profitability. In addition, Williams also suggested that 
responsibilities within the organisation should be assigned to individuals whereby the 
achievement of objectives should be measured and reported, giving rise to the notion 
of “responsibility accounting”, whereby managers can be called to account.362 
Wheldon provided a wider rationale for the preparation of cost accounting data 
including its relevance to the consideration of business policy, for example in the 
examination of different methods of manufacture or procedure, and also for providing 
essential information for an organisation in coping with the different phases of the 
business cycle, particularly during a trade depression.
363
 Wheldon also pointed out the 
importance of cost information in key price fixing decisions, taking into account 
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economic conditions and competitor pressure.
364
 The relationship between costing 
and the external market and its behaviour was also explored by Coase, who 
developed “opportunity costs” - the consequences of the management of a company 
deciding to pursue one course of action rather than another.
365
 
Distribution Costing 
In addition to senior managers’ concerns regarding the internal operational costs of a 
business, there was also recognition that external costs existed, especially as 
Castenholz pointed out that these costs had risen dramatically relative to other 
company costs as business became more complex.
366
 These external costs were 
principally in transportation, selling and marketing and were collectively regarded as 
the ‘distribution’ costs of a business. The literature prior to the Great War is bereft of 
any consideration of distribution costs. Frazer discounted their serious analysis 
because they do not lend themselves to ‘standardisation’.367 Lawrence  is regarded as 
being the first commentator to focus on distribution costs. He suggested improved 
methods of distribution cost measurement and allocation to product, alluding to an 
early form of cost driver identification still used in modern day activity based costing 
(abc).
368
  This innovation of tracing and measuring the ultimate factors which govern 
cost, rather than simply the production of the information was also examined by 
Dunnigan who thought this the most essential role of the cost accountant.
369
  Indeed 
Mazur provided evidence that manufacturers collected statistics showing that a 
product’s cost doubled or tripled in its journey from producer to consumer.370 
Copeland also provided empirical evidence of a wide variation in the proportion of 
distribution costs to their sales revenue for a sample of manufacturers of between 
16.79% and 56.26%.
371
   
Whilst there was some references in the contemporary literature from a theoretical 
perspective regarding the approach and treatment of distribution costs, the experience 
of practitioners is perhaps the most relevant of contemporary evidence. Once again, 
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the Dennison company was among the first to identify the importance of distribution, 
and of suggesting ways in which this information could be gathered and used by 
managers. Other practitioners who developed and shared ideas relating to distribution 
costing were Union Carbide, The Institute of American Meat Packers, Norton Co., 
Kellogg Co., Wahl Co. and R.H.  Macy & Co. The NACA Bulletin was the favoured 
media through which to diffuse this information. 
Although Henry Dennison was himself concerned and interested in the growth of 
distribution costs, the principal architect in the formulation of detailed and workable 
costing procedures within the Dennison Company was its chief statistician, E.S. 
Freeman. Initially writing on the issue of distribution costing
372
, Freeman then went 
on to provide further detailed evidence of the ways in which he approached the 
problem and suggestions for their solution.
373
 In his introduction to this work, 
Freeman stated that the principles of scientific management had to be adhered to in 
providing the empirical evidence for marketing costs in the same way as for 
traditional manufacturing costing procedures.
374
 Freeman rejected the traditional 
assumption of the division between manufacturing and distribution, and advocated 
instead the concept of two “factories” within a company: a goods factory which buys 
goods with money and a money factory which buys money with the goods. In this 
new way of looking at distribution, the finished product is the ‘raw material’ of the 
money factory.
375
 This concept meant that the whole function of a manufacturing 
company becomes cyclical in the sense that money is used in the first instance to buy 
raw materials and labour required to make the product, which are in turn sold to the 
consumer for money to enable the cycle to be continually repeated. For the Dennison 
company, this was a different way of viewing distribution, so that the all of the costs 
incurred in the ‘money factory’ were identified as ‘order-getting’ costs and as a 
consequence were deemed to be speculative in nature. 
Freeman proceeded to describe the way in which total distribution costs were divided 
into two distinct categories: order-getting (advertising and selling expenses) and 
order-filling (expenses incurred once an order was received).
376
 Order-filling costs 
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were often repetitive in nature, and therefore could be ‘standardised’ just like 
manufacturing processes. The Dennison company identified twenty-six different 
functions which could be dealt with in this systematic fashion. Importantly, this 
meant that Dennison could relate the relative demand of a particular product to a 
particular function thereby correctly allocating  correct distribution costs. According 
to Freeman, this level of sophistication enabled swift calculation of the standard costs 
of an order and facilitated the immediate quotation of a price to the customer, 
facilitating effective decision-making.
377
 Indeed, as Freeman noted, the benefit of 
having calculated such detailed cost information provides the wherewithal to consider 
business strategy in a more effective manner.
378
 
However, whilst the order-filling expenses could be accurately allocated to product, 
Freeman conceded that the order-getting costs are more generic in nature, and no 
attempt was made for their allocation to product, although a form of customer costing 
was in place as a way of trying to optimise salesman’s time.  
In addition to the sophisticated distribution costing processes employed by the 
Dennison company, another example of best practice in this field was at Union 
Carbide and Carbon Corporation of New York, also described in the NACA Bulletin 
by McNeice.
379
 The systems devised at Union Carbide were similar to those at the 
Dennison company in that distribution costs were divided into two separate elements: 
cost of operations (advertising and selling expenses) and cost by product (the 
expenses incurred in processing orders of each product).
380
 However, in addition to 
the important data provided by extensive distribution cost analysis which provides 
more meaningful product and customer costs, McNeice also claimed that breakeven 
analysis can also be incorporated into the results, providing for an additional layer of 
sophistication.
381
 
Greer of the Institute of American Meat Packers, provided additional evidence of best 
practice in the field of distribution costing by concurring that these expenses could 
not only be attributed to products, but also to other cost objects such as customers, 
territories or orders, thus providing a greater variety of information than that provided 
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by manufacturing . Writing later Greer advised the subdivision of distribution costs 
into five functional areas: creating demand, obtaining orders, storing, handling and 
delivery, extending credit and finally market research.
382
 Greer’s main contribution to 
this debate was to recognise the relationship between distribution costs and standard 
financial books of accounts and how these could be reconciled.
383
 
 Preparation of cost information for use in evaluating a company’s customers is 
suggested by Dohr, et al, who explained how distribution costs could be analysed by 
territory, customer account size and types of orders which could be analysed in a 
number of different ways to generate data which could support a range of managerial 
decisions.
384
 Alternative methods of assessing distribution costs are also discussed by 
Van Sickle who suggested that automated methods of data collection are the most 
efficient way of ensuring that the relevant information is captured, and also pointed 
out that both accounting and non-accounting records should be the source of the 
data.
385
 Van Sickle also claimed that the analysis of distribution costs should be 
performed outside the normal books of accounts, although Neuner provided an 
explanation of how this could be performed within the existing financial recording 
systems.
386
  Stewart, et al, provided empirical evidence that those companies 
engaging in product differentiation strategies would also experience a spiralling of 
distribution costs, relative to other companies.
387
 
 Budgeting  
In addition to the development of cost accounting techniques in the first quarter of the 
twentieth century, there was also recognition that accounting data could be used for 
management control purposes. Indeed, McKinsey stated:  
“Business Administration is largely a matter of control – control and direction of the 
various factors involved in the conduct of a business enterprise”.388 
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McKinsey also suggested that the whole basis of this control was the provision of 
information.
389
 He then proposed that this information would enable the executives of 
a business to: 
1)determine the policy of the business, 2) enable functional managers to carry out 
 this policy and 3) enable the executive to ascertain whether the functional managers 
 have fulfilled these responsibilities.  
Given these requirements, McKinsey proposed that the information required by the 
executive  should be based on accounting data, but importantly should not only be 
concentrating on the past, but should be used a basis for planning future operations, 
especially for the forecasting of future profits from which control can be exercised.
390
 
In his later work, McKinsey began to consider the important of the market-
organisation feedback loop and the ways in which the organisation structure is a key 
component in establishing the relevant flows of information required to take these 
into account.
391
 Later, he provided what is almost a manual aimed at executives on 
what information can be obtained from achieving effective controls through the 
budgeting system.
392
 
The concept of management control as alluded to by McKinsey, became one of the 
most important considerations for executives of large and increasingly complex 
organisations in the first quarter of the twentieth century. The development of 
budgeting as an accounting aide to control was enabled by the principles of costing, 
particularly in the setting of standards of performance. The development of budgeting 
was, therefore, an exercise in planning and forecasting in relation to the 
organisational environment, from which control could then be obtained. Theiss  
pointed out that ‘budgeting’ originated in public administration when the British 
Government first presented a national programme of revenues and expenditure for the 
fiscal year in 1760, and as he went on to argue, this was introduced for control 
purposes.
393
 Theiss proposed that the migration of the principles of budgeting in 
public administration to the business world took place gradually during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, and was enabled by the growing scientific approach 
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within business.
394
 These scientific approaches included the standardisation of 
operations by engineers and the ensuing measuring of efficiency, coupled with the 
techniques of cost accounting in terms of measurement, recording and reporting were 
the building blocks of budget preparation. However, despite the detailed work 
required in the preparation of business budgets in terms of the scientific production of 
data for operations, processes, etc., Theiss pointed out that it is the achievement of 
objectives (particularly profit objectives), based on a rational plan, which is the whole 
basis of having budgets in the first place.
395
 This notion of budgeting as being the 
vehicle for the planning of profitability has also been supported by Rose.
396
 One of 
the other consequences and reasons for budgeting during these early years surrounded 
the notion of being better placed to foresee problems, as suggested by Coonley,
397
 
whilst McGladrey
398
 saw budgeting as an expression of how the organisation was to 
accomplish planned results, and Perry
399
 envisaged budgeting to be part of the 
development of the whole business programme which would then assist management 
to control its operations. These commentators recognised that the purpose of the 
budget was to provide a more balanced role between the requirements for planning 
and the need for control.  
As chairman of a sub-committee of the Taylor Society, Williams, argued that cost 
accounting information would be best used when the policies and objectives of the 
business were co-ordinated. Williams provided extensive calculations regarding the 
construction of  flexible budgets with the additional focus on forecasting profit and 
loss, cash and credit position, which Williams argued is made feasible by the use of 
management standards.
400
  Williams also recognised that that whilst costs are usually 
divided into their fixed and variable elements, he forwarded that most costs actually 
contained both elements, thereby introducing the notion of ‘semi variable costs’, and 
by interpolating between the amounts of semi variable expense appropriate to a firm’s 
maximum and minimum outputs, it was possible to predict how much individual 
costs should be at different production levels.
401
 From this, Williams pointed out that 
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it is feasible to develop detailed budgets for a range of different output levels.
402
  In a 
later work, Williams stated that budgeting principles are uniform for all industries and 
should be used for three purposes: 
“1) policy determination; that is, budgets should made up on various hypothetical 
conditions as a  means of determining policies, e.g. methods of selling, different 
levels of sales volume, etc. 2) allocation; that is, where you have a total sum of 
money for a total purpose and you need to allocate it to different persons to carry 
out different phases of the work involved. 3) comparison of performance with 
forecasts; that is, for determining the effectiveness of the business as a whole 
and its various departments”403 
In addition, he advocated that the person responsible for performance should also be 
responsible for the preparation of the initial budget, which should not be based on 
past performances, but based on the best estimate of future conditions. Writing later, 
Williams suggested that the budget was the ideal vehicle for the articulation of 
leadership by senior executives in the way that policies can be communicated and 
understood.
404
 Blake also suggested that the principal advantage of a budget is to 
affect the co-ordination of the different parts of the organisation in order to achieve 
their objectives.
405
 However, Blake also drew attention to the fact that the overall 
success of any budget system was to forecast their activities by taking proper account 
of outside influences.
406
 
Parallel to theoretical academic outpourings, the development of budgeting was also 
being undertaken by practitioners, determined to mould the technique into their own 
organisations. For example, Frazer of Frazer and Torbert of Chicago, writing in the 
Bulletin of the Taylor Society, detailed the difficulties facing his company with regard 
to the organisational structure.
407
 Based on the experiences within his company, he 
claimed that a budgetary control system can only be introduced if true accountability 
is performed, and this can only be achieved if there is strict accounting classification 
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of sales, purchases and expenses according to the organisation that the budget is 
designed to serve.
408
 
Similarly, Brooks of the Dennison company, provided further evidence of the way in 
which practitioners approached budgetary control within their organisations. As 
alluded to above, Dennison’s believed that individual companies could adopt policies 
which might mitigate the effects of external economic turbulence, and particularly 
with reference to the business cycle. Brooks provided a clear example of this 
approach whereby the company budgeted increases in sales force personnel in 
anticipation of a downturn, based on the belief that during this time every sale had to 
be hard won. This had the additional benefit of being able to forecast actual sales of 
individual products with more reliability than hitherto.
409
  
Debate on the internationalisation of budgetary control resulted in International 
Management Institute (I.M.I) instituting a major conference being held in Geneva in 
1930, during which papers were presented and discussed by delegates from major 
academic institutions and representatives from leading industrial organisations, with 
the hope of arriving at a consensus on best practice. The conference did agree on an 
accepted definition: 
“Budgeting is not merely control, it is not merely forecasting, it is an exact and rigorous 
analysis of the past, and the probable and desired future experience with a view to 
substituting considered intention for opportunism in management. It is a method of 
scientific management of which estimates are drawn up covering an agreed period 
for everything connected with the undertaking which it is possible to express in 
figures”410  
The development, dissemination and diffusion of budgeting in the UK was further 
enabled by the Management Research Groups (MRG’s) founded by Seebohm 
Rowntree, and in a series of conferences in 1933 and 1934, the application of 
budgeting in various  UK industries was discussed. Dunkerley provided a summary of 
the findings of these conferences and concluded that of the industries represented 
(including confectionery, hosiery and motor vehicles), the process of budgeting by 
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the use of sales, production, stock and financial budgets was similar, whilst 
emphasising the profit objectives of most businesses and the directing of executive 
attention to this important aspect.
411
 Dunkerley also drew together a common set of 
rationales made by various companies as to the main reasons why they operate 
budgeting systems, and how it supported their businesses:  
“1) To assist in the formulation of policy, and an indication as to what those policies will 
deliver in the future, thereby reducing the risk. 2) To provide a series of managerial 
objectives, and to measure against these to highlight weaknesses for effective action to 
be taken. 3) To provide a co-ordination of effort towards the central objectives of the 
company as a whole, rather than the objectives of individual executives and their own 
sphere of responsibility”.412 
In conclusion, Dunkerley stated that budgeting was a natural part of the scientific 
management approach, but stressed that it is an “aid to managers”, and should not be 
used as the only component of the decision-making process.
413
  
In his extensive treatise on the production and use of budgets, quoting practice from a 
range of industries in both Europe and the United States to support his assertions, 
Dent introduced wider implications in the study of external factors such as economic 
conditions, changing buyer habits due to social and cultural shifts, which in turn 
affects the forecasting ability for a business.
414
 Dent was writing in a period of 
economic depression and conceded that markets in certain sectors such as luxury 
goods would be the most difficult to plan for. He advocated the use of cost-profit-
volume analysis to model scenarios for different expectations regarding possible 
changes in the external environment. This, he argued would require extensive 
research into the prevailing economic conditions.
415
 
The contemporary literature on cost accounting provided evidence of the emergence 
of a sub-division of the accountancy profession which parallels and supports the 
concept of scientific management, which was viewed as a structured and systematic 
methodology for coping with complex organisations. Although initially employed as 
a way of measuring (and thereby ensuring) internal efficiency, specifically within 
production, the remit of cost accounting techniques expanded into those areas 
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external to the firm known collectively as ‘distribution’. Concerns about control of 
increasingly complex organisations encouraged senior managers to assess budgeting 
to compliment other executive functions such as policy-making and planning. 
3.3 Development of Cost Accounting: Business History Literature 
The Business History Context of Cost Accounting 
In the post-1945 period, accounting historians have attempted to provide evidence of  
the development of cost accounting as a logical consequence of the professionalism 
of management from the late nineteenth century, and the extent to which these 
executives viewed the new techniques as integral to their role of decision-makers. 
Costing 
The first major work on the development of costing was by Solomons who used 
engineering journals rather than accounting, economics or business publications, to 
conclude that the genesis of what we now know as cost accounting emanated from 
engineers.
416
 Shortly afterwards, Garner, supporting Solomon’s interpretations, also 
concluded that early British theorists on cost accounting were overtaken by American 
commentators, and a greater emphasis on the problem of dealing with overheads 
emerged.
417
 Garner also made the point that the challenges posed by the depression of 
the inter-war years forced a greater creativity to take place in the development of new 
and complex cost accounting techniques to deal with these challenges.
418
 According 
to Garner, the reason why cost accounting evolved at all was as a product of the 
industrial landscape, and especially by the increasing complexity of manufacturing 
processes.
419
 Chandler’s interpretation was grounded in the role of the US railroads in 
19
th
 century United States, and he claimed that these railroad companies developed 
accounting systems to aid them in their planning and control procedures.
420
 Chandler 
went on to argue that the initial costing techniques originally developed by the 
railroad companies were adapted by companies in the mass production and mass 
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distribution industries.
421
 Johnson cited the example of the Du Pont company in the 
United States as being the precursor in the innovation of modern managerial control 
systems.
422
 The Du Pont company was the first to introduce the vertically integrated, 
multi-activity organisation essential for efficient mass production and thereby 
provided for dramatic breakthroughs in efficiency. Johnson went on to claim that the 
centralized accounting system allowed Du Pont to formalise a central measure, 
Return on Investment (ROI), to serve as an indicator of individual operating 
departments and the company as a whole, which informed the overall strategy of the 
business.
423
 
Writing  on the reasons why costing developed during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, Chatfield suggested that falling prices alongside the growth of 
increasingly complex  and large-scale corporations at the time were the driving 
forces.
424
 He went on to argue that the increasing number of subsidiaries required 
management to have more central control of scattered operations, and that production 
costs became more of a factor in determining price rather than inter-firm 
comparisons. 
425
  
Commenting on Fayol’s contribution to the debate on the importance of costing 
techniques, Chandler and Daems
426
 pointed out that Fayol
427
 is silent regarding the 
need to adjust cost to volume or the importance of the measure of return on capital 
employed, but is clear regarding systematic allocation of resources within a business, 
and also the benefits of long-range plans. Chandler and Daems concluded that 
European accounting practices were more suited to the careful planning of resources 
than the potential of administrative coordination.
428
 
Kaplan supported the view that it was the rapid growth of increasingly complex 
organisations between 1880 and 1925 which provided the stimulus for the 
development of innovative costing practices, but claimed it was engineers and 
industrialists who pioneered these new techniques on an individual company basis, 
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rather than dissemination and diffusion through contemporary academic research and 
publication.
429
 Kaplan therefore suggested that inter-company pressures led to rapid 
adoption of costing techniques as  a way that  individual businesses could remain 
competitive.
430
 Kaplan went on top claim that there has been little in the way of 
further development in cost accounting since 1925, and this was taken upon further 
by Johnson and Kaplan in their seminal work, who believed that despite the early 
optimism that costing techniques provided companies with the ability to plan and 
control their businesses more effectively, the subject lost its way, and again they 
claimed that no improvements were made to knowledge after 1925, placing the 
subject into an evolutionary dead-end.
431
 Scapens also painted a depressing picture of 
the failure of cost accounting to progress during the inter-war years, and he claimed 
that the subject was backward looking and only concerned with the production of 
accurate costs, which he suggested was the case up to the outbreak of World War II. 
Scapens believed that the potentially useful techniques to aid management such as 
standard costing and budgeting techniques were not widely adopted by organisations 
until the 1950’s.432  
The rapid growth and then apparent stagnation of cost accounting is also supported by 
Chatfield who claimed that the period 1885-1920 witnessed the essentials of 
methodology being devised, including integration with financial records, the 
formulation of overhead allocation procedures and standard cost procedures being 
developed. Outside of this time-frame Chatfield proposed that little had been done to 
further the subject apart from refinements of the existing techniques, whilst also 
suggesting that the outstanding problems of the inter-war periods regarding cost 
accounting have yet to be resolved.
433
 
The suggestion that cost and management accounting techniques failed to develop  
significantly after the mid 1920’s is challenged by Vollmers who provided evidence 
that the science did progress after this time, citing works which included the 
expansion of the scope of costing to areas outside the normal production 
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environment, to include other facets such as transport and distribution.
434
 She also 
claimed that the role of the cost accountant within an organisation also developed 
from one of merely producing cost information, to one of recognizing the purposes 
for which costs could be used and exploring areas of managerial decision-making 
where the techniques could provide insights not previously recognised or 
understood.
435
 
An alternative rationale why cost accounting developed during the early part of the 
twentieth century is provided by Loft who analysed the legislation passed during the 
Great War to curb profiteering (especially where government contracts were 
concerned, based on ‘cost-plus’ pricing), and concluded that the legal requirements 
encouraged companies to develop their ability to define and control their costs as a 
reaction to the social and political pressures that existed between 1914 and 1925.
436
 
This suggestion is also supported in some degree by Armstrong who pointed that 
professional accountants, who were recruited into the ministries to oversee 
government contracts, had to learn the techniques of cost accounting in order to 
discharge their duties.
437
  Armstrong goes on to state that following the end of the war 
these accountants returned to private business with these additional skills of cost 
accounting. Armstrong claimed that the slump of the 1920’s also had an effect on the 
development of cost accounting as shareholders of businesses turned to the 
accounting profession to solve the financial issues that lay behind organisational 
failure, for which the implementation of control systems were meant to remedy.
438
 
Later, Loft added further weight to the argument that the effect of the Great War had 
significant implications for the development of cost accounting practice by pointing 
out that the post-war reconstruction initiatives by the Government brought about an 
emphasis on efficiency, whereby uniform costing systems could be beneficial to this 
end.
439
 Boyns challenged the view that the Great War provided the impetus to 
development of cost accounting practice. Using archival evidence from several 
British companies he noted that there is little to indicate that there were any 
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significant changes to practice comparing the post-war period with the pre-war 
one.
440
  
Boyns et al, having reviewed the contemporary costing literature covering the period 
1887-1952, also agreed with Armstrong in  the notion that the role of professional 
accountants had a significant role in the development of cost accounting, as opposed 
to the alternative view put forward that it was engineers who were largely responsible 
for its development.
441
 Boyns and Edwards suggested that the accountancy profession 
in the UK had a major role in improving cost accounting techniques, much more than 
in the United States, and they question whether the accepted notion of the US having  
developed and implemented these techniques more rapidly than the UK.
442
 
An attempt to put the development of cost and management accounting into a wider 
historical context has been made by Fleischman and Tyson who put forward the idea 
that the earliest motives for managers to introduce some form of costing systems into 
their organisations was for contract bidding and the setting of prices. However, as 
companies became more complex, standard costs were used for the measurement of 
waste and efficiency, but more importantly, they argued that it facilitated control by 
being able to gauge the performance of subordinate managers.
443
 
Distribution Costing 
The limited business history literature on distribution costing centres mainly on the 
work of Vollmers, who put forward the proposition that a company’s production 
policy should be driven by supply, which if accepted would also mean high 
distribution costs to stimulate consumption. However, if demand should be the driver, 
production would be almost “to order” by the customer.444 The case study that 
Vollmers used to describe the role of distribution costing in a historical context was 
the example of the Dennison Company, and indeed in a later work concluded that the 
management team carefully used this additional information to inform key pricing 
decisions.
445
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In addition to the work by Vollmers, Usui also examines distribution and the role of 
costing from the perspective of an innovative and forward-looking company like 
Dennison, which for them meant “a coordinating force between the job of selling 
goods and the job of manufacturing the goods to be sold”, especially so when 
identifying selling prices for regular and special orders.
446
 
Budgeting 
Control in the early development of cost and management accounting is  discussed by 
Parker (1986) who reflected on the classical accounting view of control which is 
congruent with the scientific approach as espoused by engineers in the latter part of 
the nineteenth century.
447
 Parker argued that the accounting control model was used 
by companies to replicate and support the classical management control models of 
Taylor and Fayol:  accounting controls were by definition, authority based, with the 
objective of total control.
448
 This total control could be sub-divided into coordinative 
control, disciplinary control and exception control. Parker claimed that this version of 
the accounting control model was a ‘ready-made’ solution to contemporary managers 
of the inter-war years as it was seen as reinforcing the classical management control 
model’s perception of certainty and simplicity.449 In a later work, Parker and Lewis 
suggested that the concept of the classical management control model had persisted to 
the present day because it supports the notion of having strategic plans and 
objectives, internal control systems, external accountability and a focus of measuring 
and reporting efficiency. They then argued that cost accounting systems therefore 
perpetuate this form of control.
450
 
The role of the ‘budget’ as the cost accounting technique used by organisations as the 
method by which management control could be executed has been the focus of many 
historical commentators. In the first instance the definition of what is actually meant 
by budgetary control is not entirely clear. Whilst budgeting is considered to be a 
management accounting technique, as Quail has pointed out, senior managers during 
the first quarter of the twentieth century saw it as a way of planning and coordinating 
activities, particularly given the rise in functional departments and therefore a desire 
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to maintain some form of central control.
451
 In addition, Quail has guarded against 
using the term ‘budgetary control’ in a generic sense, as he pointed out that certain 
characteristics of such a system are necessary for its correct utilisation: 
“1) budgets are used to integrate activity across an organisation by the setting of 
targets, based on for example the anticipated sales performance, which determines 
production, inventories, purchases, labour, overheads and capital equipment. 
2) budgets integrate activity down an organisation, by sub-dividing the targets into 
divisional, departmental and individual targets, requiring an effective line of authority 
and levels of responsibility. 3) targets are used to achieve control by the monitoring of 
performance against targets with appropriate remedial action being taken by manage- 
ment via feedback loops. 4) budgets are used to make an organisation responsive to 
market conditions, in which changes in demand can be translated into changes in targets. 
Feedback loops are established between markets and targets”452  
Quail elaborated that unless these characteristics are present then the benefits of a 
budgetary control system would not only the improvement in production techniques, 
but also in the improvements of information flows and performance of different parts 
of the organisation, will not be forthcoming. Importantly, Quail concluded that a 
budgetary control system which includes all of the necessary characteristics performs 
a dual role as both a planning technique and as a framework which can be used to 
integrate and drive the organisation. It is therefore in this context that the formulation 
of best practice during the inter-war period has to be judged.
453
 
 Given the uncertainty regarding the definition of ‘budgeting’, Boyns has attempted to 
throw some light on the extent to which companies in the UK had introduced some 
form of budgeting techniques into their organisations by 1945.
454
 Boyns pointed out 
the fact that in an era of rapid corporate expansion at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, many new techniques were being developed to cope with the increasing 
complexity of organisations, of which budgeting was one.
455
 The other consideration 
was that these techniques were still being developed, and not readily available ‘off-
the-shelf’, or indeed that they would be suitable for every circumstance, and Boyns  
suggested that this could be a reason for modest levels of adoption by UK businesses 
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at the time, especially in untried industries not mentioned in the literature describing 
successful implementation.
456
 Boyns therefore went on to suggest that many 
companies introduced techniques such as budgeting in a more piecemeal fashion 
rather than as a comprehensive all-encompassing, company-wide system, which 
would be developed into something  more complex over a period of time as the 
benefits accrued were realised and appreciated more and more by senior management. 
This period of experimentation with a particular technique would therefore seem to 
be the most accepted way in which dissemination was carried out within companies, 
with this process being far from smooth and straightforward as individual issues and 
problems had to be resolved. Boyns has, however, provided some archival evidence 
from a range of different industries that budgeting in various forms of sophistication 
was being practiced by many companies in the UK by 1935.
457
  
Other factors which influenced the development of budgetary control systems have 
been suggested by Berland and Boyns who put forward the proposition that firm-
specific factors were an important factor as to the exact form of control that managers 
wished to exercise, and also that factors external to the firm are major influences, 
particularly economic, social and political themes.
458
 Citing the findings of an earlier 
work by Hopper and Armstrong
459
, they also point to the evidence that companies 
developed budgeting systems in the 1920’s as an attempt to mitigate the effects of 
economic downturns, especially in decisions such as the decision to move costs away 
from capital and towards labour.  Berland and Boyns therefore claimed that the 
reason why, within individual firms, the budgetary control system evolved over a 
period of time was to take into account changing company objectives and also were 
adapted to cope with the changing environmental conditions. They then suggested 
that these factors which were considered by individual companies and the process by 
which these changes occurred, is a key question in trying to understand the nature of 
the diffusion of budgeting in the inter-war period, and how this was linked to the 
establishment of competitive advantage of an individual company.
460
 The 
understanding the underlying processes at work within organisations in the 
development of accounting techniques, and its significance in the wider economic 
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and social setting was first suggested in a seminal work by Hopwood, who suggests 
that accounting has played a key role in the shaping of organisational governance and 
management.
461
 
The significance of the external factors and also the extent to which companies deal 
with environmental turbulence is dealt with by Berland who claimed that budgeting 
as a technique is particularly useful in times of economic certainty, where the 
planning process enables efficient resource allocation mechanisms and the ability to 
optimize production. However, this becomes more problematical when economic 
conditions are harder to predict, making forecasting increasingly difficult.
462
 
Alternative Interpretations of the Business History Perspective on 
Cost Accounting 
In addition to what has become known as the ‘economic rationalism’ approach to the 
development of cost accounting made by the majority of historical commentators 
discussed previously, there have also been some alternative views put forward by 
others.  
The accepted fact that economic necessity was the key driver in the development of 
cost  accounting techniques has been challenged by Hoskin and Macve , who claimed 
that this is an insufficient, simplistic explanation for its subsequent expansion. They 
then argued that the view put forward by economic rationalists of cost accounting 
being developed to support decision-making is flawed in that the measures of ‘cost’ 
and ‘profit’ are arbitrary and are themselves by-products of an accounting double-
entry system designed to do something else. This in itself means that decisions based 
on this information are, as a consequence, of little value in such strategic 
considerations such as pricing, output levels or the appropriate scale of investment.
463
 
An alternative view of why cost and management accounting emerged at the end of 
the nineteenth century centres on the work of Foucault
464
 whose premise is that 
individuals seek to gain control over other individuals and put in place mechanisms 
which will enable them to achieve this aim. Taking this idea into an organisational 
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environment, in an earlier work, Miller and O’Leary made the analogy between 
Foucault’s stance and that of the management of a business, claiming that cost 
accounting is merely a tool used for the purpose of power, control and ultimate 
subjugation of their respective workforces.
465
    
Whilst this alternative view of is a valid position from which to interpret the events of 
the past, it is proposed that a traditional ‘economic rationalist’ approach be used in 
this study given the general hypothesis that cost accounting evolved fairly quickly 
into being  that of a tool of strategy. However being that as it may, it is also accepted 
that the  Hoskins and Macve point of the wisdom of attempting to identify the reasons 
why particular routines such as cost and management accounting were adopted in a 
broader organisational, social or economic context is also valid.
466
  
3.4 Conclusions 
Both contemporary and business history literature conclude that one of the key 
components of the philosophy of scientific management is the science of cost 
accounting. It is therefore no coincidence that in the early years of the twentieth 
century, when managers were looking for a more structured approach to management, 
that cost  accounting provided some key attributes which were deemed to fulfil key 
aspirations, especially in the area of control. As confidence in these techniques grew, 
and more companies embraced them, the scope and sophistication of the skills of cost 
accounting widened to include the whole company and its operations, thus providing 
increasingly useful information to inform management on a range of decisions. 
Whilst there has been some debate on the slow progression of the basic principles of 
cost and management accounting since the mid-1920’s by historical commentators, it 
is also suggested that the techniques provided companies with the ability to plan and 
control more effectively, and also importantly to provide methods of measurement 
which in turn could be developed into some form of competitive advantage. 
There is, therefore, clear evidence in the literature that the senior managers of 
companies in the early years of the twentieth century increasingly viewed their 
businesses from a strategic viewpoint, and the provision of accurate, timely and 
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relevant information provided the basis from which executives could think 
strategically. The role of cost accounting in this process is also alluded to in the 
literature, but it is suggested here that different companies in different industries 
approached this in different ways as to the way it was utilised and the level of 
influence it had on performance.  
From the point of view from the confectionery industry, a strong example of the 
burgeoning  non-durable consumer goods market, it has already become clear that 
progressive companies in this sector such as Rowntree and Cadbury, embraced and 
contributed to the evolution of new management thinking. However, the ways in 
which these two competing organisations formulated and developed their cost 
accounting techniques as a consequence of these innovative approaches, and the 
effect it had on competitive position and performance will be discussed in due course. 
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3.5 Introduction - Financial Performance Analysis 
The development and popularity of the scientific management movement, including 
techniques such as cost accounting, during the first part of the twentieth century, was 
the direct consequence of the need by managers to be able to understand and 
subsequently control their increasingly large and complex organisations. The 
competitiveness of the market, particularly in the durable consumer goods sector, 
meant that efficiency of operations became the ‘holy grail’ for companies, where it 
was felt that management effort should be concentrated in achieving this goal. 
However, ‘efficiency’ in itself is a broad description and its measurement is a key 
factor in being able to judge whether or not it has been achieved, particularly in the 
overall context of organisational performance 
As a consequence of this desire to be able to provide a yardstick by which to ascertain 
the efficiency, and thereby the performance of a business, there emerged a series of 
metrics by which a company could be quantifiably measured, and consequently 
appraised. These calculations originally centred on the analysis of a company’s 
published annual financial statements and had their genesis rooted in the requirement 
by outside agencies such as banks to assess the credit worthiness of a business. 
However, these analytical techniques soon became used for internal assessment 
purposes by managers to measure performance, and became widely known as ‘ratio 
analysis’. 
3.6 Development of Financial Performance Analysis: Contemporary 
Literature 
The increasing requirements for companies to seek external financing arrangements 
to promote their growth in the latter part of the nineteenth century led to the 
publication of more frequent and detailed financial information for the digestion of 
agencies such as lenders and other investors, and the emergence of the current ratio 
(current assets divided by current liabilities, obtained from the balance sheet) as the 
principal measure of a company’s ability to remain liquid, and consequently, stay in 
business and pay its creditors.  
Developing from this early consensus, the earliest example of a suggestion that other 
relationships existed within the financial statements that could provide more detailed 
126 
 
information on the performance of a company was made by Lough.
467
 However, the 
breakthrough work was compiled and published by Wall
468
 who carried out extensive 
empirical research from 1912 to 1919 on the financial statements of 981 companies in 
a wide range of industries in his capacity as advisor to the Federal Reserve Board.
469
 
The purpose of the study by Wall was to establish a wider range of indicators than the 
commonly used current ratio to support banks in their credit assessment of firms -- 
subsequently described by Wall as “Credit Barometrics”. Wall’s study led him to 
develop a series of seven financial ratios which he believed would provide a more 
robust assessment of a company’s financial status. Table 3.1 shows the seven ratios 
which he developed : 
Table 3.1 Credit Barometrics 
Ratio Description 
 
Ratio Calculation 
Current Ratio Current Assets divided by current liabilities 
Receivables - Merchandise  Receivables divided by inventory 
Worth -  Fixed Equity Capital divided by fixed assets 
Sales - Receivables Sales divided by receivables 
Sales – Merchandise  Sales divided by inventory 
Sales - Worth Sales divided by equity capital 
Debt - Worth Debt divided by equity capital 
Source: Wall, A.(1919) Study of Credit Barometrics. Federal Reserve Bulletin. March, pp. 230-234. 
The significance of the Wall contribution is that he provided empirical data for a 
range of industries, and a national average, thereby suggesting that comparison and 
benchmarking was the important factor to be analysed.  
Parallel to the Wall study, a series of financial ratios were being developed by the du 
Pont company, to be used by internal managers for decision making.  Frank 
Donaldson Brown was the brainchild behind the financial innovations at du Pont in 
the years up to 1919. The requirement for this analysis was partly driven by the 
divisionalised nature of the company and the subsequent quandary of how best to 
allocate resources for investment in each of the divisions by centralised senior 
executives. This management requirement encouraged Donaldson Brown to develop 
a measure providing a relationship between the profit contributed by a particular 
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division and the funds invested, or “Return on Investment” (ROI) as it became 
known. The detail surrounding the calculations of ROI at du Pont were not made 
generally available to the public until after World War II, and indeed Rotch claimed 
that there was an element of secrecy surrounding their financial control techniques as 
it was perceived to provide a form of competitive advantage.
470
 The subsequent 
literature on the development of ROI and other financial ratios at Du Pont, and later 
at General Motors, which appeared post-1945 will be reviewed later in this chapter.  
Whilst the developments at du Pont were in the first instance an internal solution to 
an internal company problem, Bliss provided a more academic contribution which 
was consequently published for public consumption.
471
 Bliss approached the subject 
in the same way as Donaldson Brown, from a management point of view, rather than 
from an external perspective. Bliss suggested that information should be generated to 
“judge the accomplishments of those to whom responsibility is delegated”, or to put 
in another way, to provide some form of performance measurement.
472
 To this end, 
Bliss described how combining the income statement and the balance sheet can 
provide a more comprehensive analysis of the affairs of a business, especially with 
regard to efficiency.
473
 It is important to note that having established a range of ratios 
to interrogate past performance, Bliss claimed that these should be used as a basis for 
the preparation of the company budget in which target improvements to the ratios 
should be factored in to improve overall business performance.
474
  
From the original identification of seven ratios identified by Wall as being important , 
Bliss  expanded this number to eighteen which, as detailed in Table 3.2, he divided 
into four general categorisations designed to highlight particular aspects of business 
performance.
475
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Table 3.2 Financial and Operating Ratios 
Measures of Earnings: 
Ratio Description 
 
Ratio Calculation 
The relation of net profit to net worth Profit after tax divided by equity capital 
The relation of net profit to sales revenue and 
volume 
Profit after tax divided by sales revenue and 
volume units 
The earnings on stockholders’ investments Profit after tax divided by number of shares 
The relation of operating profit to total 
capital 
Profit before interest & tax divided by total 
capital employed 
The relation of operating profit to sales value 
and volume 
Profit before interest & tax divided by sales 
value and volume units 
The relation of gross earnings to sales value 
and volume 
Gross profit divided by sales value and 
volume Units 
Measures of Costs & Expenses: 
Ratio Description  
 
Ratio Calculation 
The relationship of costs to sales value and 
volume 
Total costs divided by sales value and 
volume units 
The cost of borrowed capital Interest charged on borrowed capital 
The cost of capital employed The weighted average of cost of borrowed 
capital and expected return on shareholders 
equity 
 
Measures of Turnovers: 
Ratio Description 
 
Ratio Calculation 
Turnover of total capital used Net sales divided by total capital employed 
Turnover of inventories Inventories divided by cost of sales 
Turnover of accounts receivable Receivables divided by sales multiplied by 
300 days 
Turnover of fixed property investment Net sales divided by non-current assets 
 
Measures of Financial Relationships: 
Ratio Description 
 
Ratio Calculation 
Net working capital ratio Current assets divided by current liabilities 
Manner in which capital is invested Proportion of current and non-current assets 
Sources from which capital is secured Proportion of shareholders equity, retained 
earnings, long-term borrowing and short-
term borrowing 
Proportion of earnings left in the business Retained earnings divided by profit after tax 
Source: Bliss, J.H. (1923) Financial and Operating Ratios in Management. New York: The Ronald 
Press. 
These eighteen measures form a comprehensive and holistic view of a business from 
which detailed observations can be made and conclusions drawn regarding 
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performance, position and efficiency. They were regarded by many commentators as 
the seminal work during the interwar period and beyond. 
Bliss subsequently discussed these in a more general sense from the viewpoint of 
senior managers: how they should use and interpret the information that the ratios 
suggest in supplying valuable insights into their individual businesses.
476
 Indeed Bliss  
described how the “story” of a business can be told from an analysis of its financial 
statements.
477
 
Justin developed the range of financial and operating ratios that Bliss suggested, 
naming his approach ‘scientific analysis’ and applying these to a practical scenario by 
analysing data from fifty-seven flour mills in the USA.
478
 Justin also made reference 
to Wall in an attempt to secure commonality of reasoning and understanding in the 
two studies. The conclusion that Justin reached was the importance of comparing 
individual companies with the average for the industry, although he conceded that 
this in itself can be misleading due to geographical, seasonal or personnel 
differentials. He therefore warned against making swift judgements without taking 
into account these mitigating factors.
479
 
Whilst Bliss finally settled on a range of eighteen major financial and operating 
ratios, sub-divided into four main categories as summarised in Table 3.2, he also 
suggested other minor ratios which could be used by managers to identify specific 
problems. This expansion of the number of possible was described by Lincoln who 
nominated no fewer than forty such calculations.
480
 These are basically the major and 
sub-ratios first identified by Bliss, and provide evidence of the growing interest into 
the insights that this scientific approach could provide. 
However, despite the growing enthusiasm for ratio analysis, Gilman suggested major 
weaknesses in the accepted ratio analysis approach, claiming that ratios were 
artificial, they are unreliable and they obscure the need for common sense.
481
 Despite 
these reservations, Gilman did suggest a series of ratios (see Table 3.3) which he 
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considered to be the most relevant for the successful interrogation of a company’s 
financial affairs.
482
 He also offered an alternative approach, suggesting the application 
of the trend or percentage method of analysis Gilman.
483
 With this alternative 
method, Gilman put forward the idea of grouping the various items of assets and 
liabilities into classes such as quick assets, inventories, fixed assets, current liabilities, 
non-current liabilities and net worth and then applying what is in effect index 
numbers to each class, and then measuring their movement over time. Gilman 
claimed that this approach is less time consuming than traditional ratio analysis, and 
provides more or less the same insights, with the additional advantage of being able 
to survey all the movements all at once, which he claimed makes the reader more 
inclined to make common sense conclusions.
484
 
Table 3.3 Historical Ratio Method 
Ratio Description 
 
Ratio Calculation 
Quick Ratio Liquid current assets divided by current 
liabilities 
Current Ratio Current assets divided by current 
liabilities 
Sales to Receivables Sales revenues divided by receivables 
Sales to Inventory Sales revenues divided by inventories 
Sales to Net Worth Sales revenues divided by equity capital 
Net Worth to Fixed Assets Equity capital divided by non-current 
assets 
Net Worth to Liabilities Equity capital divided by liabilities 
Sales to Fixed Asets Sales revenue divided by non-current 
assets 
Source: Gilman, S. (1925) Analyzing Financial Statements. New York: Ronald Press. 
Notwithstanding some of the criticisms of ratio analysis posed by Gilman, further 
attempts were made to evolve the fundamentals into a more sophisticated model of 
business relationships with scientific merit as a key driver. As already mentioned, 
Wall provided one of the first empirical studies in supplying evidence of the merits of 
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analysing financial statements, and he subsequently collaborated with Duning
485
 to 
develop previous work, including that by Bliss by assigning weights to each of the 
ratios previously identified.
486
 However, they accepted that the weights assigned to 
each ratio was largely their personal view, although based on evidence and 
rationality, but other analysts may disagree with this view. They went on to claim that 
by applying the weights that they suggest for all of the eight ratios originally 
identified by Wall (see Table 3.1), an overall index can be calculated for any 
individual company, thereby providing an easily comparable scoring system.
487
 Table 
3.4 shows the relative value or weight for each identifiable ratio that they suggest. 
Table 3.4 Relative Values or Weights of Financial Ratios 
Ratio 
 
Relative Value 
Or Weight 
Current Ratio      25% 
Receivables - Merchandise       10% 
Worth -  Fixed      15% 
Sales - Receivables      10% 
Sales – Merchandise       10% 
Sales - Worth        5% 
Debt - Worth      25% 
Source: Wall, A. & Duning, R.W. (1928) Ratio Analysis of Financial Statements. New York: Harper & 
Bros. 
 
In addition to this contribution to the literature, Wall & Duning claimed that the 
development of budgeting techniques, with their emphasis on future performance and 
position, provides the analyst with additional information from which to make a more 
robust assessment of a company’s financial affairs.488 
Taking a wider view of ‘business performance’, Morgan489 firstly prescribed what the 
objectives of a business should be: 
“The function of a business is to provide for the material needs of mankind and to 
increase the wealth of the world and the value of happiness of life. In order to 
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perform its function it must offer a sufficient opportunity for gain to compensate 
individuals who assume its risks, but the motives which leads individuals to engage 
in business are not to be confused with the business itself. When business enterprise 
is successfully carried on, with constant and efficient endeavour to reduce the cost 
of production and distribution, to improve the quality of its products, and to give fair 
treatment to customers, capital, management and labour, it renders public service 
of the highest value”490 
 
Morgan adopted a stakeholder view of the enterprise from which he compiled a series 
of factors contributing to “business deaths” or business failures, which have a 
catastrophic effect on stakeholders. One of the key factors in business failure that he 
identified, and which affected over half of the companies studied, is “lack of 
knowledge”. Morgan cited the financial and operating ratios identified by Bliss as 
being a remedy for the lack of knowledge. But instead of merely comparing the ratios 
of an individual company with others in the same industry, he formulated a rationale 
for comparing companies in different sectors by providing evidence of how examples 
from different sectors can be used to offer insights and solutions to problems of 
companies in other sectors.
491
 
In sympathy with the need for a strong empirical emphasis when comparing 
individual companies to industry averages or ‘norms’, Crum accumulated statistical 
data from 1916-27 for over 400,000 firms covering every sector and geographical 
area of the USA.
492
 In analysing this data, Crum limited his efforts to two financial 
ratios:  
Profit Ratio – Net profit after tax divided by sales revenues 
Earnings Ratio – Net profits after tax divided by total assets 
Although his scope of analysis was limited, Crum’s work is important because it 
highlights the significance of long-term trends.
493
 At about the same time as the 
publication of Crum’s study, Sloan also provided empirical data on performance 
measurement, concentrating on large corporations over a shorter time-frame, limiting 
his analysis of his chosen range of companies to net returns on capital.
494
 These 
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studies, whilst modest in the range of analysis, expand the range of knowledge and 
information available to individual companies with regard to comparisons and overall 
trends. Indeed, Epstein
495
 reviewed the work that had been carried out by Crum and 
Sloan and made some key observations, such as the companies who were the most 
profitable had branded or trade-marked products
496
. On a more general note, Epstein 
concluded that Crum’s work indicates that business losses can mean the ultimate loss 
of business capital, which in turn means an economic loss for the entire 
community
497
.  
One consequence of the increasing level of empirical evidence relating to the 
measurement of financial performance during the 1920’s was the use of ratios to 
predict business difficulty or even business failure. The initial contribution to the 
literature by Smith & Winakor identified a range of firms which had experienced 
some form of business difficulty during an eight-year period in the 1920’s and 
concluded that the ratio of net working capital to total assets was the most reliable 
indicator of business distress.
498
 Subsequently they developed this study with a larger 
sample of companies, arriving at similar conclusions.
499
 Two further studies by 
Fitzpatrick compared a sample of companies who were either successful or failures 
and concluded that net profit to worth, net worth to debt and also net worth to fixed 
assets (as used by the Smith & Winakor studies) were most relevant as indicators of 
company failure.
500
 
The literature reviewed thus far has been sourced from the U.S.A., where it is 
apparent that  the development of financial ratio analysis was borne out of the 
requirement for credit assessment of business by external agencies, and later 
incorporated by managers. However, the contribution in the UK came initially from 
an internal management perspective by Rose which was based on his practical 
experience as Works Manager at Leyland Motors and later as an independent 
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management consultant.
501
 Rose used “Higher Control”, to provide senior managers 
with statistical data on the company’s business, trading and financial position.502 For 
all of these different aspects of a company’s business operations, Rose advocated that 
information  be provided in tabular or graphical form to emphasise key areas of either 
success or failure, and also to establish trends in a visual way. 
As part of the financial position in his concept of Higher Control, Rose suggested 
carrying out analysis in the form of ratios as had been published in the literature 
emanating mainly from the U.S.A.
503
 Table 3.5 summarises the ratios that Rose has 
identified. 
Table 3.5 Higher Control - Financial Position Ratios 
Ratio Description 
 
Ratio Calculation 
Liquid Ratio Liquid current assets divided by current 
liabilities 
Payables Ratio Sales divided by payables 
Current Ratio Current assets divided by current 
liabilities 
Inventory Turnover Sales divided by inventories 
Net Worth to Fixed Assets Equity capital divided by non-current 
assets 
Sales to Fixed Assets Sales divided by non-current assets 
Net Worth to Total Liabilities Equity capital divided by total liabilities 
Sales to Net Worth Sales divided by equity capital 
Profits to Net Worth Profit before interest and tax divided by 
equity capital 
Source: Rose, T.G. (1934) Higher Control. London: Pitman. 
In preparing the information for the ratios described in Table 3.5, Rose stated that the 
management of a company should plot the information in a graphical format to 
establish the “normal” position for each ratio so that variations from this benchmark 
position can be easily and clearly identified.
504
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Whilst the Rose contribution provides a UK emphasis, he did not provide clear 
empirical evidence that the ratios he quoted are the most efficacious;  they appear to 
be his opinion based upon his own practical experience. However, in the U.S.A. the 
development of empirical-based study that commenced with the forecasting  business 
failure was continued by Foulke
505
, who compiled industry averages over a period of 
years in the late 1920’s and early 1930’s, the findings of which were eventually 
published in a series of articles.
506
  
This series of articles that Foulke originally published were eventually summarised as 
being the accepted range of ratios that had been compiled using empirical 
methodologies.
507
 However, Foulke maintained that as far as the accountant is 
concerned they are all of equal importance.
508
 Table 3.6 summarises Foulke’s work 
which are separated into five family groups. 
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Table 3.6 Family Groups of Financial Ratios 
Capital Ratios 
Ratio Description 
 
Ratio Calculation 
Fixed assets to tangible net worth Fixed assets divided by equity capital 
Current debt to tangible net worth Debt divided by equity capital 
Net working capital represented by debt Proportion of working capital debt 
funded 
 
Inventory Ratios 
Ratio Description 
 
Ratio Calculation 
Net Sales to Inventory Sales revenue divided by inventories 
Net Working Capital represented by 
Inventory 
Inventory divided by net working capital 
Inventory Covered by Current Debt Proportion of inventory funded by debt 
 
Sales Ratios 
Ratio Description 
 
Ratio Calculation 
Average Collection Period Receivables divided by sales multiplied 
by 365 
Turnover of Tangible Net Worth Sales revenues divided by equity capital 
Turnover of Net Working Capital Sales revenues divided by net working 
capital 
 
Net Profit Ratios 
Ratio Description 
 
Ratio Calculation 
Net Profits on Net Sales Profit before interest and tax divided by 
sales revenues 
Net Profits on Tangible Net Worth Profit before interest and tax divided by 
equity capital 
Net Profits on Net Working Capital Profit before interest and tax divided by 
net working capital 
 
Supplemental Ratios 
Ratio Description 
 
Ratio Calculation 
Current Assets to Current Debt Current assets divided by short term 
borrowing 
Total Debt to Tangible Net Worth Total debt divided by equity capital 
Source: Foulke, R.A. (1937) Financial ratios become of age. Journal of Accountancy. September: 203-
213. 
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In summarising his findings, Foulke reaffirmed the efficacy of ratio analysis by 
claiming they identify and quantify previous management decision-making, and is 
therefore a mechanism for measuring ability and knowledge within an 
organisation.
509
 
3.7 Development of Financial Performance Analysis: Business 
History Literature 
The review of contemporary literature on financial analysis highlights the similarity, 
but also the differences between commentators of what constituted the optimum 
number and type of ratio that should be used. However, although developed and 
refined during the period 1914-20, the system of financial ratios devised by 
Donaldson Brown at Du Pont and General Motors (GM) culminating in the Return on 
Investment (ROI) ratio has been viewed by many historical commentators as one of 
the most important contributions (see Fig.3.1). As already alluded to, the detail 
surrounding this system of financial ratios was not published until 1950 by Davies
510
.  
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Figure 3.1 The Du Pont Company: Relationships of factors affecting return on 
investment 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
. 
Souece: Davies, T.C. (1950) How the du Pont organisation appraises its performance. Financial 
Management Series 94:7: 3-23. The American Management Association. 
 
Following the publication of Davies’ work on the du Pont system of financial ratio 
calculation, two other executives at du Pont, Kline and Hessler provided more detail 
regarding the way in which a ‘chart system’ was devised at the company, thereby 
enabling the operationalisation of the ratio system as a means of financial control 
within the rationale and subsequent function of the chart system: 
“Any system of financial control, to be of maximum usefulness, should include a  
forecast of sales and profits, a forecast of working capital requirements and cash 
 resources, and capital-expenditure budgets and working capital standards, together 
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 with statements which show actual operating performance and balance sheet  
conditions promptly after the end of the accounting period”.511 
 
The chart system at du Pont that Kline and Hessler describe, reaffirmed the concept 
that it is the Return on Investment (ROI) which provides the ultimate measure of 
performance within a  company. Furthermore, in a critique of the chart system at du 
Pont, Yates discovered that the charts not only provided graphical presentation, but 
also included tabulated data in case more detailed information was required to 
support the graphs.
512
 Yates claimed that the chart system was an ideal medium for 
presenting ROI information to senior executives as it pointed to the places where 
further analysis, review and attention was required.
513
 
The development of the ROI and its subordinate ratios at du Pont has been credited 
with the way in which the company became a pioneer of systematic management. 
Dale stated that the originality of the du Pont organisational objective was that it was 
dependant on achieving the most efficient results through a series of ten systematic 
processes or ‘criterions’ of which ROI was a principal driver: 
“1) Co-ordination of economically or market-related effort. 2) Undivide responsibility.  
3) Closely defined superior-subordinate relationships. 4) Economic advantage of 
 specialisation of central staff. 5) ROI as ultimate measure of performance. 6) Ultimate 
 control by group management. 7) Knowledge of general business principles.   
8) Multiple truths in management. 9) Adoption to change. 10) The ‘ideal’ organisation514 
. 
Dale and Meloy attributed the systematic approach in management at du Pont to 
Hamilton Macfarland Barksdale, who they claim had developed his ideas whilst 
employed initially at Repauno Chemical Company and then at Eastern Dynamite 
from 1887 to 1893 when the company was taken over by du Pont. Barksdale’s talents 
were incorporated into the parent company and in 1902 became General Manager at 
du Pont until 1914.
515
 According to Dale and Maloy, Barksdale during this time had 
implemented control through financial measurement based on the rate of return on 
investment and also implemented coordination through the instrument of the budget, 
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where there was continuous examination of forecasts against actual.
516
 In a more 
detailed examination of the early financial management systems at du Pont, Johnson  
affirmed that the ROI technique was used by the company during the years covered 
by his study (1903-12) and was used extensively in supporting managers in making 
resource allocation decisions.
517
 Johnson made the point that many companies had 
used net profit (i.e. profit before interest and tax) long before 1900, but du Pont were 
the first to relate this to the level of investment that had been made in order to 
generate those profits. Johnson supported his assertions by citing a paper entitled 
“Object of Accounting” presented by R.H. Dunham to an internal Superintendent’s 
meeting at du Pont held in April 1911, where it was concluded that: 
“the true test of  whether the profit is too great or too small is the rate of return 
 on the money invested in the business and not the percent of profit on the cost”518 
 
Johnson also made the point that du Pont were also the first to use the ROI as a 
specific technique in the wider context of a management accounting system, 
especially relating to performance measurement and also control, subsequently 
concluding that this was a key contributor to the overall success of the company.
519
 
Refinement of the ROI technique at du Pont was developed in 1914 by Donaldson 
Brown who had come to the conclusion that if prices remained the same, the rate of 
return on invested capital increased as volume rose, and would subsequently decrease 
if volume fell.
520
 Brown deduced that the higher the throughput and stock-turn, the 
greater the rate of return; a phenomena that Brown termed ‘turnover’. Brown then 
realised that if you multiplied this ‘turnover’ figure with the old accepted definition of 
profit, i.e. earnings as a percentage of sales, then this would provide a more robust 
value of ROI (as detailed in Figure 3.1). In his autobiography, Brown pointed out the 
benefits of this improved analysis as not only in providing effective control, because 
problems could easily be identified at any point in the array of ratios that made up the 
ROI, but importantly in making forecasts, on which decisions are made concerning 
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the formulation of policies necessary for coordinated control of company 
operations.
521
 Brown
522
 also acknowledged the importance of the environment at du 
Pont created by Barksdale in his years as General Manager at the company.
523
  
Du Pont’s takeover of General Motors (GM) company, first instigated in 1917, 
eventually led to Brown being transferred to GM in 1921 as Vice President in charge 
of Finance which ultimately led to the gradual implementation of the same financial 
control techniques as employed at du Pont, centred around the ROI calculations. 
Johnson described the effect of the introduction of Brown’s financial systems at GM 
as “centralised control with decentralised responsibility”, thereby enabling top 
management to control the various divisions without becoming too involved in their 
operations.
524
 Johnson went on to explain that it was the management accounting 
system that provided the enabler for this to happen at GM by: providing an annual 
operating forecast which compared divisional performance with overall corporate 
goals; providing sales reports and flexible budgets to alert management to any 
deviation from plan; and providing a basis for the allocation of resources to divisions 
based on the ratios culminating in the ROI measure.
525
 
The contribution of Alfred Sloan Jnr. to the turnaround and eventual success of GM 
in the early 1920’s has been made by Dale526, whom he described Sloan as an 
empiricist who provided the model of the system, the methodology and the proper 
distribution of the equities among the stakeholders at GM. As a consequence of this 
empirical approach from Sloan and other senior executives, Dale concluded that 
ground-breaking initiatives such as ROI, gearing of pricing policies, the gearing of 
operations and expenses to provide pre-determined profitability were integrated into 
the company culture.
527
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In his own autobiography, Sloan described the important contribution of the provision 
of key financial information in the eventual turnaround of the fortunes of GM in the 
early 1920’s, especially the role played by ROI in the effective appropriation 
procedures of capital spending.
528
 Sloan also stated that in addition to the effective 
use of capital expenditure, the control of cash, inventory and production are also 
prerequisites to the success of a business. 
529
 
Commenting on the achievements at du Pont, Johnson and Kaplan observed that 
given there was no existing precedent, the cost accounting system centred on the ROI 
was  ahead of its time, and some elements are the model for the control of complex 
business organisations today.
530
 However, Johnson and Kaplan conceded that using 
ROI figures net of depreciation can lead to underinvestment by divisional managers, 
as was originally the case at du Pont, although rectified post-1920 by using gross ROI 
data. They go on to comment that this was not the case at GM whose managers 
continued using net ROI, which led to similar under-investment issues.
531
 
In his critique of ROI, specifically in relation to GM, Quail agreed that the ratios 
themselves did not provide managers at GM with answers to problems, they simply 
highlighted the irrefutable facts exposed comparison of actual versus predicted 
outcomes.
532
  Or to put it another way, it forced GM into the establishment of a 
company-wide budgetary control system, thereby emphasising sales forecasting with 
links to production scheduling, which in turn created the feedback loops essential for 
control.
533
 Quail also suggested that the information provided by financial ratios 
forced GM into establishing clear objectives and targets.
534
 The conclusion that Quail 
eventually drew was that measures such as ROI are only useful up to a point, and in 
itself is not the basis for financial control, but has to be used as part of a more robust 
and encompassing system, which evolves slowly over time.
535
 
As this review of contemporary literature review has shown, the main thrust of 
financial ratios as measure of business condition occurred in the U.S.A., driven in the 
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first instance by the need for credit assessment by external agencies, although the 
concept of ‘Higher Control’ by Rose originated in the UK, and was driven in part by 
routine ratio analysis of financial statements. Apart from the Rose treatise, Parkinson  
was probably one of the first UK contributors to contribute to the literature of 
financial ratio analysis, reflecting in the preface to his book that “One of the marked 
features of British as compared with American accountancy is the comparative 
absence of this technique.
536
 This alone seems to justify the calling of attention to it.” 
It is interesting to note that Parkinson devoted a sizeable portion of his book linking 
the financial ratios that he observed with “management accounting” techniques such 
as costing and budgeting, thereby emphasising the importance of integrating the 
various information flows within an organisation.
537
  
In his review of the development of the application of ratio analysis, Horrigan stated 
that the UK approach originated within a ‘management orientation’, rather than the 
‘credit orientation’ that occurred in the U.S.A.538 He claimed that this meant that 
professional associations such as the British Institute of Management became 
interested because it provided the means of providing information to members in the 
form of inter-firm comparisons, eventually culminating in the establishment of the 
Centre for Interfirm Comparisons, the recognised forum for providing industry ratio 
data. In addition, Horrigan also suggested that one of the major achievements of the 
contributors to the literature during the interwar period was in the empirical work 
concerning the use of ratios to predict business failure.
539
 Altman, however, whilst 
also accepting the potential for using ratios as were developed during the 1930’s 
pointed out that the order of their importance is not clear, as every study cited a 
different ratio as being the most effective indicator of business failure.
540
 
Finally, commenting on the solitary UK contribution to the contemporary literature, 
Boyns reviewed the work of Rose and made the observation that rather than using 
ratio analysis as part of an overall financial measurement and control system, Rose 
appeared to reject the idea of employing budgetary control, by claiming the 
measuring of the key metrics that he suggests is all that senior managers need for his 
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idea of ‘Higher Control’.541 Whilst criticising Rose for his narrow outlook in rejecting 
other financial techniques, Boyns observed that his work went on to be published in 
the UK over seven editions between 1934 and 1963, suggesting that his ideas had an 
audience, but found no evidence that these ideas became mainstream in the years 
following publication, and the title of ‘Higher Control’ did not become an accepted 
term in the same way as ‘Budgetary Control’ did.542 
3.8 Conclusions 
The inter-war period witnessed the steady development of financial performance 
analysis as a methodology for the assessment of business performance, with its 
foundations being grounded in the need by external agencies to assess credit 
worthiness, particularly in the U.S.A. Indeed, several of the contributions to the 
literature are the direct result of the experiences of employees of independent credit 
assessment agencies such as Dun & Bradstreet and Robert Morris & Associates. 
However, the techniques devised were increasingly being used for internal 
management purposes for providing important insights into particular aspects of 
business performance, and especially for efficiency measurement. 
Clearly, the important contribution of ratio analysis by the du Pont company in the 
early years of the twentieth century, subsequently refined during the 1920’s by GM, 
have been an important topic for business historians. However, the reluctance on the 
part of the management of the companies to divulge or share the techniques that they 
had developed meant of course that this knowledge was not publically known during 
the interwar years. Part of the explanation for this secrecy was the fear that early 
publication would undermine their competitive advantage. However, as has been 
demonstrated in this chapter, the important ROI concepts that had been developed at 
du Pont and GM had also been identified by other commentators, although maybe not 
in the same way of use and implementation. 
The dearth of literature on ratio analysis from the UK is not satisfactorily explained 
by business historians, although Quail has provided perhaps the most convincing 
argument in that performance measures and financial control are linked to the 
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difficult struggle in the UK prior to World war II to achieve an efficient form for the 
large corporation, suggesting that structure and control evolved together gradually.
543
 
This being the case, Quail therefore claimed that the use of financial performance 
measures in the UK such as ROI were slow to be implemented by UK companies, 
with use not being widespread until post World War II, citing GEC and GKN as two 
important proponents.
544
  
The contemporary performance measures identified are an important base from which 
an assessment of Rowntree’s and Cadbury’s during the interwar period can be 
undertaken to provide a complete and balanced view. It is argued in this thesis that 
achievement in cost accounting sophistication within the two companies had a 
profound effect on their respective performances. The following two chapters assess 
the different paths that Rowntree’s and Cadbury’s took in the introduction, 
application and development of cost accounting within their businesses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
543
 Quail, “The historic significance of Capital Employed”,  p. 4.  
544
 Ibid. 
146 
 
Section 2 – Fieldwork and Data Collection 
Chapter 4 
What was the extent of the development and  
implementation of Cost Accounting techniques adopted by 
Rowntree’s  between 1869 and 1938? 
4.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters indicated that cost accounting developed in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries because of a number of different factors, including the 
complexity of railroads, which created a demand for detailed information
545
; the 
growth of complex organisations and falling prices
546
; the extension of a scientific 
approach by engineers
547
; government legislation to limit profiteering during the 
Great War and to ensure capitalist control over labour processes
548
. 
This chapter examines the way in which cost accounting techniques developed within  
Rowntree’s from 1869 to 1938, and the reasons why this occurred. Firstly, this 
chapter  shows that the arrival of Joseph Rowntree as a partner and investor into the 
business in 1869 proved to be an important catalyst because of his initial desire to 
familiarise himself with all aspects of the cocoa and confectionery industry. He 
procured information (including cost data) on how to compete in the market, 
primarily to protect his existing investments. Although developed piecemeal on a 
production department basis, the sophistication of the cost information provided by 
Joseph Rowntree is exemplified by the fact that by 1891 the company had in place a 
basic system of comparing pre-determined estimates with actual results,  including a 
crude form of variance analysis, which pre-dated the literature by about five years. 
This chapter also demonstrates that a close relationship with the company’s auditors 
had been forged resulting in improvements to Rowntree costing systems and 
procedures during the latter part of the nineteenth century. A consequence of this 
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collaboration was improvement in the way that overheads were allocated and how 
cost and profitability  information was compiled and reported. 
The consequences of the changed industrial landscape in the aftermath of the Great 
War are examined, including how structural changes at the organisational level were 
made in the company, driven by chairman elect, Seebohm Rowntree, which led 
directly to the creation of a functional cost office, rather than the disparate way in 
which cost information had been presented before 1914. It is argued that the quest for 
efficiency at Rowntree’s was a key element in the drive for increasing cost 
information, predicated on the desire of the company to contribute to the overall 
development of society, particularly to improve the standard of living of ordinary 
working people. Debates on these and other management issues were encouraged 
through the forums of the Oxford Conferences and the Management Research Groups 
(MRG’s), established by Seebohm from an original concept developed by his life-
long collaborator, Henry Dennison. This chapter will also show the detailed methods 
of assimilating cost and profitability information by the newly established cost office, 
derived from, and with contributions to, the latest techniques published in the 
literature. The mechanisms as to how this information was reported and distributed 
within the company is discussed. 
Finally, the struggle by the company to understand and incorporate more 
sophisticated cost  accounting techniques, such as marginal costing, standard costing 
and budgetary control are discussed, demonstrating the complex processes and 
organisational coordination required for their successful implementation.  
4.2 Foundations & Beginnings 1869-1918 
Background  
As previously noted by Fitzgerald, the invitation to Joseph Rowntree to join the 
fledgling Rowntree company by his brother Henry Isaac in 1869 meant the business 
drew back from the brink of bankruptcy.
549
 This was largely due to Joseph’s financial 
skills which included the introduction of a system whereby each line was “carefully 
priced and costed”. The contribution to the company by Joseph Rowntree, 
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particularly regarding his financial skills was recognised in the literature by 
Vernon:
550
 
“In all trades there is one constant factor – the accounts. It was this side of the  
business which Joseph took over, leaving Henry to deal with the actual  
manufacturing of the cocoa. ‘Time and Motion’ study had not been invented 
 and costing systems were still in their infancy, but one of the things Joseph 
 really knew about was statistics. As he had once worked out figures of  
national expenditure with regard to pauperism, so now he began to explore 
 the costs of producing the various kinds of cocoa. His was the scientific approach 
 to every problem, whether it was the poverty of his countrymen or the sale 
 of his brother’s cocoa, and it proved of very great value to the business.” 
 This depiction of Joseph Rowntree confirms him as a person who approached 
business with a philosophy that was congruent with the systematic management 
movement being developed in the U.S.A. in the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
and pre-empts Taylor’s views on scientific management. T.H. Appleton, a senior 
manager within the company provided additional insights on the arrival of Joseph 
Rowntree as “bringing along his capital, business ability, foresight, judgement, 
method and steady perseverance”551. 
The UK cocoa and confectionery market that confronted Joseph Rowntree upon his 
arrival in 1869 was already well established. Several companies, including Frys and 
Cadburys, had already carved out market positions (see Table 4.1): 
Table 4.1 Sales Revenues of Fry, Cadbury and Rowntree (1870) 
 
      Fry  Cadbury  Rowntree 
Sales Revenues:  1870   £143,750 £54,790  £7,384 
 
Source: Fitzgerald, R. (1995, p. 59). 
Notwithstanding his loyalty to his brother, Joseph Rowntree was, in addition, 
concerned to  protect his own investment in the firm. With this in mind, and given his 
inexperience of the company and the industry in which it traded, Joseph Rowntree 
commenced a programme of personal training and fact-finding in the years 1869-72. 
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Evidence of the extent to which he was prepared to go in his quest for knowledge is 
provided in his personal notebook in which he describes how he made speculative 
visits to London, Bristol and Birmingham, where he placed advertisements in the 
local press for vacancies for confectionery workers. Those who answered these 
advertisements were employed by existing confectionery companies such as Epps, 
Taylor Bros., Pecks, Dunns and Cadburys; they were paid money by Rowntree in 
exchange for detailed information on their company’s processes, recipes, mixings, 
machinery, wages and importantly, cost structures.
552
 This archival evidence also 
provides further information that Joseph Rowntree extended these fact-finding visits 
to Meniers in France and Van Houtens in Holland, in recognition of the extent to 
which foreign companies had penetrated the UK market. 
Early Costing Activity 
Figure 4.1 shows that the first archival record of attempts by the Rowntree company 
to compile and prepare cost information occurred in 1870. It is included in the 
notebook of Henry Isaac Rowntree where he describes how an employee, J. 
Beaumont used his experience of working at Epps & Co. to compile a costing for a 
simple chocolate mixing: 
Figure 4.1  Raw Material Ingredient Chocolate Costing 1870 
       s. d. 
1 ½ of Grenada @ 76s.    114 0 
1 ½ of Sago Flour @ 16s.      24 0 
2 of Sugar @ 31s.      62 0 
2 of Water         0 0 
       200 0 
Source: Misc. Notebook of H.I.Rowntree 1869-77. HIR/1/1. Borthwick 
From this knowledge, Rowntrees began to systematically prepare formal raw material 
ingredient costs of its range of products. Figure 4.2 provides an example which 
demonstrates the understanding by the company that there were different processes 
involved in the manufacture of a product, and that this complexity had to be built into 
the structure and calculation of the product’s cost.  This important insight is important 
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in the level of accuracy of the final cost, because of the fact that it is a reflection and 
financial representation of the actual manufacturing process.  
Figure 4.2: Rowntree’s Rock Cocoa Ingredients Costing 1870. 
 
      s. d. 
1 of Bahia Beans @ 63s.9d.  63   9 
1 of Grenada @ 75s.11d.   75 11 
      2 )139   8 
Cost of Chocolate   69 10 
75lbs. of chocolate (as above 69s10d.) 46   9 
37lbs of Sugar 31s.0d.   10   3   
112 lbs 1
st
. Cost of Rock Cocoa  57   0 
 
Source: Costings Book 1870-76. HIR/4B/2. Borthwick 
Figure 4.2 demonstrates that the convention of the Rowntree company was to 
describe raw material ingredients costs as “1st Cost”, and also to convert cost data 
onto a ‘per cwt.’ basis, this being the standard unit of weight used within the 
business, as well as being the most efficient way of providing costs in a consistent 
and comparable way. This convention is still employed by the company today (albeit 
on a “per tonne” basis). Once the mechanism for compiling these costs was 
established the company began to prepare raw material packaging costs (2
nd
 Costs)
553
, 
and also labour costs derived from wages and piece rate data
554
. These early forays to 
provide product cost information appear to be compiled on a factory department 
basis, probably by the foreman in charge of each department. In addition to the 
calculation of prime costs for each product, the first evidence of calculating the 
apportionment of overheads (3
rd Cost) is provided in an “Analysis Book”, which 
indicates 1877 as the earliest entry
555
. Figure 4.3 provides an example of an entry in 
this Book which also provides  the first evidence of consolidated  information to 
provide total cost, and importantly, the inclusion of selling prices required to 
calculate profit for each product on a per cwt. basis. 
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Figure 4.3: 1lb. Creams Box Cost & Profitability 1878 
 
        Piece    Total     Selling 
Product  Package   1
st
.Cost  2
nd
.Cost  Wages  3
rd
.Cost   Cost     Price       Profit  
Creams   1lb.Box  36s.5d.     12s.1d.  9s.4d.   16s.0d.     73s.10d.   84s.3d.   10s.5d. 
Source: Analysis Book 1877-94. HIR/4C/6. Borthwick. 
This information was updated and provided on a monthly basis for every line  
manufactured in the department (the above example is for July 1878), with a general 
review every six months. Whilst an apportionment of overheads (3
rd
. Cost) is evident 
from this ledger, it was not until 1894 that a detailed analysis of how the allocation 
was calculated - dividing the total overhead by total cwts. sold to provide a per cwt. 
basis  - is available in the archive
556
. 
The gradual evolution of the costing procedures at Rowntree coincided with the 
appointment of T.H. Appleton to the company in 1882; he was one of the first 
dedicated members of the office staff to be recruited. In later years Appleton became 
the works manager of the company but initially he was “involved in the expenses side 
of the business, eventually becoming responsible for preparation of final accounts for 
audit”557. In the evolutionary process of costing sophistication, Rowntrees appear to 
follow the natural progression defined by Epstein as “cost keeping”, being the 
compilation and classification of manufacturing costs used mainly as a pre-requisite 
of financial statement preparation. In addition Epstein described the activity of “cost 
finding” which was deemed to be the calculation of product costs used individually 
and collectively for use by managers for control and decision-making purposes.
558
  
According to the literature, the next prominent development in the evolution of 
costing was the setting of standards of normal operating conditions, against which 
quantifiable differences, or variances could be observed; this allowed managers to 
identify issues or problems concerning efficiency, wastage or any other production 
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problem.
559
 Examination of the archival records at Rowntree’s indicates that a basic 
level of this practice was being operated as early as 1891
560
. The extent to which this 
technique was being practiced at the company, along with  what was being calculated 
and presented as a matter of routine is shown in Figure 4.4: 
Figure 4.4: Cost Sheet Results 1
st
 Half 1891  
 
Cost Sheet Cost Sheet     Cost Sheet     Actual 
Too Much Too Little     Figures      Figures 
£.     s.   d. £.      s.   d.     £.         s.   d.    £.       s.  d. 
615  17 10 1
st
. Cost    29,112  3   3  29,728 1 1   
 366    0 10 2
nd
.Cost      5,572  7   7    5,938  8   5 
  955    5   0 3
rd
.Cost    18,050  5   2  19,00510   2 
    86    8   5 Piece Wages     2,351  0   4   2,937   8   9 
    Diff. between cost sheets 
17    4   2                and money equivalent sheets                    17  4   2 
     Totals   55,603   0   6   57,609 8   5 
       
  1,404 15 9 Sales                  61,594   4   4   62,999  0 1 
 601  12  2   Net Profit                  5,991   3  10   5,389 11  8 
Notes on Differences: 
Explanation of Cost Differences: Of the difference in 1
st
 cost, £300 is due to £580 not being 
entered on the cost sheet. The largest of the items accounting for the difference in the 3
rd
.cost 
are Advertising £195, Bad Debts £116, Coal & Coke £100 and an error caused by cost not 
being calculated in same number of cwts. But of course there are numerous other differences 
both ways which more or less balance each other. 
Explanation of Sales Differences: On the difference in sales, £580 is due to an amount not 
entered on the cost sheets, and the bulk of the remainder is due to an excess of selling price 
over Blue List. 
Source: Cost Sheet Results 1891-99. HIR/4B/15. Borthwick. 
Figure 4.4 provides a clear example of an attempt by Rowntree’s to identify  a form 
of standard (cost sheet figures) and their comparison to actual figures and the ensuing 
calculation of variances (cost sheet too much = favourable, cost sheet too little = 
adverse). Also included are sales differences (sales variances), enabling a 
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reconciliation of estimated versus actual net profit. However, although the process of 
collating, calculating and presenting the data has the outward appearance of a 
standard costing system, the narrative interpretation of the calculated differences or 
‘variances’ is lacking in any great detail (given that the figures represent six months 
of activity), and appears to have been compiled as a mathematical exercise in 
reconciliation, rather than as a service to management. Indeed, the statement by the 
compiler of the analysis suggests that he was content not to investigate differences if 
they appeared to “balance each other out”, something that a ‘Professional’ Cost and 
Management Accountant would clearly find anathema
561
. However, the fact that a 
relatively modest company at this time should be putting into practice a primitive 
version of a cost accounting technique which was to later become the bedrock of the 
science of ‘Cost & Management Accounting’, is in itself illuminating. 
The variable and piecemeal contribution of Chartered Accountants and the accounting 
profession to the development of costing in the late nineteenth century is well 
documented in the literature, as previously mentioned. Indeed, a contemporary 
commentator, Strachan derided the role of the company auditor, and bemoaned their 
reluctance to offer advice and assistance to their clients.
562
 On the other hand, there is 
also evidence that many business executives did not seek or value the opinion of their 
auditors and viewed them as merely compilers and verifiers of financial statements.
563
  
The relationship between Rowntrees and their auditors, A.J. Cudworth & Co. of 
Birmingham, appeared to be much closer with regular correspondence between senior 
manager T.H Appleton and A.J. Cudworth
564
. Indeed, as an exception to the majority 
of Chartered Accountants, A.J. Cudworth had published on costing
565
, so was perhaps 
more ‘qualified’ to advise the company on issues of costing procedures and systems. 
In his article, Cudworth extolled the virtues of cost accounting and how a well-
designed cost system could inform and support the formal books of financial 
accounts, with the auditor having a key role in the actual design and implementation 
of such a system. An example of this relationship is provided in a letter from 
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Rowntrees (T.H. Appleton?) to A.J. Cudworth, dated 2
nd 
 March 1898, in which he 
was first explained the perpetual difficulties in allocating generic overhead expenses 
and then suggested that the basis of allocating overheads should be changed from 
weight, to sales value. The response by Appleton to this suggestion was : “the present 
system shows a higher profit on expensive articles and a poor profit on cheap articles, 
thus tending to induce us to throw our trade onto higher priced articles, which is 
undoubtedly a sound policy”566. In other words, Rowntree wanted to persevere with a 
costing practice that supported their current selling/marketing policy, rather than to 
take professional advice which could have led to a different product strategy that was 
more beneficial in the longer term. This is an example of a particular interpretation of 
what the science of costing actually provides to a business in terms of valuable 
information to aid decision-making. 
In another letter from Rowntree
567
 to A.J. Cudworth, dated 11
th
 October 1898, a 
slightly different tone is offered whereby Morrell requested a meeting to discuss the 
best method of obtaining the net profits made in the different departments which 
comprised the factory.
568
 The consequence of this close relationship with their 
professional auditors, is apparent in the methodology of how factory departmental 
profitability became established by 1904
569
, as illustrated in Figure 4.5. It is apparent 
that Morrell’s methodology is consistent with Cudworth’s example provided in his 
aforementioned article published in the Accountant
570
: 
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Figure 4.5 Elect Cocoa (Half Year 1904, 31
st
 Dec.) 
    £ s.  d.     £    s.  d. 
Ingredients   47,439 17 2  Sales  127,589  17  9 
Wages    5, 542   0  1 
2nd. Cost  10,301 18 6 
Manuf.Profit c/f  64,306   2 0      
               127,589 17 9     127,589  17 9 
 
Expenses divided     b/f Manuf. 
according to value    Profit  64,306   2  0 
of sales     7089  1  10       
Actual expenses of 
dept.   17,037  3  4 
Nett Profit  40,179 16 10       
    64,306   2  0    64,306    2   0 
 
Source: Factory Statistics 1892-1914. R/B/4/JBM/3. Borthwick. 
All factory departments were consolidated into a total company analysis, and by 1905 
there was the addition of ‘% sales’ and ‘per cwt.’ information for each cost item, thus 
providing a mechanism for assessing comparative rates of expense between products 
or departments, a convention which has remained to the present day. 
In addition to the provision of cost information by individual product and by total 
factory, there became established a mechanism for estimating costs and profitability 
for proposed new lines which had been identified for potential future sales. However, 
it is not clear whether these new lines cost requests came from production or 
sales/marketing. Nonetheless, the archives show that just prior to Great War, a 
process was established which provided a quick view on financial viability on any 
proposed addition to the existing range of products
571
. An example of how these 
estimates were compiled is provided in Figure 4.6, in which the level of estimation 
and approximation is evident: 
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Figure 4.6  Product: Venetian Creams - 15 March 1913 
          s.       d. 
Ingredients 3 Creams at say 24s. 0d. 
   4 No. 49 Choc at say 57s 0d.    45      6 
 
Second Cost        21      0 
 
3
rd
. Cost  14s.  0d 
   17s.  6d. 
   10s.  6d.       42      0 
 
Piece Work Making  say 14s.  0d. 
   Packing say   7s.   0d.     21       0 
          129     6 
 
Selling Price        157   6 
 
Profit         28     0 
 % of Sales        17% 
Source: Estimates for New Lines 1913. R/DF/CC/7. Borthwick. 
This capability of the rapid estimation of profitability regarding potential new lines 
was to be the foundation of the company’s ability to react to changing consumer 
preferences, thereby establishing business to occupy potential niche markets. This 
was to prove an important element in the way in which Rowntree’s competed in the 
UK Confectionery Market following the end of the Great War. 
4.3 Progress: 1918-39 
Organisational Context  
Both Rowntree and Cadbury experienced rapid growth during this period and both 
confronted the problem of how to manage a company which bore little resemblance 
157 
 
to its nineteenth century beginnings. This was particularly apparent after the Great 
War which  changed the UK confectionery landscape.
572
 
These new opportunities could only be grasped by those companies who reacted to 
the new environment. To do so required the management of the internal resources of 
the business to provide the organisational structures, systems and processes necessary 
to successfully support their operations. These challenges  meant that both Rowntree 
and Cadbury had to  manage their companies differently after 1918.  
The Rowntree company at the cessation of hostilities in 1918 was still under the 
chairmanship of Joseph Rowntree, although much of the control of the business lay in 
the hands of his son and eventual successor, Seebohm, whose thinking and published 
output on  social issues prior to 1914 were further affected by his experiences of the 
Great War. Although as a Quaker he was opposed to war on principle, he became 
involved with the war effort in his capacity as a leading Liberal supporter, and 
importantly as friend and confidant of Lloyd George who became Prime Minister of 
the coalition government in 1916. Rowntree’s concerns were with national welfare 
and reconstruction, and indeed he was appointed to the Reconstruction Committee by 
Lloyd George in 1917, with a brief to reorganise the allocation of manpower, to 
control the channels of production and distribution, to concede demands for social 
justice and to advance schemes of public welfare .
573
 Rowntree was therefore at the 
centre of national debates  surrounding the effects of the war, and its consequences on 
society as a whole, particularly its impact on labour relations which had prompted the 
formation of the International Labour Organisations by the League of Nations in 1919 
to cultivate co-operation .  
In addition, and unlike his father, Seebohm Rowntree also understood the importance 
of ‘professional’ management that was now required to cope with the complexities 
and challenges of the new post-war order. In addition to the non-family members of 
the management team such as J.B. Morrell and T.H. Appleton employed by the 
company before the war, Seebhom Rowntree recruited others such as Oliver Sheldon, 
Lyndall Urwick, William Wallace and Clarence Northcott, all of whom were to 
eventually distinguish themselves as major published contributors to the subject of 
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management in subsequent years, based on the overall social philosophies of the 
company, as espoused by Seebohm Rowntree. It is no surprise that the new 
professional approach to management at Rowntree’s embraced the principles of F.W. 
Taylor’s ideas of ‘scientific management’574, which emphasised efficiency as part of 
an overall human consideration. Indeed, as early as 1914, Seebohm Rowntree had 
been involved in a philosophical debate with other leading academics, industrialists 
and economists on the social consequences of embracing a scientific management 
approach.
575
 A further example of Seebohm Rowntree’s attitude to scientific 
management is provided in a published article in 1918 in which he bemoaned the 
inadequacies of inefficient companies citing the improvement in comparative 
working costs as being a scientific methodology for overcoming poor performance
576
. 
Rowntree was not alone. Walter-Busch has noted that the holistic benefits of 
efficiencies that could be gained from scientific management, such as shorter working 
hours and  higher wages for workers, alongside lower product prices for the 
consumer, had already been identified by leading French social reformer Albert 
Thomas who went on to become the first Director-General of the International Labour 
Organisation in 1919, and who was also instrumental in the establishment of the International 
Management Institute in 1925.
577
  
Seebohm Rowntree was therefore at the forefront of debates surrounding social responsibility 
and how business should be viewed as an essential component of the desire to improve the 
living standards of society in general. This thinking is  evident in a paper given by eminent 
Oxford historian E.M. Wrong at the inaugural “Oxford Conference”578 of April 1919 in 
which he described the new post-war order facing business: 
 “The events of the war has led us to consider new conditions of co-operation  
 and solidarity. Not enough wealth is being generated to raise the standards of 
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  living of most people. The answer is to increase demand and production.”579 
Whilst this paper was clearly focused on the wider social responsibilities facing 
business, he did proffer a solution suggesting  high demand, high production, low 
cost market environment, leading to full employment and the consequent raising of 
living standards. One of the key components of this solution was the increasing 
efficiency of manufacture, which would ultimately drive down costs, thereby creating 
the outcome described. The principles of scientific management seemed to offer the 
foundations of greater efficiency, and duly became the focus of many companies in 
the crucial post-war period, including Rowntrees. 
 
The Quest for Efficiency  
In the period immediately following the end of the Great War, the attitude of managers within 
the Rowntree company to the adoption of scientific management can be found in articles 
published in the company’s “Cocoa Works Staff Journal”, which was intended to provide a 
lively forum for the discussion, dissemination and diffusion of contemporary issues affecting 
business management . In the second issue of the Journal, H. Makepeace, for 
example, wrote: 
 “It is however, rather remarkable that the horrors of recent warfare have been  
 necessary to broaden the outlook of many employees, and to impress upon them 
  the necessity of greater efficiency. The introduction of more efficient methods  
 means Scientific Management. This can only be achieved by mutual cooperation 
  between all levels of staff in the organisation”580. 
In the same issue of the Cocoa Works Staff Journal, Oliver Sheldon referred to post-
war uncertainty and agreed that the focus should be therefore on achieving efficiency, 
which he suggested could only be brought about by the devolution of the company by 
function.
581
 Sheldon, in the next issue of the Cocoa Works Staff Journal developed 
his ideas on functionalism by advocating the need for specialism of control, the 
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analysis of work by operation which would lead to greater managerial 
responsibility.
582
 
In addition to the articles published in the Cocoa Works Staff Journals, an analysis of 
the topics discussed at the aforementioned bi-annual Oxford Conferences provide an 
insight into the prevalence of efficiency as a key topic of concern within the wider 
business community. For example : 
583
 
 
 Oxford Conference 24-26 February.1922 
  “The Principles of Efficiency in Factory Administration” by H.W. Allingham 
 Oxford Conference 19-23 April 1923 
 “The Elimination of Waste in Industry” by O.Sheldon 
 “Waste of Power and Materials” by T.Howarth 
 “Waste of Human Power” by C.Burt   
 Oxford Conference 15-19 April  1926 
 “Basis of American Efficiency” by B.Austin 
 Oxford Conference 30 September-4 October 1926 
 “Efficiency Methods in Europe and America” by J.Lee 
 “Some Methods of Executive Efficiency” by M.Parker-Follett 
 “A Trade Unionists View of Efficiency” by F.Hawksby 
 Oxford Conference 31 March-4 April 1927 
 “How Manufacturers can Co-operate with each other to Secure Maximum  
 Efficiency in Industry” by H.S.Dennison 
 “Scientific Management in the Factory” by H.S.Dennison 
 Oxford Conference 29 September-3 October 1927 
 “How can one Measure Industrial Efficiency” by H.A.L.Fisher 
 Oxford Conference 19-21 April 1928 
 “Cost Accounting as a Measure of Business Efficiency” by F.A.Mills 
Seebohm Rowntree’s ideas were further enhanced following a visit to the United 
States in 1921, where in addition to giving lectures at various institutions in New 
York, Detroit, Philadelphia and Boston, he made contacts with leading academics and 
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industrialists to gain insights from their experiences and thinking.
584
 Perhaps the most 
important meeting that took place was with Henry Sturgis Dennison, President of the 
Dennison Paper Co. in Boston, a prominent social reformer and management thinker 
who could have come from the same mould as Seebohm Rowntree. This original 
meeting was the beginning of a friendship and collaboration between the two men 
that was to last until Dennison’s death in 1952. Given the importance of the influence 
that Dennison was to exert on the Rowntree business during the inter-war period, it is 
appropriate to explore his life and career to obtain an insight into the philosophical 
and managerial foundations that would also impact on the way that Rowntree’s would 
develop as an organisation. 
 Henry S. Dennison was born in 1877 in Boston, educated privately at the exclusive 
Roxbury Latin School and Harvard, graduating in 1899, whereupon he commenced 
working for the family firm of Dennison Manufacturing Co., in Framingham, 
Massachusetts.
585
 The company had been founded in 1844 by Aaron Dennison, 
originally manufacturing jewellery boxes, but during the nineteenth century it 
diversified into paper and stationery products, and by 1899 had capital of $1,371,000 
and enjoyed annual sales of $2,000,000 .
586
 By 1906 Henry Dennison had risen in the 
company hierarchy to become Works Manager of the family firm, and in 1912 he was 
made President, a position he retained until his death in 1952.
587
 
As Vollmers has pointed out, during the first half of the twentieth century, Henry 
Dennison was to become an increasingly important exponent, of many forward-
looking and innovative management practices, borne out of his progressive liberal 
and humanitarian ideals, but also in his desire to be a successful businessman in an 
age of economic turmoil and uncertainty.
588
 Indeed, Bruce claimed that during the 
first half of the twentieth century, Dennison had an input into almost every important 
development in the evolution of management and institutionalist economic thought, 
and no one better fitted the description of “eminent industrialist”.589 
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It is also important to understand the nature of Dennison’s beliefs, which were to 
influence his subsequent career. McQuaid concluded that Dennison was not a 
romantic dreamer who yearned after some ‘pre-industrial’ utopia, but focused instead 
on managers, whose skills had earned them greater rights of industrial control; this 
belief prompted him to try and end the practice of “absentee control” placing the 
powers of ownership into the hands of practicing managers.
590
 This vision of the 
elevating of the profession of management to a much higher status was to be the 
central theme of the rest of his life. 
Dennison’s early days at the family firm convinced him that it was important for 
managers to obtain as much knowledge and experience as they could so that they 
might apply new ideas to their tasks. As an example of this attitude, McQuaid  
pointed out that as early as 1900 Dennison was visiting the National Cash Register 
Company in Dayton, Ohio because they were a progressive company trying out new 
and innovative management practices.
591
 
Also, in 1911, Dennison began his quest to end the aforementioned influence of 
outside shareholders and to place control into the hands of the practicing managers at 
the company.
592
 Writing in 1915, Dennison utilised his position by claiming that the 
company had been the responsibility of those who had the least knowledge of the 
needs of the business, and that this situation was a symptom of incompetent 
management and the subsequent poor performance of organisations. The answer to 
this situation according to Dennison was to replace absentee ownership with an 
expert managerial team to collectively own and operate a self-financing business.
593
 
Professionalism in management seemed to Dennison to be consistent with the 
Taylorist exposition of ‘Scientific Management’, and led to his involvement in 1916 
with the organisation formed to diffuse its teachings, the Taylor Society. This meant 
that  Dennison had exposure to other leading exponents of scientific management in 
the Boston area, including Henry P. Kendall and Magnus W. Alexander.
594
 In 
sympathy with the Taylorist ideals, Dennison formed a research methods and a 
planning department within his company, and in addition he instigated improvements 
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in accounting methods and divisional control systems.
595
 The culmination of his 
support and commitment to scientific management principles occurred when he was 
appointed President of the Taylor Society in 1919, and he remained a Director of the 
organisation for the rest of his life. 
Dennison’s outside influence continued, and from 1912 to 1916 he was Director and 
Vice-President of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, and his regular speeches and 
engagements brought him into contact with prominent lawyer Louis D. Brandeis, 
economist Wesley Mitchell, management thinker Mary Parker Follett, businessman 
Edward A. Filene and, importantly, with Edwin F. Gay, Dean of the recently 
established Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. Between 1915 and 
1920 Dennison collaborated with A.W. Burritt, Henry P. Kendall and Edwin Gay on 
“Profit Sharing: It’s Principles and Practice”, which cemented Dennison’s close 
association with Gay. Indeed, when the United States entered the Great War in 1917, 
Gay was appointed Director of the Planning and Statistics section of the War 
Industries Board and duly approached Dennison to act as his assistant. As McQuaid  
pointed out, this experience exposed Dennison to the strategy and operations of the 
biggest system of government and industrial co-operation ever seen at the time.
596
 
Following the Armistice and his experiences in the war effort, Dennison was more 
convinced than ever to further the cause of free international trade, collaboration 
between government/business, and radical management thinking to solve the 
problems confronting capitalism. 
The way that Henry Dennison thought about the social role of business resulted in 
close cooperation with Seebohm Rowntree throughout the interwar years, for 
example  Seebhom’s son Peter was seconded to Dennison’s works in Framingham 
Massuchessets to learn more about the innovative techniques being introduced.
597
 
Another example of how important ideas arose out of their collaboration was the 
establishment of the Management Research Groups (MRG’s) in 1926 by Seebohm 
Rowntree, a forum for the exchanging of ideas in management between UK 
companies, which was a carbon copy of a similar initiative created by Dennison in the 
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USA in 1922.
598
 Lyndall Urwick was charged by Seebohm Rowntree with organising 
the detail of getting the initiative off the ground.
599
 
Bound up within this general consensus of co-operation, was the emphasis of the 
drive for efficiency within organisations, this being the fundamental premise of 
scientific management. A key aspect of this philosophy which came to embody the 
ultimate objective of scientific management was the ‘Rationalisation movement’, a 
school of thought considered by many leading industrialists, politicians and trade 
unionists as the method to assure the status of British competitiveness in the crucial 
years following the end of the Great War. The movement had its origins in Germany 
in 1918 as a possible answer to how  to recover from the ravages of defeat in the war, 
and whilst there was some confusion as the nature of its meaning, Wilson explained 
that  the true nature of the Rationalisation movement was “to understand and apply 
every means of improving the general economic situation through technical and 
systematic organisation”.600 Wilson argued  that there was a perception of the 
relationship between improvements in standards of living and the improved 
cooperation of economic activity: goals that were so important to prominent and 
enlightened businessmen like Dennison and Rowntree.
601
  
Indeed, two senior managers at Rowntree contributed to the debate of the nature of 
the Rationalisation movement through publication. In the first instance, Sheldon cited 
the all-encompassing definition of what is meant by ‘rationalisation’ as given in the 
report of the 1927 World Economic Conference: “The methods of technique and of 
organization designed to secure the minimum waste of either effort or material:  It 
includes the scientific organization of labour, standardization, both of material and 
products, simplification of processes and improvements in the system of transport and 
marketing”.602 Sheldon argued this definition of rationalisation should include the 
grouping together of industries into larger units, which he suggested, would be better 
placed to meet the needs of consumers, and also enabling better regulation of prices.  
Sheldon saw little difference between the ethos of scientific management and 
rationalization, and observed that the principles involved might gain more widespread 
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acceptance under the guise of its new name.
603
 Urwick  provided a wider view of 
rationalisation as one of either an attitude which assume that the world economy as a 
whole would benefit from more rational control at a macro level, or as the application 
of science to managerial problems at the micro level.
604
  
The quest for efficiency at Rowntrees was therefore perceived by senior managers at 
the company like Sheldon and Urwick to be the formula by which business could be 
instrumental in creating economic prosperity that would benefit everyone in society. 
This ethos is therefore fundamentally different from simply competing solely on 
market share for example. Furthermore, as will be discussed later, Seebohm 
Rowntree would spell out the visions and objectives of the company, particularly with 
reference to the role of business in society, to coincide with his appointment as full 
chairman of the company in 1923. 
Establishment of a Functional Cost Office 
Following the cessation of the Great War, Seebohm Rowntree realised that a key 
component of a successful business was the way that a company was structured, and 
subsequently employed a young Oxford graduate, Oliver Sheldon, in 1919 with the 
task of constructing an organisational structure for Rowntrees in sympathy with 
scientific management principles. 
A subscriber to the Bulletin of the Taylor Society since 1914, Seebohm Rowntree 
would have already had a structure in mind, based on the principles of scientific 
management. One of the key concepts being advocated by disciples of scientific 
management was the principle of “functionalisation”. Evidence of this is provided by 
the published transcript of a discussion between leading members of the Taylor 
Society on what was described as the “centralization of administrative authority”, 
which took place at the end of 1917, but because of America’s involvement in the 
Great War, was not published until 1919. The conclusion drawn from this keynote 
debate was that the principles of scientific management could only be realised if an 
organisation was structured in a functional way.
605
 Indeed, Sheldon confirmed that he 
had read and concurred with the recommendations of this discussion, by quoting 
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Richard Feiss,
606
 one of the contributors to the debate in his own contribution to the 
book, Factory Organization.
607
 
Upon his appointment as executive assistant to Seebhom Rowntree, Sheldon appears 
to immerse himself in the available literature surrounding organisational structures 
and arrived at some conclusions which he subsequently summarised the benefits in an 
article published in the Rowntree Cocoa Works Staff Journal in 1921:  
 “Specialism of control; managerial responsibility; analysis of work by operations”
 608
 
Sheldon’s deliberations on how an organisation could be structured were influenced 
according to the literature he engaged with. In addition to Feiss, quoted above, 
Sheldon cites Estes
609
 in his contribution to his book The Philosophy of Management, 
describing the basic philosophy behind functionalisation: 
 “the arrangement of dependant parts or functions, so as to show their inter-relation 
  in the structure to provide the means whereby the efforts of a group of individuals will be  
 directed rationally towards a common objective.”610 
This understanding of the way in which a functionalised organisational structure 
contributes to the important strategic principle of having a framework for the way in 
which a business focuses on its key objectives is crucial. Indeed, Sheldon reinforced 
this key principle by citing Knoeppel
611
 who also emphasised the contribution of a 
functionalised organisation to the achievement of objectives: 
 “the proper adjustment of the adjustment between human beings in an effort 
  to accomplish certain definite ends”612 
In his later contribution to the book, Factory Organization in 1928, Sheldon again 
cited Estes
613
 in describing his understanding of how the idea of functionalisation 
would work in a practical way: 
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 “By this plan, specific functions common to all or several departments. . . . are each 
  placed in the hands of of a man specifically qualified for his particular function, and 
  instead of giving attention to all the factors in one department, he gives his attention 
  to one factor in all departments”614 
Following Seebohm Rowntree’s visit to the United States in 1921, the example of 
companies employing a functional structure, including the Dennison company, 
provided additional influence, and he described its importance in an internal memo 
summarising the findings of his trip.
615
 
The move towards functionalisation in the Rowntree company at the end of the Great 
War as a basis for the implementation of scientific management meant that the 
previous ad-hoc method of costing on a piecemeal departmental format that had been 
established from around 1870, was no longer appropriate for the new post-war order. 
A new Finance function was therefore established as part of the greater plan for 
reorganisation, within which a ‘Comparison’ department was created containing 
Wages Statistics, Sales Statistics and Costing sections. However, as a precursor to 
any decision made on the possible structure and mode of operation of a formal cost 
office, a visit was arranged in July 1918 by T.J. Evans (eventually to become the 
inaugural Cost Office Manager) to rivals Cadbury for the purpose of establishing how 
they had approached the problem, given that a cost office had been in existence there 
since 1903, initially under the stewardship of A. E. Cater.
616
 This of course meant that 
by 1918, Cadbury already had accumulated 15 years of experience in the operation of 
a dedicated central costing service to the company. The circumstances of the 
arrangement of this visit are unclear, but are probably based on the informal nature of 
communication between Quaker employers, and their desire to share experience and 
best-practice. 
During this formal visit to the Cadbury factory at Bourneville, T.J. Evans was 
entertained by senior executive Edward Cadbury and cost office manager A. Cater. 
Following the visit, Evans produced a report of his findings to J.B. Morrell, which 
can be summarised as follows: 
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 Report on visit to Cadbury’s Cost Office - July 1918 
“Their cost accounts are very detailed, but they do not set out separate trading  
accounts per department; their costing process follows raw materials through 
 the different processes, making careful note of loss in weight (waste); they  
separate trades costs (joiners, mechanics, etc) from manufacturing; overheads 
 are allocated as a % of direct labour; the system is designed to reflect exactly 
 what goes on within the factory; interest is not charged as part of overhead,  
but depreciation is charged; the cost system does not dovetail into the financial 
 accounting system, making it appear as though it is a bit ‘up in the air’. (Cadbury 
 recognise this as a defect); the cost procedures are very mechanised in the 
 processing of data; the cost office employs 33 clerks, which by applying standard 
 rates of pay, means that the office costs the company approximately £2,500 per 
 annum to run, making it an expensive operation, but they claim that it saves them 
 money in the long run; it appears that the cost system allows the company to  
have a grip on their manufacturing process, which we do not; process costs are 
 published by the 10
th
 of following month, with information also provided to the 
 foreman as a means of providing him with an interest in his department; the most 
 valuable part of the system is the monthly record which details cost per cwt. of  
output. This means that any savings affected by a change in manufacture quickly 
 becomes apparent.”
 617
 
Whilst Evans was obviously impressed by some of the costing procedures in place at 
Cadbury, along with the benefits that these provided, he must also have felt somewhat 
surprised at the relative level of sophistication of the existing systems of those at  
Rowntree, particularly the provision of departmental data that had been introduced 
with the help and advice of A.J. Cudworth, the company auditor. This report would 
have provided Seebohm Rowntree with the confidence of knowing that his company 
already had the foundations in place for the further development of costing 
procedures within the confines of a dedicated, fully functional costing department. 
To establish some of the criteria that Rowntree needed to consider for the 
establishment of a cost office, a ‘Costing Conference’ was convened in December 
1918 to provide a forum for discussion of the main issues, especially armed now with 
the knowledge gained from the Cadbury visit . The keynote speech at this conference 
was by T.H. Appleton, one of the long-serving managers who had been instrumental 
in the formation of costing procedures in the years prior to the Great War, as 
described earlier. The critical part of the speech by Appleton echoes the rationale for 
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essential costing practices, and incorporated some of the methodology that had been 
gained from the Cadbury experience: 
 “the successful carrying on of the business depends more and more on our ability  
 to reduce the cost of the manufacturing process by reducing idle-time of machines  
 and workers, and of keeping proper control of materials with a view to reducing waste, 
 spoiled goods and generally by keeping close supervision of details. This could only be 
 done by a careful compilation and study of the facts bearing on these problems and by 
 co-operation of the manufacturing, technical and costing staffs.”
 618
 
It is important to note that in his speech at the conference, Appleton recognised that 
in a highly complex and mechanised manufacturing environment, the existence of 
“idle time” is one of the fundamental drains on company profitability, driven by the 
burden of under absorbed overheads: a principle which was later identified in the 
literature by Clark
619
 in his seminal work on the subject, The Economics of Overhead 
Cost.
620
 
In addition to the over-riding rationale of the importance of costing to the company 
provided by Appleton, the key principles for the new cost office were also laid down 
at the conference: 
“Cost Accounts to dovetail into Financial Accounts; costs to be provided and prepared on 
 behalf of Production and Research Departments; cost structure to include: Raw Materials, 
 Labour (Direct and Indirect), Overheads and Selling Expenses; the cost office is solely  
responsible for the principle by which the allocation of overheads is allocated to individual 
l lines; estimates of departmental overheads are divided by estimates of sales on a 
 half-year basis; an initial staffing of 12 to be established.”621 
The first ‘Cost Office’ at Rowntrees was subsequently established as part of the 
Comparison Department in early 1919 under T.J. Evans, with one of the first tasks 
being the purchase of calculating machines from the Accounting and Tabulating 
Corporation of Great Britain Ltd.
622
, an important component in the successful 
operation of a cost office that he had observed on his formal visit to Cadbury the year 
previously. 
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Costing Procedures 
A new culture of management professionalism, nurtured and encouraged by the new 
acting chairman Seebohm Rowntree in the period following the end of the Great War, 
become prevalent within the company. In addition to initiatives such as the 
publication of the Cocoa Works Staff Journal as an internal forum for the sharing of 
the latest management topics and the establishment of the Oxford Conferences to 
facilitate wider discussion, the management team were also encouraged to engage 
with the latest literature through the establishment of a Technical Library at the 
Cocoa Works in York. A review of the acquisitions register at the newly established 
Technical Library
623
 provides evidence that Rowntree’s were engaging with the latest 
published developments in costing, and particularly with the ideas emanating from 
the United States, especially  with an examination of the literature being requested by 
managers within the finance function; J. Waller, T.J. Evans and J. Fanthorpe.
624
  
As discussed in the literature review, key contributions during the inter-war years 
from both an academic and practitioner perspective appeared in the journals: The 
Bulletin of the Taylor Society, the Accountant, the Cost Accountant and the Bulletin 
of the National Association of Cost Accountants, and an examination of the accession 
records of the Rowntree Technical Library confirm that the company subscribed to 
these journals.
625
 
The establishment of the Cost Office was therefore built on the foundations of the 
latest academic and practitioner ideas on costing combined with a genuine desire, 
emanating from the top of the organisation, to engage and also to contribute with 
contemporary thinking. Indeed, T.J. Evans, Cost Office Manager, provided an insight 
to the progress made during the early years of the Cost Office in an article in the 
Cocoa Works Staff Journal: 
“Thinking and implementation of cost procedures have been driven by developments 
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 in costing in USA and Germany, facilitated by scientific methods of cost finding; it is 
 important to understand the cost structure of every product line in the factory, including 
 the level of profit or loss; costs to include: Raw Materials, Labour, Factory Overheads,  
General Overheads and Selling/Delivery; it is always the case that selling prices are fixed 
 by the competition, therefore if the market dictates the selling  price then the size of the 
 profit  of the product is dependent on the cost of the articles sold; a ‘True Cost’ includes  
all the level of overhead, and it is important to allocate and apportion overheads as fairly 
 as possible. There is a danger of using a ‘flat rate’ per cwt. as some lines would get too  
much, whilst others would receive too little, thereby distorting profit per product line.  
Methods are being developed to solve this problem”
 626
 
This article by Evans demonstrates recognition of the severe competitive environment 
in the UK confectionery market during the immediate post-war years, and the 
pressure on companies to accurately calculate product profitability, based on a sound 
costing system that is consistent with the latest developments, not only  at home but 
overseas as well. Indeed, the understanding of these competitive pressure is further 
echoed by Seebohm Rowntree in a lecture given at the Oxford Conference: 
“If we are to sell our goods at a price which a poor world could afford to pay, we must 
 lower our cost of production. This requires an adequate costing system”
 627
 
In a further article in the Cocoa Works Staff Journal, T.J. Evans articulated what he 
considered to be the purpose of a cost office: 
Accurate allocation of wages to jobs; accurate storekeeping; accurate apportionment 
 of overheads; prompt presentation of information; capability of proof – tied into 
 Financial Accounts.”
 628
 
It is apparent from Evans’ article that there is a level of importance given to what is 
perceived as “accuracy”, exemplified by the insistence on arithmetic balancing to the 
financial books of accounts as though there was a possible credibility issue with some 
elements within the organisation as to the efficacy of the work and output of the new 
Cost Office.  
This concept is perhaps apparent in the fact that in 1922 an independent study of the 
Cost Office was carried out by the Organisation Committee comprising W.J. Waller, 
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H. Giles, C. Fanthorpe and L. Urwick, culminating in an official report on their 
findings which can be summarised as follows: 
      History of Department 
“Established 1919; prior to this date, costing had been undertaken by several people 
within the company; little attempt was made previously to arrive at accurate distribution 
of overheads; individual factory managers compiled their own labour costs; there was no 
overall monitoring of the efficiency of labour; pre-war, all factors in cost were more stable 
than now; the new Cost Office had to therefore build up an accurate scientific cost system 
from the beginning, to test the system and then implement; there is little experience of 
scientific cost accounting within the confectionery trade; great complexity in the building 
up of product costs.” 
Function of the Cost Office 
“Submit costs and other statistics to manufacturing and other departments; provision of 
cost information for Price List control; costs for manufacturing control to be based on labour 
costs; Wages Office are responsible for the detailed calculation of labour costs , and these 
are then transferred to the Cost Office.” 
Overall Comments 
“The chief value of scientific costing lies in the protection it affords against small sources 
of leakage on large volume lines, thereby preventing heavy losses; it therefore follows that 
it would be far more economical from the firm’s point of view to be able to devote more 
time on such large volume lines and less time to the exact costing of minor lines; smaller 
volume business should be costed on an ‘approximate’ basis.”
 629
 
In addition to the main findings found in the body of the report by the Organisation 
Committee, there is also published an appendix to the report detailing the scope and 
reporting conventions of the Cost Office, thereby providing an insight to its actual 
role within the overall organisation.  
Figure 4.7 reproduces the detailed nature of the extent to which the company was 
compiling and reporting cost information throughout the organisation in a formal and 
timely fashion. 
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Figure 4.7 Scope and Reporting Conventions of the Cost Office 
Character and purpose 
Of Cost Supplied 
Details of Figures Supplied 
 
To Whom How Often 
Costs for Price List 
Control 
a) Costs of new and 
revised assortments 
b) Effects of changes in 
Packing, altered 
proportions 
c) Costs of all Gum 
lines 
d) Costs of Dutch & 
Elect Cocoa 
e) Costs of main lines of 
Cake Dept. 
f) Costs of main lines of 
Cream Dept. 
g) Costs of all lines 
showing a narrow or 
large profit 
h) Costs of all remaining 
lines in Price List 
i) Costs of Seasonal 
Lines 
j) Comparative costs of 
centres and coverings 
k) Comparison of wage 
costs to total costs 
Managers 
Office 
 
Fancy Box Dept 
 
 
Managers 
Office 
 
Managers 
Office 
 
Managers 
Office 
 
Fancy Box 
Dept. 
 
Managers 
Office 
Sales Director 
Managers 
Office 
Fancy Box 
Dept. 
Managers 
Office 
Fancy Box 
Dept. 
 
Managers 
Office 
 
Managers 
Office 
 
 
As Required 
 
As Required 
 
 
Monthly 
 
Monthly 
 
Monthly 
 
Monthly 
 
Monthly 
 
As Opportunity 
Offers 
As Required 
 
 
Monthly 
 
Monthly 
Costs for 
Manufacturing Control 
a) Labour costs by 
process and line 
b) Idle time for large 
groups of machines 
c) Output per hour of 
machines and 
processes 
d) Labour costs for 
Packaging 
e) Complete costs for 
products 
Director of 
Dept. 
 
Director of 
Dept. 
 
Director of 
Dept. 
 
 
Director  
Weekly 
 
Weekly 
 
Weekly 
 
 
Weekly 
 
Weekly 
174 
 
Miscellaneous a) Monthly Trading 
Accounts with 
Departmental 
Accounts 
b) Valuation of WIP and 
manufactured stock at 
½ year 
c) All estimates of costs 
or savings required by 
Research Groups 
d) Such quantities or ½ 
year summaries as 
required by Directors 
Finance 
Committee 
 
 
Finance 
Committee 
 
Research 
Director 
 
Directors 
Monthly 
 
 
 
Monthly 
½ Year 
 
As Required 
 
 
As Required 
Source: Waller W.J., Giles, H., Fanthorpe, C. and Urwick, L. (1922) Report on Cost Office. 
Organisation Committee. R/DH/OO/4. Borthwick. 
This summary clearly shows the level of sophistication of the work and scope of the 
Cost Office by 1922, reflecting the emphasis on professionalism as dictated by the 
chairman elect of the company in which costing was viewed as a cornerstone of the 
company’s ability to compete effectively in the UK confectionery market. 
A measure of the success of the Cost Office during these formative years can be 
obtained in a series of memos between L. Urwick and T.H. Appleton in the course of 
1924, regarding  workload concerns of the department, specifically with requests for 
cost information for new proposed lines from Manufacturing, Research and Sales 
Offices. It is interesting to note that a request for additional manpower within the 
Cost Office was rejected, with the solution to the problem being suggested in the 
form of revised procedures for cost information.
630
 This upsurge in the demand for 
cost information for new lines by various managers in the organisation indicates that 
senior executives such as J.B. Morrell and T.H. Appleton were conscious of the fact 
that maintenance of sales and production volume was essential in a complex, highly 
mechanised company like Rowntrees due to the presence of fixed overheads and that 
idle-time leading to under absorption, was the contributing factor to inferior 
performance. The pressure was clearly on managers within the company to provide 
an ongoing solution to this perceived problem, which has been interpreted by some 
commentators such as Fitzgerald, for example, as evidence of a company with no 
clear strategy.
631
 An alternative interpretation could be however, that the existence of 
a cost office providing detailed and pertinent financial and other information to 
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managers relating to efficiency, product profitability and related issues meant that the 
company was able to survive and compete during these difficult years in the 1920’s. 
As previously noted, many of the senior managers at Rowntree contributed to the 
business and management literature in the years following the Great War, and the 
head of the comparison function, J. Wardropper, along with other managers at the 
company, described the approach to management within the company in a book 
entitled Factory Organisation, published in 1928. In the section of the book entitled 
“Records and Costing”, Wardropper articulated his understanding of the role of 
costing in a large, complex organisation. He approached the issue in the first instance 
by emphasising the necessity of information, the keeping of records and presentation 
of statistics. He argued that it is only from this basis of data that any meaningful 
attempt could be made to add value and prepare cost information, whilst specifically 
guarding against the provision of excess information by only providing relevant data. 
Wardropper discussed the important topic of the allocation of overheads, stressing the 
requirement for allocating overheads costs in providing “accurate” full-cost data, but 
pointed out that in a period of recession when the factory is not performing at full 
capacity this method would temporarily inflate the cost of a product thereby 
providing potentially misleading information for measuring individual departmental 
performance. Wardropper suggested this should be ignored for decision-making 
purposes, and the focus instead should be on standard costs at a standard level of 
output from which measures of efficiency can be derived by individual plant 
managers.  This is evidence of the understanding of the nature of standard costing and 
the implication for overheads, with some discussions of the alternative methods of 
apportionment that were being promoted in the literature as current practice. 
Furthermore, Wardropper suggested that any “undistributed or excess” overheads 
should be bundled together for attention by others than the factory managers  which 
would seem to indicate that idle time, and the way that it is managed, was more  of a 
concern for senior managers at a corporate level, rather than for operational factory 
managers.
632
 
In addition, Wardropper made reference in his chapter to costs being either fixed or 
variable in nature, and consequently demonstrated that he understood the concept of 
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marginal costs and marginal contribution.
633
 Indeed, he pointed out that there are two 
theories surrounding the role of costs in providing management with key information 
for decision-making. The first situation is when full cost is required (for all standard 
business) and the second situation is when only the variable costs should be used 
when evaluating additional business in times of adversity.
634
 The understanding of 
this concept meant that Rowntree’s could consider accepting short-term niche 
products, which might otherwise be rejected under traditional full-cost conventions 
which could have indicated an unsatisfactory level of profitability.  
With respect to the issue of distribution costs, Wardropper conceded that these were 
becoming an important consideration but stated: “this area of costing has received 
scant attention in this country and most firms are content to adopt a rough and ready 
method of charging out the expense as a flat rate.” However, he added that “the 
increasing proportion of selling and distribution charges will force attention upon this 
branch of costing, and lead ultimately to the devising of more detailed and accurate 
methods.”635 This important area for cost analysis became increasingly prevalent 
during the latter half of the 1920’s, as identified and discussed in chapter 3. Indeed 
one of the major practitioner contributors to the contemporary literature on 
Distribution Costing was the Dennison Company in the United States and specifically 
the chief statistician at the company E.S. Freeman, again as reviewed previously. 
Indeed, H.S. Dennison himself was invited to speak at one of the Oxford 
Conferences, in which he reiterated this issue: 
“Today in industry, the whole field of distribution stands more in the need of overhauling 
 than the field of actual production” 
636
 
However, despite this knowledge, the area of distribution costing does not appear to 
fall within the terms of reference of the Cost Office at Rowntree beyond the recording 
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and allocation/apportionment of these costs to products, just like any other non-
production overhead. 
Budgeting 
The important leap from “costing” as a fundamental record-keeping, analytical and 
reporting technique of primarily manufacturing operations to the more sophisticated 
process of “budgeting” and “budgetary control”, was particularly slow in the UK 
during the course of the 1920’s according to the leading historical commentators cited 
in chapter 3. The factors which contributed to this apparent lack of progress, were in 
evidence within the Rowntree company. Perhaps this is not really surprising. 
Although the term “budgeting” was being mentioned and discussed by both 
academics and practitioners in the years following the Great War, there was some 
confusion in defining exactly what it is, and importantly how it is implemented as a 
system into an organisation. Part of the problem was that the technique of budgeting, 
if carried out in the most advance way, is extremely complex involving several sub-
techniques and processes which must initially be recognised, understood and 
articulated throughout the organisation. This problem gives rise to the notion of 
“where to begin?” when contemplating introducing a budgetary system, especially 
during the 1920’s in the absence of recognised template. However, the process of 
understanding and implementing a fully-functioning budgetary control system is 
viewed as an important evolutionary step in the way that costing developed into cost 
and management accounting, that is a recognised important management tool, even 
today. 
Examination of the archives at Rowntree points to a gradual understanding of the 
concept of budgeting and the slow building of the competencies that are required to 
operate such a system effectively. However, Oliver Sheldon articulated his clear 
knowledge of the fundamentals of budgeting including the requirement of a business 
to plan sales, expenses and profit – with the necessity to compare the plan to 
actuals.
637
 The bibliography of the book that Sheldon was writing in makes reference 
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to a contemporary standard work on budgeting, thereby providing more evidence of 
engagement with the literature.
638
  
One of the most important of the fundamental underlying competencies of budgeting 
is the recognition and preparation of “standards”, or the knowledge of what is deemed 
to be the accepted method by which tasks are carried out within the factory, and the 
associated cost that goes with it. The notion of “standardization” or “one best way” is 
a key feature of scientific management as espoused by F.W. Taylor and his acolytes 
and was well recognised and appreciated by managers at Rowntrees. Oliver Sheldon 
in his book The Philosophy of Management, published in 1923
639
 articulated this 
effectively, citing other important contributors in defining what is meant by 
standardisation such as Denning
640
, Parkhurst
641
 and Emerson.
642
 
More detailed evidence of the understanding of standards at Rowntree is provided by 
J. Wardropper in the Cocoa Works Staff Journal: 
 “Standardisation of:- 
1. The product 
2. The machinery 
3. The means of production 
4. The methods and operation 
Standardisation results directly in economy, and the use of pre-determined standards  
enables the director, the manager and the foreman to keep a grip on production which 
 is essential to efficiency. Costs by themselves mean nothing. We must have standards 
 of comparison by which to test their value, for the reason for cost-finding is cost  
reduction. The discrepancy between estimated results and actual results must be  
regarded as preventable waste. If standards are fixed, the routine of management can 
 be handed over to ‘effortless custody of automation’ for valuable time can be saved by 
 concentrating on the large differences”
 643
 
There is clear evidence that knowledge of standards and the validity of comparing 
actuals to these standards was a recognised method of identifying and then 
subsequently reducing waste; thereby improving efficiency. But as previously 
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discussed, a crude version of this practice was already being carried out at the 
company in 1891, with the provision of some differences or variances and some 
attempt to explain these differences. So although the benefits had been known for 
some time, perhaps the quality of the accepted standards were only just being 
considered and ultimately prepared during the early 1920’s, particularly as T.J. Evans 
had commented on this fact in his report following his initial visit to Cadbury’s in 
1918.  
The overriding concept of a “budget” is that it is essentially the financial overlay of 
the   business operational plan (i.e. usually for a 12-month period); effectively the 
detail of what might be called the overall company policy or strategy. In other words 
it is a mechanism for operationalising the strategy in a way that is understood and 
more importantly, communicated to all mangers in the business. Therefore the ability 
to plan effectively is an important competence necessary to be able to construct and 
administer a budget process.  
A pre-requisite for any kind of planning is the formulation and articulation of 
objectives towards which the plan is thereby directed. With Seebohm Rowntree 
becoming acting chairman of the company in 1919, and eventually being appointed 
full chairman in 1923, he took the opportunity to put forward his vision and 
objectives of the business, not only in relation to the company itself, but also how it 
relates to the wider environment, as previously discussed: 
Industry Objectives 
“Goods/Services beneficial to the community; in the process of wealth production, 
industry should pay regard to the community, pursuing no policy detrimental to it; 
distribute the wealth produced which best serves the community.” 
Company Objectives 
“Establish the reputation for leading the world in quality; establish the best 
possible working conditions; To pay a dividend of 10% (after tax) of ordinary shares, 
and put an adequate sum for reserves.”
 644
 
Emanating from these objectives, was understanding of the role of coordination 
within an organisation without which planning, combined with the key aspiration of 
“control”, would be unrealisable. Indeed, the importance of planning as a key 
                                                          
644
 Rowntree, B.S. (1922) “Questions concerning the policy of the business considered as a whole.” 
R&Co93/IV/3. Borthwick.  
180 
 
component of the ideologies of scientific management was provided by Charles 
Renold of Hans Renold Ltd.( a chain making business based in Manchester), who 
were a well-respected exponent of this philosophy, in a lecture given at one of the 
previously mentioned Oxford Conferences in April 1920: 
“All the American books on scientific management devote much attention to planning. 
 The function of planning is to 1) establish a programme of work to be done. 2) control 
 the flow of work. 3) keep all men and machines occupied.
645
 
Therefore the knowledge of the rationale for effective planning and coordination as a 
key internal capability would be an important consideration for a company like 
Rowntree’s.  
From the contemporary literature, Fayol was one of the first commentators to clearly 
identify the role of planning in the successful management of an organisation as early 
as 1916, although originally only available at that time in French
646
. However, 
Lyndall Urwick as a fluent French speaker, had read Fayol’s work whilst a serving 
officer in the British Army during the Great War. Moreover, whilst involved with the 
Management Research Groups that he had established in association with Seebohm 
Rowntree, he was so convinced of the importance of Fayol’s work, that in 1928 he 
persuaded J.A. Cornborough of British Xylonite to officially translate Fayol’s key 
1916 work into English. This was subsequently published by the International 
Management Institute in 1930.
647
 
Urwick confirmed his understanding of Fayol’s identification of the significance of 
planning in his contribution to the “Dictionary of Industrial Administration” in 1928, 
edited by John Lee. Urwick’s article entitled “The Principles of Direction and 
Control” in which he articulated a process of management whereby “control” is 
deemed to be the overall aspiration, for which planning is the key enabler.
648
 Also 
commenting in their biography of Urwick, Brech, et al made the observation that this 
work is heavily influenced by Fayol.
649
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In addition to Urwick’s contribution, Oliver Sheldon used his 1923 book, The 
Philosophy of Management  to demonstrate his understanding of planning: 
 “It is the progress of work from the reception of the customer’s orders through the 
  various processes of manufacture, until ready for delivery. Planning is not control; 
 it rather draws up the necessary regulations which control puts into practice. 
Administration then ensures that all the functions combine effectively for the  
execution of that  plan”650 
It is important to note that Sheldon concurred with Urwick in the absolute 
relationship between planning and control, and how one cannot exist without the 
other, thereby providing a framework for achieving what was deemed to be the 
ultimate goal for management. 
Writing later in the Harvard Business Review he summarised the development of 
scientific management in England, and cited the work of Schulze
651
 as central to the 
concept of company-wide planning, from the point of view of both short and long-
term perspectives. Sheldon also recognised the claim by Schulze of incorporating 
coordination as part of the planning process to ensure the successful direction of 
effort.
652
 
Despite Sheldon’s acceptance of the necessity of a functionalized organizational 
structure as described above, he also stressed that for this type of structure to work 
there needed to be effective top to bottom coordination, with Sheldon quoting Feiss
653
  
as his source for this thinking: 
“Just so far as functionalization brings the necessary and effective decentralisation for 
 action, so does functionalization of itself make essential another function. Where there 
 are separate entities of an organisation, each responsible for action and results in its 
 own line, and all timing at the same ultimate object, it is necessary, in order to obtain  
 harmonious and effective ultimate action, to recognise the necessity for coordination  
 and to treat it as a distinct and basic function of the organization”.654 
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The underlying philosophy concerning planning as a key competence was therefore 
clearly understood by senior managers at Rowntree’s. However, in terms of the detail 
aspects of planning and how this relates to an accepted fundamental of a budget 
process, it is perhaps the role of sales planning that was considered essential. An 
unidentified contributor to the Cocoa Works Staff Journal in 1923 seemed to indicate 
that the company was well aware of the important role of sales planning within the 
organisation: 
“Planning how much of each product in each period by sales territory, by the  
concentration of sales effort, advertising, etc. This makes it different from a 
sales estimate”. 
Advantages of Sales Planning: 
“Factory to work economically; rules out peaks and troughs; rules out  
unemployment/short time; provides efficient stock management; purchasing 
can be carried out more efficiently; provides the ability to calculate overall  
profit based on the sales plan; can work out what capital equipment is required; 
 budgeting of labour requirements; planning of overhead allocations more 
scientifically.” 
“The ‘Sales Plan’ is effectively the ‘Business Plan’ and should be a coordination 
of all functions, based on research on trade, populations, economic prospects,  
market prospects, competition and retail position. It must be a scientific approach.  
Sales should form the basis of the efficient allocation of resources to achieve the 
 plan.”
 655
 
A key provider of information that would feed into an effective process of accurate 
sales planning was the establishment of an Economic and Business Research office, 
set up and run by W. Wallace in 1924 as part of the Finance Function which, on its 
conception had a broad brief: 
“To keep informed of general business conditions; to make detailed investigation 
 into economic and business problems; to carry out specific research for the  
Finance Function; to act as advisor to the Finance Director.”
 656
 
In his unpublished autobiography, Wallace claimed that as part of this role in the 
Economic and Business Research office, he formed contacts with key external 
contributors such as G. Schwarz at the Cambridge Economic Service and W.F. Crick 
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in the Economic Intelligence unit at the Midland Bank.
657
 An example of the range of 
detailed information that was being collected, analysed and then circulated by 
Wallace to all senior managers in the organisation is provided in the Economic Notes 
1924: 
“General overview; labour troubles; prices index (Source: The Economist);  
unemployment trends; foreign affairs; wages and purchasing power; financial  
conditions; trade prospects; profits; foreign exchanges”658 
Rowntree’s therefore had in place a comprehensive, detailed and regular process of 
collecting, collating and analysing information relating to general environment 
conditions that had direct effect on their business, and which could be built into their 
forward planning considerations, particularly with reference to a robust sales 
estimating/planning system. As was the case with other senior managers at 
Rowntree’s, Wallace also contributed to the literature on the role of business 
forecasting, and in particular he made reference to the way in which information 
gained could be used to inform a budgeting system: 
 “Finally, if, as would quite probably be the case in a business sufficiently advanced 
  to adopt scientific methods of sales forecasting, the whole of the estimated incomings 
  and outgoings are collected into a  ‘master budget’, it should be possible to chart two 
  simple curves representing this income and expenditure. This in the light of these, the  
 short period cash policy could be planned”659 
Here Wallace identified one of the key principles of a comprehensive budgeting 
system: that of being able to plan cash effectively, a crucial competence that a 
business must possess. Furthermore, in his conclusions, Wallace identified the need 
for a business to understand the demand for their products, and its direct effect on 
sales, and indirect effect on production, purchasing, labour and related overheads. 
This, he claimed, was the cornerstone of being in a position to create a forward 
looking culture based on accurately forecast future orders, founded on the prevailing 
environmental conditions.
660
 However, Wallace made the important point that the 
major difficulty in preparing an overall future plan of a business in the form of a 
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budget is the problem of forecasting sales, and claimed that this is indeed the main 
reason for the slow introduction of budgeting as a technique.
661
 
Whilst the importance of effective sales forecasting was understood by the company, 
the actual compilation of a total sales plan had been carried out piecemeal through 
data from marketing and sales personnel. Nonetheless it became clear that a dedicated 
functional sales planning had to be established. This was ultimately discussed through 
the forum of the organisation committee in 1924. The evolution of the ability to 
effectively create an effective sales planning capability was debated by T.H. 
Appleton, who described the new role of the Sales Planning Office: 
“Provision of sales statistics; preparation of the major plan; estimating new lines sales; 
 planning of sales by month, by line; planning of stocks to meet sales estimates; 
 planning of production to meet stock requirements”.
 662
 
These capabilities are some of the essential building-blocks necessary to construct 
and operate a budgeting system, and there appears to be a clear intention by the 
company to provide this information on a consistent basis. 
Prior to the introduction of a dedicated sales planning function, the company had 
already recognised that a natural progression from the ability to plan sales was the 
introduction of a production planning capability to build upon this information. 
Indeed, the idea was first mooted by F.G. Fryer following another visit to Cadbury’s 
to understand their production planning systems, and in his report on this visit he 
concluded that the function of any proposal at Rowntree would be: 
 “to issue instructions for manufacture, having regard to past and probable future sales,  
 with a view to maintaining adequate stocks; to warn buying department that certain stocks  
 might need replenishment;  to centralise and coordinate planning to know the daily 
  quantities of  every line;  to obtain knowledge of finished goods, WIP and raw material 
  stocks.”663 
Fryer articulated the advantages to the company that a production planning function 
would provide: 
 “enables long-runs of production, giving rise to a) reduction in lost time for both machines  
 and labour b)  possibility of introducing labour-saving devices c) savings in material losses  
                                                          
661
 Ibid.,  p. 90. 
662
 Organisation Committee. 11
th
 November 1924. Minute 341. R/B3/4. Borthwick. 
663
 Fryer, F.G. (1919) Report on visit to Cadbury 31/5/19. Minutes of Planning Advisory Committee. 
R/DP/PP/1. Borthwick. 
185 
 
 due to frequent changes and cleaning; reducing and fixing the maximum stocks of WIP 
  from which savings in interest on capital might be reasonably expected; increased  
 smoothness of working within the production departments; plan the most economical 
  manufacturing lot; elimination of dead or slow-moving stocks”664 
Finally, Fryer described how a proposed production planning function would be 
related to the newly established cost office: 
 
 “Although a planning department does not properly form part of the costing system,  
 the establishment of such a department is ultimately bound up within the organisation 
  of a costing system”665 
Seebohm Rowntree also sought to clarify the relationship between the different 
aspects of planning within the organisation, having conceded that although the 
business had grown, this had previously been done haphazardly: 
 “The two functions of sales planning and production planning are related but need  
 to be operated separately; the sales department has been dominant in the past in the  
 provision of forecast sales  data; scientific sales planning should mean fewer lines; more 
  effort is required on a larger volume of smaller number of lines; other companies do 
  forecast sales very accurately – Lever Bros. (visit on 24/2/21) for example who achieve 
  this by focusing sales effort on those lines which are selling at below forecast; production 
  efficiency can only be achieved if the production plan (based on the sales plan) can be 
  achieved.”666  
The production planning function was established in 1920 under the control of T.W. 
Brownless, and in his first annual report he set out the scope of the department: 
 “The Production Planning Department takes into account: sales; policy (e.g. stock  
 requirements); machine capacity; staff capacity; co-ordination between production 
  departments; to keep stocks as low as possible.”667 
However, by 1926 the annual report by Brownless focused on the problems 
encountered within the production planning function, indicative of the difficulties that 
the company encountered during this period in mastering some of the essential 
foundations of any budgeting process: 
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 “Difficulties encountered during the year include: sales estimates are erratic and  
 uncertain; we are a long way off of making chocolates to standard; uncertain capacity 
  such as increases or decreases in output compared with standard”668 
In addition to planning competencies, a key aspect of the budget process is the ability 
to analyse expenditure by functional responsibility which appears to have been 
considered by Rowntrees following the Williams’ key article in the Bulletin of the 
Taylor Society .
669
 In this seminal article Williams, as chairman of the newly 
established sub-committee of the Taylor Society on the functions of senior managers, 
proposed several key concepts including budgeting, cost-volume-profit analysis, 
responsibility accounting, financial forecasting and the use of standards to judge 
management effectiveness. A working party consisting of J.B. Morrell, W.J. Waller, 
C.Fanthorpe and O.Sheldon was convened at Rowntrees to study the content of the 
Williams article. They concluded that its implementation would be unfeasible. 
However, Seebohm Rowntree was insistent that the proposals be re-examined:  he 
could see no reason why an American idea couldn’t be applied in a UK business.670 
Following this request, the working party attempted to formulate a working proposal, 
with J.B. Morrell reporting that: 
“The Board has authorised to proceed with a system which would review constantly 
 with the Finance Director, the expenses of the company and to authorise the annual 
 or other budgets of expenses as authorised by the Board”.
 671
 
 
This one aspect of budgeting, i.e. the ability to budget and control departmental 
expenses, appears to have been approved and put into operation within the company. 
Further evidence of the slow implementation of some form of budgeting process was 
provided in the establishment of a Committee on Budgeting in 1926: 
“It is the objective of the Board to endeavour to make use of a budgeting system in 
 the Cocoa Works, where each department will estimate in advance its requirements 
 for salaries for the coming year” 
Terms of Reference of Budget Committee: 
“Investigate the present system of estimating salaries; investigate the form of the 
accounts system in order for a budgetary system to be ‘tied-up’ with the Financial  
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Accounts; indicate the lines on which a more perfect budgetary procedure may 
be developed to provide an estimate of cost.” 
672
 
However, by 1927, no report by the Committee on Budgeting had been prepared, due 
to the complex nature of the company’s organisation and how a budgetary system 
could be incorporated.
673
 
Whilst there was considerable discussion at a senior management level on the best 
way to introduce some sort of budgeting process, there is also evidence that managers 
were trying to understand the concepts by requesting that the company’s Technical 
Library obtain the latest published works on the subject. The seminal work Budgetary 
Control by J.O. McKinsey, for example, was requested by Sheldon in 1922, and 
Budgeting to the Business Cycle  by J.H. Barber was requested by Wallace in 1926.
674
 
These were in addition to the articles on budgeting published in the Bulletin of the 
Taylor Society that had obviously been read by managers in the company as 
previously mentioned. 
The debate on budgeting was also being aired at the Oxford Conferences, with A. 
Perry-Keane of Austin Motors presenting a discussion paper in 1925, in which he 
described (probably for the first time) the benefits of budgeting now known as the 4-
C’s model, i.e. co-operation, co-ordination, control and compel. He then went on to 
describe what budgeting seeks to bring about: 
 “a proper review of the market; the offering to the consumer of a product of the  
 right quality at the right price; ensuring by planning that the right quantities are  
 passed through the plant; clear lines of responsibility established; enables the  
 forecasting of detailed financial results in the form of a forecast income statement  
 and balance sheet; determines general policy, availability of resources, expected 
  return, purchase of stock and the cost of labour”675 
As Quail has already argued, Austin Motors were at the forefront of the practical 
application of budgeting techniques during the early 1920’s; in particular Perry-
Keane was an important advocate, having already written on the topic in the Cost 
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Accountant.
676
 It was important therefore that managers at Rowntrees were able to 
experience at first hand the methodologies that had been employed in the founding of 
budgetary processes by a pioneer in the field. 
Henry Dennison was also invited to present a paper at a later Oxford Conference in 
1927, in which he advocated the incorporation of budgeting techniques. As 
previously discussed, the Dennison Company
677
 were early pioneers in the use of 
budgeting in the USA (along with the Walworth Co.) Dennison presented an 
overview of the experiences of budgeting in his business: 
 “We must lay out for the coming year a detailed budget of what is expected from the  
 whole business, and then we must follow up the results. Usually after 3 years one 
  acquires a reasonable degree of skill. It determines in advance what we think is right 
  to do”678 
It is significant that Dennison guarded against the expectation of ‘instant success’ 
from the implementation of a budgeting system, quoting the experience of his own 
organisation that it was only after following the process for at least three years that 
meaningful advantages are gained. 
With the apparent failure of the budget sub-committee to develop a detailed proposal 
for the introduction of budgeting at Rowntrees, W. Wallace appeared to have become 
involved in the debate during 1927, having assumed responsibility for the 
management of the comparison function, which included costing.
679
 This was a 
logical development given his experience in his role in business forecasting within 
the company, and also his contribution to the literature and how this informs the 
budgeting process, as described above. 
Further evidence of Rowntrees willingness to gain knowledge of the budgeting 
process is that the company thought it to be advantageous to send two delegates (W. 
Wallace and C. Fanthorpe) to the prestigious International Discussion Conference on 
Budgetary Control, organised by the International Management Institute in Geneva in 
July 1930. This conference attracted 197 delegates, representing 26 countries 
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worldwide, including such important international commentators associated with the 
subject as J.O. McKinsey, H. Fayol, C.G. Renold, T.G. Rose, R. Dunkerley and J.H. 
Williams (who had initially ignited interest at Rowntrees through his publishing in 
the Bulletin of the Taylor Society). 
Although Wallace and Fanthorpe did not themselves contribute papers to the 
conference, some significant principles in terms of definition, process and practical 
application were presented by some of the key commentators that must have further 
informed their thinking: 
 Definition of Budgeting: 
 “Budgetary Control is a method of scientific management by means of which estimates 
  are drawn up covering an agreed period for everything connected with the undertaking 
  which it is possible to express in figures. These estimates are founded on previous statistical 
 experience inside the plant, plus careful study of general economic and trade data outside 
  of it, and provide an instrument for the continuous control of the actual figures at the  
 expiration of the agreed period. Thus, future estimates can be more accurately drawn, 
  and adjustments made in the conduct of the undertaking, if the fault appears 
  to be with management and not with accountancy. 
 Budgeting is not merely control, it is not merely forecasting, it is an exact and rigorous 
  analysis of the past and the probable and desired future experience with a view to  
 substituting considered intention for the opportunism of management”680  
  Budgeting Facilitates; 
 “Continuity of policy; the elimination of waste; increased output; greater degree of  
 security of employment”681 
  
This definition provided an overview of the contextual nature of budgeting and how 
its implementation should be approached in a specific and structured way consistent 
with scientific management.  Specifically, for the Rowntree delegates, the summation 
of the objectives that budgeting can achieve more or less dovetails into the 
philosophies of their company that Seebohm Rowntree had outlined some years 
previously on his appointment as full chairman of the business.  
However, despite the efforts by the company to understand budgetary control 
procedures and processes, the ability to convert this theoretical knowledge into the 
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practical application of a company-wide technique appear to have proved elusive. As 
Boyns has observed
682
, in the discussions surrounding budgeting which took place at 
meetings of the Management Research Groups, F. Spink of Rowntree accepted the 
importance of the sales plan to any budgetary control system, but conceded that the 
company had failed to incorporate the complete package: 
 “I personally do not claim that we have Budgetary Control. I do not believe  that a  
 complete system of Budgetary Control which ends up with a monthly Trading A/C 
  form, is practicable in many industries, because you have many complicated factors”.683 
Indeed, as Spink confirmed, the theoretical underpinnings of budgeting were 
recognised by Rowntree, but the complex nature of full implementation were 
considered at the time to be unobtainable, even though many of the individual 
elements of budgeting were clearly in evidence within the company.   
4.4 Conclusions 
In the early development of Rowntree’s, between 1869 and 1914, a substantial effort 
was made to clearly understand the nature of the UK confectionery market, and to 
obtain information relating to factory processes, wage payment systems, capital 
equipment and cost structures to assist in determining how to compete effectively in 
this market.  
Joseph Rowntree’s exhaustive research permitted the establishment of internal 
mechanisms by which his company could begin to make inroads into the existing 
market. A key component of this objective was the introduction and development of 
systems and procedures of relatively high level of sophistication, designed to provide 
cost and other financial and statistical data on individual products and factory 
departments. As the literature demonstrates, this occurred when the science of costing 
was in its infancy and when there were no accepted principles of “best practice” to 
follow. Indeed, it can be argued that some of the procedures that the company put into 
place, particularly to standard costing and variance analysis from 1891, are significant 
examples of practice being ahead of theory. In addition to the work of Joseph 
Rowntree, this chapter has discussed the contribution of other key figures such as 
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T.H. Appleton and J.B. Morrell in the development of cost accounting within the 
business. This development led to the company’s capability to quickly produce cost 
and profitability estimates of proposed new lines, thereby becoming a source of 
competitive advantage in the sourcing of new business opportunities. 
The advent of the Great War interrupted normal trading and market conditions, 
particularly in consumer goods industries like confectionery. Consequently the 
development of practice and procedures of techniques, like costing, appeared to have 
been suspended for the duration of the war. However, the progress made by the 
company in these formative early years provided a solid foundation to adapt to the 
changed world order after 1918. 
The progress that had been made in the development and implementation of costing 
techniques by Rowntree’s prior to the Great War laid the foundations for the 
company’s ability to compete during the interwar years. However, the initial primary 
motivation for Joseph Rowntree to introduce costing techniques within the company 
equated to one of employing all available management techniques to enable the 
fledgling business to grow and compete effectively in an established, albeit rapidly 
growing, UK confectionery market in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Consequently, with the appointment of Seebohm Rowntree as chairman elect in 1918, 
and taking account of the changed landscape, the objectives of the company appear to 
embrace role of social responsibility of business to society in general, with scientific 
management being viewed as the vehicle by which this could be achieved.  
The principles of scientific management were therefore the template from which 
Seebohm Rowntree, and the other senior executives in the company, re-organised the 
structure of the company on a functional basis, with the quest for efficiency as the 
ultimate goal.  As a direct consequence of this overall company initiative, a separate 
cost office was established in 1918, based on the already functioning Cadbury 
experience, to centralise and coordinate the costing work that had been previously 
carried out on a piecemeal basis within each production department prior to this. 
Within a short period of time, the newly established cost office was compiling, 
analysing and distributing information relating to costs and efficiency measures on a 
regular and timely basis to a wide audience of middle and senior managers within the 
company.  
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The company had made significant strides in the professionalism of costing after 
1918, based on the culture of the company (nurtured by Seebohm Rowntree) of 
engaging with and contributing to, the contemporary debates relating to all 
management issues. The company successfully made progress from traditional cost 
keeping and cost finding elements to incorporate more advanced techniques such as 
marginal costing and standard costing, based on a more informed understanding of 
the nature of overheads. However, the key indicator for the assessment of successful 
progress of costing sophistication would be the establishment of a comprehensive and 
company-wide budgetary control process. This  could be then developed to 
incorporate objective-setting, planning, expense budgeting, variance calculation and  
reporting, combined with responsibility accounting via feedback loops with 
eventually a feed-forward capability to inform future plans and budgets. As reported 
in the historical literature very few companies managed to achieve this ultimate goal 
prior the World War II, although many including Rowntree’s, did have the majority 
of the individual components in place during the inter-war years. It is therefore 
unfortunate, that given that the company had produced a basic and crude form of 
budgeting, with some attempt at explanation of differences between estimated and 
actual data as early as 1891, they failed to establish a fully functioning budgetary 
process prior to the outbreak of World War II.  But the successful implementation of 
a company-wide budgetary control system to incorporate important issues such as 
resource allocation, would have been dependant on a top-level sanction regarding the 
absolute priority in the preparing of budget information (by all managers involved), 
with powers provided to the cost office in the successful running of the process. It is 
probable that this was never considered to be necessary, and without strict adherence 
to a budget timetable, with the appropriate policing, this was always doomed to 
failure. 
The progress achieved by Rowntree’s in their development of costing procedures 
provided a crucial competence by which the company could compete in the UK 
confectionery market, thereby contributing to performance. However, the limited 
progress, particularly relating to budgetary control, would also have negative 
implications.    
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Section 2 – Fieldwork and Data Collection 
Chapter 5  
What was the extent of the development and implementation of Cost 
Accounting techniques adopted by Cadbury between 1861 and 1938?
   
5.1 Introduction 
As described in chapter 3, costing techniques had been developing as a reaction to the 
environmental factors occurring in the UK, and the rest of the western world, during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, combined with the rapidly 
increasing size and complexity of organisations. 
This chapter will examine the way in which costing techniques were developed 
within  Cadbury’s from 1861 to 1938, and why this development occurred. Firstly, 
this chapter will examine the business from when the two older Cadbury brothers, 
Richard and George Snr., took control in 1861 as a partnership and shaped the firm 
by making crucial strategic decisions regarding its structure and focus during these 
early years. Unlike Rowntrees, this approach did not place the same emphasis on cost 
and profitability information. However, the tragic death of Richard Cadbury in 1899 
led to the dissolving of the partnership and the flotation of Cadbury as a private 
limited company, with executive control being passed to the sons of George Snr. and 
Richard. 
The consequences of this sudden and unexpected change to Cadbury and the 
subsequent creation of a defined organisational and management structure, with one 
of including the establishment of a functional cost office in 1903 will be examined. 
The new younger management team were receptive to many of the ideas that were 
being advocated and viewed scientific management as a vehicle by which they could 
achieve a more efficient company, with benefits for consumers. They perceived the 
newly formed cost office as a central pillar in the provision of information. This was 
in complete contrast to the almost total absence of cost data under the old partnership 
regime. 
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The development of the cost office from its inception in 1903 until the outbreak of the 
Great War is provided, (and the way in which the department became fundamental in 
the creation of order within the factory in which processes and the flow of 
information was regulated and controlled). This was deemed necessary before any 
further development in technique could take place.  
The conditions following the end of the Great War and the changed market landscape 
facing all UK confectionery manufacturers, created an opportunity for Cadbury to 
seize this opportunity to establish products based on mass-production enabled by 
automation, mechanisation and organisational efficiency. This would result in 
confectionery being transformed into a low-cost product, which in turn would be 
reflected in lower consumer prices and increased sales volume, thereby further 
lowering unit costs. The experience and reputation gained by the cost office prior to 
the Great War enabled the company to obtain the necessary information that would be 
required in order to effect this strategy to be put into action. Indeed, part of this 
capability was the recognition by Cadbury that costs were not only restricted to 
production, but included “distribution costs”, which were also becoming increasingly 
important. Cadbury’s extended the scope of distribution costs into the domain of the 
retail trade where perceptions of inefficiency were addressed and reported. 
Finally, as with the Rowntree experience, the struggle to develop the ideas and 
techniques of costing into areas such as standard costing and budgetary control will 
be examined. This exposes the organisational complexities that needed to be 
recognised for effective coordination to occur. 
5.2 Foundations: 1861-1902 
Background 
The establishment of the firm of Cadbury can be dated to 1824, when the business 
was started by John Cadbury, a Quaker, in Birmingham initially trading in tea and 
coffee, but eventually diversifying into cocoa and setting up a production facility in 
1831. The business continued to compete effectively and make progress after making 
this decision. However, by the 1850’s John Cadbury’s wife began a long battle 
against consumption (eventually dying in 1855); with John himself also being 
afflicted with an aggressive form of arthritis. These illnesses had a direct effect on the 
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fortunes of the business which was being affected by neglect, and was manifested by 
the slow decline in sales, profits and numbers employed by the company.
684
 John’s 
son Richard joined the company in 1851 in an effort to add some fitness and youth, 
and was eventually joined by his other son George Snr. in 1861, when together the 
brothers effectively took over the complete running of the business from their ailing 
father, showing commitment by investing their mother’s inheritance of £4,000 each 
into the business.
685
  
During the early years following the establishment of their joint control, the two 
brothers slowly began to improve the fortunes of the business as a direct consequence 
of making two crucial decisions; the first of these was to concentrate solely on cocoa 
and chocolate manufacture/sales; the second was to dramatically improve the quality 
of these products at a time when the adulteration of foods was an important issue for 
consumers
686. Cadbury’s seized this opportunity and created products that satisfied 
the demand from consumers for “pure foods”.687 This strategy was supported by early 
and effective use of advertising from 1867, leading to the unique re-branding of 
cocoa based on the slogan “Absolutely Pure, Therefore the Best”.688 
In addition to the efficacy of their decision-making during the early years of their 
management of the firm, the survival and the ultimate improvement of the business 
can also be attributed to the absolute commitment of the brothers and the long hours 
they spent on every aspect of running a small but rapidly expanding business.
689
 
Legislation in the form of the Adulteration of Foods Act by the Government in 1872 
and 1875 vindicated the initial decision by the brothers: Cadbury became the market 
leader in cocoa; and its product fully conformed to the new laws, and its brand was 
trusted by the buying public. As a consequence, sales of Cadbury products increased 
dramatically and the future of the business seemed secure. This led to another crucial 
decision by the brothers also aimed at ensuring long term sustainability.
690
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The factory premises at Bridge Street in central Birmingham, the home of the 
Cadbury business since 1847, were becoming increasingly inadequate as sales and 
production increased during the 1870’s. As a direct consequence of this situation, the 
foresight of the brothers resulted in the building of  new purpose-built factory on a 
green field site at Bournville, some three miles south-west of Birmingham city centre 
in 1879, which immediately doubled the floor space of the old premises, and 
importantly, also had the potential for further expansion if the business was to grow 
in the future.
691
 Whereas it could be interpreted as a bold move by the brothers, a key 
competitor to Cadbury’s, the cocoa manufacturers  James Epps & Co., had made a 
similar move to purpose built premises on a green field site in London in 1878.
692
 
Following the move to Bournville, Cadbury were well placed to take advantage of the 
growing demand for its products during the 1880’s and 1890’s, driven by the 
environmental, social, legal and technological factors described in Chapter 1. This 
growth can be demonstrated by sales revenues and the numbers employed by the 
business during the period 1870-1900 (see Table. 5.1). 
   Table 5.1 Growth of Cadbury 1870-1900 
 Sales Revenues No. of Employees 
1870 £54,750 50(est.) 
1880 £266,285 230 
1890 £761,969 1,500 
1900 £1,326,312 3,023 
   Source: Fitzgerald R. (1995, p. 64). 
However, a threat to the continuing growth of the business occurred in 1899 with the 
sudden and unexpected death of Richard Cadbury, from diphtheria during a visit to 
the Middle East at the age of 64. This tragic event invoked an immediate change to 
the structure and management of the business. It had already been decided by the 
brothers in 1899, that in the event of one of their deaths the partnership would cease 
and the business would then become incorporated as a private limited company.
693
 
Following the creation of the new company in late 1899, the remaining brother, 
George Snr. became chairman and effectively the figurehead of the business (thus 
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enabling him to devote time to his philanthropic and political interests). As a 
consequence the day-to-day management was to entrusted to four of the sons of the 
brothers as joint managing directors, each responsible for different aspects within the 
firm. Richard’s two sons were Barrow (age 37) and William (age 32); George Snr.’s 
sons were George Jnr. (age 21) and Edward (age 26).
694
  The division of 
responsibilities within the business was supposed to be equal (Barrow in charge of 
accounts; William in charge of engineering; George Jnr. in charge of chemists and 
new product development; Edward in charge of sales and production). However, 
Barrow’s real interest lay in the work of the Quaker movement, and William was 
more of an outdoor type and tended to be more concerned with pursuits outside the 
business.
695
 Despite their relatively young age, the real dynamic at a critical period 
for the future development of the company lay with George Jnr. and Edward. Indeed, 
further motivation for ensuring the success of the company was in the fact that in 
1900, George Cadbury Snr. donated his own personal wealth to the creation of the 
Bournville Village Trust. This decision he would later claim as being the correct 
thing to do because he concluded that “my children will be all the better off for being 
deprived of this money, as great wealth is not to be desired and in my experience is 
more of a curse than a blessing to the families that possess it.”696 
Influences 
George Jnr. had first joined the family firm in 1897, with a brief to learn as much 
about the business as he could. Prior to his eventual appointment as joint managing 
director in 1899, following Richard’s untimely death, he had already made several 
visits to European cocoa and confectionery manufacturers. He hoped these visits 
would help understand and learn more of the different processes and products, and 
included time at the Stollwerck confectionery manufacturer, based in Germany where 
he worked at their  factory at Pressburg in Austria-Hungary, and also at one their 
German-based locations for an overall total of six months.
697
  
This experience of working at Stollwerck’s would have undoubtedly provided George 
Jnr. with valuable insights into production processes, but would have also influenced 
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his thinking regarding the overall management of a large and successful 
confectionery manufacturer. The Stollwerck company was an important influence on 
George Jnr. because since its founding in Cologne in 1839, the business had been 
recognised as an innovator, for example in the establishment of a purpose-built 
factory in Cologne in 1877, some two years before the similar decision of Cadbury. 
In addition, during the 1870’s and 1880’s, Stollwercks invested heavily in marketing 
and distribution and also in the recruitment of professional managers to help the 
Stollwerck family run the company. Evidence of this can be found in the increase in 
the recruitment of a central administrative team from 65 staff in 1886 to 154 by 1896. 
In terms of marketing, the company were innovators in packaging design, packaging 
protection (for perishable products) and branding, aided by a separate advertising 
department. From the product development perspective, Stollwerck’s founded a 
research laboratory in 1884, with staff holding by doctorates in chemistry. Most of 
these innovations within the business during the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
had been instigated by Ludwig Stollwerck, one of the five brothers running the firm 
during this period, who also reorganised the company’s functional operating 
departments, and importantly,  introduced recognised book-keeping and cost 
accounting systems and procedures. These decisions were later described by Ludwig 
Stollwerck as “the most important decisions of my career”.698 The six months that 
George Jnr. spent working at the Stollwerck business would have had a profound 
effect on his vision of how a successful cocoa and confectionery should be managed, 
and the importance of those structures and processes that were in place at that time 
within the German company. 
In addition to his experiences at Stollwerck’s in 1897, and following his appointment 
as joint managing in 1899, George Jnr. continued his search for knowledge of 
managerial practices by visiting progressive and enlightened firms in the USA during 
1901.
699
 One of these companies  was the National Cash Register, based in Dayton, 
Ohio, founded and run by another recognised management innovator of the late 
nineteenth century, John Patterson. 
John Patterson founded the National Cash Register (NCR) in 1884 at a time when 
many other businessmen were experimenting with mass production techniques and 
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the establishment of extensive distribution channels. Patterson realised that to achieve 
economies of scale he needed to create an efficient system of management, whereby  
internal processes could be broken down into uniform tasks easily learned by his 
workforce to promote efficiency.
700
 In addition, Patterson was seen as an early 
pioneer of the introduction of welfare programmes for his employees, designed to 
support this efficiency drive, based on the belief that contented workers are more 
productive. As part of this initiative the company moved into purpose-built premises 
in 1894, providing improved working conditions and incorporating employee 
facilities such as a library, kindergarten, sports facilities, clubs, societies, education, 
medical facilities, swimming pools and garden areas.
701
 Indeed, such importance was 
given by Patterson to these facilities that the gardens and open spaces surrounding the 
new factory premises were designed by the Olmstead Brothers, whose other 
commissions included the design of Central Park in New York. The design of the 
garden was intended to create a harmonisation between the machine and nature.
702
 
The new factory was to compliment the extensive welfare programs for his 
employees, and Patterson sought to exercise control of the company through an 
organisational model based on the pyramid. In this structure, Patterson and the board 
of directors were at the apex, supported by three “originating” divisions of legal, 
publishing and labour. In turn these would be further supported by three “operating” 
divisions of selling, making and recording, making this structure a kind of crude form 
of the line and staff organisation.
703
 Although basic in nature, Patterson also 
introduced a unique committee system in which he established an Executive 
committee to determine strategic policy, and a series of Factory committees to direct 
the individual departments.
704
 
Another key decision by Patterson, designed to provide the NCR with continuing 
competitive advantage, was the establishment of an Experimental department in 
1888, whose sole objective was to provide a stream of new ideas on products and 
processes.
705
 This initiative is one example of the forward-looking nature of the 
company, whereby any opportunity that could present itself would be seized and 
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embraced by the business to maintain its market position.
706
 Other pioneering 
initiatives at NCR included the establishment of a successful suggestion scheme, 
which was cleverly introduced to turn the negativity of a “complaint” by employees 
into the positivity of a “suggestion”, supported by cash incentives.707 In 1901, the 
company created a Labour Department, which became the template of the later 
Personnel Departments, which brought together all the human issues which had been 
previously been distributed throughout the business, and dealt with on an ad-hoc and 
piecemeal fashion.
708
 
A fully integrated costing system had also been incorporated as part of the policy of 
creating an efficient company and also providing Patterson with the control that he 
demanded. Indeed by the early 1920’s NCR were operating one of the most 
sophisticated budgetary control systems in the USA, enabling the company to “hold 
the post-mortem in advance”, which ensured centralised control over the co-
ordination of activities.
709
  
Thus, by his visit George Jnr. would have obtained a wealth of knowledge and 
experience from observing the operation of one of the most successful companies in 
the USA. Although a detailed report of his visit does not exist in the archives, a 
special Board Meeting was held at Bournville on his return in which the enthusiasm 
for the techniques by NCR was recorded and decisions were made by the Board to 
immediately adopt some of the welfare schemes, to introduce a suggestion scheme 
and to create a committee system to facilitate more efficient management.
710
 In 
addition to these immediate actions, the overall managerial philosophy of the NCR 
business must have not only influenced George Jnr., but also the other three young 
managing directors at Cadbury.  
In addition to George Jnr.’s visit to the National Cash Register in 1901, Henry S. 
Dennison, who was to become one of the most influential contributors to 
management thought, and eventual mentor to Seebohm Rowntree as previously 
discussed, also spent time at the NCR in 1900 to improve his own training and 
education. In his report, Dennison cast doubts on some of the more paternal practices 
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employed by Patterson at the NCR, but he also reported his enthusiasm for the way 
that the company used “careful, thoughtful planning” in which they incorporated an 
extensive research and development programme to ensure their long-term viability 
and profitability. As part of this long-term vision at NCR, he also recognised the 
willingness of the company to invest a large proportion of its profits into plant and 
equipment with strategic intent. This seemed to contrast with the accepted economic 
view at the time of the maximisation of short-term profitability.  He concluded that 
“the greatest lesson to be learnt from the NCR lies in a steady, gradual advance”. 
Following his visit, Dennison incorporated many of the NCR-style philosophies, 
practices and processes into his own company.
711
 
Early Costing Activity 
As already discussed, the Rowntree  company had exhibited a range of costing 
practices, processes and procedures in the archive that were consistent, if not in 
advance of accepted  theoretical and practical applications in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, but the Cadbury archive is absent of such evidence. The evidence 
demonstrates that the development of costing at Rowntree’s during this period  was 
promoted and driven by chairman Joseph Rowntree, this being one of his most 
important personal attributes and competencies that he employed after joining the 
business in 1869. The Cadbury example, however, suggests that the development of 
the business during the latter part of the nineteenth century, had more to do with the 
two original Cadbury brothers, George Snr. and Richard making crucial strategic 
decisions, which laid the foundations for success in the twentieth century, rather than 
the ability to control the company via costing systems. However, this is not to say that 
costing processes were completely absent at Cadbury during this time, but the only 
archival evidence that exists to this effect are references to the fact that all costing 
work was carried out personally by George Snr., usually after 6pm when he had 
carried out his normal duties as joint head of the company.
712
 So, rather than any 
formal cost reports being prepared and distributed to other key managers, it appears 
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that George Snr. merely carried  out all his costing work in a relatively basic way, in 
his own personal notebook.
713
 
5.3 Beginnings: 1903-1918 
Organisational Context 
The seismic changes that occurred at the company following the untimely death of 
Richard Cadbury in 1899, were most apparent in the way that the business was 
structured and managed following the appointment of the four younger Cadbury 
brothers as joint managing directors following incorporation into a private limited 
company during the same year. The changes in organisation that eventually occurred 
came about through a realisation that there had to be in place a process for the 
effective delegation of managerial duties, whilst still maintaining final responsibility 
with the four new managing directors. This was achieved firstly by the creation of 
specialised functional departments; secondly by introducing a management 
committee system that had been observed at the National Cash Register; and thirdly, 
by recognising and establishing specific roles for “managers”.714 
Evidence of the practical introduction of these changes can be seen in the creation of 
some of these new functional departments: Engineers (1900), Chemists (1901), Cost 
Office (1903), Advertising (1905) and Planning (1913).
715
 These new departments 
were accompanied by specialised management committees designed to coordinate the 
activities of these new functions, primarily to ensure the communication of the 
overall policy of the company. This had the principal goal of directing effort into the 
overriding corporate objectives.
716
 
In addition to these functional committees, others were also established including the 
Suggestions Committee (1902), founded to administrate the new suggestions scheme, 
as derived from the National Cash Register example, and importantly the Men’s 
Works Committee (1905) and the Girl’s Works Committee (1905). These were 
important in the devolution of responsibility to a more democratic footing designed to 
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shift the emphasis from what had been traditionally one of personal control prior to 
1899, to that described as “associated control”.717 
Whilst providing practical evidence of a desire by the new management team to 
introduce wide ranging changes to the organisational structure and associated lines of 
communication, the specific example of the management committee system has been 
criticised as being slow and cumbersome, although it was acknowledged that the 
easing of conflict, the construction of loyalty and the importance of a team approach 
were also beneficial.
718
 
The final innovation as part of the overall scheme to improve the organisational 
structure was the establishment of a new “Staff” grade in 1904, created to recognise 
the importance of junior managers. This new grade was in addition to the established 
role of the traditional foreman, but was to receive extended status and privileges.
719
 
The Establishment of the Cost Office 
As previously argued, the decision to establish a functional cost office at Cadbury 
was one of the key organisational changes that occurred following its 1899 
incorporation into a private limited company. Also, as previously suggested the 
motivation for the decision could have come from influences drawn from successful 
businesses elsewhere which had already introduced cost systems with favourable 
results, but also in the realisation that the development of the firm into a complex 
mass-producer required a proficient cost control capability. Therefore, the inefficient 
method of George Cadbury Snr. independently calculating ad hoc costs and the 
subsequent fixing of prices in the years prior to 1899 had to be replaced. Indeed, 
commentating in later years, William Cadbury expressed his astonishment that the 
business had survived during the period 1861-99 for so long without more dedicated 
costing processes and procedures in place.
720
  Upon the introduction of the new 
management structure, George Snr., took the opportunity to devolve his previous sole 
responsibility for all costing matters to Edward. This was formally requested at a 
board meeting: 
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“Cost Department – This subject has been considered and Edward Cadbury is requested 
 to submit a scheme for systematically getting all the costs of all new goods and of all 
 present lines on the price list”721 
Realising that he was not fully conversant with the techniques and practices of 
costing, Edward Cadbury sought the skills of a more experienced professional. 
Through the Quaker business network in Birmingham, A.E. Cater was recommended 
to Edward. Cater had been working as an estimator with the local printing firm of 
White & Pike, which had recently closed in 1903 as a result of a fire at their premises 
in Longbridge.
722
 
Edward subsequently interviewed A.E. Cater, and was suitably impressed, offering 
him the position of Cost Accountant on a salary of £10 per month.
723
 Having thus 
created a cost office headed by a suitably qualified and experienced manager, Edward 
Cadbury wanted to ensure that the terms of reference of the new function were 
established and made clear to the rest of the company. Right from the outset, it was 
important that the cost office was the central repository of production and factory 
information, and its official custodian. This important presumption was identified and 
ratified at board level: 
 “The cost office is to be a centre to which all information should come first hand,  
together with signed authority of all instructions affecting the following:- 
1. Recipes for all goods and the process for their manufacture 
2. Weights and sizes for all goods made. 
3. Methods of packing, style of box and details of materials used in making and 
 filling same. 
4. The keeping up-to-date of piece rates and buying prices and discounts as embodied 
 in the cost cards. 
 The duties of the one appointed by the Firm for this purpose to be the collecting and 
 filing of information received through the Board, of Directors and to notify to the 
 proper quarter such information. A. Cater to undertake these duties”.724 
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Once established in his new role, Cater’s first task was to make sense of the existing 
recording system. He found, for example, that recipes had been written up in penny 
memorandum books by various foremen, which meant the tracing of complex recipes 
was extremely difficult. This state of affairs was exacerbated by the fact that different 
recipes were called different names by the foremen, making for an element of 
confusion regarding the official factory records. Cater found that he had to start with 
the price list and work back methodically, step-by-step through each production 
department, identifying each stage of manufacture, then back to the issues of raw 
materials from store. Cater employed a card index system to achieve his goal and 
these were filed in the official company recipe book and became the source of all 
production requirements. The task took Cater two years to complete.
725
 Once finished 
the cost office was deemed the central source of official product data from which all 
departments were required to work. A system for the communication and instruction 
of any new products or changes to existing ones that were made had to be in the form 
of an official “Blue Note” from the cost office.  Blue Notes eventually became 
synonymous with any reports or other communication that emanated from the cost 
office. 
The elevation of the cost office as the fulcrum of production data caused some 
friction with existing personnel, and this animosity had to be overcome initially by a 
talk given by Cater to all the foremen, explaining the overall advantages that this 
system would eventually benefit everybody concerned. It is worth noting that this talk 
by Cater was also attended by William and Edward Cadbury to reinforce the notion 
that these new procedures had full board backing.
726
 
In addition to the upkeep and provision of detailed source recipe information, it soon 
became clear that the first needs of a fully operational cost office was reliable data on 
the company’s expenditure, and information about its workers activities. Upon his 
appointment, Cater was unimpressed by the factory records necessary to carry out the 
functions of the cost office. The processes that were required to achieve a robust 
records system began with the examination of all purchase invoices to extract detailed 
information such as price, full detailed particulars and the purpose to which intended. 
This led to the establishment of a requisitioning system, a central receiving deck, 
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stores, storekeepers, official stock running-out lists, stock control and the creation of 
check-weighers to ensure accurate measurement of work-in-progress from one 
manufacturing department to another. These progressive measures were essential if 
Cadbury was to establish a capability in costing and the extensive nature of what was 
achieved in these early years is noted by the company.
727
 Having established the 
organisational basis for creating flows of information, the board felt that the 
foundations were now in place for a cost system to be established, and subsequently 
sanctioned the next phase for the cost office: 
 “The question of the inauguration of a complete cost system has been considered and 
 the Directors approve the proposed arrangement”.728 
 “A systematic method of cost finding and cost keeping to be introduced based on the 
 provision of: 
- Invoices for materials supplied to cost office by buying office. 
- Records of materials requested from stock. 
- Stock-taking to be carried out by both cost office and buying office.729 
Once the processes of recording and measuring materials in the factory was 
established, the cost office then proceeded to coordinate with the wages office 
regarding the compilation of labour costs. The weekly records of the payment of 
wages to each worker was sent to the cost office, grouped in departments, combined 
with a weekly time-sheet stating the work and operations performed. These wage 
costs of all operations were then analysed and a labour cost for each department 
together with each product line could be then calculated.
730
 
In addition to the compilation of the direct production costs, emphasis was also 
placed on the apportionment and allocation of indirect production costs such as 
heating, lighting, power, refrigeration and other factory services.
731
 Finally the cost 
office also recognised that the other overheads of the company such as distribution, 
selling, advertising and administration costs had also to be taken into account and 
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allocated appropriately. It was conceded, however, that this was particularly difficult 
to deal with in a scientific way.
732
 
Growing interest in the work of the cost office by senior managers at the company 
was exemplified by the debate on the scope of the department at board level in which 
the information that was provide needed to be controlled: 
 “It is agreed that all costs from the cost office to provide particulars at the special 
 authorisation of a director.”733 
 “It is agreed that reports on specific departments by the cost office are to be sent 
 in duplicate to the department concerned and also to the director specifically interested.”734 
The board also recognised that the growing scope of the cost office meant that they 
would increasingly require access to information throughout the business: 
 “Departments are authorised to supply total figures to the cost office as and when 
 required”735 
By 1907, therefore, the cost office was clearly established as a key processor and 
supplier of relevant information that would inform the decision making at the 
company, and importantly there appeared to be full support of its operations by the 
board, thereby opening up the potential that was already evident. 
Formalising Costing Procedures 
Initially, the principal objective of the cost office was the compilation and provision 
of cost data relating to individual lines that appeared on the company’s price list, 
which were reviewed daily by Edward Cadbury and were in continual preparation. 
The price list was therefore under constant examination in which no line sold could 
escape a detailed scrutiny of its profit-earning capacity.
736
 
In addition to the work being carried out during these early years by the cost office in 
establishing procedures for the collection of data regarding internal manufacturing 
processes, Figure 5.2 illustrates  a section of a report that was also produced at this 
time in which a comparison against major competitors was made of the percentage of 
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profit on fancy boxes enjoyed by the trade (later known as “trade margin”).  The 
conclusion drawn from the analysis was that it was consistent that for Cadbury, 
Rowntree and Fry, the wholesale trade made better margins. This work was 
presumably requested by a director and was an early example of the company 
widening the scope of cost information to include what was to be referred to as 
“distribution costing”, and demonstrates the realisation by Cadbury that costs that 
affected overall profitability extended beyond the factory gates. This knowledge was 
to become an important facet of their ability to understand the complete value chain 
in later years.
737
 
Table 5.2 Comparison of percentage of profit made by the trade on fancy boxes. 
           Cadbury      Rowntree & Co.    J.S. Fry & Co.  
Price 
Point 
of Box 
 
Sold 
at 
Whole- 
saler 
 
Sold 
at 
Retail- 
er 
 
% 
Profit 
at 
Whole- 
saler 
% 
Profit 
at 
Retailer 
Sold 
at 
Whole- 
saler 
 
Sold 
at 
Retail- 
er 
 
% 
Profit 
at 
Whole- 
saler 
% 
Profit 
at 
Retailer 
Sold 
at 
Whole- 
saler 
 
 
Sold 
at 
Retail- 
er 
 
% 
Profit 
at 
Whole- 
saler 
% 
Profit 
at 
Retailer 
 
2/6d. 
 
20/- 
dozen 
 
 
21/6 
dozen 
 
 
33.33% 
 
 
28.33% 
 
19/11 
dozen 
 
20/10 
dozen 
 
33.33% 
 
30.33% 
 
19/11 
dozen 
 
 
21/10 
dozen 
 
33.50% 
 
27.10% 
Source: Cadbury Brothers Ltd. Board Meeting. June 21
st
. 1904, m. 413. 
However, the main concern of the cost office was the understanding and 
measurement of the production processes within the factory production departments. 
The growing emphasis on the creation of an efficient plant was evident in the 
identification by the cost office of the problem of waste. One of the important 
elements of this was the loss of weight of materials in storage. To address this, the 
cost office debited each production department with the weight of materials inward, 
and credited with weight outwards. Another example was the recognition that loss 
was incurred by the margin of “overweight” as a direct consequence of the fact that 
the majority of the firm’s product lines were sold by weight. Therefore, to guarantee 
the advertised weight of each product to the consumer, they were originally 
manufactured at a weight appreciably higher. However, the cost office calculated  the 
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product overweight element and subsequently incorporated it into the final product 
cost, thereby drawing inefficiencies to the attention of management.
738
 
Further evidence of the growing importance of the cost office and the information it 
could provide, was reflected in the additional manpower allocated to this office with 
the appointment of new staff, some of whom were external to the company.
739
 
Towards the end of 1907 there was recognition by the board that the activities of the 
cost office be extended in which information was to be prepared in connection with 
questions arising on both the selling and production sides to provide a more 
comprehensive service to management.
740
 These additional responsibilities for the 
cost office and the ensuing onerous workload placed upon it was also quickly 
recognised by the board by the approval of the purchase of mechanical adding 
machines at a cost of £90 to facilitate a more efficient service.
741
  
Evidence of the problems associated with the workload in the cost office are 
demonstrated in comments made in a report by the company’s auditors in which they 
state: 
“There are problems regarding the analysis of purchases in the buying office, so 
 better links with the cost office are required, but it is recognised that the limited 
 time available by A. Cater has prevented this.”742 
At around this time the board decided to appoint a second-in-command to A. Cater, 
the cost office manager, in an attempt to alleviate the obvious workload issues that 
were existing in the cost office. The person appointed, was R.R. Sly, who quickly 
began to contribute to the output of the cost office.
743
 
The additional resources that had been allocated to the cost office meant that the 
scope of their work could be extended. An early example of this is provided by the 
analysis of the comparative costs associated with the proposed mechanisation of the 
’snip cutting’ operation employed within the factory. The cost comparison project 
was commissioned by Edward Cadbury and is evidence of the desire by the board to 
identify those areas in the company where suggestions for cost savings could be 
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made. The analysis prepared by Sly of the projected savings of the snip cutting 
operation was probably one of his first important tasks upon his appointment as 
assistant cost office manager.
744
 Appendix 3 provides the original documentation of 
this project and although the annual cost savings suggested were a modest £383 per 
annum, it does confirm the level of co-operation that must have existed between the 
cost office and the engineering and research departments as identified by Horrocks.
745
 
Apart from these specific projects on cost savings through mechanisation and other 
schemes, the cost office became responsible for the provision of additional routine 
factory information. For example, Appendix 4 demonstrates a 1910 analysis 
undertaken in the measurement of the proportion of sugar to glucose within each 
production department, combined with some explanation of any significant recent 
movements. The fact that this analysis also includes a comparison to previous years 
going back to 1907 indicates that this had become routine information provided to the 
board and other managers. 
The widening activities and importance of the cost office during these years is 
described by Lawrence Cadbury, another younger son of George Snr., who had also 
recently joined the firm as a trainee in much the same way as his elder brothers and 
nephews had previously done. In this report, Lawrence Cadbury made the following 
observations: 
“On entering the works I spent my first few days in trying to grasp the general 
 organisation and methods of management employed. For this purpose I found 
 that the cost office is a very convenient centre, as it forms a link between all the 
 various processes and trades, explaining the value of each, and shows how every 
 step in the manufacture contributes to the final cost of the finished article”.746 
Lawrence Cadbury’s interest in the central role of the cost office meant that upon the 
completion of his training period the following year, he was duly elected to the board 
and it was agreed that the cost office would form part of his portfolio of 
responsibilities within the firm.
747
  He remained there until the outbreak of the Great 
War when he volunteered for the Friends Ambulance Service, where he served until 
demobilization in 1919, after which he was awarded the Order of the British Empire  
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by the British government and the Croix-de-Guerre by the French government for his 
contribution to the war effort. 
The increasing workload and responsibility of the cost office in the years prior to the 
Great War is provided in Appendix 5, where the department appeared to have taken 
over the  responsibility  for the calculation of the value of machinery, plant and 
equipment within the factory for 1913 including the appropriation of the relevant 
depreciation charges. Again, the cost office provided additional value to this report in 
the provision of values for the previous two years to provide appropriate comparison 
of movements. 
Evidence of interest in activities outside production areas, where control was also 
becoming a necessity is provided by a board request of Cater to investigate and 
submit an analysis of selling costs.
748
 This work by Cater was extended the following 
year to include an analysis of research work carried out within the business. 
Following this report by Cater the board decided that: 
“It is agreed that under normal conditions we should look to spend up to 
 £10,000 per annum in respect of research and experimental work”749 
So even during the abnormal conditions created by the Great War, Cadbury were 
constantly enquiring which elements of the business gave cause for concern, and how 
the cost office could use their expertise in the provision of such information. 
Early Quest for Efficiency 
The principles of scientific management and the associated emphasis on efficiency 
became a central pillar of Cadbury’s in the years prior to the outbreak of the Great 
War. Indeed, Rowlinson and Hassard concluded that scientific management was an 
integral part of the construction and establishment of the company’s overall labour-
management institutions, along with the Bournville village, welfare provision, sexual 
division of labour and the works council scheme.
750
  
The principles of scientific management were attractive to Edward Cadbury because 
they provided a mechanism by which efficiency could be achieved. Indeed writing in 
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1912, he attributed the continuous growth of the company to the attention to 
efficiency, specifically in the elimination of waste and the resulting reduction of costs 
within each production department.
751
 He placed the benefits from efficiency within 
the context of foreign competition, and to the wider social community.
752
 However, in 
his critical study of the application of scientific management at the company, 
Rowlinson made the point that whilst Edward Cadbury was sympathetic to the over-
riding principles, he attempted to modify the detailed mechanics of application to 
ensure that the social principles of the firm were not compromised.
753
 However, 
Rowlinson  has also described the lengths that Edward Cadbury was prepared to go in 
order to achieve an efficient workforce by the introduction of piecework payment 
systems, combined with a systematic approach to labour management.
754
 Rowlinson  
concluded that whilst Edward Cadbury was a strong advocate of the introduction of 
machinery wherever possible, during the period 1901-1914, the output of the 
Bournville factory increased without excessive mechanisation, mainly as a 
consequence of the introduction of piecework systems.
755
 
Specific evidence of Cadbury’s interest in efficiency has already been identified in 
the role of the cost office in supplying cost savings data regarding the ‘snip-cutting’ 
mechanisation proposal as early as 1909. Based on this apparent success in the 
practical application of analysis to enable efficiency, the company decided in 1912 to 
involve an American firm of accountants and engineers  to assist in further efficiency-
based projects. The reasons why New York based Suffern & Sons were chosen are 
unclear: 
 “It has been agreed to engage the services of Suffern & Son, an American firm 
 of business experts in regard to the unloaders gang, covering operations from 
 train to store, at a fee of 125 guineas with the provision that they should be 
 excluded from all manufacturing departments. The cost department is to liaise 
 fully with Sufferns.”756 
Prior to their contract with Cadbury, Suffern & Sons had been aggressively marketing 
their services to companies in the United States and were subsequently hired in early 
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1912 by Lukens Steel in Pennsylvania to introduce new wage-incentive systems 
designed to improve efficiencies in the plant. Before the contract had been signed, the 
projected savings quoted by Sufferns as part of their original sales pitch were to be 
approximately £20,000 per annum. However, after the project was completed in 
1913, these planned savings were not realised. Indeed, Lukens realised that the actual 
savings achieved would not cover the fees charged by Sufferns, resulting in their 
refusal to pay the Suffern’s invoice for the work. Legal action ensued, and it is 
claimed that these disputes became common as the many companies who were 
seduced by the promised savings offered by efficiency consultants, became 
disillusioned when these were not realised.
757
  Similarly, the Whitin Machine Works 
Co. based in Whitinsville Massachusetts also hired Sufferns to carry out a range of 
efficiency projects led by senior consultant Charles Knoeppel at their works during 
1912. Like the Lukens Steel example, the senior management at Whitin’s were less 
than impressed at the results produced by the Sufferns consultants, claiming that the 
fees charged barely covered the efficiency savings generated, as was the case with 
Lukens Steel.
758
 It is however interesting to note that Whitin’s later hired Knoeppel in 
1914 to carry out further work at the factory after he had set up his own efficiency 
consulting practice.
759
 Perhaps the reasons that Suffern & Sons were hired by 
Cadbury was as a result of a similar targeted marketing campaign at UK businesses 
by the firm, who were obviously keen to expand their practice overseas. An 
alternative speculative  view is that a director of the company might have been 
familiar with senior partner Ernest Suffern’s contribution to the literature of 1911.760 
For whatever reason, Sufferns  & Sons were indeed granted a contract to assist in the  
specific area of the business that the board felt required immediate attention, and in 
collaboration with the cost office produced the results of the study: 
“A proposal for the introduction of piecework in the Unloaders Gang, with the 
 assistance of J.F. Whiteford of Suffern & Sons, as the irregularity of the flow of materials 
 into the factory is one of our chief difficulties. The cost office has produced a summary 
 of this work”761 
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Table 5.3 Comparison of Unloaders Labour Cost – Before and after 
Reorganisation 
Line 1912 Average for 
Year – Before 
Reorganisation 
1912 3
rd
. Quarter 
Before 
Reorganisation 
3
rd
. Quarter 
After 
Reorganisation 
 
Cocoa Bonded 
Stores 
0.76d. per bag 0.94d. per bag 0.46d. per bag 
Cocoa Front 
Stores 
0.68d. per bag 0.80d. per bag 0.44d. per bag 
Timber to Mills 15.65d. per ton 17.86d. per ton 11.52d. per ton 
Tinplate 14.52d. per ton 16.49d. per ton 13.47d. per ton 
Source: Works Organisation Report. November 18
th
 1913. J.E. Bellows
762
 
“This converts to approximately £600 per annum savings, and in addition also provides 
savings in overheads due to reduction in gang of 20 men, and this means a saving in clerical 
work for the new system”763 
Based on this experience, Cadbury appear to have benefitted from the assistance of a 
firm of efficiency consultants. Indeed, the specific consultant assigned to the Cadbury 
contract by Suffern’s (J.F. Whiteford) would later contribute to the literature,764  
based on his practical experience as a consultant. It is interesting to note that in his 
book, Whiteford extolled the virtues of cost finding as a pre-requisite in establishing 
efficiency, but went further by suggesting a form of standard costing to be introduced 
to which actual results could then be compared and subsequent comparisons made.
765
 
Despite Whiteford’s knowledge regarding the potential of standard costs to a 
business, there is no evidence that managers at Cadbury were being advised on such 
technical matters. Moreover, as will be later discussed, Cadbury did not have in place 
a standard costing system prior to the outbreak of World War II. 
In addition to the advisory capacity provided by Suffern’s regarding the 
implementation of efficiency programmes at Bournville, and despite the disruption 
caused by the onset of the Great War, Cadbury’s decided to hire the services of H. 
Casson in 1917 to provide education and training to inform employees on the topic of 
                                                          
762
 Cadbury Brothers Ltd. Works Organisation Report. November 18
th
 1913. J.E. Bellows . 
763
 Ibid. 
764
 Whiteford, Factory Management Wastes.  
765
 Ibid., p. 140. 
215 
 
efficiency within the Bournville works. This initiative by the company was part of an 
overall plan in anticipation of a world after the eventual cessation of hostilities.
766
 
H. Casson was a prominent exponent of scientific management and efficiency, having 
been employed as a consultant by Harrington Emerson in the USA since 1906, 
initially working on railroad associated projects.
767
 In his 1917 book, Casson claimed 
that his was the first publication in the UK on the subject of scientific management, 
being a compendium of articles that first appeared in the Efficiency Magazine.
768
 The 
contribution that Casson claimed was that he offered an alternative approach to 
scientific management from the accepted American principles. He advocated what he 
described as a “British” way; a methodology that was more suited to the UK, based 
on staff training, corporation, explanation, goodwill and conciliation. In other words 
rather than forcing the techniques on a workforce as a  top-down exercise, Casson’s 
approach was to educate employees on the overall benefits of efficient working 
thereby creating a willingness to embrace and accept new practices. This he claimed 
would increase output, wages, dividends and goodwill.
769
 Indeed, Casson’s over-
riding definition of efficiency was simply , “A higher percentage of results.”770 
Although Casson warned of a three year time-frame that was usually required before 
total efficiency in a factory could be achieved
771
, the ensuing results would be in the 
reduction of costs, the increase in profits and the reduction of the selling price of the 
article.
772
 
It is reasonable to assume that board members at Cadbury were familiar with 
Casson’s book, and also his reputation, particularly his previous association with 
Harrington Emerson, and this influenced their invitation to invite him as training 
facilitator at the Bournville works. In addition, Casson also mentioned the fact  that 
he had known J.E. Whiteford (of Suffern & Sons) for some time, so there appeared to 
have been a network of efficiency consultants sharing knowledge and contacts.
773
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George Cadbury Jnr. presided over Casson’s six lectures spread over a period of three 
months given to:
774
 
1. Sales 
2. Works Managers 
3. Foremen ‘A’ 
4. Forewomen ‘A’ 
5. Foremen ‘B’ 
6. Forewomen ‘B’ 
In these lectures Casson emphasises the over-riding aims of a business:
775
 
1. To build up a business. 
2. To build up ourselves. 
3. To increase the profits and wages. 
4. To decrease costs and benefit customers. 
Part of his lectures, published after their completion in the factory, Casson made the 
point that although efficiency and scientific management embraced the whole factory, 
it is the cost accounting system which enabled measurement to be made, although 
conceding the important point that such a system cannot by itself ensure that 
efficiency is achieved.
776
  
This approach by Casson was consistent with the Cadbury philosophy of engagement 
and consultation with the employees, together with the realisation that fundamental 
change could only occur through cooperation and consensus. Also the message 
reinforced the wisdom of the decision to create and fully resource a cost office within 
the company back in 1903, without which the results and extent of any efficiency 
could not be measured and identified. 
5.4 Progress: 1919-1938     
  
 Further Quest for Efficiency 
The strength of the Cadbury board’s concern for efficiency, and how this permeated 
throughout the organisation, is illustrated by the publication in 1919 of a standard 
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work on payment systems by J.E. Prosser, an employee in Cadbury’s Works 
Organisation Department.
777
 In this book Prosser described in detail the procedures, 
advantages and disadvantages of each of the existing wage payment systems that 
were  in operation, both in the UK and the USA: Time-Wage, Piece Wage, Halsey 
Premium, Rowan Premium, Cost Premium and Differential Piece Rate. In his 
description of each payment practice, Prosser continually made reference to the 
principles of scientific management and how each one supports the quest for 
efficiency, thereby making their introduction potentially beneficial to both workers, 
in terms of higher wages and also for management in terms of lower unit cost. In the 
preparation of his book, Prosser cited all the leading contributors to the literature 
including A. Hamilton Church,  E.H. Schell, E.T. Elbourne,  D.F. Schloss, D. Rowan, 
F.E. Webner and H.L. Gantt. Describing the overall consequences of a scientific 
management approach to wage payment systems, Prosser claimed that under the old 
methodology the control of production was left in the hands of employees, a direct  
consequence of an absence of rigid standards, especially of output. Consequently, 
management were incapable of detecting any losses of output.
778
 However, Prosser 
was keen to point out that under a more scientific approach, managers had for the first 
time a mechanism for having foreknowledge of labour and associated overhead costs, 
one of the key building blocks of a budgetary control system.
779
 In the Cadbury 
official review of Prosser’s book, the company claimed that his experience of 
working in the works organisation department at Bournville provided the perfect 
background necessary for this important contribution to the literature. The reviewer 
also made the point that the book also focused on the ability to  trace the effect on the 
part of the employee as reflected in the decreased wages cost per week combined with 
the tracking of the additional savings on overheads following such effort.
780
 
The experience of the Great War prompted Cadbury to seek a more consultative and 
cooperative attitude amongst manufacturers, as a way of attempting to create a new 
world order following the Armistice:  
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 “Manufacturers in this country, if they are to hold their own in the face of 
 international competition that will follow the war, whether immediately or 
 after a few years, must cease to act as isolated units, and cooperate in research, 
 in organisation and probably in buying and selling.”781 
Indeed as Delheim
782
 observed, this belief was in line with the accepted notion by the 
establishment in which society, after reconstruction, would be based on cooperation, 
goodwill and communal service. However, as Delheim went on to say, the stark 
reality of a post-1918 world of labour unrest and recession meant that these ideals 
were quickly abandoned.
783
 
One of the key lessons that Cadbury’s learned from their war-time experience was the 
fundamental importance of taking advantage of the advances in mass-production 
techniques that had been developed to meet the demands of the war effort. From this 
realisation, Cadbury’s concluded that efficiency in production was the foundation of 
competitive power, based on the reduction of manufacturing costs due to the further 
development of  mechanisation.
784
 This philosophy was also augmented by the belief 
that for such a policy to work, then the number of products available to the consumer 
would have to be reduced. The practicalities of this were published within the 
organisation in 1925 under the general title of “Simplification”: 
“Simplification means enquiring whether any multiplicity of products can be reduced 
 without in any way curtailing the efficient response of supply to the demand of the  
public. This means the prevention of an unnecessarily wide range of similar items.”785 
The organisational competence that was the foundation of this strategy was the 
formulation of a capability rooted in the establishment of research and development 
activities, combined with engineering expertise and outputs measured by the cost 
office. However, the specific requirement for Cadbury was not to establish a lead in 
areas of technological discovery, but to build upon and improve existing knowledge. 
Projects were therefore chosen which would provide a steady conveyor-belt of 
improvements in efficiency, resulting in the measurable lowering of cost. This would 
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mean that even if sales were static, profits would steadily increase.
786
 The 
collaboration that was necessary to achieve this capability was the establishment of 
the Research Committee in 1911, the conduit by which flows of information would 
pass, and was gradually improved and developed over the years following 
inception.
787
  
The practical plans put into place which delivered the efficiencies craved by the 
company were based upon the realisation that by 1919 the “new” factory at 
Bournville, built in 1879, was no longer capable of providing the infrastructure from 
which savings could accrue. Investment was therefore made in the factory  which 
could cope with any future increases in volume, and specifically the replacement of 
older buildings with multi-story ones to facilitate the power of gravity in the 
movement of materials or finished goods throughout the different departments, 
thereby creating space for the installation of long lines of machinery necessary for 
mass production.
788
 
Decisions regarding the initial choosing of new machinery, and its subsequent 
efficient layout, was taken by the aforementioned Research Committee, whose over-
riding consideration in their deliberations was the primary objective of lowering 
costs, without compromising product quality.
789
 Therefore in the quest for the 
optimum level and type of mechanisation that would be required to deliver these 
objectives, an extensive fact-finding mission to visit the key confectionery machine 
manufacturers in continental Europe was planned. As part of this initiative that was 
arranged by A. Boughall and R. Waudby between October and November 1919, visits 
to the premises of Gabel, Petzholdt, Hansell, Gebruder-Bindler, Franke, Bauerminster 
and Passburg were undertaken and technical information regarding refiners, 
melangeurs, conches, tempering machines, mould fillers and shaking machines was 
obtained for consideration by Cadbury’s management back at Bournville.790 
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Development of Costing Procedures 
By the end of the Great War, Cadbury’s had already accumulated fifteen years of 
experience in the operation of a dedicated cost office, and was deemed important 
enough for a delegation of Rowntree managers to visit the company in 1918 to 
provide the basis for the establishment of their own cost office, as described in 
chapter 4. The report by the Rowntree delegation upon the conclusion of their visit 
confirmed that the Cadbury cost office was staffed in 1918 by 33 clerks, costing 
approximately £2,500 per annum, a considerable investment by Cadbury, clearly 
indicating that they thought this necessary to obtain the information they required. 
The Cadbury board decided to re-emphasise the role of the cost office within the 
organisation during 1919, and also to announce the promotion of cost office manager 
A. Cater to the board of Fry’s, following the merger with Cadbury in 1918.791 This 
promotion is evidence of the level of satisfaction that the board placed on the 
performance of Cater since his appointment as cost office manager in 1903. The 
board minute states: 
 “Cost Office Arrangements: A. Cater is to leave to join the Fry’s board, replaced by 
 R. Sly as cost office manager, and will represent the department on the Sales and 
 Buying Committees. The cost office is responsible for recipes, issuing of blue notes, 
 final costings and the fixing of selling prices”792 
The replacement of Cater by Sly is also indicative of the confidence placed upon him 
by the board since his appointment as assistant to Cater in 1909, and perhaps also in 
recognition of his distinguished service as an officer in the Navy during the Great 
War.  
A more detailed resume of the responsibilities of the cost office following the end of 
the Great War have been described as: 
1. “Determination of price at which a line can be sold, in conjunction with sales, 
 production and time office, taking into account expected volume, specification 
 and method of manufacture. 
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2. To monitor costs of each line to bring to light any variation caused by waste or 
 unavoidable changes in cost. The effect on profitability to be calculated to  
determine whether selling price needs to change, or line to be discontinued 
 from price list. 
3. To act as a channel for the issue of instructions referred to as ‘Blue Notes’,  
which are the pre-requisite authority for the introduction of new lines, laying 
 down standard processes, recipes and prices. This to be the system of canalising 
 all instructions to ensure that no change can take place without bringing to bear 
 the cost aspect. All ‘Blue Notes’ to have director approval, and should be 
 consistent with policy”.793 
The importance of the ‘Blue Notes’ cannot be over-emphasised: this was the 
mechanism by which individual projects were identified for consideration and the 
subsequent flow of information required for their assessment. The final element in the 
process of consideration was, of course, the financial impact based upon the work 
prepared and co-ordinated by the cost office. All of these procedures ensured that the 
cost office played a central role in the decision-making process, and that board policy 
was being operationalised.  
With the modus operandi of the cost office firmly established and sanctioned by the 
board, further developments followed, including the formation of a joint 
costing/planning committee in 1919,
794
 and a request from the board that costs should 
be calculated and made available at each stage of manufacture.
795
 
The uncertainty regarding prices of important raw materials during the years 
following the end of the Great War created unease within UK confectionery 
manufacturers; it was discussed extensively by Cadbury’s board, culminating in the 
following decisions regarding the basis for costing work: 
 “The board has decided the basis on which sugar and cocoa should now be costed 
 and agreed the following rates until the end of 1920”: 
 Sugar at 115/- per cwt. 
 Cocoa at 85/- per cwt796 
A measure of the extent of this raw material price volatility at this time is provided by 
a modification by the board later in the month to the prices already set: 
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 “The board has agreed that the price of sugar to be costed until the end of 1920 at”: 
 Sugar at 108/- per cwt.797 
Notwithstanding these uncertainties surrounding raw material prices, the board were 
intent on driving forward their plans for the creation of a modern production facility 
at Bournville based on the key organisational goal of efficiency as previously 
outlined. The organisational changes required to plan, co-ordinate and control these 
changes were put into operation: 
 “Organisation of engineers, production and cost office: 
 The board have considered draft proposals for the planning of all engineering and 
 building work for economical production before putting in hand. This scheme will 
involve the institution of a production section in the engineers office, the budgeting 
 in advance of all maintenance work over definite periods and the estimating of all 
 other work. Budgets and estimates are to be prepared by the estimating section of 
 the engineers office with summaries of estimates and budgets and all cost returns are 
 to be sent to the cost office. Proposals to be submitted to J.F. Whitehead 
 (of Suffern & Sons) for his comments.”798 
This decision was important because it effected flows of information necessary to 
realise the expansion plans and because it indicated the board recognised that 
estimating and budgeting was a way of understanding the financial impact of the 
plan. Once again the cost office was pivotal in the process because of their long-
standing role as co-ordinators and as the central repository of cost and financial data. 
The continuing role of Suffern & Sons, and especially that of J.E. Whiteford, as 
management consultants was highlighted for their input into the decision-making 
process. However, the ideas that were being proposed fell considerably short of a 
comprehensive budgetary control system, and there is no record of the response by 
Whiteford to these suggestions.  
Whilst the company decided to press ahead with its mechanisation schemes, there 
was some criticism of the way the Inland Revenue viewed the writing off of plant and 
equipment. The Cadbury objection to the rules centred around the fact that only wear 
and tear of machinery was taken into consideration, not the cost of replacement due to 
obsolescence. This they claimed fell short of the commercial realities of the necessity 
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to keep plant and equipment up to the latest design and technology, and could deter 
firms from making appropriate investment.
799
 
Evidence of a specific mechanisation project was the evaluation of the process of 
forming Maracas Biscuits in 1921 in which the appropriate ‘blue note’ shows the 
extent of the calculations that were carried out by the cost office as part of the overall 
evaluation of the proposal. Based on their analysis, the cost office concluded that the 
cost of production of this particular process could be reduced by approximately 50%, 
principally due to labour savings resulting from the replacement of seventeen girls by 
a man and two male youths.
800
 
Plans for expansion and increased mechanisation at Cadbury came at a time of 
difficult trading conditions in the UK market, prompting the board in late 1921 to 
review its sales estimates for the following year: 
 “Basis of costing for 1922: In view of the depression in trade generally and in 
 consequence of the reduction in prices, steps should be taken to alter the basis of 
 costing for 1922, and shall be based on sales of 75% of the current year.”801 
This drastic re-calculation of the sales estimate would have had a profound effect on 
the allocation and absorption of the company’s overheads , resulting in a higher 
absorption rate based on the lower projected sales figure. At the same board meeting, 
the directors even considered the possibility of reducing the number of employees at 
the company: 
 “Reduction in numbers: A review of number of employees and to report on  
reducing numbers, but maintaining the highest level of efficiency”802 
These debates at board level are indicative of the uncertainties of the period following 
the end of the Great War, highlighting the pressure surrounding decisions for 
expansion at the Bournville plant, which could have proved unwise. 
In consideration of these uncertainties, Cadbury decided to form a finance committee 
in 1922, which would oversee and co-ordinate all the relevant financial 
considerations facing the company. Indeed, one of the matters that the newly formed 
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finance committee had to consider was a technical issue centred around a debate that 
had first been discussed in the literature prior to the Great War. The principle relating 
to the treatment of interest on capital within an organisation’s cost structure generated 
a fierce debate that had become the defining moment surrounding the growing 
differences of approach that had become obvious to financial accountants, concerned 
with the audit, and to cost accountants, concerned with ascertaining precise 
manufacturing benchmarks.
803
 A series of articles in the Journal of Accountancy led 
initially by Hamilton Church, a pioneer of cost accountancy, who argued that interest 
should be part of production costs because in order to manufacture a product, firms 
usually had to borrow money.
804
 This view was challenged by Sterrett
805
 and by 
Richards
806
 who claimed that this policy could simply be an easy way to artificially 
increase costs to be subsequently used by unscrupulous salesmen in negotiating 
higher selling prices or contracts. It was also claimed that it was unfair to charge 
interest on fixed capital to the product, but to omit it on floating working capital. 
However, the overwhelming argument against the inclusion of interest in production 
costs was the fact that these are used in the valuation of inventories for balance sheet 
purposes, and therefore would inflate this figure, something which auditors could not 
condone as part of their responsibility to external stakeholders. 
The debate rumbled on, and in a later edition of the Journal of Accountancy, Edward 
Suffern (a senior partner in Suffern & Sons) in his capacity as a registered auditor, 
surprisingly argued  both for and against the inclusion of interest in production costs, 
suggesting that it depends “very largely upon the conditions obtaining in each 
instance, the character of the business and the output and the uniformity or variations 
thereof. In other words: What is it you ought to know? Determining this, how should 
this knowledge be obtained?”807 This pragmatic view by Suffern was a reflection of 
the role and experience of his firm in advising manufacturing clients in a hands-on 
practical way. In the same journal Nicholson
808
, a leading contributor to the literature 
on cost accounting argued for its inclusion simply because in his opinion, it was a 
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legitimate business expense, whilst Joplin
809
 bemoaned the intrusion of the “cost 
engineer” in a field for which they were not properly qualified to comment. This 
obvious animosity between financial and cost accountants created by the schism 
regarding the treatment of interest led to the eventual bifurcation of the profession in 
1919 resulting in the formation of the National Association of Cost Accountants 
(NACA) in the USA and the Institute of Cost and Works Accountants (ICWA) in the 
UK.
810
 
This important technical debate was also a topic of discussion at Cadbury, initially 
within the forum of the finance committee: 
 “The finance committee have considered the question of adding interest on capital 
 to the cost of any product and recommend as a principle that no charge should be 
 added, and should be excluded.”811 
The implications of this decision by the finance committee was considered so 
important that it referred the matter to the main board for sanction: 
 “Interest on Capital: the board approves the recommendation of the finance  
committee that interest on capital should be excluded from costs.”812 
However, although this decision appeared to uphold the traditional view, there were 
strong concerns emanating from the cost office, subsequently expressed at the next 
meeting of the finance committee: 
 “A. Cater protests against the decision of the previous meeting of the committee, 
 claiming it is a wise provision to do so, but this committee adheres to its previous 
 decision claiming this is in line with appropriate costing conventions, and is referred 
 to the joint costing committee.”813 
This over-ruling by the finance committee was an obvious disappointment for the 
cost office and its standing within the organisational hierarchy as an advisor to senior 
managers, but was accepted and continued to operate and report appropriately. 
However, this obvious difference of approach is a specific practical example of the 
growing independent thinking by cost accountants and their willingness to challenge 
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accepted conventions when they believed it was in the best interests of the 
organisation.  
The continuing difficult trading conditions during 1922 prompted the board, and 
specifically Edward Cadbury, to consider the company’s forward strategy, especially 
given the plans for expanding the capacity of the Bournville plant. A key decision 
that was taken during this time was perhaps a defining moment for the UK 
confectionery market during the inter-war period: 
 “The board authorises Edward Cadbury to base the costing of all milk chocolate lines 
 on a basis of net profit of 7%, instead of the current 10%.”814 
Given the importance of milk chocolate lines to the company, this decision provided 
the cost office with re-defined profitability parameters, enabling these lines to bear 
selling price reductions in the marketplace. It was assumed that the effect of any price 
reductions would stimulate sales, thereby reversing the trend. Whilst this decision did 
provide a change to the profitability of some of the company’s key lines, it also meant 
that the drive for efficiency within the company had a more urgent tone for the 
success of this strategy in the longer term. Indeed, this approach was extended later in 
the year to other lines on the Cadbury price list: 
 “The board approves new minimum net profits to be: Grade 1 Assortments = 12 ½ %  
        Grade 2 Assortments = 10%”815 
The die now appears to have been cast: the company had decided to follow a policy 
of high volume and lower prices, driven by the current and expected efficiencies 
within the factory based on appropriate labour management and mechanisation 
savings utilising information calculated and provided by the cost office. Indeed, an 
example of the growing  level of the sophistication being adopted by the cost office 
was the recognition of waste within the factory and how this had to accounted for in 
their calculations: 
 “Bournville have reported loss in plain chocolate as 1% in choc. Mill and 2% in 
 moulding depts., and now agree to include this waste as an item of cost.”816 
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This is particularly relevant given the importance of the high volume chocolate lines 
to the business and the necessity to provide a realistic view of the processes within 
each factory department and how they impacted on cost. 
The improvements and expansion in the factory and the way that existing lines on the 
price list, or indeed the consideration of potential new lines were evaluated in terms 
of profitability thresholds, became a technical issue that was raised by the cost office: 
“Edward Cadbury raised the question of dealing with special expenditure 
incurred through  reconstruction of different sections of the factory, which 
under the system of capitalisation in force, is charged entirely in the company’s 
accounts as revenue. It was pointed out that if such expenditure is charged to 
the particular department incurring it, it increases the % of overhead on 
wages to an abnormal extent thus prejudicing the introduction of new 
lines. It is therefore decided to change it to  factory expenses, thereby spreading 
the cost over the whole factory.”817 
This is evidence of the cost office bringing to the attention of the board a cost 
accounting technicality which they felt could undermine the profitability of some 
lines, as a direct consequence of the conventions on allocation and apportionment of 
overheads, which were subsequently changed to accommodate this anomaly. 
Following this decision, the whole topic of overheads in the company became a 
discussion point for the board, especially with the seemingly inexorable rise in terms 
of total expenditure: 
“Edward Cadbury has arranged for the cost office to supply a detailed report  
covering the last three years of overhead charges, the total of which has risen 
 considerably during 1924.”818 
This sudden request for this type of information from the cost office seems surprising 
as it would be reasonable to assume that this would have been routine reporting on a 
regular basis, but this appears not to have been the case and/or the information was 
being prepared but not acted upon. Either way, the emphasis on overheads had clearly 
become an area for greater focus. A report from the cost office was duly prepared as a 
response to the request by Edward Cadbury: 
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“A report from the cost office giving an analysis of overhead charges for 1923 
 and 1924 was considered and it was agreed to the cost office explanation of the 
 various items”819 
Following this round of discussion regarding the topic of overhead expenditure, the 
subsequent minutes of the next finance committee meeting are illuminating: 
“Following further investigation, the cost office have identified that the repainting 
 of the factory was a significant overhead expense which was not properly authorised. 
 Heads of departments are instructed to pay closer attention to the monthly reports 
 provided by the cost office detailing overhead expenditure (Blue Statements).”820 
This is evidence that monthly overhead expenditure reports were being compiled and 
circulated by the cost office as a monthly routine, the significance of which did not 
appear to be properly understood by senior managers within the company. This could 
have been the consequence of a lack of co-ordination and communication, or perhaps 
this was as a result of the absence of targets to compare actual results against, which 
would have been highlighted by some form of budgeting system. The significance of 
this anomaly within the company, and its consequences will be discussed later. 
The continuing focus by the board on overheads was further exemplified by 
additional information that the cost office had been asked to provide: 
“Two statements from the cost office giving details of overhead expenses for 1924 
 and 1925 have been received, and the large differences have been identified and  
circulated for consideration and explanation. It was agreed to ask the cost office to 
 work out the cost of each of the main headings per ton of sales for each year.”821 
These additional statistics, compiled by the cost office in terms of year-on-year 
comparisons, and importantly on a rate per ton basis, provide a contextual framework 
in which significant movements can be identified for appropriate investigation by the 
managers concerned. Indeed, further detail in addition to that already provided was 
requested from the cost office: 
“A full explanation of overheads regarding factory expenses and general office wages  
and salaries is required.”822 
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From this request the cost office duly obliged: 
 “The cost office provided an analysis of the overheads as requested in 
 minute 268.”823 
Despite the attention given by management and the plethora of data combined with 
the subsequent analysis and investigation, the subject of the control of overheads was 
still a cause for concern at the company throughout the 1920’s: 
“The question of overhead charges was discussed. It was thought that it would be 
 desirable to have a meeting of members of Staff ‘A’ when the question of  
economies in non-productive charges might be discussed.”824 
No record is available that suggests that this meeting took place, although as will be 
discussed later, the concept of budgeting and budgetary control were being 
considered by the company at this time when the whole issue of overheads could be 
finally addressed. 
The workload that was clearly being placed on the cost office by the company to 
provide increasingly more information and analysis, came to a head in the re-
evaluation and re-categorisation of work carried out by the cost office: 
 “Owing to the large numbers of instructions which are issued to the works in the 
  form of ‘blue notes’, the board approves the recommendation by Edward Cadbury 
 that these be divided into two categories, the first being signed by a director as 
 at present, and the second by the head of the cost  office. These latter ‘blue notes’ 
 are confined to instructions of a lesser importance.”825 
This recognition of the increasing workload of the cost office by the board prompted 
approval of an extension to their office accommodation.
826
 
With regard to the ambitious mechanisation plans within the factory which the 
company hoped would deliver the efficiency savings, the role of the cost office in the 
evaluation of such schemes became more formalised: 
 
 
                                                          
823
 Cadbury Brothers Ltd. Finance Committee December 31
st
.  1926,  m. 280. 
824
 Cadbury Brothers Ltd. Finance Committee May 11
th
.  1928,  m. 333. 
825
 Cadbury Brothers Ltd. Board Meeting January 7
th
.  1925,  m.  6. 
826
 Cadbury Brothers Ltd. Board Meeting February 9th. 1925,  m. 118.  
230 
 
 “Cost Office extent of control: 
The following is a record of the extent of the cost office control in regard action 
 taken under the following: 
1. Purchase, hire or construction of new or additional machines. 
2. Additions to machines to increase output or eliminate handling, etc. 
3. Variation of handling, i.e. conveyors, etc. 
4. General rearrangement of machinery in rooms. 
 It is the responsibility of the director concerned to see that the relevant cost office 
 figures have been obtained.”827 
This board minute seems to suggest that the progress of any mechanisation proposal 
within the factory was determined by the financial data compiled and published by 
the cost office, further demonstrating the growing importance and influence of cost 
data on company strategy during this period. A report to the board provides evidence 
of the extent of the size and organisation of the cost office at this time:
828
 
Table 5.4 Cost Office Organisation 1925-1927 
 
     1925  1926  1927 
 Personnel:- Men   37  37  33 
       Girls   28  31  27 
       Total   65  68  60 
 Area of Office:-   2,220 sq.ft. 2,220 sq.ft. 4,368 sq.ft. 
 Total Salaries    £16,868  £17,305  £16,516 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Source: Cost Office Annual Report 1928. June 19th. 1928. 
The detail in this report confirmed the importance given to the cost office by the 
company and the level of resource that it was prepared to devote as recognition of the 
value that it subsequently provided and the way that it enabled strategy to be 
implemented. 
However, despite the steps that had been taken by Cadbury’s and other firms to apply 
a scientific approach in the quest for efficiency, there was also during the late 1920’s 
a call for a more collective approach which could ultimately accrue more benefits to 
society. An example of this alternative view is provided in a report by the Liberal 
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Party
829
 in which they indicated that despite the strides taken in efficiency by 
individual companies, much needed to be done on a wider industry basis. The 
example they provided was the standardisation and simplification of costing systems. 
This initiative proposed by the Liberal Party would probably have been known to 
Quaker employers like Cadbury, who were long-standing supporters of Liberal 
philosophies and policies. With this in mind, Edward Cadbury put forward a proposal 
in a paper read at a meeting of the Manufacturing Confectioners’ Alliance in 1930 
where he suggested that a working party be established in which to consider the 
institution of a uniform costing system for the industry.
830
 The proposal was accepted 
and a committee was set up comprising: 
 A.E. Cater (Cadbury Bros. Ltd.) – Chairman 
 R.R. Dodd (Joseph Terry & Sons Ltd.) 
 J.E. Jenkins (Yeatman & Co. Ltd.) 
 W.G. Shepherd (Rowntree & Co. Ltd.) 
R.R. Sly (Cadbury Bros. Ltd.) 
In addition E.V. Amsdon was appointed as an external consultant to the committee to 
provide a professional and objective viewpoint, and also to facilitate proceedings.
831
 
However, given that the proposal for the project was initiated by Edward Cadbury, 
and that the committee itself consisted of two senior cost accountants from Cadbury, 
including the chairman, it is safe to assume that much of the direction and eventual 
recommendations would have had a significant Cadbury input. The costing 
committee reported back to the Manufacturers’ Confectionery Alliance with 
recommendations which were unanimously accepted, and resulted in the eventual 
publication of their findings.
832
 
The published book by the costing committee is divided into two sections, the first 
being a guide for smaller manufacturers and the second, for larger firms. This is 
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significant because it reiterates the fact that the Alliance had an overall membership 
of some 450 individual UK firms , the vast majority were small.
833
 
With regard to the section devoted to the larger manufacturer, the findings followed 
the accepted taxonomy of costing progression as being firstly with regard to “cost 
keeping”, this being the compilation and classification of manufacturing costs used 
mainly as a pre-requisite of financial statement preparation. In addition, there is the 
activity of “cost finding” which was deemed to be the calculation of product costs 
used individually and collectively by managers for control and decision-making 
purposes.
834
 However, whilst this would provide the confectionery manufacturer with 
the tool-kit required to prepare detailed cost information which would provide 
invaluable insights into their respective businesses, there is no reference in the book 
to “standard costing” -  the highest accepted level of costing sophistication.835 With 
the absence of any mention of standard costing, it is unsurprising to find only a 
fleeting mention of budgets or budgeting, and this is in a fairly vague reference to the 
“budgeting of overheads”.836 
Given this anomaly, the published report by the costing committee fell short of a 
comprehensive guide to costing for the industry, especially so for the section intended 
for consumption by larger manufacturers who had probably already implemented 
standardised procedures and processes based on the scientific approach for efficiency. 
We can therefore assume that Cadbury, as the main contributor to the report, did not 
have in place a recognised standard costing system at Bournville at this time. 
Notwithstanding this anomaly, the cost office continued to provide valuable 
information to inform the senior management decision-making as demonstrated in a 
memo detailing  concerns regarding the minimum levels of profit required for each 
line:
837
 
“With reference to our conversation regarding the figures for minimum profit 
 on each grade laid down by the board in 1928, it may be thought wise to reconsider 
 these figures at the present moment, as it would have the effect of steadying down 
 the present market situation as far as this department is concerned. It would also 
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 provide a margin against a possibility of our finding ourselves short of profit,  
necessitating decreased weight or increased prices, should the raw material market  
suddenly advance.” 
The consequences of having to increase prices in the marketplace - a complete 
reversal of the company’s strategy of lowering prices, was viewed very seriously in a 
subsequent board meeting:
838
 
 “Minimum Standard Rates of Profit – The recommendation of Edward Cadbury 
 is approved that we revert back to the minimum standards of profit for the principal 
 lines laid down in 1923, in place of the lower minimum rates substituted in 1928” 
This decision to raise the minimum profit percentage level, whilst still maintaining a 
price reduction strategy clearly necessitated the lowering of costs, both in terms of 
production and overheads. The key to achieving this was the relentless drive for 
internal efficiency combined with the need to constantly increase sales. The role of 
the cost office in providing the relevant information for this strategy became 
essential:
839
 
 “Every line on the home list has been costed continuously during the past 
 twelve months, checked  against the selling price of the line, and the result  
scrutinized by a Director. 
 Recommendations have been made and accepted for reduced prices, increased 
 weights or improved quality for a large number of lines on our price list. 
 Costs continue to drop and owing to the need of maintaining sales, cost office 
 are following the policy of  recommending reductions and increased weights.” 
Emphasis of this trend continued to be reported by the cost office during 1932 and 
1933, with some additional specific factors being highlighted for 1934:
840
 
 “Costs for the year have once again continued in a downward direction owing to:- 
a) Abnormal writing down of raw materials. 
b) Considerable reduction in selling expenses owing to decrease advertising  
expenditure. 
c) Reduced costs due to the factory being at a continuous high pressure in 
 practically all departments. 
d) Economy in production in many directions. 
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 We have led the trade in most reductions and appear to be able to compete in 
 all directions, the least satisfactory being in various Nut lines, where competitors 
 seem to be much less affected than we are. However, we suggest that those  
concerned with economies should intensify their efforts during the next two years,  
especially in the prevention of any increase in fixed overheads.” 
These insightful comments by the cost office confirm the market leader status 
enjoyed by Cadbury in the UK confectionery market, a position obtained by forcing 
down prices through the constant reductions in costs throughout the organisation. The 
comments also allude  that whilst the company currently enjoyed an enviable 
position, circumstances could change in the future, making the attention to costs an 
even greater priority. Indeed, some of these fears of impending change were realised 
the following year:
841
 
 “The era of falling raw material prices seems to be over. During 1935 prices 
 of cocoa and sugar hardened. However, selling costs were reduced again mainly 
 as a result of less advertising expenditure  and increased sales and production 
 brought economies from all points” 
The cost report also highlighted the introduction of contract trade in covering 
chocolate as  successful, in not only in widening the company’s business, but more 
importantly, in the reduction in the load of overheads to other products.
842
  
The Cadbury strategy of price reductions, based upon their ability to reduce costs, had 
wider competitive implications for the UK market in an era of collusion and 
restrictive practices. An example is provided of a meeting in early 1936 between 
senior executives at Cadbury and Nestle which centred on the Cadbury pricing 
strategy:
843
 
 “Our theory of selling which envisages an expansion of the total market of 
 chocolate on the one hand, and not allowing smaller houses to creep in on  
the other interested them (Nestle) very much. Commenting on our policy,  
they viewed our position as entirely logical based on better quality combined 
 with the lowest price compatible with a profit. However, the alternative policy 
 which Nestle would prefer to adopt would be for the largest houses to keep up 
 their prices and maintain  their position through heavy advertising.” 
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Nestle’s concerns at this meeting were further emphasised at the formal Five Firm 
Conference of the largest manufacturers later in 1936, at which Rowntree joined in 
the call for a halt to the continuing reduction in UK confectionery prices:
844
 
 “Mr. Fryer of Rowntree opened the discussion by referring to the increase in prices 
 which had taken   place in raw cocoa, cocoa butter, nuts, milk, coal and electric,  
some of these in Rowntree’s opinion were likely to be permanent, with the  
suggestion that these increases should be passed on to the consumer. Cadbury 
 however, did not agree that the existing consumer values were at a maximum and 
 would therefore press for further reductions. Nestle commented that whilst it 
 might be that from a Bournville point of view consumer values were not at rock 
 bottom, but for ordinary businesses prices were at a dangerously low level. 
 Cadbury retorted that Bournville’s costs were easy on milk chocolate at the  
2d. for 2oz. Level and this was arrived at after reviewing costs which not only took 
into account existing stocks, but looks also at the forward position. Cadbury would 
 be prepared to take Rowntree’s and Nestle’s suggestions back for further 
 consideration, but did not think any increase in milk chocolate prices was called for.” 
The tone taken by Cadbury’s at this conference demonstrated their ability to make a 
particular stand regarding pricing based on the efficacy of  cost information without 
compromising company profitability. 
This uncompromising stand by Cadbury regarding pricing became increasingly under 
pressure during 1936, and was flagged up by the cost office:
845
 
“Continuous increase in the costs of main raw ingredients, notably cocoa and 
 almonds. Many other prices of important supplies experienced, including engineer’s 
 supplies such as fuel. So as a result profits were reduced on all lines.  
A new outlook based on rising prices is being adopted throughout the organisation. 
 New weights and higher prices were recommended to the board for introduction 
 between January and September to enable reasonable profits to be obtained against 
 actual costs of raw materials in production. 
The board encouraged Sales to take no early action to correct the prices or weights 
 of the majority of lines on which the company rely on for profit. The end of the year 
 therefore arrived with a proportion of the output of the factory being sold at a loss, 
 with no immediate prospect of any corrections taking place.” 
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We can conclude from these comments that the cost office clearly pointed out to the 
board that the long-standing policy of continuously reducing selling prices was 
becoming unsustainable; a different mindset was needed. The cost office was 
unimpressed and frustrated by the boards decision to disregard their advice, and to 
continue with the price-reducing strategy, despite the potential consequences for 
profit that had been duly explained. 
These economic realities provided by the cost office were also combined with 
changes  occurring in the UK confectionery market at this time, specifically the 
upsurge in sales at Rowntree’s - a direct consequence of their introduction of 
innovative new lines such as Aero and Kit Kat described in Chapter 2. Edward 
Cadbury became increasingly concerned and wrote directly to Rowntree’s in an 
attempt to establish what he described as “an equilibrium” in the marketplace.846 
In an attempt to strengthen what was becoming an increasingly weak position, 
Edward Cadbury reiterated his opinion that Rowntree’s patent on aerated chocolate 
was not valid, and would be vigorously challenged. But as a concession to any 
possible legal proceedings, Cadbury suggested that they would consider changing 
their current pricing policy:
847
 
“The offer we would be willing to make may be briefly summarised by saying that 
 we are willing to raise the price (or reduce the weight) of the lines mentioned in 
 the attached schedule. There are, however, two points of view in a matter of this 
 sort. We can either adopt a policy based on cost or we can view the matter as it 
 strengthens or weakens us from a purely competitive angle. At the same time, we 
 think it is dangerous and not in the interests of manufacturers for prices to be put  
 at a level higher than is justified by costs as this would inevitably attract new entrants  
 and impair our competitive strength in relation to other products and amenities.” 
 
By this gesture to Rowntree’s, Edward Cadbury appeared to be attempting to 
convince Fryer that the  technique of cost-plus pricing was superior to one of prices 
being a function of what the market would bear. Cadbury’s domination of the UK 
confectionery market during the inter-war years was based on the notion of cost-plus 
pricing, with total cost being the basis of this policy, which guarantees that all 
overheads are covered and the appropriate level of profit is therefore achieved. The 
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foundation of this approach was the ability to  reduce costs further than the 
competition, thereby dictating prices within the market. This restricts entry into the 
market, as Edward Cadbury mentions in his letter, and also forces competitors who 
cannot match the prices set by the market leader to either compete differently or to 
cease trading. It is therefore apparent that the long period of dominance by Cadbury 
based on their ability to reduce costs was under threat and this attempt to convince 
Rowntree’s that the status quo should be maintained was to become a futile gesture. 
Confirmation of the changes that Cadbury’s had to adopt during 1937 were evident 
once it became apparent that circumstances were operating against their previous 
long-held strategy:
848
 
 “The cost office has had a difficult year owing to the fact that raw cocoa doubled its 
 price during the  year, but fell back to its original figure by December. Prices and 
 weights were adjusted as early as  possible, the first taking place in February and 
 the last at the end of August. The three or four months lag which naturally occurs  
 in getting the cost office recommendations for increased prices and lesser weights 
 through to the public naturally resulted in decreased profits. However, the position 
 of the 2oz. at 2d. CDM block when costed with Accra ‘A’ cocoa beans can still show  
 a fair profit, and the price of this block remains unchanged throughout. Generally 
 speaking, throughout the year whether prices and weights were changed or not, 
 the margin of profit resulting was considerably lower than that retained on each  
 line during a normal year.” 
The cost office were obviously consigned to the new order and reported back the 
consequences accordingly. Interestingly the flagship line of the 2oz. block retained its 
2d. price, which was important to the company because this had been a key feature of 
their value for money advertising campaign, and remained so until the outbreak of 
World War II. 
Distribution Costing 
Consistent with the literature as previously discussed, progressive companies during 
the 1920’s were not only considering efficiency and cost identification and reduction 
within the production confines of an organisation, they were also realising that 
significant elements of expenditure were to be found in those areas of the company 
known collectively as “distribution”. For a business like Cadbury’s, whose strategy 
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was based on low prices and high sales volume, the costs associated with distribution 
had by the late 1920’s become a significant element which required attention. A 
breakdown provided by the cost office of the costs associated with their biggest 
selling line, Cadbury’s Dairy Milk (CDM), appeared to  confirm this 849: 
 
 Cost of Production: Raw Materials   34% 
    Other Prodn. Costs 21% 
       55% 
 Cost of Distribution: Transport    4% 
    Selling & Advertising   8% 
    Wholesale & Retail Costs 33% 
       45% 
    
From this analysis, the company concluded that approximately only 33% of these 
costs were under their direct control (i.e. other productions costs – mainly labour and 
associated costs of 21%, selling and advertising costs of 8% and transport costs of 
4%).
850
 However, it could be argued that the company’s suggestion that raw materials 
costs were not in their control,  is slightly flawed because some control could be 
exercised through recipes, process efficiency and waste management.  
The company decided to direct some focus on the costs of distribution which could 
facilitate the company strategy predicated on further price reductions and higher sales 
volumes. The first initiative under consideration, would serve the two inter-related 
objectives of improving the capability of distributing high volumes to its customers, 
and reducing the overall cost of doing so. This initiative, which commenced in 1922, 
was the design and establishment of a system of railhead depots.
851
 It has also been 
identified that chemists working at company were concerned that quality control of 
their products ceased after they left the factory. Consequently they were particularly 
keen to improve delivery and storage prior to sale.
852
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The principal rationale for the railhead depot system was a way of coping with the 
increase in logistical complexity of delivering the company’s products to the 
thousands of wholesalers and retailers in the UK. However, the company realised that 
a significant investment would be required in order to realise the required efficiencies 
in distribution. The project was ambitious, took ten years to complete and began with 
the gradual roll-out of the railhead depots until they had covered the whole of the UK 
by 1932:
853
 
Table 5.5 Railhead Depot Rollout Programme 1922-1932 
 Year  No. of Depots 
 1922   1 
 1923   3 
 1924   4 
 1925   7 
 1926   8 
 1927   9 
 1928                11 
 1929                12 
 1930                14 
 1931                15 
 1932                16 
Source: Cadbury Bros. Industrial Record 1919-39: A Review of the Inter-War Years (1941, p. 57). 
The operation of the railhead depot system was based upon the sending out of loads 
from the factory in bulk containers providing cost savings in carriage, freight, 
packing, packing cases and storage. Initially, the cost office reported favourable 
figures which prompted the company to persevere and extend the depot system: 
 “A cost statement has been prepared by the cost office in respect of the London  
and Manchester  depots showing throughout that the cost of delivery from the  
manufacturing room to customers by the depot system, as compared with delivery 
 by rail from Bournville with the following savings effected: 
  London Depot – 8/5d. per ton (annual saving = £1,757) 
  Manchester Depot – 11/2d. per ton (annual saving = £794)”854 
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There were, however, the additional costs associated with the running of the depots 
and as a consequence this initially failed to realise a net benefit to the company, even 
by 1931.
855
 It was only with the upsurge in sales volume from 1932 that the increases 
in the railhead depot overheads were fully absorbed, and the appropriate overall cost 
savings began to be generated.
856
 Table 5.6 illustrates the extent of the reductions in 
cost accruing from the railhead depot system became apparent during the 1930’s:857  
Table 5.6  Distribution Cost per 100lbs. of Net Sales 
 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
Cost per 
100lbs  
7s.8d. 7s.7d. 7s.2d. 6s.9d. 5s.11d. 5s.5d. 4s.10d. 
Source: Transport Department Annual Report for 1936. 
In association with the railhead depot initiative of how best to service the trade, and 
part of the overall distribution problem, the company also viewed the trade itself as a 
significant distribution cost which they wanted to address. Edward Cadbury in 
particular had always viewed the margins offered to the trade as being a particular 
issue, and as already described, one of the first tasks of the newly inaugurated cost 
office in 1904 was to carry out a comparative inter-firm analysis of the trade margins 
offered to wholesalers and retailers on fancy boxes. The extent of the trade margins 
that were being offered to the trade in 1904 had not diminished by 1929, due 
principally to competitive pressures in the UK confectionery market, especially in 
branded goods. It was at this time that the company decided to embark on an 
extensive project to try and understand the dynamics of the retail trade, and how 
inefficiencies could be identified and resolved to the mutual benefit of both the trade 
and the manufacturers.
858
 For its time this was an ambitious and innovative concept, 
especially the identification of an element of cost that was clearly external to the 
company in terms of the trade margin, but was regarded as a legitimate area for 
analysis and investigation. It was not until 1981 that the idea of viewing costs outside 
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of a company’s normal sphere of operations was deemed to be worthy of 
consideration.
859
 
In order to understand the nature of retail distribution, Cadbury decided to carry out a 
survey of the trade in the UK based upon a sample which they believed would be 
representative of the country as a whole. Knowledge of the following was the basic 
requirement of the survey: 
a) The number of confectionery selling points in relation to the population. 
b) The size of shops selling confectionery. 
c) The grades of shops selling confectionery. 
d) The types of shops selling confectionery. 
e) The location of shops selling confectionery.860 
Once this information had been obtained, the next phase of the survey was to 
understand the turnover and profitability of retailers. This being particularly sensitive, 
the Manufacturing Confectioner’s Alliance was drafted in to carry out the data 
collection, which was eventually published in a report for public consumption.
861
 
Unsurprisingly, the report unearthed retailing inefficiencies and poor financial 
performance, particularly among the smaller sized outlets. One of the conclusions 
drawn was that a key determinant of inefficiency was that there appeared to be too 
many retailers.
862
 
Given this evidence, Cadbury prepared an analysis which focused on the smaller 
retailers (those graded as II, III and IV), and proposed a solution to the existing level 
of performance.
863
 Table 5.7 summarises the emphasis that Cadbury wanted to make 
supporting the changes that they deemed necessary to address the existing malaise 
affecting the retail trade.  
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Table 5.7 The Cost of Retailing 
Grade IV Shop 
Status Trade 
Margin 
 
Sales 
Cost 
of 
Sales 
Shop 
Wages 
Other 
Expense 
 
Rent 
Net 
Profit 
% of 
Sales 
Current 24% £500 £383 - £31 £31 £55 11.0% 
Proposed 21% £700 £550 - £44 £31 £75 10.7% 
Grade III Shop 
Status Trade 
Margin 
 
Sales 
Cost 
of 
Sales 
Shop 
Wages 
Other 
Expense 
 
Rent 
Net 
Profit 
% of 
Sales 
Current 26% £800 £591 - £44 £45 £120 15.6% 
Proposed 23% £1,100 £847 - £53 £45 £155 14.1% 
Grade II Shop 
Status Trade 
Margin 
 
Sales 
Cost of 
Sales 
Shop 
Wages 
Other 
Expense 
 
Rent 
Net 
Profit 
% of 
Sales 
Current 28% £1,500 £1,083 £50 £56 £81 £230 15.3% 
Proposed 25% £2,000 £1,499 £75 £75 £81 £270 13.5% 
Source: Adapted from Cadbury Bros., Industrial Record 1919-39: A Review of the Inter-War Years 
(1941, p. 49).  
To support this conclusion, Cadbury applied the knowledge gained from the costing 
applications within their own factory. In particular, that the behaviour of costs should 
be evident in the calculations. Cadbury recognised that the cost of sales would vary 
according to changes in sales volume, whilst shop expenses and wages would be 
semi-variable and rent is a fixed cost. Therefore overall increases in profit to the 
retailer depended upon the attainment of additional sales; a lesson that Cadbury had 
learned shortly after the end of the Great War. Of course the whole rationale for the 
exercise was the benefit that would accrue to Cadbury if the retail trade margin could 
be reduced as suggested. However, whilst the data presented by Cadbury was on the 
face of it a sensible solution, the reality of making the proposed change to the retail 
landscape were a much different proposition as Cadbury conceded: 
 “The factors which have brought the present position about are clear. How it can 
 be altered without undue interference with individual rights and without creating 
 a monopoly for existing traders is a much harder problem.”864 
                                                          
864
 Ibid., p. 50. 
243 
 
It seems logical that Cadbury anticipated that any eventual change to the retail trade 
would be brought about by the application of natural market forces. In this situation 
this would result in the elimination of the most inefficient retailers in the same way 
that the company were constantly seeking to eliminate inefficient competitors.  
The final element of distribution which Cadbury sought to understand and control 
was the company’s advertising expenditure. The way that the business approached 
this important cost category forms  part of  an early example of budgeting practiced 
by the company and is  described below. 
Budgeting 
The problems facing Cadbury with regard to the introduction of some form of 
budgeting process in the years immediately following the Great War were essentially 
the same as those that faced Rowntree’s at this time. As previously identified in the 
literature, the progress of UK companies in the adoption of budgetary control systems 
was slow, due in part to the ignorance or confusion of managers as to what budgeting 
was and importantly, how it should be introduced as a company-wide initiative. This 
is explained by the complex nature of a fully integrated budgeting system which 
relies on the existence of a series of sub-processes. Therefore, as with Rowntree’s 
example, the archive at Cadbury was examined to find the evidence of these sub-
techniques whereby the building of competencies can take place to enable budgeting 
to be operated.  
The first fundamental required of a budgeting system is the existence of standardised 
processes and the calculation of the requisite standard costs derived from these 
processes. The emphasis in the quest for efficiency at Cadbury based on scientific 
management principles meant that standardization was an early priority for the 
company as already identified in the control of product recipes, an early priority for 
the cost office previously mentioned. In addition the wide application of piece-rate 
wage systems at Bournville as described by Prosser, meant that labour processes in 
the factory had to be standardised, in sympathy with scientific management 
philosophy. Indeed, by 1925, 95% of females at Bournville were on individual piece-
work in addition to the 20% of males also on individual piece-work, with another 
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70% of males on group piece-work.
865
 Prosser emphasised the role of standards and 
even alluded to the notion of a “standard cost” without really explaining what is 
meant by this.
866
 We can conclude that expected standards of performance were being 
set by the company within the factory, and that there was some attempt to measure 
any variation from this expectation by the cost office, although this appears to be 
done on a departmental basis, rather than by product line. 
As already discussed, the budget is essentially the financial overlay of a company’s 
short-term (12-month) operational plan, which has been derived from the longer-term 
strategy. Therefore the initial setting of objectives, the subsequent crafting of the 
strategy and the ability to plan effectively is another pre-requisite of a budgeting 
system. For Cadbury, the years following the end of the Great War were predicated 
on a high volume/low prices strategy rooted in the quest for efficiency. Acceptance of 
this philosophy meant that Cadbury’s could formulate their policy based upon the 
foundations of efficiency within the company, as outlined by Edward Cadbury: 
 “Our policy for the future is based upon: 
1. The best possible quality. 
2. A fair profit to ourselves, giving the public the advantage of the economies 
 we make in buying or manufacture. 
3. A fair profit to the trade. 
4. An adequate advertising programme. 
5. The extension of the depot system to suitable centres, thus giving the customer 
 the best possible service and quality of product.”867 
Edward Cadbury in his policy statement also made the point that the selling price to 
the consumer was an important element of the company policy based on providing 
the best possible value.
868
 This relentless drive for efficiency and the lowering of unit 
costs, provided the opportunity to reduce the selling price to the consumer and would 
be the overwhelming strategy that would not only shape Cadbury during the inter-war 
years, but the also the whole UK confectionery market. 
The planning capability which is essential to the operationalising of the strategy, 
including the successful operation of a budgeting system had two separate but inter-
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connecting components of sales planning and production planning. As Prosser 
pointed out: “planning is an essential feature of scientific management”869, so it is 
slightly surprising that a dedicated production planning function was not formed until 
1913.
870
  The initial purpose of the planning office was to control the flow of work 
through the production departments within the factory and ensuring that product was 
available in stock ready for sale by the expected date.
871
 In addition, other key 
objectives of the planning office were to stabilise employment in the factory, to 
minimise idle time and ensure employee earnings were maximised.
872
  
However, the essential fundamental requirement needed to ensure successful 
planning within the factory is the availability of a detailed sales plan. This is perhaps 
the main driver of any budgetary process and is the starting point for all subsidiary 
budgets. Again, it is surprising that this procedure was not formalised by the sales 
office at Cadbury until 1924.
873
 
Once the sales planning process had been established, the role of the planning office 
was to initially calculate materials requirements to be fed into the buying office for 
purchasing requirements. Additionally the planning office would then attempt to plan 
the production requirements on a weekly, monthly and annual basis, whilst also 
continually modifying the plan in accordance with any variation of the sales forecast. 
As part of this process, the planning office also had to ensure strict control of part-
processed and finished goods, essential in maintaining quality in a food 
environment.
874
  
Therefore, we can observe from this that as a business Cadbury did have in place 
some of the essential components of a budgeting system that could have been 
incorporated together into a formalised company-wide operation. However, given the 
lack of an accepted template of how this should be constructed, then it is unsurprising 
that the cost office did not feel it had the authority or resources to manage and run a 
complex process like a budget. 
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Despite these shortcomings, the archive at Cadbury does indicate that there were 
disparate elements of budgeting occurring within the organisation, the earliest of 
which is evidence of an advertising budget being prepared as early as 1916 (see 
Appendix 6). This budget appears to have been prepared from within the advertising 
office and demonstrates a detailed analysis of the different types of advertising spend: 
Press, Sampling and Coupons. The budget for 1916 had been derived by analysing 
the 1914 and 1915 actual spend on the different elements to arrive at an estimate for 
the upcoming year, adjusted for the most recent knowledge. There is no evidence that 
the cost office was involved in the preparation of these calculations, or indeed that 
they were in receipt of the final budget. 
Whilst there had obviously been some attempt to forecast a specific element of 
overhead cost within the company, it was not until 1926 when the whole subject of 
overhead expenditure became an issue at board level as described earlier. The debate 
surrounding the inexorable rise in overheads prompted the following for 
consideration by the finance committee in 1927: 
“Edward Cadbury put forward a proposal that a system of budgeting be introduced 
 in respect of certain non-producing departments in order that a stricter control may 
 be exercised on the costs of these departments. The committee agreed to the proposal 
 and to the suggestion that J.E. Whiteford (of Sufferns) should be asked to make a 
 general survey of the situation to include a system for the allocation of expenses.”875  
There is no evidence that a formal report was made or submitted by Whiteford in the 
months following the initial proposal by Edward Cadbury, and the next mention of 
the subject within the finance committee does not take place until 1929: 
“The board have referred the subject of budgets to this committee, and a question 
 from George Cadbury Jnr. has been on the actual dates on which budgets should be 
 prepared, and it was agreed that the question should be left over until the general 
 problem of budgetary control has been considered.”876   
This demonstrates that whilst budgetary control (albeit on a piecemeal basis) was 
deemed to be desirable within the company, there appeared to be debate and 
uncertainty as to how this could or should be achieved, and in a similar way to the 
Rowntree experience described previously, the subject was effectively moved aside. 
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Indeed, the work of the finance committee for the rest of 1929 moved on to a 
discussion on how to achieve a full reconciliation between the cost and financial 
accounts.
877
  
Whilst there is no evidence that managers within Cadbury were being exposed to the 
latest literature on budgeting, as was the case with Rowntree’s, they did deem it 
appropriate to send representatives to the Oxford Conferences.  At these conferences, 
leading commentators such as Dennison and Perry-Keane presented the latest 
developments on budgeting, importantly from a practitioner perspective. In addition, 
the company sent R. Sly, cost office manager, to the prestigious International Discussion 
Conference on Budgetary Control, organised by the International Management Institute in 
Geneva in July 1930, where representatives from Rowntree’s were also present, as previously 
mentioned. 
Despite the exposure provided to Cadbury representatives at the Oxford Conferences and  the 
Geneva conference regarding the principles and practice of budgeting by the world renowned 
speakers present, the development of budgeting at the company faltered. Perhaps the extent 
of the complexity involved in the implementation of a comprehensive budgeting system, that 
was described at the Geneva Conference, proved to be too onerous.   The conference 
described budgeting as a company-wide initiative, which had to include various sub-budgets, 
all of which had to be centrally co-ordinated through a budget committee:
878
 
1. Sales Budget 
2. Production Budget 
3. Purchase Budget 
4. Expense Budget 
5. Finance Budget 
6. General Budget 
 
In addition, the conference was also informed of the necessity to develop a standard 
costing system by which the judgement of the validity of the budgets could be 
consequently subjected, and control exercised through deviations from standards.
879
 
However, in addition to the provision of a sales plan, the only evidence of the 
implementation of a recognised budgeting system at Cadbury is in the area of expense 
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budgets, which is not surprising given the attention that the company had made in the 
past to the control of overheads. So for Cadbury, during the 1930’s the subject of 
budgeting was principally to force departmental managers into estimating their 
proposed expenditure for the following year, treating it almost like an “authority to 
spend”. Indeed an example of this is provided by the cost office manager (the cost 
office in itself was an overhead expense), who in the cost office report for 1931, 
provided detail for the first time of the “cost office budget for 1932”, in terms of 
personnel, salary and other costs.
880
  
Consequently, the notion of a fully integrated budgetary control system being 
controlled and coordinated centrally, was not evident at Cadbury prior to World War 
II, even though the key components for its successful implementation were present 
throughout the company. An examination of the agreed principal activities of the cost 
office in 1937 appears to be devoid of any mention of budgeting, confirming the 
company’s lack of development in this area.881 
5.5 Conclusions 
Cadbury’s growth during the early years was clearly fashioned by the personal 
determination and decision-making skills of the two original Cadbury brothers, who 
together as a team created a forward-looking business that was in tune with the 
consumer, particularly with regard to quality. However, with some similarity  to the 
Rowntree experience, Cadbury’s also  sought to further understand the UK cocoa and 
confectionery market, and also how best to organise and manage a business that could 
compete in this marketplace. They did this through the study of other businesses that 
were already successful, thereby incorporating best practice. However, from the point 
of view of existing known costing processes and procedures, Cadbury’s appear to be 
not as advanced in incorporating these systems as Rowntrees during the period of the 
last part of the nineteenth century. However, the tragic events of 1899, in which one 
of the original Cadbury brothers died, meant that the creation of a limited company 
combined with the appointment of young managing directors would mean that greater 
attention to costs and profitability would become a necessity.  
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The early years of the twentieth century were crucial to Cadbury because the business 
was initially forced into a major management restructure following the untimely 
death of senior partner Richard Cadbury. However, the new young managing 
directors appointed after the flotation of the business in 1899, had the courage and 
conviction to make crucial decisions on product development, marketing, 
organisational structure and strategy. 
The environmental conditions and competitive nature of the UK cocoa and 
confectionery market, particularly with the threats posed by overseas companies, 
meant it was imperative that Cadbury created a modern, efficient and profitable 
business whilst still adhering to the social principles laid down by the original 
brothers. Edward Cadbury in particular recognised this fact and was an early advocate 
of scientific management which he saw as part of the solution in the establishment of 
a major force in the industry. The creation of a fully functioning and hugely 
influential cost office, supported and encouraged by the board, was a key component 
in the establishment of records, processes, systems and information that was essential 
to this objective. As a consequence, the business was in a shape that was necessary to 
confront the changes, threats and opportunities that existed after the end of the Great 
War.  
The early achievements of the cost office prior to the Great War under the 
stewardship of A.E. Cater, were further enhanced following the Armistice by virtue 
of the way that the strategy of the company of quality product and low price, driven 
by a relentless drive for efficiencies, was made plausible by the outputs of the cost 
office. The company not only concerned itself with costs within the factory gates, but 
also sought to understand, and subsequently reduce, the growing element of costs that 
were occurring external to the business known collectively as “distribution costs”. 
These costs being part of the overall overheads of the company were also scrutinized 
and their control was viewed as being crucial to the success of Cadbury. Throughout 
the inter-war period the cost office became  central to the way that the company was 
managed, and specifically their role in the calculation of line costs. This information 
could then be used to inform senior management of the extent to which prices could 
be reduced in the marketplace, with the emphasis of adhering to individual pre-
determined product profit margins. 
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Perhaps the most important failing during this period was the inability of the cost 
office to take a central role in the implementation and management of a company-
wide budgetary control system, founded on the fundamentals of standard costing. As 
with the experience of Rowntree’s, this situation was as a consequence of managers 
being unable or unwilling to assume responsibilities that they perceived they did not 
posses. This failure is even more poignant given the apparent willingness by the 
board to provide managers with exposure of budgeting at a world class conference 
and also the fact that many of the sub-components required for successful 
implementation were already present within the business. However, in addition to the 
above responsibility issues, it can be argued that, as with the case with Rowntree, 
although the theoretical techniques were well established by the 1930’s, there was 
little in the way of practical evidence of successful budget implementation and 
therefore the absence of a recognised blueprint to copy.  
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 Section 3 – Data Analysis 
Chapter 6  
Evaluating the performance differences of Rowntree and Cadbury 
between 1919-38 
6.1 Introduction 
One of the responses by companies to the increasing size and complexity of 
organisations at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth 
was to develop and improve a range of internal management capabilities. One of the 
ways in which this manifested itself was the introduction of costing systems as 
demonstrated by Rowntree and Cadbury in the previous chapters. The expected 
payoff for these two businesses as a direct consequence of this investment in a 
costing capability was an improvement in their overall performance.  It is useful 
therefore to examine the actual performance of the two companies in the period 1919-
38 (20-year time frame) utilising accepted contemporary metrics and methodology, 
and to observe the contribution of costing competence to this performance. It is also 
proposed to identify any deficiencies in costing practice which could have impacted 
this performance. 
Previous attempts to provide an indication of the individual performance of Rowntree 
and Cadbury in the literature has been made on an ad-hoc basis, providing a 
somewhat confusing picture.
882
 This chapter provides a more structured and complete 
analysis on a comparative basis in which an overall assessment can be made of 
relative performance between the two companies utilising a wide range of measures 
that were known at the time, and had been published in the contemporary literature. 
6.2 Methodology 
The consideration of performance for the two companies over the defined twenty-
year period will be divided into: 
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 Absolute Performance 
 Relationship Performance (Ratios) 
The combination of these two approaches will provide the basis for an overall and 
inclusive assessment of performance, from which appropriate and complete 
conclusions can be drawn. 
The bases for the assessment of performance for each company are the published 
annual accounts (balance sheet and income statement), as shown in Appendices 7, 8, 
9 and 10. To ensure the comparisons are compatible, some of the details in the annual 
accounts have been re-worked using additional information from the Cadbury and 
Rowntree archive to provide a like-for-like basis on each individual element. 
Therefore for the Income Statement the following convention has been used for both 
companies: 
Income Statement 
 plus Sales Revenues 
 less Direct Ingredients Cost 
 less Direct Packaging Materials Cost 
 less Direct Labour Cost 
 less Discounts 
 plus Other Income 
 equals Gross Profit 
 less Advertising Cost 
 less Overheads Cost 
 equals Operating Profit (Earnings Before Interest and Tax - EBIT) 
Similarly, the Balance Sheet for both companies are also shown in a common format 
of: 
Balance Sheet 
 Total Assets minus Total Liabilities  equals Total Capital 
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For each measure, the comparative information has been produced in tabular and 
graphical formats providing a complete analysis for the period 1919-38. The 
complete data analysis is shown in Appendix 11. The measures as calculated will 
then be considered for an overall assessment for the twenty year time frame under 
consideration (1919-38), and also in five-year time frames to ensure a more detailed 
approach: 
 1919-23 
 1924-28 
 1929-33 
 1934-38 
This approach will ensure that the individual and comparative performance of the two 
companies during the inter-war period is fully assessed. 
The literature review of the contemporary approach to the assessment of performance 
suggested a range of measures by the leading contributors. The measures which have 
been used in the relationship ratio analysis are based on a review of the contemporary 
literature where an individual measure has been identified by at least two of the 
leading commentators (Figure 6.1). The literature review identified Wall, Bliss, 
Gilman, Crum, Rose and Foulke as the leading published contemporary contributors 
and these have been analysed to identify the commonalities. 
Figure 6.1 Ratio analysis by leading contemporary commentators. 
Ratio Ratio Calculation 
Wa
ll 
Blis
s 
Gilma
n 
Cru
m 
Ros
e 
Foul
ke 
Current Ratio Current Assets divided by Current Liabilities x x x x x x 
Operating Profit Ratio Profit Before Interest & Tax divided by Sales   x       x 
Net Profit Ratio Profit After Interest & Tax divided by Sales   x       x 
Operating Profit to Net 
Worth 
Profit Before Interest & Tax divided by capital 
employed   x     x x 
Sales to Net Worth Sales divided by capital employed x x x   x x 
Sales to Inventory Sales divided by inventory x   x   x x 
Sales to Receivables Sales divided by receivables x x x     x 
Debt to Net Worth Debt divided by capital employed x x       x 
Sales to Fixed Assets Sales divided by non-current assets     x   x   
Net Worth to Fixed 
Assets Capital employed divided by non-current assets x   x   x   
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It is proposed to apply these measures for both companies, with the exception of “Net 
Profit Ratio”, as this includes the consideration of interest and taxation which was 
deemed to be inappropriate as part of the overall product cost as discussed in chapter 
5. Moreover, as a consequence, the “Gross Profit Ratio” (Gross Profit divided by 
Sales) will be used instead as this is deemed to be a more significant way of assessing 
the efficacy of cost management techniques. The ratios shown in Figure 6.1 are 
assigned as “Primary Ratios” by  contemporary commentators, and some are 
supported by “Supporting Ratios”, which are designed to provide insights and 
explanations for these primary ratios.  
Measures Used:  Absolute Performance  
These measures assess the performance of both Rowntree and Cadbury for the period 
1919-38 in terms of the absolute annual statistics, without any regard for any 
relationships these would have had to other aspects of the company. The individual 
absolute measures that are presented are: 
 Sales Revenue (£ millions) 
 Market Share, by Sales Revenue (%) 
 Gross Profit (£ millions) 
 Operating Profit (£ millions) 
Measures Used:  Relationship Performance (Ratios) 
In addition to the absolute performance measures described above, a more complete 
assessment of any company should also take account of the relationships that existed 
between different elements of a business, and importantly, how these changed over 
time. The ratios used to analyse Rowntree and Cadbury have been determined from 
the contemporary literature as defined in Figure 6.1, with the exception of the 
inclusion of the Gross Profit Ratio in place of Net Profit Ratio, as previously 
explained. The full range of Primary and appropriate Supporting Ratios, with an 
indication of how an improvement in performance can be ascertained is shown in 
Figure 6.2.  
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Figure 6.2 Primary and Supporting Ratios used in Analysis 
Ratio Improvement 
Shown By 
Primary Ratio: Current Ratio Rise 
Primary Ratio: Gross Profit Ratio Rise 
- Supporting Ratio: Ingredients Cost 
Ratio 
Fall 
- Supporting Ratio: Packing Materials 
Cost Ratio 
Fall 
- Supporting Ratio: Direct Labour Cost 
Ratio 
Fall 
Primary Ratio: Operating Profit Ratio Rise 
- Supporting Ratio: Advertising Cost 
Ratio 
Fall 
- Supporting Ratio: Overheads Cost Ratio Fall 
Primary Ratio: Operating Profit to Net Worth Rise 
Primary Ratio: Sales to Net Worth Rise 
Primary Ratio: Sales to Inventory Rise 
Primary Ratio: Sales to Receivables Rise 
Primary Ratio: Debt to Net Worth Fall 
Primary Ratio: Sales to Fixed Assets Rise 
Primary Ratio: Net Worth to Fixed Assets Rise 
 
6.3 Relationship  Performance Measures Defined 
As previously explained, the relationship ratios that are used in this chapter are those 
that were most commonly suggested by contemporary commentators. These ratios 
provide a broad and insightful analysis of the trends in performance, with each 
focusing on a specific aspect as understood at the time: 
Primary Ratio: Current Ratio 
Basis of Calculation: Current Assets divided by Current Liabilities    
Answer Expressed as: Ratio 
Description: Also known as the Working Capital Ratio, this measure is intended to  
demonstrate the liquidity of the business and its ability to meet its short-term 
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obligations in terms of creditors. The contemporary view was that a ratio of 2:1 was 
the accepted norm. 
Primary Ratio: Gross Profit Ratio 
Basis of Calculation: Gross Profit divided by Sales Revenues. 
Answer Expressed as: % 
Description: In addition to the absolute gross profit realised by a business, it is also 
important to know the relationship of this profit to the sales figure as a way of 
determining the rate of profit.  
Secondary Ratio: Ingredients Cost Ratio 
Basis of Calculation: Ingredients Cost divided by Sales Revenues. 
Answer Expressed as: %  
Description: This ratio is intended to support and inform the answer provided in the 
Gross Profit Ratio; this is a component of the answer which attempts to identify the 
influence of this direct cost element on gross profit. 
Secondary Ratio: Packing Materials Cost Ratio 
Basis of Calculation: Packing Materials Cost divided by Sales Revenues. 
Answer Expressed as: %  
Description: This ratio is intended to support and inform the answer provided in the 
Gross Profit Ratio; this is a component of this answer which attempts to identify the 
influence of this direct cost element on gross profit. 
Secondary Ratio: Direct Labour Cost Ratio 
Basis of Calculation: Direct Labour Cost divided by Sales Revenues. 
Answer Expressed as: %  
Description: This ratio is intended to support and inform the answer provided in the 
Gross Profit Ratio; this is a component of this answer which attempts to identify the 
influence of this direct cost element on gross profit. 
257 
 
Primary Ratio: Operating Profit  Ratio 
Basis of Calculation: Operating Profit divided by Sales Revenues 
Answer Expressed as: % 
Description: In addition to the absolute operating profit realised by a business, it is 
also important to know the relationship of this profit to the sales figure as a way of 
determining the sufficiency of profit.  
 Secondary Ratio: Advertising Cost Ratio 
Basis of Calculation: Advertising Cost divided by Sales Revenues. 
Answer Expressed as: %  
Description: This ratio is intended to support and inform the answer provided in the 
Gross Profit Ratio, as this is a component part of this answer which attempts to 
identify the influence of this indirect cost element on operating profit. 
Secondary Ratio: Overheads Cost Ratio 
Basis of Calculation: Overhead Cost divided by Sales Revenues. 
Answer Expressed as: %  
Description: This ratio is intended to support and inform the answer provided in the 
Gross Profit Ratio, as this is a component part of this answer which attempts to 
identify the influence of this indirect cost element on operating profit. 
Primary Ratio: Operating Profit to Net Worth 
Basis of Calculation: Operating Profit divided by Capital Employed 
Expressed as: % 
Description: This ratio represents the earning power of the capital invested in the 
business and determines whether too much or too little capital is being employed. 
This ratio is the equivalent of the modern-day ROCE (Return on Capital Employed) 
ratio. 
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Primary Ratio: Sales to Net Worth 
Basis of Calculation: Sales divided by Capital Employed 
Expressed as: Ratio 
Description: This is another measure as to whether a business is under or over 
capitalised. It ascertains the efficacy of the company to generate sufficient sales to 
justify the level of investment in the business. 
Primary Ratio: Sales to Inventory  
Basis of Calculation: Sales Revenue divided by Inventory 
Expressed as: Ratio 
Description: This ratio measures the rapidity of turnover of inventory which indicates 
whether a company has invested too highly in inventory or may be inefficient in its 
management. 
Primary Ratio: Sales to Receivables  
Basis of Calculation: Sales Revenue divided by Receivables 
Expressed as: Ratio 
Description: Used to establish the extent of the investment in receivables as a possible 
method of stimulating sales, or could be interpreted as an over-investment in 
customer credit or lax collection procedures. 
Primary Ratio: Debt to Net Worth 
Basis of Calculation: Long Term Debt divided by Capital Employed 
Expressed as: Ratio 
Description: Regards the level of dependence of a company on long-term debt, which 
is another factor in the assessment of risk to the business. This ratio is the equivalent 
of the modern-day Gearing ratio. 
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Primary Ratio: Sales to Fixed Assets 
Basis of Calculation: Sales Revenue divided by Non-Current Assets 
Expressed as: Ratio 
Description: This ratio is used to determine the productivity of the plant and 
equipment in the generation of sales, and can be viewed as an indicator of a 
company’s competitive position. 
Primary Ratio: Net Worth to Fixed Assets 
Basis of Calculation: Capital Employed divided by Non-Current Assets 
Expressed as: Ratio 
Description: This ratio indicates the company’s policy of investing its profits and 
consequently whether or not it has over or under-invested in plant and equipment. It 
also determines whether the company’s profits are being dissipated. 
6.4 Performance Analysis Summary 1919-38 
For all businesses in the UK, the artificiality of the war years gave way to a time of 
uncertainty and challenge following the armistice in November 1918. For the 
confectionery market  the competitive pressures from foreign manufacturers, 
particularly French and Swiss, that had existed prior to 1914 had ceased almost 
overnight with the outbreak of the Great War. For UK companies like Cadbury and 
Rowntree, the biggest questions were whether, and to what extent, this foreign 
competition would return? In addition, what were the other environmental and 
competitive imperatives  that had to be taken into account? As a consequence, each 
would have to craft a strategy of how to compete in this new post-war era, and also 
how to organise their internal capabilities to support this. The data presented in 
Appendix 11, in tabular and graphical form, provides detailed analysis of the 
performance of Cadbury and Rowntree for each of the interwar years using the 
measures already described. From this data an overall comparative assessment for 
each of the five years sub-period 1919-38 can be formulated in an attempt to clarify 
the success or otherwise of each company during this period. 
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As previously discussed, Cadbury’s explicit strategy following the end of the Great 
War was to invest heavily in mechanisation schemes combined with other efficiency 
initiatives to enable substantial savings in costs. This in turn would provide the 
opportunity to reduce consumer prices, thereby generating additional sales volumes 
and revenues. The combined effect of this strategy would then increase profits and 
ultimately provide greater returns on capital. However, for this to be fulfilled, the 
additional sales volume generated by the company would have to exceed the 
reductions in per unit revenues that price reductions bring. It would also have to more 
than compensate for the inevitable increases in overheads generated through size and 
complexity. Additionally the savings in direct costs, mainly through mechanisation 
and efficiency projects, would also have to be substantial enough to make up for the 
loss in revenues. Therefore, Cadbury’s performance in the period 1919-38 has to be 
judged against these strategic intentions. 
For Rowntree, however, the lack of a formal strategy, other than to try and emulate 
Cadbury in terms of creating products suitable for mass sales and mass production, 
meant that in the years following the end of the Great War, they responded to the 
market environment by developing and marketing short-run products that appealed to 
more niche and opportunistic markets. However, like Cadbury, Rowntree too invested 
heavily in non-current assets and promoted a culture of efficiency as a way of 
continually driving down costs. For them also, the drive for sales volumes and 
revenues was a key determinant of success. 
As market leader, the Cadbury strategy of forcing down consumer prices had the 
effect of reducing revenues for the whole UK confectionery market for the inter-war 
period. However, this did have the desired effect of increasing overall sales volume as 
more consumers could afford to purchase confectionery on a regular basis, rather than 
as a special treat, as was previously the case (see Figure 6.3). 
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Figure 6.3 UK Confectionery Market 1919-1938: (Sales in Tons) 
 
Source: Fitzgerald, R. (1995) Rowntree and the Marketing Revolution. (p. 625). 
Whilst this overall sales tonnage growth appears impressive for the inter-war years, it 
should always be remembered that this was driven in part by the continued reductions 
in consumer prices, so this performance has to be viewed in conjunction with the 
corresponding UK sales revenues for the same period (see Figure 6.4). This chart 
shows a somewhat different story of the UK confectionery market, because apart 
from a spike in the first years following the end of the Great War, the trend of actual 
sales revenues declined throughout this period, until a modest recovery occurred late 
in the 1930’s. 
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Figure 6.4 UK Confectionery Market 1919-1938 (Sales in Revenues. £m.). 
 
Source: Fitzgerald, R. (1995) Rowntree and the Marketing Revolution (pp. 622-623). 
The driver of this situation, that of the continued reduction in consumer prices, is 
demonstrated by the declining revenues on a calculated £/Ton basis based on the sales 
tons and sales revenue figures above (see Figure 6.5). 
Figure 6.5 UK Confectionery Market 1919-1938 (Sales in Revenues £/Ton) 
 
Source: Calculated from Figures 6.3 and 6.4. 
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What this meant in practical terms for the companies operating in the confectionery 
market  is that the relationship between sales volumes, sales revenues and costs was 
crucial in the effectiveness of a consumer price-reduction strategy. Given that the 
overall market expanded in volume terms, but revenues decreased, the crucial 
question is did Cadbury or Rowntree generated sufficient revenues themselves? 
For Cadbury, this was more crucial and their actual sales revenues generated during 
this time increased from £5.7m. in 1919 to £9.3m. by 1938 (+ 63.2%). For the same 
time, Rowntree increased their revenues from £4.1m. to only £5.1m. (+ 24.4%). 
However, as has been demonstrated by the detailed analysis, the sales revenues for 
Cadbury were quite flat from around 1921 to 1935 at around £7.0m. per annum, 
suggesting that it was not until the latter half of the 1930’s, that is after the Fry’s 
merger and the decision to increase prices, that they began to earn sufficient revenues. 
This situation was mirrored by their market share, whilst improving from 9.7% in 
1919 to 15.3% in 1938, there was also an approximate ten year flat period from 
around 1924 to 1933, where it hovered around 10-11%, where no gains were being 
made. The market share for Rowntree also plateaued at around 5.0% for much of this 
time – this improved up to 8.4% by 1938 following their product successes from 1935 
onwards. 
The subsequent effect on actual gross profit was that for Cadbury this grew from 
£2.2m. in 1919 to £4.3m. by 1938 (+ 95.5%), albeit again with a long period of 
stagnation at around £3.5m. per annum. The corresponding trend in the gross profit 
ratio also increased from 39.1% to 49.0% by the end of the 1930’s, suggesting 
improvements in cost efficiency. Looking at the main cost drivers, the reduction in 
ingredient prices during the inter-war period constituted a major influence on gross 
profit, resulting in reductions in the ingredient cost ratio. Packing materials as 
measured by the cost ratio demonstrated little movement during this period for 
Cadbury, hovering between 6.0 – 8.0%. However, the principal impact of savings due 
to mechanisation and other efficiency initiatives was limited: direct labour 
experienced only modest reductions in this cost ratio from 9.2% to 7.6% by 1938. 
Indeed during this time this ratio actually increased during the mid-1920’s. The 
general reduction in ingredient prices was also a factor in Rowntree’s gross profit 
performance, with the ingredient cost ratio movement being almost identical to that of 
Cadbury. However, in contrast to the stability in the packing material cost ratio for 
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Cadbury, Rowntree managed to decrease these substantially from 14.4% in 1919 to 
8.2% in 1938. But it was in direct labour that Rowntree failed to match the 
efficiencies that Cadbury had gained  in the inter-war period.  Rowntree’s actually 
increased their direct labour ratio from 10.2% in 1920 to 17.8% by 1938, compared 
with the Cadbury figures of a reduction from 9.8% to 7.6% in the same period. This 
increase for Rowntree was due principally to  additional complexity as they struggled 
to find appropriate mass produced products, whilst still relying on smaller volumes 
and short-runs.  
However, it is in the area of operating profit that the performance of the two 
companies during the inter-war period differs in terms of actual performance, but are 
similar in the fact that neither company grew their operating profit. The actual 
operating profit for Cadbury between 1919 and 1938 can only be described as 
volatile, with upward and downward movement from year-to-year. Rowntree by 
contrast, experienced a very stable record of operating profit with hardly any 
fluctuations at all. But, in terms of the overall trend in operating profit, for both 
companies this was flat, with Cadbury’s being £1.2m. in 1919, and £1.2m. in 1938, 
albeit with the fluctuations already described. For Rowntree this was similar, for apart 
from £0.6m. in 1919, operating profit in this twenty year period was £0.3m. in 1920 
and £0.3m. by 1938, but without the volatility of Cadbury. The actual operating 
performance of the two companies was also mirrored in the operating profit ratio, 
with similar volatility for Cadbury and stability for Rowntree, but with the overall 
trend for Cadbury being slightly downward, whereas for Rowntree the trend was flat. 
The contributor to this somewhat disappointing performance included the inexorable 
rise in advertising, with the advertising cost ratio rising steeply during this time in 
almost exactly the same way for both companies, as each attempted to increase sales 
and gain market share. It is notable that despite similar trends, Rowntree consistently 
spent more on advertising as a proportion of sales  than Cadbury in every year during 
the inter-war period. Another main contributor to operating profit, that of overheads, 
reveals that Cadbury’s  overheads cost ratio rose steadily during this time from 17.4% 
in 1919 up to 26.0% by 1938 as they constantly attempted to control this expenditure. 
On the positive side, the savings that Cadbury eventually began to realise following 
the introduction of the railhead depot distribution system became evident during the 
mid to late 1930’s and had the effect of reversing the upward trend in the overheads 
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cost ratio. Rowntree’s, on the other hand consistently exhibited a lower overheads 
cost ratio throughout almost the entire inter-war period, with the overall trend being 
slightly downwards. All of this meant that the operating profit to net worth ratio - the 
measure of the return on investment -  demonstrated that although Cadbury constantly 
outperformed Rowntree in each year, this comparison is again typified by volatility 
versus stability. 
Looking at the sales to net worth ratio, the trend for Cadbury is downwards, being 1.7 
in 1919, and 1.5 by 1938, suggesting that the company was not gaining sales revenue 
in sufficient amounts to justify the level of investment, despite the fact that sales 
volumes were increasing. This meant that the lowering of consumer prices had a 
detrimental effect on overall performance. There is some evidence to suggest that the 
decision to actually increase prices towards the end of the 1930’s, due to market 
pressures, actually benefitted the company in this respect. Rowntree also saw their 
sales to net worth ratio deteriorate until the mid-1930’s demonstrating their own 
failure to establish appropriate sales revenues, despite initiatives such as higher 
advertising spend as previously discussed. Indeed examination of the sales to fixed 
assets ratio, further highlights the notion that the continued investment in physical 
capital equipment by both companies was not having the desired affect on the growth 
in sales revenues, with again the proviso that by the mid-1930’s this appeared to be 
finally being reversed. Indeed, confirmation of the failure of the two companies to 
fully utilise their non-current assets appropriately is indicated by the measure of net 
worth to fixed assets ratio, which for Cadbury declined from 4.5 in 1919 to 2.4, and 
for Rowntree from 3.5 to 2.5 in the same period, although the rapidity of decline was 
more severe for Cadbury. The conclusion from this is that Rowntree appeared to 
utilise their non-current assets more efficiently than Cadbury during the inter-war 
period. 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the performance of both Cadbury and 
Rowntree during the inter-war years was the rapid deterioration in their liquidity, as 
measured by the current ratio. This was particularly so of Cadbury, who saw their 
healthy 3.0 current ratio in 1919 fall steadily to a nadir of 0.7 in 1933; for seven years 
during the inter-war period their current liabilities exceeded their current assets. This 
meant that Cadbury were an extremely risky proposition from about 1928 to 1937, an 
unforeseen event could have occurred whereby the company’s cash-flow position 
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would have been severely compromised. However, the company’s position did 
recover to an acceptable 2.0 just prior to the outbreak of World War II. Whilst 
Rowntree’s themselves never operated in a negative liquidity position, their current 
ratio also deteriorated by the same trend as Cadbury, but only to a low of 1.2 in 1931-
32 before recovering to 1.5 by the end of the inter-war period. So whilst they were 
also experiencing liquidity problems, they were not as serious or as prolonged as for 
Cadbury. 
Other aspects of working capital management such as the control of stocks, as 
measured by the sales to inventory ratio, demonstrate efficiency for both companies, 
with this ratio rising from 2.6 in 1919 to 3.7 by 1939 for Cadbury, with a peak of 6.4 
in 1934. Also for Rowntree, this had also risen in much the same way as Cadbury 
from 2.4 in 1919 to 4.3 in 1938, and again with a peak of 5.2 in 1934. By contrast, the 
trend of the sales to receivables ratio fell for both companies during the inter-war 
years as they endeavoured to encourage sales growth by the continued extension of 
credit facilities to the trade, although by the end of the 1930’s this appears to have run 
its course as revenues rose and the policy was subsequently reversed around 1934. 
Long term debt was never an issue for both companies in the inter-war years, with 
only Cadbury taking out such loans on a few occasions, and even then the impact on 
the debt to net worth ratio was fairly insignificant. 
So the overall summary of performance by Cadbury and Rowntree, utilising the 
measures and methods described earlier, indicates a mixed picture of positives and 
negatives but also many similarities between the two companies. The high volume, 
low price strategy conceived by Cadbury at the end of the Great War, which 
ultimately dictated the whole UK market, did not achieve the results expected. The 
additional sales volumes that Cadbury generated were at the expense of falling 
revenues per ton resulting in a stagnation of overall income, whilst simultaneously 
incurring additional expenses as a consequence of rapid growth, especially in 
overheads. The result was disappointing profit growth and stagnant returns on capital. 
It was not until the late 1930’s when consumer prices rose did the situation improve, 
thereby calling into question the Fordist-type strategy into question. Moreover, whilst 
Rowntree were also affected by price reductions, they formed a capability for 
producing a greater range of short-run product offerings; with these being able to sell 
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profitability in a more stable way -  though they fell short in some absolute measures 
compared to Cadbury -  they did manage to compete in a different way to ensure their 
survival. 
6.5 Performance Analysis in Detail  
1919-23 
Like all UK businesses, Cadbury and Rowntree enjoyed an initial post-war economic 
boom, which saw actual sales revenue rise by 43% to £8.2m. by 1920 for Cadbury, 
and by 24% to £5.1m. for Rowntree. This rapid increase in revenues however, was 
matched by an explosion in world wholesale prices, resulting in huge increases in 
direct material costs. This had the effect of actually reducing the gross profit for both 
companies in 1920, despite the strength of the growth in sales. This was further 
exacerbated by a gradual rise in direct labour costs. Both companies, however, 
decided to increase their advertising spend in the years following the end of the Great 
War, the consequences of which were a reduction in operating profit for both 
companies -  down to the identical level of £0.3m. in 1920, with the corresponding 
operating profit ratio down from 20.3% in 1919 to 4.2% in 1920 for Cadbury, and 
from 14.9% to 5.3% for Rowntree. This reduction  had a consequent effect on the 
operating profit to net worth ratio: Cadbury’s fell to 9.7% in 1920, their lowest for the 
whole inter-war period, and Rowntree’s to 10.5%. However, liquidity in both 
companies in 1920 was healthy with current ratios for Cadbury of 3.9 and 3.7 for 
Cadbury and Rowntree respectively. These figures would not be repeated again 
before the outbreak of World War II. 
The conflicting uncertainties of the post-war boom resulting from a surge in sales 
revenues, combined with increases in the cost of materials and labour gave way after 
1921 to a period of economic decline  in which sales revenues  in 1923 declined for 
both companies,  particularly so for Rowntree, where they were below the immediate 
post-war levels of 1919. The effect of this decline on the overall UK confectionery 
market as measured by sales revenues during this time was for Cadbury to hold their 
share (9.7% in 1919 and 9.6% in 1923), but for Rowntree this meant a reduction in 
share (7.0% in 1919, reduced to 4.6% by 1923). This bifurcation in the market 
performance of the two companies after 1921 had a corresponding effect on gross 
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profit: Cadbury maintained at around £3m. (43.3% of sales) per annum, but 
Rowntree’s fell each year £1.1m. (34.4% of sales) by 1923. A further examination of 
the direct costs affecting gross margin performance during this period reveals that 
both companies were able to reduce their ingredients and packaging materials costs 
by roughly the same percentage of sales revenues Whilst Cadbury had  been able to 
stabilise their direct labour cost to around 10% of sales, Rowntree’s increased from 
7.6% in 1919 to 17.0% by 1923. The effects of Cadbury’s determination to improve 
efficiency through mechanisation and other initiatives appeared to be having the 
desired effect, particularly on direct labour costs. 
Despite the different experiences of the two companies at the gross profit level, this 
was not as marked at operating profit level with Cadbury’s actually reducing from 
£1.3m. in 1921 down to £1.1m. by 1923. This compares with Rowntree’s holding 
operating profit at £0.2m. per annum for the years 1921-3, although the difference in 
%  of sales revenues (17.2% in 1923 for Cadbury and 5.2% for Rowntree) was still 
substantial. The effect of the reduction in sales was to increase the overheads burden 
for Rowntree (19.8% in 1921 up to 24.6% by 1923). Both companies realised the 
need to increase their investment in advertising spend in an attempt to stimulate sales 
during the recession.  Cadbury’s advertising costs as a % of sales revenue went up 
from 2.0% in 1921 to 3.5% by 1923, with Rowntree’s making similar increases from 
3.7% to 4.5% during the same period. 
The substantial investments in plant and machinery that both companies made in the 
years following the end of the Great War were regarded as essential for the 
efficiencies generated by mechanisation that would be necessary to maintain 
competitiveness. This meant that non-current assets at Cadbury’s grew from £0.7m. 
in 1919 to £1.4m. by 1923, an increase of 100%, with Rowntree’s also increasing by 
a similar rate from £0.5m. to £1.0m. during the same period. This increase in non-
current assets meant a corresponding increase in the amount of capital invested by the 
two companies. However, the growth in the rate of absolute operating profit did not 
match the increased rate of investment, resulting in an overall decline in the operating 
profit to net worth ratio for both companies (Cadbury 35.3% in 1919 to 27.6% in 
1923, and Rowntree 34.4% down to 6.3%). Similarly, if we examine the sales to net 
worth ratio as a complement to the operating profit to net worth ratio, there is a 
similar story in the failure of both companies to improve their sales performance. For 
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Cadbury this ratio was 1.7 in 1919 but had fallen to 1.6 by 1923, with Rowntree’s 
reducing from 2.3 to 1.2. In addition, the measure of the impact of investment in plant 
and machinery on sales revenue is the sales to fixed assets ratio, which produced a 
similar story of declining performance, whereby Cadbury’s ratio fell from 7.8 to 4.9 
in the period 1919 to 1923, with Rowntree’s ratio also reducing from 8.0 to 3.0.  
As far as liquidity for the two companies is concerned, the healthy current ratio 
experienced by both companies in 1920 was maintained by Rowntree’s (3.4 in 1923), 
but declined to 1.6 for Cadbury - below the crucial 2.0 minimum as advised by most 
commentators in the contemporary literature. This reduction in overall liquidity is 
also apparent by examining the net worth to fixed assets ratio which indicates the 
extent to which cash is tied up in the form of non-current assets.  This measure also 
declined for both companies during this period, particularly so for Cadbury, but 
indicated a reduction in their overall liquidity for them both. However, efficiency in 
inventory management as measured by the sales to inventory ratio is evident for both 
companies with Rowntree improving from 2.4 in 1919 to 3.2 in 1923, although 
Cadbury’s achieved a stronger ratio from 2.6 to 5.0 during the same period, indicating 
that both firms were improving their merchandising capacity.  
Apart from a spike in 1920, the sales to receivables ratio deteriorated for both 
companies between 1919 and 1923, but more so for Rowntree, providing evidence 
that as sales revenues reduced in this period the length of credit offered to trade 
customers was being extended in an attempt to incentivise them. This equated to an 
average of 44 days credit in 1919, rising to 46 days by 1923 being offered by 
Cadbury, and from 41 days in 1919 to 64 days in 1923 for Rowntree, demonstrating 
the desire by both companies to hold on to customers. The consequences, however, 
are that there becomes an over-investment in customer credit, increasing the necessity 
of additional working capital. 
Long-term debt, combined with its inherent risks, was not a particular issue for both 
companies during this period. Cadbury had made some loans during 1920-22, but by 
1923 none were reported. Rowntree also did not show any long-term debt at this time. 
 
 
270 
 
1924-28 
The years of uncertainty and economic volatility following the end of the Great War 
were a time of adjustment and realignment for both Cadbury and Rowntree as they 
both strove to meet the challenges of the new environment. However, once these new 
threats and opportunities had been identified and understood, by 1924 it was down to 
each company to create strategies and internal competencies to improve their overall 
performance. 
In the years leading up to 1924, Cadbury had already embarked on a policy of high-
volume, low-cost, based upon their ability to improve efficiency through the 
investment in mechanisation schemes and the careful reorganisation of internal 
processes, supported by the role of the cost office as previously discussed. 
Consequently, although sales volumes  increased during this period, actual revenues 
for Cadbury fell from £7.2m. in 1924, to £6.6m. in 1928, evidence of insufficient 
additional sales to recoup the loss due to price reductions. This failure had the effect 
of reducing their market share during the same period from 10.6% in 1924 down to 
9.8% by 1928. Rowntree’s meanwhile, experienced a modest improvement in actual 
sales revenues during the same period, rising from £3.3m. in 1924 to £3.6m. in 1928 
(+9.1%). This therefore had the corresponding effect of them improving their market 
share from 4.8% to 5.3% during this five-year period. 
This difference in market performance between the two companies was also evident 
in terms of gross profit, with Cadbury experiencing a reduction from £3.4m. in 1924 
down to £2.7m. by 1928. This reduction in actual gross profit was also reflected in 
the gross profit ratio (1924, 46.2%; 1928, 41.7%). By contrast, Rowntree improved 
their overall actual gross profit during this period by 16% (£1.2m. in 1924, £1.4m. in 
1928), resulting in a corresponding increase in their gross profit ratio from 36.2% up 
to 38.2%. For both companies, however, after a period of raw material price 
reductions, this five-year period saw these begin to increase again, particularly 
ingredients, which was a contributory factor in the reduction of Cadbury’s gross 
profit. The ingredients cost ratio for Cadbury rose significantly from 34.9% in 1924 
to 42.3% by 1928. This ratio also increased for Rowntree’s, but not by as much 
(33.6% in 1924 to 35.5% in 1928), which was a factor in their own overall gross 
profit performance. Packing materials costs, however, reduced as a percentage of 
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sales during this time for both companies. As a final component of the effect on gross 
profit, the quest for efficiency by Cadbury and Rowntree saw the direct labour ratio 
reduce during this period. As a comparator it is important to note that by 1928 this 
ratio was 16.1% for Rowntree, compared with 9.6% for Cadbury as a direct 
consequence of their increased mechanisation plans beginning to have the desired 
effect. 
The differing gross profit performance of the two companies percolated down to their 
respective operating profit figures, with Cadbury’s reducing by half from £1.4m. in 
1924 to £0.7m. by 1928, resulting in a similar operating profit ratio reduction, falling 
from 19.3% to 10.2% in the same period. Moreover, whilst the general overhead ratio 
increased slightly for Cadbury, it was the sharp rise in advertising costs, (4.2% of 
sales revenues in 1924, rising to 7.9% in 1928), which had the greatest effect. The 
failure to attract sufficient sales to compensate for revenue reductions as a 
consequence of their price reduction strategy meant that Cadbury had little alternative 
but to invest more in consumer communication. For Cadbury, these deficiencies had a 
direct impact on their operating profit to net worth ratio, which reduced from 31.1% 
in 1924 down to 15.5% by 1928. By contrast, for Rowntree, as was the case with 
gross profit, their actual operating profit rose during this time from £0.2m. to £0.3m., 
with a corresponding increase in operating profit ratio from 5.4% to 7.7%. Similar to 
Cadbury, Rowntree maintained control of general overheads, but also recognised the 
need to increase their investment in advertising, resulting in the advertising costs 
rising to over 10% of sales revenues by 1928 for the first time since the end of the 
Great War. Despite this increase in advertising costs, the operating profit to net worth 
ratio rose for Rowntree from 6.7% in 1924 to 10.4% by 1928. Aside from 1919, this 
difference in this important measure for 1928 was to be the closest that Rowntree 
came to Cadbury for the whole inter-war period. 
Despite the absolute advantage that Cadbury had over Rowntree regarding the 
operating to net worth ratio, their increasing capital investment in non-current assets 
(£1.4m. in 1923 to £2.0m. by 1928) was not producing the benefits that should have 
been expected. Similar to the previous five-year period, Cadbury’s failed to generate 
sufficient sales as indicated by the sales to worth ratio.  This ratio fell from 1.61 in 
1924, to 1.53 in 1928. This was compared to a rise for Rowntree from 1.25 to 1.35 in 
the same period. Looking at the more specific ratio of sales to fixed assets, again we 
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see the Cadbury performance deteriorating from 5.0 in 1924 to 3.2 by 1928, further 
evidence of insufficient sales being generated for the level of increases in non-current 
assets that the company was making. Rowntree, on the other hand, experienced an 
improvement in their sales to fixed assets ratio, which improved from 3.1 to 3.6 
during this period. An alternative measure of an over-investment of capital in non-
current assets is the net worth to fixed assets ratio. For Cadbury, the decline in this 
ratio that started in the previous five-year period, continued over the next five years  
from 3.1 in 1924 down to 2.1 in 1928, implying a falling off in the earning power of 
money invested in non-current assets. By contrast, for Rowntree this ratio improved 
slightly by 0.1, suggesting a more efficient use of invested capital. 
Management of working capital became an issue for both companies in this period, 
with the deterioration in liquidity for Cadbury which had started in the previous five-
years, continued unabated for the company, and by 1928 the current ratio had been 
reduced to 1.0, this being the absolute minimum ensuring company survival 
suggested by contemporary commentators. This deterioration occurred for 
Rowntree’s. They had previously enjoyed a comfortable current ratio, but by 1928 
this had gradually fallen year by year to 1.8, and although better than Cadbury, was 
now below the theoretical recommended level of 2.0. However, efficiency in stocks 
management was evident as demonstrated by the sales to inventory ratio which for 
Cadbury slightly increased by 0.1 during the period, but was even more so for 
Rowntree by 1.1. But the measures to promote the continuing drive for increased 
sales that had begun in the previous five years continued, as exemplified by the 
extended credit arrangements provided to trade customers. This resulted in the 
reduction of the sales to receivables ratio for Cadbury from 7.5 in 1924 to 6.7 by 
1928, and for Rowntree from 5.5 to 5.0. 
Both Cadbury and Rowntree had not incurred any long-term debt obligations during 
this period resulting in zero debt to net worth ratios. 
1929-33 
The efforts by Cadbury and Rowntree to improve their sales revenues which had been 
a feature of the previous ten years, via increased advertising expenditure and 
extended credit terms for the trade, had mixed results. For Cadbury, from 1929 
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onwards, these initiatives appeared to bear fruit as absolute sales revenues increased 
up to £7.0m. before the worldwide depression of 1929 started to manifest itself on the 
UK economy, and consequently revenues declined to £6.5m. by 1933, which were 
approximately at the same level as ten years previous. For Rowntree, who had 
previously enjoyed modest improvements in sales , also succumbed to the realities of 
the economic climate and  saw their revenues fall from £3.6m. at the end of the 
previous five-year period down to £2.7m. by 1933. However, along with the 
reductions in sales revenues for Cadbury, the general economic environment also saw 
total UK confectionery market revenues decline by 15.4% which had an even greater 
adverse effect on other manufacturers.  Consequently, Cadbury actually gained some 
modest market share, which increased from 10.2% in 1929  to 11.6% by 1933, their 
highest since the end of the Great War. For Rowntree the position was less 
favourable,  they experienced a modest reduction in their market share, from 5.1% to 
4.8% in the same period, with their 1933 figure being the same as for 1924.  
This changing economic landscape necessitated an even greater emphasis on cost and 
profitability information to ensure competitiveness. For Cadbury, the actual gross 
profit rose briefly in this five-year period and ended £0.2m higher in 1933 than in 
1929 at £3.4m., resulting in an improvement in the gross profit ratio from 47.0%  to 
51.6%  between 1929 and 1933. The general world economic depression caused raw 
material prices to fall, resulting in the ingredient cost ratio for Cadbury reducing from 
37.8% in 1929 to 33.7% by 1933, this being one of the factors in the improvement in 
gross profit. However, one of the key drivers of the Cadbury strategy - the reduction 
of direct labour – resulted in minor improvements in the direct labour cost ratio, 
reducing from 8.6% in 1929 to 8.4% by 1933. This improvement in this ratio should 
have been better, but was tempered by the continuing failure by the company to 
generate sufficient additional sales revenues. In contrast, the actual gross profit for 
Rowntree during this period fell to £1.1m. by 1933, after a previous period of 
consolidation. This figure was the same as reported during 1923, some ten years 
earlier. This had the effect of slightly reducing the gross profit ratio for Rowntree 
from 41.8% in 1929 to 40.0% by 1933. However, it is worth pointing out that this 
gross profit ratio was significantly higher than the 1923 figure, demonstrating that the 
company was now generating a higher proportion of gross profits relative to sales 
revenues, emphasising the drive for efficiency. Unlike Cadbury, Rowntree were 
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unable to utilise lower raw material prices and saw their ingredients cost ratio 
increase, again albeit slightly, from 33.9% to 35.1%, although some benefits in the 
packing materials cost ratio were experienced. In addition, the gradual reduction in 
the direct labour ratio that had been achieved by Cadbury was not evident at 
Rowntree, and by 1933 had risen to 16.9% of sales revenues. This figure was now 
twice the level of Cadbury (8.4%), and was as a direct consequence of increased 
complexity due to the larger range of individual lines that the company was offering 
on its price list.  
Despite the encouraging performance regarding gross profit during this period, the 
operating profit level for Cadbury can only be described as volatile. Throughout these 
five years, the absolute level of operating profit showed no level of consistency, 
ending up at £0.8m. in 1933, which was roughly the same level as at the end of the 
previous five-year period in 1928. This volatility was also mirrored in the operating 
profit ratio, which in the same way as the absolute operating profit, saw upwards and 
downwards swings throughout these five years, ranging from a low of 10.7% in 1930 
to a high of 16.8% in the following year. As a determinant of the level of operating 
profit, advertising costs at Cadbury continued to grow year on year, with the 
advertising cost ratio peaking at 10.7% of sales revenue in 1933, the highest level that 
would be experienced during the entire inter-war period. However, an examination of 
the overheads cost ratio illustrates an inexorable rise during this period from 23.8% in 
1929 up to 28.0% by 1933, despite the distribution savings made through the 
introduction of the railhead depot system, although as previously ascertained, these 
savings did not become fully realised until 1932. Moreover, the constant debate at 
Cadbury board level, on the level of overheads within the company provides evidence 
of an inability to control these effectively - a direct consequence of the absence of an 
integrated budgeting system within the company.  Rowntree on the other hand, 
experienced stability regarding the absolute level of operating profit, reporting £0.2m. 
for every year except one during this five-year period. However, their operating profit 
ratio for the same time did decline overall from 8.1% in 1929 to 6.7% by 1933, but 
without the level of volatility experienced by Cadbury. Rowntree continued to invest 
in advertising as they had been doing consistently since the end of the Great War, and 
by 1933 the advertising cost ratio was 11.5%, which was as close to the Cadbury 
figure (10.7%) for the whole interwar period. 
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The volatility affecting the operating profit at Cadbury was also evident in the 
operating to net worth ratio, which having deteriorated in the previous five-year 
period, increased only slightly in the years 1929-33. For Rowntree, however, their 
operating profit to net worth ratio demonstrated a downward trend, falling from 
10.1% in 1929, to 6.8% by 1933.  
As in previous periods, the sales to net worth ratio also continued to fall for both 
companies, suggesting that the appropriate revenues to sustain investment were still 
not being achieved. It comes as no surprise therefore, that the sales to fixed assets 
ratio also deteriorated for both companies as the investment in non-current assets in 
the form of plant and machinery was not generating enough revenues. The sales to 
fixed assets ratio for Cadbury went down from 2.8 in 1929, down to 2.6 by 1933, and 
for Rowntree from 3.4 to 2.9 in the same period. Additionally, the net worth to fixed 
assets ratio also shows a decline for Cadbury, emphasising the fall in the earning 
power of its non-current assets, although for Rowntree this appears to have stabilised 
somewhat suggesting a more efficient usage. 
The deterioration in liquidity, as demonstrated by the current ratio, that had been 
affecting both companies in the previous five years, continued to 1933. This was 
despite the fact that both had been operating below the accepted safety margin of 2.0 
suggested by contemporary commentators. Indeed, for Cadbury, 1929 saw their 
current ratio slip below 1.0 to 0.9, effectively meaning that their current liabilities 
exceeded their current assets which for their stakeholders, put the company in a 
position of potential bankruptcy. This perilous position continued throughout this 
period, and by 1933 the ratio had fallen still further to 0.7. Cadbury were clearly 
operating their business in a state of heightened risk, for which an unexpected event 
could have catastrophic consequences. It is unclear whether Cadbury were aware of 
this heightened risk posed by their liquidity issues and it is inconceivable that the 
management of the company would have taken measures to deliberately exacerbate 
the situation. In the same way it was also the case for Rowntree, where their current 
ratio also slipped to 1.2 in 1931 and 1932 before recovering to 1.4 by 1933, although 
this was by far the worse position than at any time since the end of the Great War. 
Efficiency in stocks management at Cadbury improved even further during this time, 
with the sales to inventory ratio rising from 5.0 in 1929 to 6.2 by 1933, further 
276 
 
evidence of the growing competence in internal planning of raw materials, work in 
progress and finished goods. Rowntree on the other hand saw their sales to inventory 
ratio decline for the first time during the inter-war period. Moreover, also impacting 
on effective management of  working capital was the sales to receivables ratio which 
had been deteriorating for both companies, as they attempted to encourage more sales 
uptake from the trade. However, this downwards trend stabilised somewhat during 
this five-year period, especially for Cadbury which only reduced by 0.1, from 6.5 in 
1929 to 6.4 in 1933. Rowntree also ended the period with a ratio of 5.5 which in fact 
was an improvement on the position during the previous five years. For both 
companies they must have arrived at a situation whereby they could not extend credit 
terms any further without damaging their overall cash flow position even more. 
1934-38 
Perhaps the most significant event in this five-year period, which affected 
performance evaluation was the formal merging of Cadbury with Fry in 1935. An 
amalgamation between the companies had already existed since 1918 under the 
umbrella of a holding company called the British Cocoa and Confectionery 
Company, although Cadbury and Fry had operated as independent businesses until 
1935.  
Absolute sales revenues at Cadbury, which had slowed during the previous five years, 
began to improve during 1934, and accelerated from 1935 onwards, a direct 
consequence of the inclusion of Fry’s sales, but also as a result of the reversal of the 
years of price-cutting policy that the company had been following. So by 1938, 
Cadbury’s actual revenues were £9.3m., a 32.9% increase over the 1934 figure. This 
resulted in an improvement in market share from 12.9% in 1934 to 15.3% by 1938. 
However, for Rowntree this period saw their sales revenues grow even faster, mainly 
due to the product and marketing initiatives described in chapter 2. The results were 
dramatic as their revenues increased by an impressive 88.8% during this period from 
£2.7m. to £5.1m., with a corresponding improvement in market share from 5.0% to 
8.4%. 
The gradual improvement in actual gross profit for Cadbury that had been in evidence 
in the previous five years now accelerated with an increase of 10.3% between 1934 
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and 1938 to £4.3m., which was their highest level during the inter-war period. 
However, despite this improvement in actual gross profit, the effect of the 
improvements in sales revenues were not translated by the same proportion, this 
being evident in the gross profit ratio which for Cadbury fell from 55.9% in 1934 
down to 49.0% by 1938. The principal reason for this apparent failure was the sharp 
increase in ingredient prices that were being discussed at Cadbury board level 
previously identified. The ingredients cost ratio therefore increased from 29.8% to 
38.6% in this period, with a peak of 46.0% during 1937. The other drivers of cost: 
packing materials and direct labour, both fell as a percentage of sales, thus 
highlighting the effect of ingredients as the major impact on gross profit. Meantime, 
Rowntree experienced a more substantial improvement in actual gross profit of 
54.5% from £1.1m. in 1934 to £1.7m. by 1938, and similar to Cadbury this was their 
best performance of the inter-war period. But just as Cadbury suffered in terms of the 
gross profit ratio, Rowntree also saw this decline in much the same way as a 
consequence of the impact of increases in ingredient prices, with the ingredient cost 
ratio rising from 33.1% in 1934 to 40.6% by 1938, with 1937 being the worst year at 
44.8% of sales. The packing materials cost ratio fell slightly and direct labour 
stabilised at just over 17.5%. So as with Cadbury, the major impact on gross profit 
was the variability of ingredient prices. 
The absolute level of operating profit only improved marginally for Cadbury during 
this time, and the 1938 level of £1.2m. was exactly the same in 1919, some twenty 
years previously, with the impact of the ingredient price increases forcing the 1937 
figure down to £0.7m., which was one of the worst of the inter-war period. This 
impacted on the operating profit ratio, reducing this from 19.1% in 1934 down to 
12.9%  by 1938, forced down by the ingredients cost, but also by the decision to 
increase advertising costs in 1938 after these had been falling during the previous 
three years. This meant that the advertising cost ratio climbed back to 7.3% by 1938, 
after reducing down to 6.0% the previous year. In addition, the burden of overheads 
remained an issue for the company, although by 1938 the overheads cost ratio had 
stabilised at 26.0%. For Rowntree this period saw the continuation of the stability of 
their absolute level of operating profit, which like the previous fifteen years had been 
at £0.2m./£0.3m. per annum. But like Cadbury, the trickle down of ingredient cost 
increases caused the operating profit ratio to decline to 5.3% by 1938, exacerbated by 
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a similar decision to increase advertising expenditure in 1938. Also like Cadbury, 
Rowntree were faced with increasing levels of actual overheads, although the 
overheads cost ratio was kept at 20.5% in 1938, and had even fallen to 15.0% during 
the previous year.  
The impact on the operating profit to net worth ratio was therefore different for the 
two companies, with Cadbury seeing theirs fall from 29.3% in 1934, down to 18.8% 
by 1938, with a low of 14.7% in the difficult year of 1937. Rowntree, meanwhile, 
buoyed by successes in the marketplace due to the new product introductions 
described earlier, enjoyed an improvement in the operating profit to net worth ratio 
from 6.8% in 1934, and closing at 8.5%. 
The sales to net worth ratio, which had been steadily declining for both companies 
since the early 1920’s, experienced an improvement from around 1935. For Cadbury 
this meant an increase 1.49 in 1933 up to 2.02 by 1937, before slipping back to 1.46 
in 1938. This was also the case for Rowntree who saw theirs rise from 1.0 to 1.6 
during the same time, evidence that an appropriate rate of revenues was now being 
generated. This was also the case when examining the sales to fixed assets ratio, 
which saw similar movements in the right direction, although it is worth pointing out 
that for both companies these ratios were well below the early 1920’s figures. 
However, the net worth to fixed assets ratio finally started to show signs of 
improvement for Cadbury, indicating a more efficient use of capital, whilst 
Rowntree’s stability for this measure continued as it had been since the early 1920’s.   
The deterioration in the liquidity position, which had been affecting both companies 
during the preceding ten years, appeared to be resolved by the late 1930’s. This was 
especially true for Cadbury, who had previously been exposed to a real threat of 
liquidation as they were constantly operating negative working capital for a number 
of years. However, in 1937 their current ratio reached 1.2, and in 1938 became 2.0, 
this being the accepted norm for a stable liquid business. This was the same for 
Rowntree, who had enjoyed a more acceptable range of current ratios in the previous 
ten years, and they too had improved on this situation by the late 1930’s with a 1.5 
ratio in 1938. 
By comparison, the efficiencies in stock management that had been a feature of both 
companies since the end of the Great War were reversed during this period. The sales 
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to inventory ratio for Cadbury peaked in 1934 at 6.4, but declined thereafter to 3.7 by 
1938, one of the lowest in the inter-war years, with Rowntree also suffering the same 
fate, falling from 5.2 down to 4.3 in the same period. Both businesses were clearly 
faced with a challenging and changing market environment in the last half of the 
1930’s, and consequently their ability to successfully manage stocks was clearly 
compromised. However, the management of debtors stabilised during this five-year 
period with the sales to receivables ratio for both Cadbury and Rowntree improving, 
suggesting that the previous policy of extended credit terms to trade customers was 
now at an end.  
Finally, for the first time since 1920, Cadbury incurred some long-term debt from 
1933, resulting in their debt to net worth ratio fluctuating during this period, ending at 
0.097 in 1938, following a maximum of 0.201 in 1936. Rowntree meanwhile 
continued to have zero long-term debt obligations, as had been the case during the 
whole inter-war period. 
6.6 Conclusions 
Having charted the performance measures of Rowntree and Cadbury during the 
interwar years, a number of trends and key differences can be identified. In terms of 
the absolute measures, the trend in sales revenues performance for both companies 
was very similar, with growth only occurring from around 1934-5, although there was 
a constant £4 million per annum difference between the two companies. This was 
mirrored in the similarity in the trend for market share, whereby Cadbury enjoyed a 
constant superiority over Rowntree, but with significant growth obtained only from 
1934-5 onwards. The upward trend in absolute gross profit show a better performance 
for Cadbury, but this was not translated into growth in their operating profit which 
was characterised by volatility. Rowntree’s by comparison, experienced a more stable 
performance in both gross and operating profit, demonstrating better efficiency in 
control of overheads. The profitability ratios for the interwar period follow the same 
trend as the absolute measures, although the difference in the gross profit ratio 
between the two companies was not as marked. 
The detailed trends in costs that impacted upon profitability again show some 
similarities, particularly in the important ingredients cost ratio. There were, however, 
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some key differences, especially in the packing materials cost ratio which constantly 
reduced for Rowntree’s, and in the direct labour cost ratio, which lowered for 
Cadbury’s. Those costs which affected operating profit: advertising and overheads, 
demonstrated similar trends but also differences. There was a strikingly similar trend 
for both companies in the advertising cost ratio throughout the interwar period, with 
Rowntree’s exhibiting a higher ratio throughout. However, as alluded to above, the 
overheads cost ratio was constantly higher for Cadbury, with this increasing 
significantly from around 1931, whereby this ratio began to decrease significantly for 
Rowntree from the same period. 
Looking at the ratios which measure the efficacy of capital employed, the operating 
profit to net worth ratio demonstrates a similarity to the operating profit ratio whereby 
the volatility at Cadbury’s is contrasted with stability at Rowntree’s, with neither 
company showing growth. Similarly, the effectiveness of the way in which sales 
revenues have been generated from the capital employed, as measured by the sales to 
net worth ratio and the sales to fixed assets ratio, also show similarities. These ratios 
demonstrate reductions for both companies, indicating failure to generate sufficient 
revenues to justify the level of  investment made. This view is confirmed by the net 
worth to fixed assets ratio which showed a decline for the interwar period, meaning 
that there had been an over-investment in fixed assets for both companies, but 
particularly so for Cadbury’s. 
In terms of working capital arrangements, the measure of liquidity via the current 
ratio again shows a similar downward trend for both companies, with improvement 
only occurring after 1937. Indeed, for Cadbury the years 1929 to 1937 saw the 
company experience a period where their current liabilities exceeded their current 
assets, thereby exposing the company to risk of liquidation. Although Rowntree’s 
were never in the same negative liquidity situation as Cadbury, they too were below 
the advisory minimum current ratio threshold for the majority of the 1930’s. 
Continuing with measurements of the management of working capital, a similar trend 
in inventory management occurred between the two companies, but Cadbury’s 
experienced greater volatility. This is measured by the sales to inventory ratio, and 
this measure began to decline for both Cadbury and Rowntree from around 1933-34. 
There was also similarity in the trend regarding decline in the sales to receivables 
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ratio, confirming the extending of credit facilities to the trade in a bid to secure 
additional sales. 
Therefore, the question of which company performed better during the interwar 
period would depend on attitudes to risk, perception of what constitutes good 
management and in addition, what was the overall effect on each company’s 
profitability and market share expectations? The next chapter will discuss the ways in 
which the development and operation of cost accounting methods contributed to the 
overall performance of Cadbury and Rowntree as measured in this chapter. Moreover, 
the next chapter will also consider where any shortcomings in cost accounting 
sophistication were the reasons for the performance failings that have been identified.  
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Section 3 – Data Analysis 
Chapter 7 
What was the contribution of cost accounting techniques to the 
overall performance of Cadbury & Rowntree between 1919 and 
1938? 
7.1 Introduction 
The realisation by Cadbury and Rowntree of their respective company strategies 
during the interwar period resulted in performance outcomes as presented in 
Appendix 11 and discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter will focus on the 
ways in which the application of the cost accounting by the two companies described 
in chapters 4 and 5 supported this performance. In addition, it will also identify 
whether the level of sophistication that was achieved in cost accounting techniques 
contributed to any deficiencies in performance. The capabilities that would have had 
an influence on this performance, and would have been supported and informed by 
appropriate cost accounting techniques include: 
 Pricing decisions 
 Application and measurement of efficiency 
 Control of overheads 
 Planning, budgeting and forecasting 
This chapter will examine the extent of these capabilities at Cadbury and Rowntree to 
ascertain the effectiveness of cost accounting techniques on the overall performance 
of both companies. 
7.2 Pricing Decisions 
Perhaps the single most important factor that influenced demand in the UK 
confectionery market during the interwar period was consumer pricing. As discussed 
earlier it was the strategic intent of Cadbury to compete on price, and, to a lesser 
extent on quality, during this period. Their ability to implement this strategy was 
predicated on their competence in making pricing decisions, supported and informed 
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by information generated through their cost accounting system. Despite the gradual 
reductions in consumer price during the interwar years, it was still believed by 
managers at Cadbury that this would provide an accepted level of profitability, 
enabled by cost reductions. Indeed, as described in chapter 5, the principal aim of the 
cost office at Cadbury was to ensure that each individual line on the price list 
achieved the company’s pre-determined profit expectations, although it is not clear 
how the company arrived at what it considered to be an acceptable level.
883
 
Moreover, as the cost office had been formally in operation since 1903, the company 
had by the interwar years built up the necessary experience to calculate product costs. 
The policy at Cadbury was to prepare product profitability on a ‘total cost’ basis, that 
is to include prime cost and, in addition, some allocation of factory and general 
overheads. However, the company’s overheads apportionment method that was in 
place was based on an estimate of the projected sales volume and mix at the start of 
the year, and was never recalculated during the course of the year as more up-to-date 
information became available. Consequently, the overheads recovery rate assigned to 
product costs quickly became inappropriate. So whilst the company thought that the 
information emanating from the cost office relating to product costs was “accurate”, 
this was only partially correct. Indeed, the archive at Cadbury shows no evidence that 
the company prepared any data during this time on the relationship between price 
reductions, cost savings and the additional volume that would be required to sell in 
order to generate an overall increase in profit. This point is made clear by Sanders in 
the contemporary literature: 
 “It would not be worthwhile to cut prices to the point where the net profit on the  
 increased output  was smaller than the net profit on the lesser output had hitherto 
 been.”884 
Sanders also made the point that to pursue a strategy of price reduction requires the 
ability of a business to make careful forecasts of all the factors involved, especially in 
the way that costs behave relative to changes in output. Only by doing this can the 
decision to reduce prices be quantified and the increased level of required revenues be 
determined. 
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Whilst Cadbury had built a cost-finding capability since 1903, and were to some 
extent the prime movers in the compilation and publication of the standard work on 
the subject for the whole UK confectionery industry,
885
 they had little idea whether or 
not the strategy that they were intent on following would produce the revenues or 
profits to justify this policy. This would account in some way for the volatility of both 
gross and operating profit for Cadbury during the interwar period, as described in 
chapter 6. 
It is argued that despite Rowntree’s having only formalised a functional cost office in 
1918, the company had been preparing detailed product costs since the arrival of 
Joseph Rowntree into the company in 1861, and had therefore accumulated longer 
experience. Indeed, as demonstrated in chapter 4, the company were preparing 
product cost data which formed the basis of pricing decisions that had needed to take 
place from around 1870. From this, the company could then calculate product 
profitability to inform appropriate decision-making. Following the establishment of 
the cost office in 1918, the provision of this information became more formalised, 
rather than ad-hoc as was previously the case. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 4, 
Rowntree’s had also by 1918  developed a capability in the provision of estimated 
costs/profitability, meaning that there could be a fast response to any proposed ideas 
for new lines into the market, which would hasten decision-making. This capability 
provided the company with competence in supporting the emergent strategy that was 
to profitably develop, manufacture and market a wide range of individual lines 
serving niche markets. In the absence of large volume lines based on mass production 
techniques that Cadbury enjoyed, this was clearly an alternative strategy that 
Rowntree could follow and still remain in business. The basis of the Rowntree model 
was that in addition to its standard branded lines, it would also sell cheaper unbranded 
products and also own label products to the growing number of chain stores.
886
 These 
stores were beginning to assert a growing influence on the market and the ways that 
manufacturers  interfaced with the trade in terms of alternative product offerings.
887
 
The increase in the number of individual lines that the company sold in the inter-war 
years is demonstrated in Table 7.1. 
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Table.7.1  Rowntree Total Number of Lines 1920-1935 
 1920 1929 1935 
Number of lines 205 368 440 
Source: Fitzgerald, R. (1995) Rowntree and the Marketing Revolution ( p. 88). 
It should also be noted that Rowntree’s also developed a market for “Fancy Boxes” 
(essentially special seasonal lines) during the early 1930’s, and the main constituent 
of the increase in the number of packs offered by the company between 1929 and 
1935 shown in Table 7.1 was based on these Fancy Boxes which grew from 7 in 1929 
to 171 by 1935.
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This alternative strategy that Rowntree’s were perhaps forced into, of having a range 
of standard branded products supplemented with additional cheaper unbranded 
offerings and also some short-term seasonal “Fancies”, required a different approach 
to costing and pricing decisions. With this in mind, Rowntree’s were substantial 
consumers of the latest theories surrounding management as demonstrated in chapter 
4 and evidenced by the range of books and journals that were being added to the 
company’s technical library at the request of practicing managers in the organisation. 
The seminal work by Williams of the Taylor Society that was received in the 
technical library and later identified by Seebohm Rowntree as the basis for the 
creation of a budgeting system, was also notable for the clear identification and use of 
marginal costs and marginal contribution.
889
 In addition, the idea of broadening the 
standard product range to include cheaper unbranded offerings was consistent with 
the theory of ‘price discrimination’ suggested by Clark, whereby a possible solution 
to the problem of unused capacity is for a company to offer essentially the same 
product to different markets at different prices.
890
 John Wardropper, chief cost 
accountant at Rowntree made reference to the concept of the marginal approach when 
assessing non-standard business in his own published work.
891
 Evidence that the cost 
office understood the role of their variable and fixed elements, and consequently were 
calculating costs on certain of their lines on a marginal basis is provided in William 
Wallace’s unpublished biography where he claimed that the company were pioneers 
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in the use of marginal costing approaches to decision-making.
892
 Therefore, the role 
of cost accounting at Rowntrees was crucial to their ability to follow a particular 
strategy and to maintain a relatively constant level of profitability between 1919 and 
1936, from which date product development and marketing of the company’s 
successful new range of count lines began to bear fruit c.1936. 
7.3 Application and Measurement of Efficiency 
As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, both Cadbury and Rowntree advocated the 
application of  scientific management. Of the two companies it was perhaps Cadbury 
who first realised the potential benefits of scientific management following the 
appointment of Edward Cadbury as joint managing director in 1899.
893
 A key 
foundation of scientific management which the company quickly identified was 
pursuit of efficiency as  the foundation for their ultimate strategy.  As discussed in 
chapter 5, the quest for efficiency began prior to the Great War, with the cost office 
having being formally established in 1903, to measure the company’s performance in 
this respect. The use of external American consultants for the identification and 
implementation of efficiency at the Bournville works in collaboration with the cost 
office was testament to its importance to the management at Cadbury. In addition, the 
application of mechanisation schemes that had commenced prior to the Great War, 
which were greatly increased following the Armistice, were to become the principal 
method by which efficiency could be achieved. The obvious way that efficiency 
would be measured was in increased productivity thereby reducing direct labour 
costs. The role of the  cost office was vital in the assessment of proposed 
mechanisation schemes and the subsequent identification of labour savings. The 
reduction in the direct labour cost ratio at Cadbury which declined from a peak of 
11.1% in 1922 to 7.6% by 1938, exemplifies the drive towards efficiency through 
mechanisation made possible by information emanating from their cost accounting 
systems.  
Rowntree’s, on the other hand, did not rely so heavily on mechanisation as Cadbury, 
although they did invest in non-current assets as appropriate. However, it was in their 
application of the knowledge of the market environment, combined with the 
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subsequent introduction of appropriate product offerings that was to be their strength. 
A key enabler of this capability was the establishment of the Economic and Business 
Research office by William Wallace in 1924 to carefully monitor the external 
environment.
894
 This required close co-operation between sales, product development 
and the cost office, whereby any proposal for a new pack could be processed 
efficiently from a commercial, technical and financial perspective. Evidence of the 
way that Rowntree’s improved the efficient introduction of new pack offerings is 
provided by the packing materials cost ratio which due to the additional complexity 
of this strategy, would normally increase. However efficiency in the development of 
new lines meant that the packing material ratio actually fell from a peak of 17.0% in 
1920 down to 7.1% in 1936.
895
 Improved efficiency in the introduction of new lines 
was one of the cornerstones of Rowntree’s ability to survive during the inter-war 
years. 
Given that both companies sought to gain efficiencies through the appropriate 
investment in plant and machinery, the operating profit to net worth ratio would 
provide an indication as to whether the company’s capital (net worth) was being used 
efficiently. As discussed in chapter 6, for Cadbury the inter-war years saw this ratio 
behave in a particularly volatile fashion which suggests this was less than efficient. In 
addition the sales to fixed assets ratio consistently fell during the same period which 
meant that insufficient sales were being generated for the level of investment that had 
been made. By comparison, Rowntree’s operating profit to net worth ratio was more 
stable, although still lower than Cadbury, providing evidence of a more measured and 
conservative approach to the investment in capital assets. Therefore for Cadbury an 
explanation of their relative inefficient use of capital is that the company failed to 
utilise techniques of financial forecasting. This would have enabled them to ascertain 
the level of additional sales revenues that would be required to offset the reductions 
in price that had been enabled by cost reductions. It is argued that this was a major 
failing of the company in the execution of their strategy.  
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7.4 Recognition and Control of Overheads 
Perhaps the most important problem that confronted many companies during the 
period of rapid expansion and complexity at the beginning of the 20
th
 century was the 
control of overheads. Cadbury and Rowntree were no exceptions. The recognition of 
the increased presence and importance of overhead costs to a business had been well 
known throughout most of the 19
th
 century. The review of the literature in chapter 3 
reveals that Babbage had identified the nature of overheads or indirect costs, and how 
these behaved differently from direct costs.
896
 Garcke and Fells developed this further 
by suggesting that these costs should also be incorporated in some way into total 
product costs.
897
 By the turn of the century, Church
898
, Whitemore
899
 and Emerson
900
  
had all contributed suggestions to the ways by which overheads could be allocated to 
overall product costs. Examination of the archives at Cadbury and Rowntree, 
described  in chapters 4 and 5, has demonstrated that by the outbreak of the Great 
War, both companies had recognised the role of overhead costs and consequently had 
put in place relatively sophisticated methodologies for the allocation and 
apportionment of these costs to individual products, in order to derive  total cost for 
each line. However, whilst this ability to recognise and apply overhead costs is a key 
attribute of cost-finding, it requires managers to further develop this knowledge in the 
subsequent attempting to understand the nature of these costs. It was therefore vital to 
know which cost fluctuates in relation to output and those which don’t, and 
importantly, how these can be controlled in a way which is of benefit to the whole 
firm. This interpretation of overheads leads to the identification of variable and fixed 
costs and how these should be recognised and then used for appropriate decision-
making. Again, the literature contains evidence that this was recognised by Garcke 
and Fells
901
 and then developed into techniques such as break-even analysis by 
Hess
902
 and evolved into the concept of marginal costing by Williams.
903
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So, whilst Cadbury and Rowntree both had methodologies in place for the treatment 
of overheads in the role of product costing, the evidence suggests that the recognition 
of fixed and variable elements of costs was better understood by Rowntree as already 
demonstrated previously by Wardropper.
904
 One of the key concepts surrounding  
overhead costs is that when a company experiences reductions in demand this 
generates “idle time”. Indeed, Clark’s seminal work on the understanding of the 
dynamics of overheads in the contemporary literature centred upon the fact that 
whilst businesses attempt to assign overheads to product in a rational fashion, the 
issue of unused capacity is not taken into account, thereby rendering any calculations 
inaccurate and misleading.
905
 Clark stated quite simply that: 
 “The study of overhead costs is largely a study of unused capacity”906 
Clark suggested that unless the implications of changes in output are both understood 
and anticipated in any cost computations, the resulting decisions would be erroneous. 
Under the new order of increased mass production and mechanisation, Sanders 
developed Clarks’ proposition by stating that a firm must still sell products at a price 
that will maintain its plant and equipment even if it is not being run at full capacity.
907
 
In the examination of Rowntrees costing practices in chapter 4, the archival evidence 
suggests that senior managers at the company, notably T.H. Appleton, understood the 
concept surrounding overheads as demonstrated by Clark. Indeed, Clark suggested 
that the way to cope with overheads that are not absorbed due to idle time was to 
employ the concept of “discrimination”.908 This refers to the theory that the same 
basic product can be sold to different classes of customer at different levels of price. 
For Appleton this meant that Rowntree’s should try and source any potential business 
which would then take up any idle time and the income derived would then contribute 
to overhead costs. Although criticised by some within the company of this “scatter-
gun” approach, but in the absence of any credible alternative, this would provide the 
solution to the problem of overheads that Clark had identified. Moreover, this policy 
continued throughout the interwar years by Rowntree and involved the move to own 
label and other unbranded products at one end of the price discrimination spectrum, 
                                                          
904
 Wardropper,, Records and Costing,  p. 231, in Northcott,  Factory Organization. 
905
 Clark, Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs, p. 1. 
906
 Ibid. 
907
 Sanders “Overheads in economics and accounting”,  p. 17. 
908
 Ibid., p. 19. 
290 
 
and to the development of higher priced “Fancies” at the other end. For both, the 
product of confectionery was essentially the same but it was recognised by the 
company that this basic product could be sold in different ways, to different 
consumers at different prices. For Clark, writing slightly later, this gave rise to the 
concept of “differential costs”, where costs are considered under different sets of 
conditions
909
. This means putting to work any idle overhead whenever a product is 
worth its differential (or variable) cost. This concept dovetails with marginal costing 
and marginal contribution that was beginning to be suggested by Williams and others, 
as discussed in chapter 3. Under these principles, Rowntree’s were therefore agreeing 
to develop and market products under marginal costing criteria that would have 
otherwise been rejected if they had been evaluated using total costs. One of the 
principal arguments of this thesis is that the execution of this policy was the reason 
why Rowntree were able to survive during the interwar years whilst returning a 
relatively stable (albeit lower than Cadbury’s) level of operating profit. Their 
understanding of the role and behaviour of costs that were sympathetic to the ideas 
emanating in the literature from Clark and Williams meant that a strategy could be 
employed by the company which did not depend on a relatively few large volume 
mass-produced lines that was typified by Cadbury. 
So whilst the complexities surrounding overheads appears to have been understood 
by Rowntree’s, the archival evidence does not suggest that this was considered at 
Cadbury. Given the latter’s strategy predicated on their ability to reduce selling prices 
based on reduced costs, the successful execution of this strategy required that overall 
total costs for each product be ascertained, including taking into account direct costs 
and an allocation of indirect costs or overheads. However, as Ashley indicated, for 
this to operate effectively it was important to understand the behaviour of overhead 
costs and the mechanism by which these are then apportioned to individual products:
 
 
 “If overheads are to be charged to the cost of particular products, however 
  the allocation is determined, that with the relatively fixed expenses, the percentage 
  addition to prime costs will vary with the volume of business. This means that with  
 every marked increase in the volume of business (realised or anticipated) a new 
  percentage figure must be worked out for overhead charges”910 
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The archival evidence suggests that Cadbury calculated the overhead apportionment 
rate infrequently, meaning that their calculated total product costs (and the 
consequent rate of profit) was not being changed to take account of changes in 
output; pricing decisions were  taken on outdated information. This is crucial 
because, as Ashley noted, the consideration of overheads is vitally important in the 
execution of business policy.
911
 
As discussed in chapter 5, for Cadbury the issue of overheads was constantly being 
discussed at board level with appropriate levels of concern regarding reports of any 
overall increases in their absolute level. The company appeared to be constantly 
requesting information from the cost office regarding overheads, but without any 
formal mechanism of how these could be better controlled. This will be discussed 
later in this chapter. However, the company did consider an important element of 
overhead costs in their decision to introduce a railhead depot system, which would 
reduce their overall distribution costs. Whilst there is some evidence to support the 
suggestion that this initiative eventually produced cost savings on a per unit basis, the 
overall increase in sales volume during the interwar years meant that overall 
distribution costs actually increased, due in part to the variability of distribution costs. 
Of course these costs have to be viewed in the light of reducing revenues due to price 
reductions. The company was uncertain that the benefits of the railhead depot system 
would compensate for the reduction in sales revenues, and there is no archival 
evidence that any formal calculations were made to provide a financial justification. 
The measures described in chapter 6 indicate how the various consideration of 
overheads by Cadbury and Rowntree contributed to their relative performance during 
the interwar period. As already discussed, Cadbury’s overhead cost ratio was 
constantly higher than Rowntree’s during this time, thereby reducing their ability to 
secure a clear advantage at absolute operating profit level. Cadbury’s policy of 
constantly introducing new mechanisation schemes as a way of reducing production 
costs meant the relentless increase in investment in non-current assets, resulting in the 
inexorable rise in depreciation costs, which contributed to the overall rise in 
overheads. It is argued that the company did not recognise the relationship between 
costs, revenues and volumes and their combined effect on overall financial 
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performance. Given that their whole strategy was based on this dynamic, the 
company appear to have had no idea of the total consequences of their decisions.  
Perhaps it was based on the vague logic that if costs can be reduced, then consumer 
prices can also be reduced, leading to overall increases in sales volumes. However, 
these plans were never quantified and nobody in the organisation really knew how 
much extra overall volume (let alone which individual products) would be required to 
generate the additional revenues that were needed for the whole strategy to deliver the 
appropriate returns. This failing by Cadbury was a consequence of their ignorance or 
understanding of the economic theory concerning the price elasticity of demand.
912
 
Knowledge of the extent to which demand for a product will react to a change in its 
price is vital in any pricing decision. This information can be used to calculated the 
effect of price changes on revenue and, for given costs, profits.  If Cadbury had been 
able to assimilate this information, they would  have been in a better position to 
understand their price reduction strategy in the formulation of an “optimum price” 
which would have led to profit maximisation. This issue at Cadbury was not 
uncommon at the time as demonstrated by a seminal work by Hall and Hitch.
913
 In 
their paper, Hall and Hitch carried out an empirical study during the 1930’s of a wide 
range of British companies in the consumer goods, textiles, intermediate products, 
capital goods, retailing and building sectors, in an attempt to discover the nature of 
behaviour surrounding pricing decisions. From their study, Hall and Hitch discovered 
a situation which mirrored the Cadbury experience: 
 “Most of our informants were vague about anything so precise as elasticity, and  
since most of them produce a wide variety of products we did not know how to rely 
on illustrative figures of cost. In addition, many, perhaps most, apparently make no 
effort, even implicitly, to estimate elasticities of demand or marginal (as opposed to 
average prime) cost; and of those who do, the majority considered the information of 
little or no relevance to the pricing process save perhaps in very exceptional conditions. 
The most striking feature of the answers was the number of firms which apparently do 
not aim, in their pricing policy, at what appeared to us to be the maximization of profits.”914 
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In an attempt to understand why this should be so, Hall and Hitch postulated that this 
was because companies were considering long-term profits rather than short-term 
maximization. However, they discounted this by suggesting: 
 “But the large part of the explanation, we think, is that they are thinking in altogether 
 different terms; that in pricing policy they try to apply a rule of thumb which we shall 
 call ‘full cost’ and that maximum profits, if they result at all from the application of this 
 rule, do so as an accidental (or possibly evolutionary) by-product.”915 
Considering these findings – which applied to a swathe of British business during the 
1930s -  it should come as little surprise that Cadbury were not alone in their failure 
to base key strategic decisions on little or no information regarding their potential 
consequences. In addition, it should also come as no surprise that there was 
disappointing levels of growth in operating profit, as suggested by the Hall and Hitch 
study. 
For Rowntree, their better understanding and subsequent control of overheads 
resulted in a lower overheads cost ratio than Cadbury for most of the interwar years, 
and generated a more stable (albeit lower) operating profit performance which 
sustained the company as a viable business until the product and marketing successes 
of the late 1930’s. It is argued here that this can be attributed to the way in which the 
company was aware of the latest cost accounting thinking, particularly on the 
behaviour of costs, informed by knowledge of the concept of marginal costing 
derived from the contemporary literature that was being  digested by senior managers 
at the company.  
7.5 Budgeting & Forecasting 
As already discussed in chapters 4 and 5, the archival evidence for both Cadbury and 
Rowntree suggests that the contemporary techniques of budgeting had not been fully 
incorporated in either company prior to the outbreak of World War II. This is despite 
the fact that managers from both companies were exposed to the latest thinking on 
budgeting techniques through the literature, papers presented by leading speakers at 
the Oxford Conferences, discussions within the MRG’s and attendance at the 
important conference in Geneva organised by the International Management Institute. 
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The reasons for this failure are grounded in the fact that although the theoretical 
processes were well established by as early as 1922, the practical examples of 
budgeting in practice were quite rare in the UK.
916
 However, as previously argued the 
evidence indicates that although senior managers at both companies were enthusiastic 
regarding the implementation of budgeting, the practical mechanics of doing so were 
not well known or perhaps understood. Indeed, McKinsey made the point that 
successful implementation of a budgeting system depends on the appointment of a 
senior executive to administer the complex process.
917
 Both Cadbury and Rowntree 
do not appear to have understood the importance of having a senior representative 
taking charge, and it is therefore suggested that the chief cost accountant at each 
company did not consider himself as operating at that level of authority. So in the 
absence of a “champion” responsible for driving the process, the successful 
implementation of a fully integrated budgetary control system was unlikely to 
happen. In addition, there is  evidence to suggest that it was only at Rowntree’s that 
the essential building block of budgeting - that of the preparation of standard costs - 
was in general operation within the company during the interwar years. By 
comparison, there is no evidence that Cadbury’s had established standard costs at 
Bournville prior to World War II. However, many of the other components of a 
budgeting system were established at both Cadbury and Rowntree, including the 
provision of detailed sales and production plans along with a rudimentary form of the 
estimation of overheads, but this was probably more of a permission to spend by 
departmental managers rather than a detailed appraisal of resources required.  
Therefore, given that neither company had established a comprehensive method of 
budgeting as discussed in chapters 4 and 5, what effect did this anomaly have on their 
respective performances? For Rowntree, their strategy up to 1936 was to apply their 
knowledge of the market and to quickly develop product and pack offerings designed 
to exploit various niche markets which would contribute to overheads and profit. For 
Cadbury, their strategy was one of price cutting based on cost efficiencies driven by 
mechanisation. McKinsey suggested a framework for assessing the benefits to a 
company that a fully integrated budgetary control system could provide.
918
 By 
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employing the McKinsey framework
919
 to Cadbury and Rowntree, it is possible to 
assess how their respective businesses benefitted by some of the partial budgeting 
processes that they had in place, and also to identify how the failure to fully 
incorporate a fully integrated budgetary control system contributed to deficiencies in 
their relative performance: 
Coordination of Sales and Production – As previously identified in chapters 4 and 
5, both Cadbury and Rowntree recognised the benefits to their respective businesses 
of successfully managing the complexities of their operations by the coordination of 
sales and production. This resulted in the fact that they were both able to determine 
the most efficient production plan to meet sales expectations, thereby preventing 
excessive inventories. The inventory to sales ratio detailed in chapter 6 measures the 
efficiency of inventory management and a rise in this ratio demonstrates 
improvements for both Cadbury and Rowntree during the interwar years. However, 
for Cadbury this had in fact peaked in 1934, so the final years of the 1930’s did see 
this measure deteriorate somewhat. Also for Rowntree, this had also risen in much the 
same way as Cadbury between 1919 and 1938, also with a peak in 1934.  
Formulation of a Profitable Sales and Production Programme – The application 
of cost accounting at both Cadbury and Rowntree meant that selling prices, costs and 
subsequent profitability were calculated and published for each product line, based on 
current information. Indeed as we have seen, this function was deemed to be the 
principal role of the cost office at both companies post-1918. In addition, both 
companies attempted to compile a sales plan, from which an appropriate production 
plan could then be assimilated. However, whilst the individual components appeared 
to be in place, the absence of a mandatory budgetary requirement meant that there 
was no attempt to bring these components together in order to try and formulate a 
view as to whether the current plan was profitable. Therefore whilst there was 
disparate information regarding individual product profitability and proposed 
sales/production plans at both Cadbury and Rowntree, there was no aggregation of 
this data to provide senior managers of the extent of the possible overall profitability 
for the whole company. The effect on performance is that attention was provided at a 
micro level which was then deemed to confirm appropriate performance at a macro 
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level, but without the appropriate analysis to confirm this was the case. This failure 
meant that overall profit performance could have been improved for both companies 
if they could have used a standard cost system and applied this to the sales plan to try 
and formulate optimum profitability. 
Coordination of Sales and Production with Finances – Effective management of 
working capital would have been greatly enhanced at both companies if the planned 
sales and production programmes could have been considered regarding the short-
term financial requirements necessary to fulfil the proposed plan. This was especially 
true for Cadbury, whose liquidity position, as measured by the current ratio was a 
major deficiency for the company throughout the inter-war years. Indeed, this lack of 
coordination between sales, production and finance could have invoked bankruptcy 
for Cadbury, particularly during the 1930’s when their current liabilities were greater 
than their current assets for much of this decade. Whilst Cadbury’s working capital 
position was critical, Rowntree’s situation was only marginally better and they too 
operated at well below the 2:1 accepted norm in their current ratio for most of the 
1930’s. This lack of planning of the financial requirements for the sales and 
production requirements at both companies is viewed as a major flaw in their overall 
management, and particularly so for Cadbury, as this could have been the cause of 
business failure. 
Proper Control of Overhead Expenses – As previously discussed, the recognition, 
understanding and control of overhead expenses was a significant challenge for both 
Cadbury and Rowntree, driven as these costs were by the increasing size and 
complexity of their respective businesses. The archive at both companies as analysed 
in chapters 4 and 5 reveals attempts at director level to provide some leadership in the 
control of overheads, with varying degrees of success. However, whilst Rowntree 
better understood the behaviour of overheads, what is apparent is that for both 
companies there was little in the way of attempting to coordinate the activities of the 
various elements of overhead expenditure as an effective method in the efficient 
allocation of resources. Also in the absence of a coordinated budgeting system of 
overheads, this meant that comparison with actual could not take place in the 
identification of over or under spend in the application of responsibility accounting. 
This also meant that effective control through feedback and feed forward measures 
was also absent. 
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Formulation of a Financial Programme – Given the emphasis placed on 
improvements in efficiency by both companies which were to be provided by 
investment in plant and equipment, then it should have been a priority to place 
emphasis on the careful planning in the provision of capital. However, whilst the 
archive demonstrates that the cost offices at both Cadbury and Rowntree carried out 
individual piecemeal appraisals of potential investments in mechanisation schemes 
and the likely savings to be accrued, there does not appear to be any overall 
coordination in the allocation of capital resources, which would have been part of the 
overall budgeting process. If this had been carried out systematically then an 
appropriate examination of the overall effectiveness of capital expenditure could have 
been carried out to ascertain an optimum return on capital as measured by the 
operating profit to net worth ratio. For both companies, this measure in the 
effectiveness of investment in capital deteriorated throughout the inter-war period, 
with Cadbury experiencing the most volatility, which demonstrates their inability to 
relate return to investment, and to plan for its improvement. This capability had been 
successfully developed by companies in the United States and elevated to a 
sophisticated level by Du Pont through which the company used to create a 
competitive advantage,
920
 and extended at General Motors with a similar effect.
921
 
Coordination of all Activities of the Business – There is archival evidence that both 
Cadbury and Rowntree placed great emphasis on the coordination of the disparate 
activities of their organisations, principally through effective use of the committee 
system that both companies used extensively.
922
 However, a fully integrated 
budgeting system would have provided a more structured mechanism for the effective 
coordination not only of activities, but also of resources through the submission of 
estimates to a budget committee tasked with ensuring the overall company financial 
objectives are met. This would be enabled by the aggregation of inputs by the cost 
office to provide a forecast estimated income statement and balance sheet showing 
the anticipated results provided for by the budgetary programme. Only by doing this 
could the board of either company be satisfied that the overall financial objectives 
would be accomplished. Failure to do so effectively meant that they were running 
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their businesses blind with no real notion of what the proceeding year would deliver, 
or indeed if the business could even survive. 
7.6 Conclusions 
The development of cost accounting capabilities at both Cadbury and Rowntree was a 
significant factor in the growth of both companies and also in the support of their 
respective strategies. The ability to prepare cost and profitability information in a 
timely fashion enabled them to effect pricing decisions that would support an 
assessment of company profitability, although the inaccuracies regarding the 
apportionment of overheads could have provided a misleading guide to the 
contribution of individual products. For Rowntree, their understanding of marginal 
costing principles meant that they could approach pricing decisions for small volume 
non-standard business in a much more effective way, enabling them to evolve a 
strategy based on niche markets, based on superior knowledge of the environmental 
and market conditions through the extensive and systematic use of intelligence 
gathering. 
 
In addition, the drive towards efficiency which was regarded as an essential 
foundation for both Cadbury and Rowntree, meant that information derived from the 
cost office was a key enabler in the measurement of initiatives designed to achieve 
this goal. For both companies the implementation of efficiency schemes had a 
significant effect on performance, although the strategy by Cadbury of converting 
efficiency savings into price reductions appeared to be compromised by their inability 
to know how much additional sales revenues was required to maximise the profit for 
this strategy. This was caused by the inability to apply price elasticities to their 
products, meaning that the effect of price reductions on volumes, costs and revenues 
could never be adequately quantified. 
 
The understanding and treatment of overheads was an important consideration for 
companies that had been growing rapidly since the latter part of the nineteenth 
century. Whilst both Cadbury and Rowntree developed appropriate methodologies of 
allocating and apportioning overheads to products thereby ensuring adequate 
information to make decisions such as pricing, it was perhaps Rowntree who 
recognised the notion that overheads behaved in different ways than direct production 
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costs, and had to be viewed accordingly. Despite initiatives at board level, Cadbury’s 
ability to control overheads effectively is demonstrated in their inferior overheads 
cost ratio throughout the interwar period which had the effect of lowering overall 
operating profit performance. Rowntree’s superior management of overheads enabled 
the company to achieve a relatively stable level of operating profit performance, 
albeit lower overall than Cadbury’s. 
 
The capabilities discussed so far were supported by cost accounting development at 
Cadbury and Rowntree and had been enabled by the introduction and operation of 
cost-keeping and cost-finding techniques as was recognised by contemporary 
commentators. However, the next level of costing sophistication via the operation of 
a standard costing system to support a budgetary control process was only in 
operation at Rowntree’s prior to the outbreak of World War II. Some elements of 
standardisation, forecasting and budgeting were present in both companies, but a fully 
integrated system that would coordinate, communicate and control the business, in 
addition to providing an effective means of resource allocation, was absent. This 
effectively meant that there was no scientific means by senior executives at Cadbury 
and Rowntree of having any reliable information of the future financial consequence 
regarding the strategy being employed, or indeed, if the company would survive at 
all. 
 
Performance at both companies was undoubtedly improved and assisted by the 
implementation of cost accounting techniques during the inter-war years, but it is also 
important to recognise that failure to embrace some of the latest developments, 
particularly in budgeting, meant that strategic decisions were being taken with only a 
vague notion, or even hope, that this would result in overall future company 
performance improvement. 
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Section 4 – Conclusions 
Chapter 8 
Conclusions      
8.1 Introduction 
The central contention of this thesis is that two UK companies that had similar 
backgrounds rooted in family and Quaker traditions, that had both been formed 
during the mid-nineteenth century and were primarily in the same industry offering 
similar products, could have competed and performed  differently based on their 
respective cost accounting capabilities. 
Whilst previous studies of Cadbury and Rowntree have focussed on marketing, 
production, distribution and organisational issues, as reported previously in the 
literature review, this new study provides substantial evidence which contributes to 
knowledge by examining how cost accounting techniques that were in operation by 
the two organisations during the interwar years allowed them to compete differently 
in the UK confectionery market. Fundamental differences in performance for each are 
observed. 
In this concluding chapter, it is argued that there were differences in how each 
company interfaced with prevailing environmental conditions and the subsequent 
impact this had on the formulation and implementation of strategy. From this base, 
the disparate pathways that each company took in the development of cost accounting 
techniques is evaluated, combined with the level of sophistication that was eventually 
achieved prior to the outbreak of World War II. Finally, conclusions are drawn on the 
overall effect on the performance of Cadbury and Rowntree, as comparable 
businesses, that cost accounting provided, which is in addition to the capabilities  that 
has already been formulated in the literature and is a substantial contribution to 
knowledge. 
8.2 Relationship with the Environment 
Given the overall environmental conditions described in chapter 1, which formed the 
bases of the formulation, growth and development of Cadbury and Rowntree, it is 
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necessary to evaluate the ways in which each company contributed, interfaced and 
embraced these factors. 
Economic Factors 
A study of economic growth in the UK from the mid-nineteenth century to the 
outbreak of World War II paints a picture of an economy lagging behind its major 
international competitors, in certain sectors, with suggestions in the literature that this 
was due in part to the failure of UK companies to invest in technology, R&D and 
modern management techniques. However, both Cadbury and Rowntree were active 
in these crucial areas, but with the caveat that family dominance at senior level meant 
that this was to be a limiting factor to success, conforming to the Chandlerian view 
that personal capitalism was a barrier to effective management by the reluctance to 
delegate responsibility.
923
 
The measures of actual improvements in living standards such as real wages, cost of 
living, life expectancy and infant mortality, all demonstrate that the majority of the 
population of the UK benefitted, particularly in the years 1900-39. This improvement 
was driven in part by the gradual urbanization of the population which provided rises 
in real wages. This trend meant the concentration of people, combined with greater 
disposable incomes that was to be exploited by companies offering everyday treats 
and luxuries like confectionery. Both Cadbury and Rowntree recognised these factors 
and offered products that would appeal to this new expanding market. 
Although the interwar years witnessed a period of depravation caused by high 
unemployment, a closer analysis demonstrates that high rates of unemployment were 
chiefly confined to specific areas of the UK which experienced structural decline in 
traditional industries, along with unskilled and elderly workers. Those in the UK 
unaffected by these specific categories enjoyed the benefits of improved living 
standards, and were therefore the focus of efforts by Cadbury, Rowntree and the other 
confectionery manufacturers in developing products to satisfy a growing market in 
which choice was becoming a significant factor. 
The dramatic improvements in transport links from the inland waterways system to 
the building of the rail network and the road infrastructure during the nineteenth and 
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early twentieth centuries was the foundation for the growth of many companies, 
including Cadbury and Rowntree as it provided them with the ability to distribute 
large volumes of product quickly to all parts of the UK for immediate consumption. 
Indeed the decision for the site of the Bournville factory was based on its proximity to 
transport links. Both companies therefore took advantage of their ability to reach 
large populations, but Cadbury was more proactive in developing a transport 
capability in the establishment of the railhead depot system which integrated rail and 
road networks to provide a superior and efficient method of distribution. 
The revolution in the retail trade at the end of the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth century was as a direct response to the cultural, social and 
economic changes that were also taking place at this time. Indeed, as already 
mentioned, the modern retail trade was the oxygen that provided the growth in the 
consumer society that companies like Cadbury and Rowntree thrived upon. A key 
element in this changing retail landscape was the growth of the multiple retailer, and 
Rowntree’s responded to this by offering specific packs to the multiples as a way of 
ensuring sufficient sales and production within the factory. This business was 
assessed under a ‘marginal costing’ basis and was accepted in order to absorb 
overheads that were still necessary to run the business effectively. Cadbury were also 
aware of the opportunities offered by the changing retail landscape, but were also 
concerned of the potential threats this posed to the overall profitability of their 
business. This concern became evident in their extensive and innovative study of the 
retail trade, as discussed in chapter 5, which concluded that inefficiencies in the 
number of retail outlets caused reductions in profit for both the manufacturers and the 
retailers themselves. Despite the official publication of the findings of the study, this 
proved futile and no positive action or remedies were carried out.  
In addition to the ways that Cadbury and Rowntree interfaced with the retail trade, the 
operation of resale price maintenance at this time also meant that these and other 
manufacturers would benefit in the implementation of their marketing strategies, 
particularly in the growth of branded products. 
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Socio-Cultural Factors 
The changes in population and demographics that occurred during the early part of 
the twentieth century, particularly in the advent and growth of the middle class, meant 
greater opportunities for those companies seeking to promote goods which could be 
interpreted as being “luxury”.924 This greater buying power was at the heart of the rise 
of consumerism and the subsequent demand for an ever-widening range of consumer 
goods. This new phenomena posed not only a greater opportunity for companies like 
Cadbury and Rowntree, but also challenges in the introduction and use of 
mechanisation and also the adoption of innovative organisational capabilities 
combined with transport and distribution systems to be able to serve and compete in 
this new market environment.   
Combined with the opportunities of a population that was becoming increasingly 
concerned with choice and differential that defines a  “consumer society”, Cadbury 
and Rowntree operated in an industry which had also been part of the revolution in 
the UK diet, driven in part by large scale reductions in commodity prices on sugar 
and cocoa, providing the opportunity to create branded products which not only also 
served the purpose of broadening the variety in the diet of the population, but also 
created a demand for indulgence, gifting and special occasion. 
The creation of the consumer society meant the widespread use of branded products 
by the leading manufacturers to differentiate their products, which required the 
increasing use of advertising techniques to communicate this to consumers. Both 
Cadbury and Rowntree became extensive investors in all forms of advertising, with 
Rowntree particularly in the interwar years spending a larger proportion as a 
percentage of sales. 
Technological Factors 
Perhaps the most surprising component of the growth of Cadbury and Rowntree in 
the UK confectionery market is the fact that neither were responsible for fundamental 
technological breakthroughs in the development of either cocoa or confectionery 
processes. Both were content in scouring the world for innovations of both process 
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and technology which they could then convert into products to service the new 
consumer society. Indeed, both Cadbury and Rowntree were followers of the 
developments that had taken place throughout the world and were content to imitate 
rather than provide fundamental additions to technology. However, both companies 
were active in establishing research and development departments, and for Cadbury 
especially, this capability was focussed on developing products for mass production 
using the latest mechanisation facilities that could be sourced internationally. 
Cadbury’s desire for increasing use of machinery at Bournville was demonstrated by 
the fact that shortly after the signing of the Armistice, they sent a delegation to 
leading machinery manufacturers that were located in war-torn areas of Europe with 
the specific remit to source the most up-to-date technology for both manufacturing 
and packing operations, as discussed in chapter 5. 
8.3 Organisational Capabilities 
One of the key components of a company’s ability to compete in any market is the 
choice and establishment of an appropriate organisational structure. The growing size 
and complexity of organisations meant that senior executives had to find ways of 
managing the internal processes of their businesses through the use of systems and 
procedures. The growing pains of organisations like Cadbury and Rowntree from 
closely controlled family businesses to large scale corporate entities meant the 
embracing of structures that had to be consistent with their values and objectives. 
The change from a paternalistic and personal form of management at Cadbury, to a 
more structured approach was hastened by the unexpected death of Richard Cadbury 
in 1899, forcing the dissolving of the organisation as a partnership and the 
establishment of Cadbury as a private limited company. The four sons of the original 
Cadbury Brothers became joint managing directors of the new company and 
immediately commenced plans for a new structure that included the establishment of 
functional departments combined with the founding of committees designed to co-
ordinate these activities. However, overall control and decision-making of the 
company was still in the hands of the Cadbury family to which all the newly created 
committees reported. This newly created organisational structure, albeit with some 
criticisms in the literature as identified in chapter 5, regarding the cumbersome nature 
of decision-making that is inherent with a committee system, provided Cadbury with 
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a platform from which to further its ambitions. The notion of a functional 
organisation structure was to be one of the key principles surrounding scientific 
management and so Cadbury appear to be at the forefront of the application of this 
theory into a practical application thereby providing the company with a form of 
competitive advantage. 
Whilst Cadbury’s hand had been forced somewhat in the change to a more formalised 
organisational structure, for Rowntree the continued overall control by Joseph 
Rowntree meant a much slower pace of change, even though incorporation had 
occurred before Cadbury in 1897. A consequence of the long-standing chairmanship 
of the company by Joseph Rowntree was that the modernisation of the company 
organisationally that had been occurring at Cadbury since 1900, had not been taking 
place. The separate diversions for Joseph Rowntree in both the Quaker movement and 
his involvement in advising the Government during the Great War meant that his 
attentions were not entirely focused on his principal business. It was not until after the 
Great War had ended and more responsibilities were handed to his son Seebohm as 
chairman elect, that Rowntrees also began to move towards a more modern approach 
to the management of the company. Seebohm began by recruiting professionals 
shortly after the Armistice to oversee the creation of a new structure, with Oliver 
Sheldon in particular tasked with the introduction of functionalization in 1919. 
However, whilst the changes were effected with gusto during the years that followed, 
being closely related to scientific management theories, the fact is that Cadbury had a 
twenty year start on Rowntree in the creation of an organisational capability that was 
capable of providing the internal efficiencies that enabled them to consider and 
implement a precise strategy that the whole company could follow. 
However despite this time lapse in the creation of a functionalised company the 
company were determined to make up for lost time.  Rowntree’s under the effective 
management of Sheldon, Urwick, Appleton, Northcott, Wallace and Morrell, quickly 
developed an organisation that could co-ordinate its internal activities. This capability 
of being able to combine internal effectiveness with an understanding of the external 
environmental threats and opportunities would provide the basis for their 
competitiveness during the inter-war years.  
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8.4 Formulation and Implementation of Strategy 
The ways that Cadbury and Rowntree interfaced with, and embraced, the 
environmental conditions described above were essential components in the 
formulation and subsequent implementation of their respective strategies. The 
changed UK market landscape that all confectionery manufacturers found themselves 
in after the end of the Great War meant that opportunities now existed to create a 
domestic-led market, and to carve appropriate market shares within it. The emphasis 
on the UK market was driven by the lack of commercial opportunities regarding 
exports as a consequence of the Great War, limiting Cadbury and Rowntree to 
establishing subsidiaries in countries of the Empire, which themselves were of little 
financial value due to domestic tax considerations.
925
 However, a positive implication 
of the Great War was that at a stroke it severed most of the UK imported 
confectionery products from leading European sources, particularly from 
Switzerland, France, Germany and Holland. Moreover the ravages of the war meant 
that it would be difficult for these competitors to resume the same level of business in 
the UK that they had enjoyed prior to 1914. This meant that the UK market had 
become a much more lucrative proposition that could be exploited by domestic 
manufacturers. 
As a consequence of this new post-war order, Cadbury, who had struggled against 
Swiss companies in the milk chocolate blocks sector prior to 1914, viewed this new 
market environment as an opportunity to utilise their extensive use of efficiency 
programmes, based on scientific management principles, that they had been 
developing since the beginning of the twentieth century. This focus on operational 
efficiency combined with appropriate investment in mechanisation and managed 
effectively by their functional organisation structure would have the direct 
consequence of forcing down unit costs. This, they reasoned, would be the enabler 
that would then allow them to reduce consumer prices below that which the 
competition could go, and particularly for any future Europe-led competitor, whilst 
still maintaining product quality. The benefits derived from sustained mass 
production would then lead to further reductions in costs which could then be 
converted into lower consumer prices leading to even further increases in sales 
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volume for the company. However, given this rationale, the actual quantification of 
how this would work did not take place, meaning that the company could not provide 
an adequate measure of its potential efficacy. Despite the lack of any analysis for its 
justification, this strategy was formulated after the end of the Great War by Cadbury 
and implemented immediately with the consequence of driving down consumer 
prices for the whole UK market as previously demonstrated (see Table 6.5). The 
sustained overall reduction in the sales revenue per ton continued during much of the 
interwar period, and was only arrested in 1936 with the success of competitor activity 
by Rowntrees and also with the establishment of Mars as a major player in the UK 
confectionery market.  
The implementation of this strategy by Cadbury meant that the whole organisation 
was dedicated to the principles surrounding efficiency and the utilisation of 
mechanisation, demonstrated for example in the way in which the research 
department was set up as an enabler in the development of ideas into products whose 
sole criteria was that they had to be able to be mass produced. This thinking was also 
embedded into the way in which products were marketed, with advertising campaigns 
focussing on price reductions and also with salesmen being instructed to focus their 
customers on those products which could be produced efficiently, rather than 
attempting to establish what the consumer actually wanted. However, whilst the logic 
behind this strategy appeared to be sound, and this was demonstrated by the company 
increasing its sales volumes and revenues during the inter-war years, there was never 
any attempt to provide any analysis of the financial consequences of this policy, or 
indeed what the actual relationship was between cost reduction, price reduction, sales 
volume, sales revenues and overall profitability. In other words the company was 
never able to quantify the effects of the strategy or to provide adequate evidence of its 
continued success, or otherwise. This occurred despite there being advice in the 
literature identified in chapter 3 - notably by Sanders
926
 and Ashley
927
  - that a price 
cutting strategy had to be carefully assessed and quantified prior to implementation. 
Indeed, as already discussed, Ashley emphasised the point that for a price-reduction 
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strategy to succeed, the additional sales required had to be “substantial”928, and the 
evidence reported in chapter 6 is that for Cadbury this was not achieved. 
Therefore, whilst the precise components underpinning the formulation of Cadbury’s 
price-cutting strategy in the immediate post-1918 period were well-known and quite 
well articulated at the time, the long-term consequences were not so well thought out. 
Furthermore, any strategy focusing on reducing consumer prices has a single theme 
and has a finite life up to the point where price cannot be lowered any further and 
their competitors will eventually either catch up through their own internal 
efficiencies or offer alternative reasons for consumers to buy their products instead. 
This argument was never accepted by senior managers at Cadbury during the inter-
war years and also into the 1940’s on the publication of “Industrial Record – A 
Review of the Inter-War Years” in which they reiterated this belief, and they 
continued to maintain that purchasing decisions regarding confectionery are made by 
consumers based primarily on the relative  price and perceived value that a product 
provides. This, they maintained, was the key driver in the UK confectionery market. 
It is therefore concluded that Cadbury were not particularly attune to the changes that 
were taking place in the UK confectionery market and the ways that consumers were 
becoming more sophisticated in their choice of products that were not based entirely 
on value for money. 
The determined focus by Cadbury to promote a strategy which they were able to 
implement as a consequence of their internal organisational capabilities, combined 
with the willingness to invest heavily in capital assets to facilitate mechanisation 
savings, is contrasted with Rowntree’s apparent failure to offer their own alternative 
overt strategic intentions. An examination of the objectives of the company, as 
outlined by Seebohm Rowntree prior to his official appointment as chairman in 1923 
(although he had in fact already been carrying out these duties since the end of the 
Great War), provides no real clue as to exactly how these are to be achieved.
929
  
Like Cadbury, Rowntree had also been an enthusiastic promoter of the principles of 
scientific management combined with the central theme of efficiency as a clear 
enabler in the provision of an effective company capable of competing in the UK 
                                                          
928
 Ibid., p. 40. 
929
 Rowntree, B.S. (1922) “Questions concerning the policy of the business considered as a whole.” 
R&Co93/IV/3. Borthwick. 
309 
 
confectionery market. However, unlike Cadbury, Rowntree did not have the 
additional vision of leveraging efficiency into a capability that would enable them to 
influence the market as a whole. For Cadbury this meant that for a significant part of 
the inter-war years they were able to lead the market through the control of consumer 
pricing.  
This apparent lack of a clear formalised strategy by Rowntree that could be compared 
to the more overt Cadbury strategy needs to be examined in a more analytical way. 
The earlier discussion in this chapter of the ways that both companies related to the 
complex and rapidly changing environment clearly shows that this was crucial in the 
ability to compete in the UK confectionery market. Therefore the knowledge and 
understanding of the environmental conditions and how to change, react and satisfy 
these circumstances was also a clear pre-requisite for survival and for success. As 
previously identified in chapter 4, Rowntree’s clearly considered this aspect to be of 
crucial importance and subsequently established an Economic and Business Research 
function in 1924 headed by William Wallace as part of Finance, with the specific 
brief to formally collect all relevant environmental data that could inform the internal 
management of the company. The range of information collected on a regular basis 
included economic conditions, financial and banking trends, population, wages and 
trade prospects. This extensive repository of knowledge provided the company with 
an effective and sound basis from which to identify possible opportunities in the 
market which it could then exploit far quicker than its rivals, enabled by its internal 
capability of efficient product development. Furthermore, Urwick explained the 
significance of ‘market research’ in the deliberations of marketing, by noting that the 
enterprise must “relate his product to the consumer, by assembling particulars as to 
the habits and economic position of the people who will buy his goods”, particularly 
emphasising the fact that the data gathered should be “subjected to the most rigorous 
statistical treatment”, thereby accepting the best-practice that any raw information 
that had been gathered required  to be analysed in a skilful way to avoid 
misinterpretation.
930
 An examination of the Rowntree Technical Library accessions 
register shows that standard texts on statistical analysis were being added to the 
                                                          
930
 Urwick, Marketing and Selling,  p. 158 , in Norhcott,  Factory Organisation.  
310 
 
library for use by managers in the correct interpretation of data.
931
 In addition, a 
recent biography of Urwick suggested that there was a recognition of best-practice in 
the area of distribution by Rowntree’s, and go further by suggesting that the Urwick 
contribution described above actually enhanced the accepted knowledge in this field 
in the 1920’s.932 
 So rather than crafting a specific and structured strategy similar to the Cadbury 
approach, Rowntree’s were more reliant on their ‘swiftness of foot’ ability to react to 
environmental conditions, based on a capability of superior intelligence, this being in 
sympathy to the Mintzberg and Waters suggestion of an “emerging strategy”.933 
8.5 Pathways to Cost Accounting 
The archival evidence sourced at Cadbury and Rowntree, and subsequently discussed 
in chapters 4 and 5, demonstrates the different pathways to cost accounting that the 
two companies took from the latter part of the nineteenth century up to the outbreak 
of World War II, driven in part by the dynamism of the senior directors at each 
company. For Cadbury, within the original partnership of brothers George Snr. and 
Richard, there appeared to be little in the way of attention to formal costing 
procedures, with the only attempt being rough jottings in George Snr.’s pocket 
notebook. Whilst this cursory attitude to costing appeared to be appropriate to the 
business at that time - with the death of Richard in 1899 and the succession by the 
four young Cadbury sons as joint managing directors - this position had to change. 
The organisational changes described earlier in this chapter included the 
establishment of a formal cost office in 1903, and was part of a company-wide 
initiative to create separate research, planning, sales, advertising, purchasing and 
other functions.  
By comparison, Rowntrees introduced formal cost accounting procedures within the 
business much earlier as a direct consequence of the arrival of Joseph Rowntree in 
1869 and driven by his particular interest in the quantitative side of management, 
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which included his requirement for cost information to be available throughout the 
organisation. However, as already concluded, there was no attempt by Joseph 
Rowntree to formalise the organisational structure of the business prior to 1918 with 
the consequence that the extensive costing techniques in operation were carried out 
on a piecemeal departmental basis and appeared to be uncoordinated. However, as 
was the case with Cadbury, the election of a younger person in the form of Joseph’s 
son, Seebohm, to chairman-elect after the end of the Great War witnessed a more 
enlightened attitude in the establishment of a modern functional organisation 
structure. The creation of a formal cost office in 1918, was part of this larger plan for 
change. And as with the experience of Cadbury, other functional departments were 
established in subsequent years. 
So we had a situation whereby Rowntree’s had been utilizing some quite 
sophisticated cost accounting processes since 1869, but in a very loose and 
unstructured way throughout the business. This contrasted with Cadbury’s who didn’t 
provide much in the way of cost information until 1903 following the creation of the 
cost office. This then went on to be a crucial component in the way that the company 
operated by way of scientific management principles, and the crafting of their 
strategy. Rowntree’s in 1918 thought that they had much catching up to do with 
regard to costing and sent a delegation to Cadbury to assess their own operation at 
Bournville. However, whilst they returned from this visit with ideas relating to the 
role of a functional cost office and how this inter-related with the other functions in 
the provision of information, the actual costing techniques themselves were already in 
operation at York, and had been so for many years.  
It can be concluded that whilst Cadbury had created a formal cost office as early as 
1903,  from a near zero base, Rowntree’s had already established a longer tradition of 
a culture of cost accounting, alongside the provision of other statistical data within 
the business as a direct consequence of the influence of Joseph Rowntree. The 
criticism of this state of affairs is the fact that no attempt was made prior to 1918 to 
formalise procedures as part of a structured organisational model. Despite this failing, 
Rowntree’s were in as fortunate a position as Cadbury in the ability to utilise cost 
accounting as a capability in order to compete in the UK confectionery market during 
the interwar years. 
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8.6 Cost Accounting Sophistication 
For both Cadbury and Rowntree the different paths to the implementation and 
subsequent development of cost accounting techniques had been influenced by the 
attitudes of the senior family board members. Indeed, the motivation surrounding cost 
accounting development in each company was the realisation by the controlling 
family executives that this could provide the information necessary to formulate 
appropriate strategies. However, once established as an internal capability, cost 
accounting was identified as a key enabler in the ability to compete in the UK 
confectionery market in the interwar years. 
The examination of the archival evidence at Cadbury and Rowntree regarding the 
progress of cost accounting procedures, and the subsequent description in chapters 4 
and 5 provides evidence of some similarities in their respective approaches, but also 
some key differences that were necessary to fulfil the individual organisational 
objectives. This meant that the progress of the two companies towards what can be 
described as “cost accounting sophistication” was different, thus providing some 
associated consequences. The definition of what is actually meant by cost accounting 
sophistication is provided by Epstein who described a taxonomy of progress: 
“Cost-keeping is being defined as those activities concerned primarily with the  
recording and classification of actual manufacturing costs for purposes of financial 
 statement preparation. Cost-finding is being defined as those activities concerned 
 primarily with the determination of actual product costs to aid in cost control and  
overall managerial decision-making. These activities are to be further distinguished 
 from the more advanced methods involved in standard cost systems.”934 
For Epstein, the ultimate test of the development of cost accounting for any 
organisation meant they had to follow this taxonomy with the ultimate goal being the 
establishment of a standard cost system which would then form the foundations for 
the introduction and operation of an integrated company-wide budgetary control 
procedure. 
With reference to the Epstein model described above, both companies had established 
by 1900 their cost-keeping abilities in the provision of the annual financial 
accounting statements as required of a private limited company. However, within the 
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definition of cost-finding, the evidence described in chapter 4  demonstrates that 
Rowntree’s had advanced procedures within the York factory that had been driven by 
the vision of Joseph Rowntree and his desire for management to be informed by 
statistical information, of which costing was part. Indeed, the additional evidence 
from the archive as described, also suggests that they had in place by 1891 a 
rudimentary standard cost system from which actuals were compared to provide some 
basic variance analysis, although it is suggested that the significance of this apparent 
costing breakthrough was not readily recognised at the time and the archive suggests 
that it fell out of favour within the company. This is not surprising given the fact that 
cost accounting was not a centralised functional activity at this time, but consisted of 
a piece-meal approach by different middle managers in different factory departments. 
Despite this deficiency in organisational sophistication, there is evidence in the 
thoughtful way that Rowntree’s were approaching the issue of overheads and their 
subsequent allocation to product, with formal debates taking place in 1898 with their 
auditor, A.J. Cudworth, regarding alternative methodologies. Although Cudworth was 
principally a chartered financial accountant, he had already published in the literature 
on matters relating to the new role of cost accounting within companies and by 1904 
Rowntree’s were compiling cost reports in accordance with his recommendations. 
The eventual establishment of a functional cost office in 1918, under T.J. Evans, 
meant the centralisation of cost accounting effort under the direction of a professional 
cost office manager, and by 1922 had in place a comprehensive cost information 
gathering and reporting system that was informing all key managers of cost-related 
data on either a weekly, monthly or ad-hoc basis. This effort during the early 1920’s 
was bound up in the  company’s concern with efficiency that was being debated 
internally within the company and also externally in forums such as the Oxford 
Conferences, and later the Management Research Groups (MRG’s) in accordance 
with scientific management philosophy. The drive by Seebohm Rowntree in the 
creation of a culture based on the quest for efficiency within the company, and 
informed by the knowledge of senior managers derived from interaction with the 
latest literature, meant that the latest managerial techniques were constantly being 
applied within the company. This is also demonstrated by the fact that not only were 
Rowntree’s applying the latest cost-keeping techniques in terms of factory reporting, 
but as a consequence of their subscription to the Bulletin of the Taylor Society, along 
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with other management journals, had also been exposed to the potential of the 
application of marginal costing, especially the views of John Williams.
935
 As a 
consequence, Rowntree’s were clearly making decisions based on marginal costing 
methods. The knowledge of the theories concerning overheads by the seminal work 
by Clark, that had been requested by the technical library on behalf of senior 
managers , is further evidence of the desire by the company to implement the latest 
knowledge from the literature into practical application.
936
 It is argued that the 
knowledge gained from understanding the nature of overheads, combined with the 
role of price discrimination, as suggested by Clark and the application of marginal 
costing principles suggested by Williams proved to be a key contributor to the way 
that Rowntree’s competed in the UK confectionery market in the interwar years, and 
the subsequent effect on performance.  
Enormous steps were taken by Rowntree’s to fully recognise and apply the latest cost 
accounting techniques during the 1920’s. This included progress to the ultimate level 
of costing sophistication, that being the elevation to a standard costing environment, 
as described by Epstein. The basis that a formal standard costing system provides in 
supporting budgetary control procedures was well recognised during the 1920’s. 
However, despite sending delegates to the prestigious Budgetary Control Conference 
held in Geneva in 1930, and the subsequent initiatives from Seebohm himself, little 
progress was made. The reasons for this failure to adopt formal budgetary control 
processes are principally due to the failure to understand the significant effort 
required to establish a company-wide procedure, the failure to appoint a senior 
director to drive the project through and as has already been established in the 
discussion in chapter 4, the realisation by some managers was the perception that the 
company had become too complex for a budgetary control system to be introduced.
937
 
By contrast, Cadbury had followed a protracted road to cost accounting 
sophistication, especially coming from a very low base prior to the incorporation of 
the business in 1899 with the elevation of the younger Cadbury brothers to joint 
managing directors in the same year. Prior to this date, cost-keeping was virtually 
non-existent within the company. The responsibility for costing fell to Edward 
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Cadbury, who, given that he had no real experience of knowledge of the subject, had 
the foresight to recruit an experienced professional from outside the company to head 
up the costing function. The sourcing of a suitable candidate was accomplished 
through the Birmingham Quaker network. This appointment led to the establishment 
in 1903 of a functional cost office, where the newly appointed cost office manager, 
A.E. Cater found that the basic information to produce cost data was practically non-
existent and the first two years were spent establishing appropriate processes for the 
efficient flow of information through the factory and the setting up of the necessary 
records and documentation. Indeed, the cost office soon became the custodian and 
repository of all official production documents. The decision to appoint an 
experienced professional cost accountant to provide a dedicated service in the 
establishment of a fully operational cost office proved to be decisive in the building 
of cost accounting into a capability.  This would inform and support the company’s 
eventual strategy based on price cutting brought about by cost reductions. 
The years leading up to the outbreak of the Great War witnessed rapid growth of the 
cost office under Cater in which the latest cost-finding techniques were applied to the 
Bournville factory, including for example, the appropriate allocation and 
apportionment of overheads to product. In addition to normal product cost 
information and factory reporting, the cost office was central in the provision of ad-
hoc information relating to prospective efficiency schemes, which were gradually to 
become a central theme during the early years of the cost office. These projects were 
suggested, developed and subsequently assessed through the close co-operation 
between other newly established functions such as engineering and research 
departments working alongside the cost office. This work towards the quest for 
efficiency  was also reinforced by the early appointment of American-based 
efficiency consultants in 1912, who also worked with the cost office in the 
establishment of appropriate savings within the factory. Therefore by the onset of the 
Great War, Cadbury had established an efficient and productive cost accounting 
capability that was providing a range of information in the support of the company’s 
objectives, based on efficiency. 
This single-mindedness in the creation of an efficient company was demonstrated 
after the end of the Great War in the rapid expansion of mass production techniques 
at Bournville based on investment in buildings, plant and machinery designed to 
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progressively lower unit product cost. Whilst the cost office was instrumental in 
providing the information that would identify the required cost savings due to 
mechanisation, there is no evidence to suggest that any form of Return on Investment 
(ROI) calculations were prepared to fully appraise any proposed capital expenditure 
project. The decision to invest in capital equipment was taken if cost savings were 
found to accrue from that investment. There was a lack of forward looking analysis 
that would have forced the company in the forecasting of future sales volumes and 
revenues along with associated cost predictions.  This analysis could have estimated 
potential future returns, and therefore inform the management decision. It is argued 
that this failing was a major flaw in the efficacy of the cost office as a key informer of 
company strategy that was predicated on returns provided by investment in 
mechanisation schemes. 
A.E. Cater, the original cost office manager since 1903 was promoted to the board of 
the newly merged Fry company in 1919, and was succeeded by R.R. Sly who had 
been appointed as second-in-command in 1909, and who was to remain in this 
position until the outbreak of World War II. Under Sly’s leadership the cost office 
was involved in the expansion of its remit, and also to widen its level of costing 
provision, to include those activities that were outside the normal production areas, 
notably those that were collectively known as distribution costs. The most significant 
project that came under this category was regarding the company’s changes in 
transport, with the establishment of a railhead depot system that would eventually 
lead to unit cost savings in this area. The company also identified inefficiencies in the 
way that the trade was organised due to the proliferation of the number of outlets, and 
subsequently produced cost information to support this belief. The recommendations 
for a drastic re-organisation of the trade proved futile and the status-quo remained 
until market forces determined this long after the end of World War II.  
Whilst Cadbury had approached the notion of overheads from different perspectives 
and were clearly aware of the need to reduce these as appropriate, the evidence 
suggests that the company did not understand the nature and behaviour of overheads 
in a complex manufacturing environment in which mechanisation was central to the 
way that the company operated.  
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Unlike Rowntree’s, Cadbury’s only achieved the development in their cost 
accounting sophistication, as suggested by Epstein, up to the level of cost finding.
938
 
They failed in the establishment of an appropriate standard costing system from 
which budgetary control procedures could be built. Also like their main competitor, 
the benefits that would accrue from budgeting were well recognised at board level 
and despite various requests and the formation of working parties to report on the 
establishment of budgeting, little progress was made during the interwar years. For a 
company whose strategy was based on understanding the complex interactions of 
capital investment, sales volume, sales revenues, costs (variable and fixed) and 
profitability, the inability to model these variables and their interaction is concluded 
as a major deficiency that must rest within the cost office. Indeed, the publication of 
the standard work on cost accounting within the confectionery industry published in 
1934 and chaired by Cater
939
, demonstrated sophistication to the level of cost finding. 
In this publication, there is scant reference to the more advanced techniques such as 
standard costing, budgeting or marginal costing. From this it can be concluded that 
Cadbury thought that they were at the cutting edge of cost accounting sophistication, 
given that they had  had such a long experience in the development and application of 
cost-finding.
940
 It is argued that they believed that competence in cost-finding was all 
that was required to demonstrate excellence in cost accounting, when clearly this was 
not the case. The management of the cost office by Cater/Sly from 1903 to 1939 
suggests that although they were instrumental in the initial success of the cost office, 
progress in cost accounting techniques were to pass them by and their conservatism 
and their inability to embrace change in the application of more sophisticated 
methods are  crucial failings prior to the outbreak of World War II. 
8.7 Overall Implications for Cadbury and Rowntree 1919-38 
The interwar years represented a time of environmental change and turbulence that 
affected all aspects of life in the UK. This was reflected in the microcosm of the UK 
confectionery market, where the leading manufacturers had to take account of the 
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 Epstein, The Effect of Scientific Management,  p. 3. 
939
 Although representatives on the working party that contributed to the eventual published document 
included one from Rowntrees, it is clear that the driving force for the project came from Cadbury, and 
the content is a description of the way that cost accounting was carried out at Bournville. 
940
 This misguided belief is supported by comments made by Edward Cadbury at the Representatives’ 
Conference on 28
th
 June 1925: “Few of our competitors can claim to have such a scientific basis of 
costing as us”. 
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external forces and to subsequently establish internal systems and processes in order 
to compete effectively in this market. 
The overt strategy that Cadbury crafted after the end of the Great War could be 
interpreted as one designed to influence and ultimately control the UK confectionery 
market based on their ability to establish, maintain and control the consumer selling 
price. All decisions and efforts within Cadbury were focused on the constant attention 
to efficiency, both internal and external to the firm, which would then lead to cost 
reductions, being the foundation of their strategy. This thinking was flawed in that for 
this to be successful, an ability to forecast and plan ahead, both operationally and 
financially was crucial in the measurement of the efficacy of such a strategy. This 
could only be achieved by an understanding of price elasticity and the subsequent 
measurement of the effect of a price change on demand. As appeared to the general 
case in the UK at the time, demonstrated by the Hall and Hitch study
941
, Cadbury 
never appeared to take this into account. Therefore, in the absence of the capability to 
ascertain target sales volumes and revenues necessary to take account of the cost and 
subsequent selling price reductions, combined with the lack of method to allocate 
resources, it is incomprehensible that any measure of success could be achieved. This 
is in addition to the fact that a consumer price reduction strategy has a finite life once 
the price for the same product cannot be lowered any further. It is also predicated on 
the belief that value is all that the consumer is concerned about when purchasing a 
product like confectionery. The conclusion is drawn that for Cadbury, the 
understanding of the external factors was not a key concern as they saw themselves as 
a shaper of the environment, rather than a follower of it. Indeed, part of this thinking 
was the belief that they employed the latest management techniques combined with 
an efficient organisation structure that would support their stance. Part of this belief 
was that they thought they were at the cutting edge of the knowledge and application 
of cost accounting techniques that would therefore contribute to their success, and as 
has been discovered in this thesis, this was not the case. 
Rowntree’s, on the other hand, took a more realist stance, and made it a clear priority 
that it was a necessity to be able to have constant up-to-date information and 
knowledge of all aspects of the environment to inform the company regarding its 
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decision-making. From this understanding, the company could therefore embrace, or 
even predict, environmental factors and then subsequently design and develop 
products quickly and profitably to take advantage of any changes. So whereas 
Cadbury held the conviction that change will not happen, especially if they could 
control it, the Rowntree view was that change was inevitable and that a company 
must recognise that, be prepared for that and be in a position to react to it. This 
importance in the understanding of environmental forces is recognised in the 
literature and can be measured by four factors: 
“1) the degree of competition 2) the type of competition 3) the rate of growth in  
any sector 4) the degree to which they can trust the information they have collected.”942 
The internal functions, processes and techniques that Rowntree established during the 
1920’s, that were informed by environmental conditions. The role of the cost office 
was instrumental in their ability to compete effectively in the UK confectionery 
market. Further insights from the literature have suggested that it is the resource, 
capabilities and knowledge-based theories of the firm that explain the ways in which 
companies like Rowntree were able to organise themselves in such a way so as to be 
able to compete as they did during the interwar years.
943
 In addition to the accepted 
fundamentals of the resource based view of the firm, it is further suggested that it the 
source of the functionality of the resources within an organisation which are 
important, and crucially the extent to which the value of a resource can be viewed in 
the application to the product market and how this relates to the satisfaction of 
consumer needs.
944
 
Therefore in comparing the cost accounting resource and capabilities of the two 
companies, the way in which Rowntree’s incorporated marginal costing techniques to 
take account of potential sales that were available outside what might be called its 
‘core’ business which included own-label and fancies, is an example of the way that 
customer requirements were accommodated in the operation of the cost office. This is 
consistent with the suggestion from the literature that “firms compete not on the basis 
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 Berland  as cited by Berland, N. and Boyns,  “The development of budgetary control in France and 
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 Penrose, The Theory of the Firm.  
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of similar resources, but on the basis of whether these resources can be employed to 
meet similar customer needs”.945 
 This ability to ensure that resources were directed to the satisfaction of the needs of 
the consumer had a dual payoff for Rowntree. Not only were they exploiting niche 
markets, but by accepting orders on a marginal basis, this also meant that a more 
efficient utilisation of plant, machinery and labour could be obtained. This had the 
knock-on effect of being able to absorb overheads and contribute to profit. Indeed, for 
all the efforts that both Cadbury and Rowntree placed in the quest for efficiency 
previously discussed in chapters 4 and 5, it is suggested by Clark that the ultimate key 
to the discovery of efficiency is in the sourcing of alternative business for essentially 
the same product at different prices, at no added overhead.
946
 This according to Clark 
eliminates idle capacity which he regarded as the core of the problem in the study and 
control of overheads, and any company which has unused productive capacity is not 
able to manage their business effectively.
947
 The implications of this for Cadbury is 
that, as has already been reported in chapter 6, the sales revenues generated by the 
company during the interwar period were insufficient to justify the increases in 
capital expenditure. In other words the growth in capacity was not being fully utilised 
as demonstrated in the sales to fixed assets ratio and also the net worth to fixed assets 
ratio, leading to inefficiencies in overheads, and ultimately to reductions in operating 
profit and return on investment performance. For Cadbury, this was at the core of 
their failure to convert a seemingly appropriate and sound strategy into 
overwhelmingly superior financial performance, and the cause of this was their 
inability to understand the complex relationships between investment, sales revenues, 
costs and profitability. For all the sterling work carried out by the cost office at 
Cadbury, particularly in the early years, when it was the central fulcrum in the 
storing, processing and control of production information, and also in the 
identification of inefficiency within the factory, the inability to be able to inform 
senior management of the consequences of their decisions was the ultimate cause of 
this shortfall. It is argued that the fact that the senior managers at Cadbury made these 
decisions almost blind can be concluded as foolhardy. Moreover, this had an effect on 
the company’s dire working capital arrangements, as measured by the current  ratio, 
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when for most of the 1930’s Cadbury’s current liabilities exceeded their current 
assets. This was a clear symptom of their inability to plan for and allocate resources 
effectively. Therefore, the argument suggested by this thesis is that decision-making 
at the company was taken in the absence of adequate information and consequently 
placed the business in grave jeopardy of insolvency. 
Rowntree’s financial performance during the interwar years was also unspectacular, 
and in terms of absolute measures of sales revenues, market share, gross profit and 
operating profit, lagged behind Cadbury for the entire interwar period. In addition, 
there were insignificant gains in growth of the rate of profit as a percentage of sales 
revenues or in return on investment as measured by the operating profit to net worth 
ratio. However, for a company which did not possess the product advantage that 
Cadbury had established, particularly in terms of milk chocolate, they achieved a 
level of performance founded on a strategy based on the ability to identify and exploit 
niche markets , that was both consistent and stable, unlike the volatility that 
characterised Cadbury. In addition, although Rowntree’s also suffered with their 
working capital, especially during the 1930’s, their current assets were consistently 
greater than their current liabilities, making them less of a risk in terms of potential 
business failure due to cash flow problems.  
It is concluded that both companies could have achieved a better performance in the 
interwar period if they had established and implemented fully operational budgetary 
control procedures. This would have demanded company-wide attention to the need 
for forecasting, control and the effective allocation of resources. Despite the exposure 
to the accepted techniques by representatives of both companies, and the expressed 
desire by senior directors for this to happen, both Cadbury and Rowntree failed to 
introduce a fully integrated budgetary control system prior to the outbreak of World 
War II. The main reason for this failure perhaps lies in the proprietorial nature of the 
management of both Cadbury and Rowntree which tended to foster the idea that 
middle managers should not assume responsibility that they perceived they did not in 
fact possess.
948
 The implementation of a complex company-wide initiative like 
budgeting requires the nomination of a manager who is recognised by all in the 
organisation as being responsible for its control and completion. For both Cadbury 
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and Rowntree this key arrangement was never in place, so in the absence of a 
champion for the driving of a budget process, the desire for its implementation 
always remained so, and budgeting persisted to be an ad-hoc uncoordinated technique 
that was only present in a limited form in disparate parts of their organisations. 
The consequences of the failure to implement budgetary control was more serious for 
Cadbury, given that their strategy was predicated on the ability to plan, measure and 
evaluate the implications of price reductions, based on cost savings. The superior 
financial performance which they perceived would result, could never be quantified 
in advance. Also given the emphasis on cost savings being driven by investment in 
mechanisation schemes, the appropriation of resources was also crucial to this policy. 
The fact that they were never able to do so during the interwar years because of the 
absence of the appropriate techniques meant that performance under any measure was 
always unpredictable and at risk. This fact is demonstrated in the examination of the 
company’s financial performance in chapter 6. For Rowntree’s, the real benefit of 
budgeting would have accrued in the ability to achieve a superior level of efficiency 
through the identification of problems exposed by rigorous variance analysis and 
responsibility accounting. This capability could have contributed to a more acceptable 
absolute financial performance for the company as a direct consequence of the 
managerial control that budgeting provides. 
Overall, the popular conception in the literature, as reviewed in chapter 2, was that 
Cadbury’s were more successful than Rowntree’s. However, as has been 
demonstrated in this thesis, this common-held view is not that simplistic and, 
depending on attitudes to risk and the identification of a wide range of performance 
measures, it has been argued here that Rowntree’s had in place a cost accounting 
capability which meant that they were able to survive and compete in a market that 
was effectively dominated in terms of price by a major competitor. However, this 
perceived dominance by Cadbury was never converted into the performance that it 
was capable of because of a lack of sophistication regarding cost accounting 
techniques that would have better informed their decision-making. Indeed, it is 
concluded that as a direct consequence of this lack of sophistication, the principal 
strategy of Cadbury was unsuccessful, and the performance measures that have been 
identified and utilised in this thesis only improved when the price-cutting policy was 
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reversed in 1935 due to competitive pressure from Rowntree and the establishment of 
a new player in the market, Mars.  
Finally, the conclusion is that Rowntree absorbed, and indeed contributed to the latest 
thinking regarding management techniques, and as a consequence were able to apply 
this knowledge in terms of organisational efficiency and effectiveness during the 
interwar years. Cadbury on the other hand, were less concerned with the theoretical 
outpourings in the contemporary management literature, but were interested in more 
practical solutions that could be provided by consultants, for example. This attitude 
was rooted in the belief that they had superior products over those of its competitors, 
and as long as they had control over the market price, then performance would be 
guaranteed. However, the lack of attention to the information required for this 
strategy to be confirmed as appropriate and sustainable, meant that Cadbury were not 
as successful as they thought they were, or indeed Rowntree were not as 
unsuccessful, as has been portrayed and identified in the business history literature. 
The reasons for this misconception have been founded on a simplistic view of 
performance. This thesis provides a heterogeneous approach to the alternative and 
comprehensive measures of performance, thereby providing a different and balanced 
perspective of achievement than hitherto, and how the alternative capability of cost 
accounting contributed to this revised view.  
8.8 Publications and Further Research 
The possibilities for further work suggested by this thesis include: 
a) Methodology 
The application of contemporary financial performance measures used in this 
thesis could be extended further into other key sectors such as motor vehicle 
manufacturers, representing durable industries. The comparator case studies 
could be Austin and Morris. In contrast to the non-durable industries, as studied 
in this thesis, durables are more concerned with specific measures such as 
liquidity, stock control and working capital management. 
In a more general sense, there could be further critical investigation of how 
changes in the use of accounting ratios over time affect the rating of overall 
company performance, say into the 1960’s and 1970’s. 
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b) Cost Accounting  
The development of cost accounting techniques during the interwar period, as 
identified in this thesis, were greatly influenced by the impact of World War I 
and its economic, social and technological effects. Further work could 
therefore be in the identification of the greater challenges posed by the 
aftermath of World War II, and its consequences for the development of cost 
accounting techniques, especially the much broadening use of budgetary 
control in the UK. 
c) Rowntree and Cadbury 1919-38 
Further research into Rowntree and Cadbury could centre on specific areas 
such as the introduction and operation of the Cadbury railhead depot 
distribution system during the interwar years. For Rowntree, future work 
could include the degree of professionalism in management and the extent to 
which this contributed to decision-making and the ultimate formulation of 
policies designed to ensure company survival in the interwar years. 
d) UK Confectionery Market 
The growth of the UK confectionery market in the years prior to World War I, 
as identified in this thesis, particularly in chocolate blocks, was driven 
principally by imports from European, and especially by Swiss companies. 
Further study could be undertaken to understand how the Swiss confectionery 
manufacturers were able to establish dominance in the UK within a short 
period of time at the start of the twentieth century, and which capabilities 
were required to affect their successful strategy. 
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Appendix 1
UK Confectionery Market Share 1900-1938 by Sales Value
Year             Fry's              Cadbury's           Rowntree's             Mackintosh's Total Total Total
£'millions % share £'millions % share £'millions % share £'millions % share £'millions Tons(000) £/Ton
1900 1.33 8.2 1.2 7.6 0.5 2.8 0.0 0.2 16.25 187.0 87
1905 1.37 6.6 1.4 6.5 1.0 4.8 0.1 0.5 20.77 204.0 102
1910 1.64 6.4 1.7 6.6 1.2 4.8 0.1 0.5 25.43 239.0 106
1919 n/a n/a 5.7 9.7 4.2 7.1 1.1 1.9 58.58 189.0 310
1920 n/a n/a 8.2 8.0 5.1 5.0 1.1 1.1 102.70 295.0 348
1921 n/a n/a 7.5 8.3 4.1 4.5 n/a n/a 90.00 295.0 305
1922 n/a n/a 6.6 8.7 3.6 4.7 n/a n/a 76.30 308.0 248
1923 n/a n/a 6.6 9.6 3.2 4.6 n/a n/a 69.00 314.0 220
1924 n/a n/a 7.2 10.6 3.3 4.8 n/a n/a 68.10 322.0 211
1925 n/a n/a 7.2 10.1 3.4 4.8 n/a n/a 71.40 357.0 200
1926 n/a n/a 7.2 10.2 3.2 4.6 n/a n/a 70.70 366.0 193
1927 n/a n/a 6.8 9.9 3.6 5.3 n/a n/a 68.90 375.0 184
1928 n/a n/a 6.6 9.8 3.7 5.4 0.6 0.9 67.50 381.0 177
1929 n/a n/a 6.8 10.2 3.4 5.2 0.9 1.3 66.40 382.0 174
1930 n/a n/a 7.0 11.1 2.9 4.6 n/a n/a 63.30 375.0 169
1931 n/a n/a 6.8 11.6 2.8 4.7 n/a n/a 58.80 371.0 158
1932 n/a n/a 6.5 11.3 3.0 5.1 n/a n/a 57.60 396.0 145
1933 n/a n/a 6.5 11.6 2.8 4.9 n/a n/a 56.20 416.0 135
1934 n/a n/a 7.0 12.9 2.7 5.0 n/a n/a 54.10 427.0 127
1935 n/a n/a 7.7 13.8 3.1 5.5 n/a n/a 55.70 455.0 122
1936 n/a n/a 8.6 14.9 4.4 7.6 n/a n/a 57.60 462.5 125
1937 n/a n/a 9.2 15.2 5.2 8.6 n/a n/a 60.40 485.0 125
1938 n/a n/a 9.3 15.3 5.2 8.5 n/a n/a 60.90 481.0 127
Source: Fitzgerald (1995); Rowntree Income Statements; Cadbury Income Statements
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Appendix 2 
Confectionery Manufacturers in UK Market 1919-38 
 
Company      Principal Category 
 
Barker & Dobson Ltd.    Chocolate, Sugar 
Liverpool 
 
Angelas Ltd      Sugar, Chocolate 
London 
 
Parkes Classic Confectionery    Sugar 
Birmingham 
 
Voile & Wortley Ltd     Sugar 
London 
 
Lings Ltd      Sugar 
London 
 
Bristows Ltd      Sugar 
Crediton 
 
Beech’s Chocolates     Chocolate 
Preston 
 
Jameson’s Chocolates Ltd    Chocolate 
London 
 
Eclipse Candy Co. Ltd    Sugar 
Salford 
 
Carsons Ltd      Chocolate 
Glasgow 
 
Cecil Coleman Ltd     Sugar 
London 
 
Whitefields Ltd     Chocolate 
London 
 
Needlers Ltd      Sugar, Chocolate 
Hull 
 
Walker & Hartley Ltd     Sugar 
Blackpool 
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Company      Principal Category 
 
Reeves Ltd      Chocolate 
London/Glasgow 
 
Cleeves Ltd      Sugar 
London 
 
C. Kunzle Ltd      Chocolate 
Birmingham 
 
Harry Vincent Ltd     Sugar 
Worcester 
 
JS Fry & Son Ltd     Chocolate, Sugar 
Bristol 
 
Meltis Ltd      Sugar 
Bradford 
 
Fryer & Son      Sugar 
Nelson 
 
Walter Palmer Toffee Ltd    Sugar 
London 
 
Fillery’s Toffees Ltd     Sugar 
Birmingham 
 
John Mackintosh Ltd     Sugar, Chocolate 
Halifax 
 
RS Murray & Co. Ltd     Sugar 
London 
 
W & M Duncan Ltd     Chocolate 
Edinburgh 
 
Edward Sharp Ltd     Sugar 
Maidstone 
 
Fox Glacier Mints Ltd    Sugar 
Leicester 
 
Charles Bond      Chocolate 
Bristol 
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Company      Principal Category 
 
HJ Packer & Co. Ltd     Chocolate 
Bristol 
 
AS Wilkin Ltd     Sugar 
Newcastle 
 
Dunhills      Sugar 
Pontefract 
 
Maynards Ltd      Sugar 
London 
 
Rowntee Ltd      Chocolate, Sugar 
York 
 
Cadbury Bros. Ltd     Chocolate 
Birmingham 
 
Clarke, Nicholls & Coombs Ltd (Clarnico)  Sugar, Chocolate 
London 
 
James Pascall Ltd     Sugar 
Mitcham 
 
Anglo-American Chewing Gum Co Ltd  Sugar 
London 
 
Matlow Bros Ltd     Sugar 
London 
 
Callard & Bowser Ltd    Sugar 
London 
 
George Lee      Sugar 
Essex 
 
WR Wilkinson & Co Ltd    Sugar 
Pontefract 
 
Sovereign Confectionery Ltd    Sugar, Chocolate 
Warrington 
 
Joseph Terry & Sons Ltd    Sugar, Chocolate 
York 
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Company      Principal Category 
 
Brierley, Collier & Hartley    Sugar 
Rochdale 
 
AJ Caley & SonLtd     Chocolate, Sugar 
Bristol & Norwich 
 
 
 
 
Source: Catalogues of Annual Confectionery Exhibitions, Olympia, London (Various 1924-38). 
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              1919                1920                1921                1922                1923 
Assets 
          Non-Current 
          Land & Buildings 267345 
 
317944 
 
507945 
 
625306 
 
668742 
 Plant & Machinery 68643 
 
119717 
 
196272 
 
266038 
 
299386 
 Goodwill 390000 
 
390000 
 
390000 
 
390000 
 
390000 
 
  
725988 
 
827661 
 
1094217 
 
1281344 
 
1358128 
Investments 
 
590032 
 
446631 
 
613229 
 
1066505 
 
1734811 
           Current 
          Cash 44059 
 
94428 
 
640571 
 
778509 
 
503204 
 Debtors 694285 
 
815541 
 
908948 
 
840333 
 
839532 
 Inventories 2183640 
 
2491672 
 
1812216 
 
1595759 
 
1335683 
 
  
2921984 
 
3401641 
 
3361735 
 
3214601 
 
2678419 
           Liabilities 
          Current 
          Reserves 340043 
 
298258 
 
543444 
 
899879 
 
1240677 
 Trade Creditors 636034 
 
569887 
 
368031 
 
472968 
 
400971 
 
  
976077 
 
868145 
 
911475 
 
1372847 
 
1641648 
Non-Current 
          Long-Term Loans 
 
0 
 
257386 
 
107981 
 
100124 
 
0 
           
           Net Assets 
 
3261927 
 
3550402 
 
4049725 
 
4089479 
 
4129710 
           Capital 
          Subscribed Shares 2176140 
 
3027654 
 
3027654 
 
3027654 
 
3224156 
 Reserves 575191 
 
348103 
 
951484 
 
1002239 
 
845968 
 Excess Profits 510596 
 
174645 
 
70587 
 
59586 
 
59586 
 Total Capital 
 
3261927 
 
3550402 
 
4049725 
 
4089479 
 
4129710 
 
 
Source: Cadbury Brothers Ltd. Company Archive, Bournville. 
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Cadbury Balance Sheets 1919-23 
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                1924                1925                1926                1927                1928 
Assets 
          Non-Current 
          Land & Buildings 736410 
 
817026 
 
909607 
 
1070733 
 
1142699 
 Plant & Machinery 318883 
 
382272 
 
388688 
 
437807 
 
516571 
 Goodwill 390000 
 
390000 
 
390000 
 
390000 
 
390000 
 
  
1445293 
 
1589298 
 
1688295 
 
1898540 
 
2049270 
Investments 
 
1930566 
 
1944754 
 
2247684 
 
2287445 
 
2197595 
           Current 
          Cash 570937 
 
363984 
 
302900 
 
142895 
 
203538 
 Debtors 966760 
 
950658 
 
809064 
 
888992 
 
977632 
 Inventories 1345632 
 
1598552 
 
1736500 
 
1400951 
 
1204176 
 
  
2883329 
 
2913194 
 
2848464 
 
2432838 
 
2385346 
           Liabilities 
          Current 
          Reserves 1353456 
 
1699326 
 
1907078 
 
1740706 
 
1709046 
 Trade Creditors 409516 
 
471464 
 
604349 
 
630953 
 
616953 
 
  
1762972 
 
2170790 
 
2511427 
 
2371659 
 
2325999 
Non-Current 
          Long-Term Loans 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
           
           Net Assets 
 
4496216 
 
4276456 
 
4273016 
 
4247164 
 
4306212 
           Capital 
          Subscribed Shares 3224156 
 
3224156 
 
3224156 
 
3224156 
 
3224156 
 Reserves 1212474 
 
992714 
 
989274 
 
963422 
 
1022470 
 Excess Profits 59586 
 
59586 
 
59586 
 
59586 
 
59586 
 Total Capital 
 
4496216 
 
4276456 
 
4273016 
 
4247164 
 
4306212 
 
Source: Cadbury Brothers Ltd. Company Archive, Bournville. 
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               1929                1930                1931                1932                1933 
Assets 
          Non-Current 
          Land & Buildings 1548006 
 
1542326 
 
1559149 
 
1584452 
 
1721618 
 Plant & Machinery 532596 
 
491548 
 
457792 
 
433558 
 
424172 
 Goodwill 390000 
 
390000 
 
390000 
 
390000 
 
390000 
 
  
2470602 
 
2423874 
 
2406941 
 
2408010 
 
2535790 
Investments 
 
2270505 
 
2337122 
 
2234063 
 
2794778 
 
2989841 
           Current 
          Cash 149393 
 
529866 
 
937761 
 
404375 
 
177084 
 Debtors 1053101 
 
948431 
 
907541 
 
974139 
 
1022930 
 Inventories 1642948 
 
1290908 
 
1117679 
 
1285533 
 
1041037 
 
  
2845442 
 
2769205 
 
2962981 
 
2664047 
 
2241051 
           Liabilities 
          Current 
          Reserves 1984849 
 
2042285 
 
2066209 
 
2137451 
 
2398149 
 Trade Creditors 1205546 
 
1023012 
 
828626 
 
1088239 
 
800657 
 
  
3190395 
 
3065297 
 
2894835 
 
3225690 
 
3198806 
Non-Current 
          Long-Term Loans 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
200258 
           
           Net Assets 
 
4396154 
 
4464904 
 
4709150 
 
4641145 
 
4367618 
           Capital 
          Subscribed Shares 3224156 
 
3224156 
 
3224156 
 
3224156 
 
3224156 
 Reserves 1171998 
 
1240748 
 
1484994 
 
1416989 
 
1143462 
 Excess Profits 0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 Total Capital 
 
4396154 
 
4464904 
 
4709150 
 
4641145 
 
4367618 
 
Source: Cadbury Brothers Ltd. Company Archive, Bournville. 
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                1934                1935                1936                1937                1938 
Assets 
          Non-Current 
          Land & Buildings 1128942 
 
1170470 
 
1288042 
 
1449171 
 
1592922 
 Plant & Machinery 478214 
 
499264 
 
502974 
 
550753 
 
646295 
 Goodwill 390000 
 
390000 
 
390000 
 
390000 
 
390000 
 
  
1997156 
 
2059734 
 
2181016 
 
2389924 
 
2629217 
Investments 
 
3218247 
 
3225868 
 
3629770 
 
2250642 
 
2318617 
           Current 
          Cash 254637 
 
17800 
 
67363 
 
789251 
 
258807 
 Debtors 1019458 
 
1204462 
 
1178289 
 
1303841 
 
1333537 
 Inventories 1102282 
 
1491926 
 
1752775 
 
1881997 
 
2494750 
 
  
2376377 
 
2714188 
 
2998427 
 
3975089 
 
4087094 
           Liabilities 
          Current 
          Reserves 1773872 
 
1773938 
 
1801862 
 
2049403 
 
570427 
 Trade Creditors 1131169 
 
1116991 
 
1481082 
 
1295039 
 
1455635 
 
  
2905041 
 
2890929 
 
3282944 
 
3344442 
 
2026062 
Non-Current 
          Long-Term Loans 
 
93488 
 
258730 
 
926000 
 
714500 
 
619500 
           
           Net Assets 
 
4593251 
 
4850131 
 
4600269 
 
4556713 
 
6389366 
           Capital 
          Subscribed Shares 3224156 
 
3224156 
 
3244156 
 
3244156 
 
5831035 
 Reserves 1369095 
 
1625975 
 
1356113 
 
1312557 
 
558331 
 Excess Profits 0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 Total Capital 
 
4593251 
 
4850131 
 
4600269 
 
4556713 
 
6389366 
 
 Source: Cadbury Brothers Ltd. Company Archive, Bournville. 
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1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 
      Sales Revenues 5668468 8178124 7503116 6628107 6646609 
      Ingredients 2418349 4461407 2921322 2228443 2503135 
Packing Materials 367999 820071 553010 408617 406627 
Labour 521330 804281 785239 732986 689437 
Discounts 150820 215380 217626 197716 185843 
Other Income 4146 14151 14266 13097 18320 
Gross Profit 2214116 1891136 3040185 3073442 2879887 
      Advertising 74584 116358 152434 215906 235563 
Other Overheads 988662 1429493 1626460 1565847 1503159 
Operating Profit 
(EBIT) 1150870 345285 1261291 1291689 1141165 
 
 
 
 
      
 
1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 
      Sales Revenues 7246279 7218574 7182260 6816656 6581158 
      Ingredients 2531289 2536226 2455765 2657814 2783446 
Packing Materials 446476 468545 443199 373377 340468 
Labour 758171 819681 782011 699255 629240 
Discounts 190117 199216 206153 211204 205310 
Other Income 30986 57413 101612 119011 118400 
Gross Profit 3351212 3252319 3396744 2994017 2741094 
      Advertising 307470 386235 488946 549161 522052 
Other Overheads 1645361 1725663 1797678 1649563 1549935 
Operating Profit 
(EBIT) 1398381 1140421 1110120 795293 669107 
 
Source: Cadbury Brothers Ltd. Company Archive, Bournville. 
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1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
      Sales Revenues 6814709 7026539 6805515 6504101 6506189 
      Ingredients 2577090 2736042 2157348 2076030 2194372 
Packing Materials 365151 504051 459866 505189 510120 
Labour 586871 560682 544605 550264 545000 
Discounts 212920 210638 210266 0 0 
Other Income 132191 107712 80461 81273 100279 
Gross Profit 3204868 3122838 3513891 3453891 3356976 
      Advertising 503862 586984 552321 621051 696453 
Other Overheads 1619217 1787437 1816571 1796122 1821491 
Operating Profit 
(EBIT) 1081789 748417 1144999 1036718 839032 
 
 
 
 
      
 
1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
      Sales Revenues 7032449 7730252 8560142 9215630 9315690 
      Ingredients 2092843 2635222 2994721 4242914 3599961 
Packing Materials 545380 534310 597772 649358 701498 
Labour 602079 626537 670491 703056 710050 
Discounts 0 0 0 0 0 
Other Income 136799 96014 0 0 0 
Gross Profit 3928946 4030197 4297158 3620302 4304181 
      Advertising 577766 589649 591890 549156 679589 
Other Overheads 2004878 2223915 2277660 2399415 2425512 
Operating Profit 
(EBIT) 1346302 1216633 1427608 671731 1199080 
 
Source: Cadbury Brothers Ltd. Company Archive, Bournville. 
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1919 
 
             
1920 
 
            
1921 
 
            
1922 
 
           
1923 
 Assets 
          Non-Current 
          Land & Buildings 349400 
 
460180 
 
510790 
 
531763 
 
554707 
 Plant & Machinery 150023 
 
218384 
 
408453 
 
440389 
 
476516 
 West Indies 20462 
 
30689 
 
49572 
 
21739 
 
19530 
 
  
519885 
 
709253 
 
968815 
 
993891 
 
1050753 
Investments 
 
43885 
 
46677 
 
323150 
 
706495 
 
463453 
           Current 
          Cash 11925 
 
64280 
 
320599 
 
9858 
 
49345 
 Debtors 464894 
 
448106 
 
473256 
 
545911 
 
552954 
 Inventories 1763870 
 
1662148 
 
1103495 
 
986288 
 
976127 
 
  
2240689 
 
2174534 
 
1897350 
 
1542057 
 
1578426 
Excess Profits 
 
0 
 
259629 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
           Liabilities 
          Current 
          Reserves 500274 
 
192601 
 
278126 
 
338310 
 
239414 
 Trade Creditors 503560 
 
394188 
 
255650 
 
272101 
 
224979 
 
  
1003834 
 
586789 
 
533776 
 
610411 
 
464393 
Non-Current 
          Long-Term Loans 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
           
           Net Assets 
 
1800625 
 
2603304 
 
2655539 
 
2632032 
 
2628239 
           Capital 
          Preference Shares 750000 
 
1500000 
 
1500000 
 
1500000 
 
1500000 
 Ordinary Shares 750000 
 
1000000 
 
1000000 
 
1000000 
 
1000000 
 Reserves 300625 
 
103304 
 
155539 
 
132032 
 
128239 
 Total Capital 
 
1800625 
 
2603304 
 
2655539 
 
2632032 
 
2628239 
 
Source: Rowntree Ltd. Company Archive, Borthwick 
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1924 
 
              
1925 
 
             
1926 
 
               
1927 
 
              
1928 
 Assets 
          Non-Current 
          Land & Buildings 555390 
 
556989 
 
546150 
 
533071 
 
520215 
 Plant & Machinery 489034 
 
466353 
 
473711 
 
489534 
 
494099 
 West Indies 18833 
 
18040 
 
15573 
 
14791 
 
12031 
 
  
1063257 
 
1041382 
 
1035434 
 
1037396 
 
1026345 
Investments 
 
579933 
 
731873 
 
916859 
 
1085327 
 
1002328 
           Current 
          Cash 53664 
 
21222 
 
7920 
 
5066 
 
9647 
 Debtors 589537 
 
656669 
 
585362 
 
684785 
 
723233 
 Inventories 846835 
 
736365 
 
797777 
 
797167 
 
735713 
 
  
1490036 
 
1414256 
 
1391059 
 
1487018 
 
1468593 
Excess Profits 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
           Liabilities 
          Current 
          Reserves 234565 
 
184159 
 
210000 
 
260000 
 
310000 
 Trade Creditors 288694 
 
356516 
 
436829 
 
654009 
 
489028 
 
  
523259 
 
540675 
 
646829 
 
914009 
 
799028 
Non-Current 
          Long-Term Loans 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
           
           Net Assets 
 
2609967 
 
2646836 
 
2696523 
 
2695732 
 
2698238 
           Capital 
          Preference Shares 1500000 
 
1500000 
 
1500000 
 
2250000 
 
2250000 
 Ordinary Shares 1000000 
 
1000000 
 
1000000 
 
250000 
 
250000 
 Reserves 109967 
 
146836 
 
196523 
 
195732 
 
198238 
 Total Capital 
 
2609967 
 
2646836 
 
2696523 
 
2695732 
 
2698238 
 
Source: Rowntree Ltd. Company Archive, Borthwick 
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1929 
 
             
1930 
 
               
1931 
 
               
1932 
 
               
1933 
 Assets 
          Non-Current 
          Land & Buildings 505997 
 
496087 
 
488769 
 
484651 
 
474903 
 Plant & Machinery 488650 
 
457240 
 
457588 
 
481284 
 
463124 
 West Indies 10293 
 
9674 
 
9668 
 
9103 
 
8462 
 
  
1004940 
 
963001 
 
956025 
 
975038 
 
946489 
Investments 
 
1296874 
 
1355987 
 
1461389 
 
1430774 
 
1365906 
           Current 
          Cash 5609 
 
11723 
 
12720 
 
11784 
 
14414 
 Debtors 584604 
 
507203 
 
570814 
 
514999 
 
495409 
 Inventories 681291 
 
599728 
 
603851 
 
643166 
 
581023 
 
  
1271504 
 
1118654 
 
1187385 
 
1169949 
 
1090846 
Excess Profits 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
           Liabilities 
          Current 
          Reserves 375597 
 
408807 
 
427114 
 
393728 
 
399481 
 Trade Creditors 488603 
 
398239 
 
544485 
 
544309 
 
363472 
 
  
864200 
 
807046 
 
971599 
 
938037 
 
762953 
Non-Current 
          Long-Term Loans 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
           
           Net Assets 
 
2709118 
 
2630596 
 
2633200 
 
2637724 
 
2640288 
           Capital 
          Preference Shares 2265000 
 
2265000 
 
2265000 
 
2265000 
 
2265000 
 Ordinary Shares 250000 
 
250000 
 
250000 
 
250000 
 
250000 
 Reserves 194118 
 
115596 
 
118200 
 
122724 
 
125288 
 Total Capital 
 
2709118 
 
2630596 
 
2633200 
 
2637724 
 
2640288 
           Source: Rowntree Ltd. Company Archive, Borthwick 
Appendix 9 (continued) 
Rowntree Balance Sheets 1929-33 
344 
 
 
 
                
1934 
 
               
1935 
 
              
1936 
 
               
1937 
 
              
1938 
 Assets 
          Non-Current 
          Land & Buildings 462256 
 
444441 
 
483517 
 
536903 
 
589011 
 Plant & Machinery 455239 
 
480081 
 
573157 
 
631643 
 
642555 
 West Indies 284 
 
91 
 
135 
 
69 
 
4 
 
  
917779 
 
924613 
 
1056809 
 
1168615 
 
1231570 
Investments 
 
1480181 
 
1448510 
 
1322451 
 
1213805 
 
1243316 
           Current 
          Cash 10556 
 
10661 
 
15727 
 
39070 
 
106041 
 Debtors 453545 
 
557723 
 
732084 
 
779169 
 
761349 
 Inventories 510781 
 
568005 
 
859440 
 
1204145 
 
1188691 
 
  
974882 
 
1136389 
 
1607251 
 
2022384 
 
2056081 
Excess Profits 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
           Liabilities 
          Current 
          Reserves 415371 
 
410398 
 
404830 
 
490165 
 
685855 
 Trade Creditors 312042 
 
434875 
 
851970 
 
673424 
 
720613 
 
  
727413 
 
845273 
 
1256800 
 
1163589 
 
1406468 
Non-Current 
          Long-Term Loans 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
           
           Net Assets 
 
2645429 
 
2664239 
 
2729711 
 
3241215 
 
3124499 
           Capital 
          Preference Shares 2265000 
 
2265000 
 
2265000 
 
2515000 
 
2515000 
 Ordinary Shares 250000 
 
250000 
 
250000 
 
500000 
 
500000 
 Reserves 130429 
 
149239 
 
214711 
 
226215 
 
109499 
 Total Capital 
 
2645429 
 
2664239 
 
2729711 
 
3241215 
 
3124499 
 
Source: Rowntree Ltd. Company Archive, Borthwick 
Appendix 9 (continued) 
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1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 
      Sales Revenues 4148152 5133250 4058450 3612426 3152721 
      Ingredients 1792448 2623436 1661907 1228799 1157439 
Packing Materials 597483 874478 543932 440132 399753 
Direct Labour 315488 523644 632330 612025 534563 
Discounts 116491 155041 141728 118460 102294 
Other Income 112728 416542 96339 101882 123252 
Gross Profit 1438970 1373193 1174892 1314892 1081924 
      Advertising 78357 193296 149754 242175 140432 
Other Overheads 741439 907672 804812 847318 776698 
Operating Profit (EBIT) 619174 272225 220326 225399 164794 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 
      Sales Revenues 3270338 3399627 3305698 3616553 3648137 
      Ingredients 1099451 1026193 966033 1254663 1295868 
Packing Materials 448469 492919 427386 421298 377583 
Direct Labour 542545 634841 609542 623193 586575 
Discounts 117424 122478 120164 125773 133505 
Other Income 122960 102114 102544 128261 140772 
Gross Profit 1185409 1225310 1285117 1319887 1395378 
      Advertising 227999 284037 306536 318676 383418 
Other Overheads 781979 722353 724808 726446 730375 
Operating Profit (EBIT) 175431 218920 253773 274765 281585 
 
Source: Rowntree Ltd. Company Archive, Borthwick. 
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1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
      Sales Revenues 3387224 2890348 2671463 2880854 2702369 
      Ingredients 1148007 951338 800676 999225 947645 
Packing Materials 346178 327310 317920 229954 196555 
Direct Labour 522569 466182 425205 447194 457224 
Discounts 118736 119217 126311 146377 124536 
Other Income 162961 168548 138666 134428 104938 
Gross Profit 1414695 1194849 1140017 1192532 1081347 
      Advertising 384021 306362 271479 344317 312066 
Other Overheads 756841 703320 681432 659848 589237 
Operating Profit (EBIT) 273833 185167 187106 188367 180044 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
      Sales Revenues 2670680 3017728 4295536 5057497 5054854 
      Ingredients 884389 1047427 1759606 2264219 2049819 
Packing Materials 254885 287814 304164 388873 413972 
Direct Labour 466001 534448 778352 891686 898547 
Discounts 88321 86832 126191 123712 126371 
Other Income 88988 101442 96073 108167 119508 
Gross Profit 1066072 1162649 1423296 1497174 1685653 
      Advertising 317747 343480 440763 493874 508695 
Other Overheads 569057 618534 709884 760284 910320 
Operating Profit (EBIT) 179268 200635 272649 243016 266638 
 
Source: Rowntree Ltd. Company Archive, Borthwick. 
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Appendix 11 – Performance Metrics  
Absolute Performance: Sales Revenue 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
  £.m £.m 
1919 5.7 4.1 
1920 8.2 5.1 
1921 7.5 4.1 
1922 6.6 3.6 
1923 6.6 3.2 
1924 7.2 3.3 
1925 7.2 3.4 
1926 7.2 3.3 
1927 6.8 3.6 
1928 6.6 3.6 
1929 6.8 3.4 
1930 7.0 2.9 
1931 6.8 2.7 
1932 6.5 2.9 
1933 6.5 2.7 
1934 7.0 2.7 
1935 7.7 3.0 
1936 8.6 4.3 
1937 9.2 5.1 
1938 9.3 5.1 
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Appendix 11 Performance Metrics (continued) 
Absolute Performance: Market Share (by Sales Revenue) 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
  % % 
1919 9.7 7.0 
1920 8.0 5.0 
1921 8.3 4.6 
1922 8.7 4.7 
1923 9.6 4.6 
1924 10.6 4.8 
1925 10.1 4.8 
1926 10.2 4.7 
1927 9.9 5.2 
1928 9.8 5.3 
1929 10.2 5.1 
1930 11.1 4.6 
1931 11.6 4.6 
1932 11.3 5.0 
1933 11.6 4.8 
1934 12.9 5.0 
1935 13.8 5.4 
1936 14.9 7.5 
1937 15.2 8.4 
1938 15.3 8.4 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
 Absolute Performance: Gross Profit 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
  £m. £m. 
1919 2.2 1.4 
1920 1.9 1.4 
1921 3.0 1.2 
1922 3.1 1.3 
1923 2.9 1.1 
1924 3.4 1.2 
1925 3.3 1.2 
1926 3.4 1.3 
1927 3.0 1.3 
1928 2.7 1.4 
1929 3.2 1.4 
1930 3.1 1.2 
1931 3.5 1.1 
1932 3.5 1.2 
1933 3.4 1.1 
1934 3.9 1.1 
1935 4.0 1.2 
1936 4.3 1.4 
1937 3.6 1.5 
1938 4.3 0.9 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Absolute Performance: Operating Profit 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
  £m. £m. 
1919 1.2 0.6 
1920 0.3 0.3 
1921 1.3 0.2 
1922 1.3 0.2 
1923 1.1 0.2 
1924 1.4 0.2 
1925 1.1 0.2 
1926 1.1 0.3 
1927 0.8 0.3 
1928 0.7 0.3 
1929 1.1 0.3 
1930 0.7 0.2 
1931 1.1 0.2 
1932 1.0 0.2 
1933 0.8 0.2 
1934 1.3 0.2 
1935 1.2 0.2 
1936 1.4 0.3 
1937 0.7 0.2 
1938 1.2 0.3 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Primary Ratio:  Current Ratio 
Calculation: Current Assets divided by Current Liabilities 
Expressed as: Ratio 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
1919 3.0 2.2 
1920 3.9 3.7 
1921 3.7 3.6 
1922 2.3 2.5 
1923 1.6 3.4 
1924 1.6 2.8 
1925 1.3 2.6 
1926 1.1 2.2 
1927 1.0 1.6 
1928 1.0 1.8 
1929 0.9 1.5 
1930 0.9 1.4 
1931 1.0 1.2 
1932 0.8 1.2 
1933 0.7 1.4 
1934 0.8 1.3 
1935 0.9 1.3 
1936 0.9 1.3 
1937 1.2 1.7 
1938 2.0 1.5 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Primary Ratio:  Gross Profit Ratio 
Calculation: Gross Profit divided by Sales Revenues 
Expressed as: % 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
1919 39.1 34.7 
1920 23.1 26.8 
1921 40.5 28.9 
1922 46.4 36.4 
1923 43.3 34.3 
1924 46.2 36.2 
1925 45.1 36.0 
1926 47.3 38.9 
1927 43.9 36.5 
1928 41.7 38.2 
1929 47.0 41.8 
1930 44.4 41.3 
1931 51.6 42.7 
1932 53.1 41.4 
1933 51.6 40.0 
1934 55.9 39.9 
1935 52.1 38.5 
1936 50.2 33.1 
1937 46.2 29.6 
1938 49.0 33.3 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Supporting Ratio:  Ingredients Cost Ratio 
Calculation: Ingredients Cost divided by Sales Revenues 
Expressed as: % 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
1919 42.7 43.2 
1920 54.6 51.1 
1921 38.9 40.9 
1922 33.6 34.0 
1923 37.7 36.7 
1924 34.9 33.6 
1925 35.1 30.2 
1926 34.2 29.2 
1927 39.0 34.7 
1928 42.3 35.5 
1929 37.8 33.9 
1930 38.9 32.9 
1931 31.7 30.0 
1932 31.9 34.7 
1933 33.7 35.1 
1934 29.8 33.1 
1935 34.1 34.7 
1936 35.0 41.0 
1937 46.0 44.8 
1938 38.6 40.6 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Supporting Ratio:  Packing Materials Cost Ratio 
Calculation: Packing Materials Cost divided by Sales Revenues 
Expressed as: % 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
1919 6.5 14.4 
1920 10.0 17.0 
1921 7.4 13.4 
1922 6.2 12.2 
1923 6.1 12.7 
1924 6.2 13.7 
1925 6.5 14.5 
1926 6.2 12.9 
1927 5.5 11.6 
1928 5.2 10.4 
1929 5.4 10.2 
1930 7.2 11.3 
1931 6.8 11.9 
1932 7.8 8.0 
1933 7.8 7.3 
1934 7.8 9.5 
1935 6.9 9.5 
1936 7.0 7.1 
1937 7.0 7.7 
1938 7.5 8.2 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Supporting Ratio:  Direct Labour Cost Ratio 
Calculation: Direct Labour Cost divided by Sales Revenues 
Expressed as: % 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
1919 9.2 7.6 
1920 9.8 10.2 
1921 10.5 15.6 
1922 11.1 16.9 
1923 10.4 17.0 
1924 10.5 16.6 
1925 11.4 18.7 
1926 10.9 18.4 
1927 10.3 17.2 
1928 9.6 16.1 
1929 8.6 15.4 
1930 8.0 16.1 
1931 8.0 15.9 
1932 8.5 15.5 
1933 8.4 16.9 
1934 8.6 17.4 
1935 8.1 17.7 
1936 7.8 18.1 
1937 7.6 17.6 
1938 7.6 17.8 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Primary Ratio:  Operating Profit Ratio 
Calculation: Operating Profit divided by Sales Revenues 
Expressed as: % 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
1919 20.3 14.9 
1920 4.2 5.3 
1921 16.8 5.4 
1922 19.5 6.2 
1923 17.2 5.2 
1924 19.3 5.4 
1925 15.8 6.4 
1926 15.5 7.7 
1927 11.7 7.6 
1928 10.2 7.7 
1929 15.9 8.1 
1930 10.7 6.4 
1931 16.8 7.0 
1932 15.9 6.5 
1933 12.9 6.7 
1934 19.1 6.7 
1935 15.7 6.6 
1936 16.7 6.3 
1937 7.3 4.8 
1938 12.9 5.3 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Supporting Ratio:  Advertising Cost Ratio 
Calculation: Advertising Cost divided by Sales Revenues 
Expressed as: % 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
1919 1.3 1.9 
1920 1.4 3.8 
1921 2.0 3.7 
1922 3.3 6.7 
1923 3.5 4.5 
1924 4.2 7.0 
1925 5.4 8.4 
1926 6.8 9.3 
1927 8.1 8.8 
1928 7.9 10.5 
1929 7.4 11.3 
1930 8.4 10.6 
1931 8.1 10.2 
1932 9.5 12.0 
1933 10.7 11.5 
1934 8.2 11.9 
1935 7.6 11.4 
1936 6.9 10.3 
1937 6.0 9.8 
1938 7.3 10.1 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Supporting Ratio:  Overheads Cost Ratio 
Calculation: Overheads Cost divided by Sales Revenues 
Expressed as: % 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
1919 17.4 17.9 
1920 17.5 17.7 
1921 21.7 19.8 
1922 23.6 23.5 
1923 22.6 24.6 
1924 22.7 23.9 
1925 23.9 21.2 
1926 25.0 21.9 
1927 24.2 20.1 
1928 23.6 20.0 
1929 23.8 22.3 
1930 25.4 24.3 
1931 26.7 25.5 
1932 27.6 22.9 
1933 28.0 21.8 
1934 28.5 21.3 
1935 28.8 20.5 
1936 26.6 16.5 
1937 26.0 15.0 
1938 26.0 20.5 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Primary Ratio:  Operating Profit to Net Worth Ratio 
Calculation: Operating Profit divided by Total Capital 
Expressed as: % 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
1919 35.3 34.4 
1920 9.7 10.5 
1921 31.1 8.3 
1922 31.6 8.6 
1923 27.6 6.3 
1924 31.1 6.7 
1925 26.7 8.3 
1926 26.0 9.4 
1927 18.7 10.2 
1928 15.5 10.4 
1929 24.6 10.1 
1930 16.8 7.0 
1931 24.3 7.1 
1932 22.3 7.1 
1933 19.2 6.8 
1934 29.3 6.8 
1935 25.1 7.5 
1936 31.0 10.0 
1937 14.7 7.5 
1938 18.8 8.5 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Primary Ratio:  Sales to Net Worth Ratio 
Calculation: Sales Revenue divided by Total Capital 
Expressed as: Ratio 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
1919 1.7 2.3 
1920 2.3 2.0 
1921 1.9 1.5 
1922 1.6 1.4 
1923 1.6 1.2 
1924 1.6 1.3 
1925 1.7 1.3 
1926 1.7 1.2 
1927 1.6 1.3 
1928 1.5 1.4 
1929 1.6 1.3 
1930 1.6 1.1 
1931 1.4 1.0 
1932 1.4 1.1 
1933 1.5 1.0 
1934 1.5 1.0 
1935 1.6 1.1 
1936 1.9 1.6 
1937 2.0 1.6 
1938 1.5 1.6 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Primary Ratio:  Sales to Inventory Ratio 
Calculation: Sales Revenue divided by Inventory 
Expressed as: Ratio 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
1919 2.6 2.4 
1920 3.3 3.1 
1921 4.1 3.7 
1922 4.2 3.7 
1923 5.0 3.2 
1924 5.4 3.9 
1925 4.5 4.6 
1926 4.1 4.1 
1927 4.9 4.5 
1928 5.5 5.0 
1929 4.1 5.0 
1930 5.4 4.8 
1931 6.1 4.4 
1932 5.1 4.5 
1933 6.2 4.7 
1934 6.4 5.2 
1935 5.2 5.3 
1936 4.9 5.0 
1937 4.9 4.2 
1938 3.7 4.3 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Primary Ratio:  Sales to Receivables Ratio 
Calculation: Sales Revenue divided by Receivables 
Expressed as: Ratio 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
1919 8.2 8.9 
1920 10.0 11.5 
1921 8.3 8.6 
1922 7.9 6.6 
1923 7.9 5.7 
1924 7.5 5.5 
1925 7.6 5.2 
1926 8.9 5.6 
1927 7.7 5.3 
1928 6.7 5.0 
1929 6.5 5.8 
1930 7.4 5.7 
1931 7.5 4.7 
1932 6.7 5.6 
1933 6.4 5.5 
1934 6.9 5.9 
1935 6.4 5.4 
1936 7.3 5.9 
1937 7.1 6.5 
1938 7.0 6.6 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Primary Ratio:  Debt to Net Worth 
Calculation: Debt divided by Capital Employed 
Expressed as: Ratio 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
1919 0.000 0.000 
1920 0.072 0.000 
1921 0.027 0.000 
1922 0.024 0.000 
1923 0.000 0.000 
1924 0.000 0.000 
1925 0.000 0.000 
1926 0.000 0.000 
1927 0.000 0.000 
1928 0.000 0.000 
1929 0.000 0.000 
1930 0.000 0.000 
1931 0.000 0.000 
1932 0.000 0.000 
1933 0.046 0.000 
1934 0.020 0.000 
1935 0.053 0.000 
1936 0.201 0.000 
1937 0.157 0.000 
1938 0.097 0.000 
 
 
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0.250
1
9
1
9
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
1
1
9
2
2
1
9
2
3
1
9
2
4
1
9
2
5
1
9
2
6
1
9
2
7
1
9
2
8
1
9
2
9
1
9
3
0
1
9
3
1
1
9
3
2
1
9
3
3
1
9
3
4
1
9
3
5
1
9
3
6
1
9
3
7
1
9
3
8
Ratio Cadbury
Rowntree
364 
 
Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Primary Ratio:  Sales to Fixed Assets 
Calculation: Sales divided by Non-Current Assets 
Expressed as: Ratio 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
1919 7.8 8.0 
1920 9.9 7.2 
1921 6.9 4.2 
1922 5.2 3.6 
1923 4.9 3.0 
1924 5.0 3.1 
1925 4.5 3.3 
1926 4.3 3.2 
1927 3.6 3.5 
1928 3.2 3.6 
1929 2.8 3.4 
1930 2.9 3.0 
1931 2.8 2.8 
1932 2.7 3.0 
1933 2.6 2.9 
1934 3.5 2.9 
1935 3.8 3.3 
1936 3.9 4.1 
1937 3.9 4.3 
1938 3.5 4.1 
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Appendix 11 Performace Metrics (continued) 
Primary Ratio:  Net Worth to Fixed Assets 
Calculation: Capital Employed divided by Non-Current Assets 
Expressed as: Ratio 
  Cadbury Rowntree 
1919 4.5 3.5 
1920 4.3 3.7 
1921 3.7 2.7 
1922 3.2 2.6 
1923 3.0 2.5 
1924 3.1 2.5 
1925 2.7 2.5 
1926 2.5 2.6 
1927 2.2 2.6 
1928 2.1 2.6 
1929 1.8 2.7 
1930 1.8 2.7 
1931 2.0 2.8 
1932 1.9 2.7 
1933 1.7 2.8 
1934 2.3 2.9 
1935 2.4 2.9 
1936 2.1 2.6 
1937 1.9 2.8 
1938 2.4 2.5 
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